America Is Coming Apart at the Seams

                                            Protesters demonstrate as a store burns in Minneapolis. (Joshua Lott/The Washington Post)

We are seeing dark and scary times in the US. 100,000 plus are dead from the coronavirus. There are now than 40 million unemployed Americans and the unemployment rate hovers around 15%. And Americans are rioting and cities are burning.

The coronavirus has shut down the US for roughly two months, and only this week are most states opening back up. The virus, with its grim death toll, has been headline news for weeks now. And orders by authorities, such as “shelter-in-place” and wearing masks, and so on, have been subjects of political fighting between the right and left. With the Americans stuck indoors, economic life has ground to a halt, with dramatic consequences. Millions of people are out of work or furloughed, seeking unemployment, and desperate for life to return to normal. While the majority of Americans have taken the virus and its effects mostly in stride, understanding the severity of the health crisis and the need to stay indoors and maintain social distancing, there’s a pocket of citizens who are angry. Angry at medical professionals. Angry at politicians. Angry at the WHO. Angry at the virus.

On top of all of that, we now have another prominent case of police brutality against a person of color. On May 25th, an African-American man from Minneapolis, Minnesota, George Floyd, apparently, attempted to make a purchase at a deli using a counterfeit $20 bill. (It’s still unclear whether he even knew he possessed fake money, or whether he deliberately tried to swindle the deli). The deli called the police in response. But the four officers who were dispatched to the scene made a minor situation far worse. An unarmed Floyd was handcuffed and showed little resistance, though the police pushed a shoved him around. Eventually, three of the officers were on top of Floyd (while the other officer stood guard), subduing an already subdued guy, and one of them grinded his knee into Floyd’s neck for almost nine full minutes. As this happened, Floyd clearly suffered, claiming he couldn’t breathe. The police showed little interest in Floyd’s struggles, and he died on the street, in the exact spot where he was savagely detained. In response, the four cops were fired. Additionally, the officer who killed Floyd was charged on three counts, including 2nd degree murder, while the three other officers were charged with aiding and abetting 2nd degree murder.

People of color and their white allies are justifiably angry and frustrated about the Floyd killing, specifically, but also by the years and years of police brutality and rampant political, economic and social discrimination against non-whites. Additionally, please keep in mind there is also a larger recent context to these developments. The number of hate crimes are way up. The presence and activities (in the streets and online) of white nationalists are an increasing domestic threat in the US. On several occasions, President Trump has aided and abetted, even given cover to, violent white racists. Furthermore, the Floyd murder is only the latest in a string of recent killings of African Americans (Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, etc.) by police and/or white Americans. Viewed in context, then, racial tensions have been simmering, and the Floyd murder catalyzed people into action.  

Protests and violence first broke out in Minneapolis, and have spread across the entire US. Since May 26th, protests, violence, and mayhem have hit the US. Heavily militarized police are on the streets. Unmarked security forces--secret police?--are on patrol in Washington, DC. Protesters and police have fought; police have even used gas against protesters. Buildings and cars have burned. Stores have been damaged and looted. Cities are in complete turmoil. And the political, economic, and social effects will reverberate through the US for years to come.

Most of the protesters have been peaceful and have good intentions, it seems. They’re protesting injustice and taking to the streets to vent their agony. A small contingent of protesters are looking to start or participate in illegal activities, like looting damaged stores. More ominously, according to reports, the protesters have been infiltrated by white nationalists seeking to hijack the moment and cause problems in their name. The infamous "Boogaloo Bois" have appeared at dozens of protests, looking to menace and threaten protesters. And similarly, unaffiliated armed white dudes have shown up in Philadelphia (baseball bats and hammers) and Indiana (guns). Three white extremists in Las Vegas were arrested on terrorism charges, including "conspiring to carry out a plan that began in April in conjunction with protests to reopen businesses closed because of the coronavirus and later sought to capitalize on protests over George Floyd." And we know white supremacist social media platforms are actively encouraging members to use violence in the hopes of starting a race war--an idea known as "acclerationism" and is popular among white supremacists.

It’s easy to take a narrow view and look at all the health and economic problems as unrelated from the protests and racial issues in the US. After all, the former two issues (health crisis and the economic fallout) and the latter one (protests) have different proximate causes—the coronavirus with respect to the first two, the killing of an unarmed black man regarding the last one. Moreover, racism, police brutality, and violence against people of color have a long and distinct history in the US. But are they really different from each other?  

I think if we zoom out, we see something different. I do, at least. I see the internal crises in the US—health, race, political, economic crises—the result of a profound leadership problem. Simply put, the ongoing chaos in the US is the impact of bipartisan national leadership failures. Americans are sharply polarized, increasingly indifferent to the plight of others on the opposite side of aisle, can’t agree on facts, and can’t even agree on who or what America is. Why? Because national Democrats and Republicans have prioritized power above all else, and have engaged in a protracted power struggle, politicizing everything while failing to stand up for national unity, America’s democracy, and moral decency and rectitude. I’m willing to place more blame on the GOP, but the Democrats aren’t blameless here.   

Let’s look at the culprits in brief detail.

1. Trump is a massive failure. He’s grossly incompetent. He’s a narcissist. He’s a habitual liar. He routinely engages in race baiting. He spouts conspiracy theories. He’s an authoritarian. And he clearly has little to no moral backbone. His modus operandi right now is to get re-elected in November. If that means he has to figuratively or even literally burn down the US in the process, then so be it.

His performance on COVID is embarrassing. For weeks, he downplayed, ignored, and failed to act on guidance given to him by his own government. His delayed response cost roughly 36,000-54,000 Americans their lives, according to research from Columbia University. He’s recommended a host of downright ridiculous and dangerous home remedies to combat COVID, against the advice of medical professionals. He’s repeatedly patted himself on the back that ONLY 100,000 Americans have perished from the coronavirus. At this point, Trump’s more interested in deflecting blame, with China increasingly feeling Trump’s ire.

Trump has a long and troubled past with respect to racial issues. In 2017, I wrote: “Well before he was a political figure and had to make political calculations about his words and actions, Trump had a checkered past with various identity groups. He (along with his dad and Trump Management) was sued in the 1970s for housing discrimination, played a part in spreading false statements and riling up New Yorkers in the Central Park Five case, and aroused suspicions of bigotry during his Apprentice days. And of course, what helped Trump rise to political prominence, even before his formal participation in US politics, was his 'Birther' antics, a xenophobic and racially-tinged campaign against former President Barack Obama.”

And in his time as president, Trump has fared little better. Trump’s support for white nationalists in Charlottesville in 2017 is but one in a string of examples of his taking the side of violent white Americans. Earlier this year, when armed protesters stormed the capital and threatened Michigan politicians, Trump begged the state to take easy on them. He even stoked the fires of radicalism and violence in April, when he Tweeted, “LIBERATE MICHIGAN!” Of course, this is a marked and intentional contrast to his latest Archie Bunkerisms. In this recent Tweet from Trump, during an extraordinarily tumultuous time, Trump wrote: “These THUGS are dishonoring the memory of George Floyd, and I won’t let that happen. Just spoke to Governor Tim Walz and told him that the Military is with him all the way. Any difficulty and we will assume control but, when the looting starts, the shooting starts. Thank you!” His dog whistle here isn’t very subtle. His answer to the protests supporting the rights of people of color, ostensibly, is to threaten American citizens with violence—a far cry from his position on white protesters. Furthermore, the use of the word “thugs,” in the context in which he used the word, is commonly interpreted nowadays as a racial slur—akin to the N-word—against African Americans.

Frankly, I’m not so sure that Trump is all that bothered by the protests and violence. The ongoing chaos in cities across the US allows him to use tough rhetoric and get a photo-op. Moroever, it enables Trump to play the “law and order” card—used by Nixon and other right-wing politicians over the years—that he’s very comfortable with. Indeed, Trump recently tweeted, “Law & Order!” The instability allows him to play the tough-guy, using and abusing police and military forces for political purposes, and then take credit for cleaning up the mess in the streets once everything has calmed down. The good part is that some prominent military officials, such as former Secretary of Defense James Mattis, are now speaking out, condemning Trump's politicization of the military and his divisive rule. The downside is that Trump is no longer flirting with authoritarianism, but overtly leaning on the tools and strategies of illiberal dictators, which poses a direct and immediate existential threat to America's democracy. How serious is this political and institutional crisis? Esteemed policy wonk Robin Wright, today in The New Yorker, wonders if America is becoming a Banana Republic.

2. Congressional Republicans have failed, too. The GOP has silently abetted and sometimes vocally supported and assisted Trump in whatever he’s said and done during his presidency. How many Republicans have challenged Trump? Overall, Mitt Romney has done a decent job. But who else? The Republican party is now the party of Trump, and so just about every Congressional Republican is worried about running afoul from the party line, which adheres to strict conformity with and praise of Trump. The risk of drifting from the party line, mind you, is that deviant Republicans—those who dare to critique Trump—could get primaried by even “Trumpier” candidates. All of this has degraded and perverted a formerly esteemed political party, transforming it into decoration and puppetry. In exchange for degrading their personal and political reputations and integrity, Republicans (both in and out of Congress) try to take solace in knowing they've gotten their tax cuts and two new conservative members of the Supreme Court. But in consumating that deal with the devil, they've unleashed a political virus that's wreaking havoc on conservatism, the Republican Party, and the US. 

3. Congressional Democrats have also failed. Yeah, Democrats only control the House of Representatives, but they are stakeholders here as well. They can’t just blame Trump and the GOP; they bear some responsibility. And not only that, national Democrats have consistently allowed Trump to dominate them. Of course, he has the bully pulpit and tens of millions of Twitter followers. But if the Democrats were serious—really serious—they could be far more creative in pressing the case for the policies and values they supposedly believe in, and communicate clearly and repeatedly those views to the public. Making television appearances on CNN and MSNBC isn’t enough. Democrats could hold daily press conferences at symbolic sites; plan and coordinate peaceful national protests; commit to formulating a comprehensive domestic policy and governing strategy with meaningful and constant input and buy-in from a cross-section of American society; engage more frequently with and be much more responsive to the interests and concerns of local communities—don’t just hold photo-ops; and so on. This is just a small list of ideas. I’m sure more creative and innovative folks can think of other, better ideas the Democrats could implement.

If there is any ray of sunshine at the moment, it’s the role of some local and state politicians, who are having to clean up the failures of national, federal officials and politicians. This is evident in the case of COVID, as it is in the Floyd case and the ongoing protests/riots. I’m thinking specifically, just off the top of my head, of Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms, Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot, and Ohio Governor Mike DeWine. (There are others, and I’m sure some of you might have your favorite. Apologies for overlooking anyone.) They’ve tried to display calm, sensible leadership. But even the mayors and governors, even the good ones, have been overwhelmed by the severity of these crises and haven’t been perfect in their decisions. Governors and mayors of all political stripes have been slow to react to the growing violence and looting. My guess is that they believed that adding beefed up, militarized police to a powder keg situation would only exacerbate tensions. Unfortunately, in the absence of strong policing, swaths of the US, extending from cities into suburban areas, have erupted in anarchy.  

The US is at its lowest point in 50 plus years. It’s not hyperbole to say that America is coming apart at the seams. Americans are out of work, sick, angry, and frightened. And political authorities are largely indifferent, feckless, craven, and incompetent. And the worst of the politicians are actively cheering on the chaos. The answer to the ills of America won’t be found in new leaders or policies. The solution, I suspect, will require a more fundamental reassessment and restructuring of American society. We need to rethink the role of the state, relations between the state and society, and relations between American citizens. Anything less than that will simply paper over the existing deep-seated problems in 21^st century America. 

*Note: this post was updated on June 4th. 

COVID-19 and US-China Relations

                                                      Photo Credit: Fox News Online 

YS and two of his colleagues at Universitas Jendral Achmad Yani, Mariane Delanova and Rama Daru Jati, recently finished a paper on US-China relations in a post-COVID world. Below Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman discuss the main points of the paper, US-China relations more generally, and lastly the wider international political and security impact of COVID. 

BN: To start, let's get the big question out of the way. How do you and your colleagues see COVID-19 impacting US-China relations? What's your argument?

YS: In essence, it is my argument that COVID is leading to a decline in trust between the US and China. While it can be argued that ties between the US and China are deep and can withstand the breakdown due to COVID-19, I disagree. There won't be a complete breakdown, at least not yet, even with all of Trump's blustering–and both him and China know it—but in essence, we will see the beginning of a warmer Cold War. Rather than complete hostility/containment policies like the US pursued during the Cold War, it will be a limited containment, with more economic/political engagement than the US had with the USSR during the Cold War.

BN: How exactly does COVID "lead to a decline in trust between the US and China"? What are the key events, processes, etc., triggering the decline in trust?

YS: As I noted in my paper, the key is the politicization of the virus. On the one hand, we see China's victory laps in the US and Europe and its hamfisted attempt to shift the blame from its censorship and cover-ups and slowness to act initially; while in the US, both Trump and Biden are trying to show themselves as tough against China. Granted that this can be argued as just political rhetoric, but with rising distrust toward China within the US population, it will have significant effects in the aftermath of COVID.

BN: Is the virus a primary causal factor in the deteriorating relations between the US and China? Or just another major issue lumped atop of several major issues (trade, currency, BRI, South China Sea, Taiwan, Huawei, etc.) that plague the US-China relationship these days?

YS: The virus is basically the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back, since it is basically threatens vital US interests—plus, this is an election year in the US.

BN: Is this downturn in US-China relations a short-term thing or something more protracted? After all, the election will be done and resolved—I hope—by early November. So what happens after that, in either a second term Trump or a 1st term Biden administration?

YS: This will last a while. Not only due to the election, but also, like I mentioned, due to various things that China has done. And the virus has made a number of countries around the world very hostile to China. And Biden will be tarred and feathered as weak against China should he win and decide to accommodate China. Even before the virus, during the Democratic Presidential Debate, virtually everyone on the podium bashed China. Maybe the Democrats don't mean it, but they are all aware that being soft on China does not help them at all. Yes, elections are poetry while governing is prose. But being soft on China will hurt Biden's presidency—similar to the accusation that Presidents Truman and Carter were soft against the commies.

BN: I think you’re on to something. In the US, increasingly the driving force behind souring relations with China is, in my view, a product of a new American political consensus that China is a growing threat (to the US, to US allies, and to the world order). Coincidentally, I've read a few pieces today on the possibility of an emerging Sino-US cold war. And those articles typically argue that the signs of a new cold war are grounded in objective facts—economic, political, security policies and statements China has said and done. But I think that misses the mark a bit. Almost all of those things, except for China's actions in the early days of the pandemic, have been present for years. What's changed is America's perception of China. Put simply, China is a looming threat to the US because key leaders in the US, on both sides of the political aisle, see China as a threat. The key question is why have those perceptions changed? I bet Obama wishes he had this consensus behind him as he tried to implement his Pivot to Asia.

I don't think it's a given that a President Biden goes weak on China, precisely because of this new American consensus on China. He'll probably attempt to reset the relationship. But there's no guarantee that will go well (See: the Obama-Biden-Clinton reset with Russia.) And if he goes weak on China, he'll get dragged back to a harder line eventually by both R's and D's and the larger Blob network.

YS: I will need more data, but I suspect this COVID-19 is what is causing the fall in US perception towards China. See the Pew Research graphic below. Of course, the trade war, among other things, has also influenced America’s increasingly negative view towards China. I think Trump's trade war does sour people's view towards China—more and more people now know that China is not a fair economic partner.

But I'd argue that COVID is the real game changer. While companies have been grumbling about China's industrial espionage, a majority of people didn't feel the pain/didn’t care. COVID-19 is the great equalizer, and everyone sees China as the culprit and China does not want to own it.

BN: Given what you've said, where does all of this lead? How does the US, its allies, and any other state that's now highly skeptical and suspicious of China deal with and respond to China going forward? Are we entering the early days of a "new cold war"?

YS: We will end up in a new cold war for sure, which might not a bad thing. While, yes, the risk of war (and nuclear war) will increase, I don't think it is all bad, though. China will have to learn to compromise lest it will find itself isolated. And the US will also have to start focusing on third world countries like it did during the Cold War.

BN: One of things I see—and it fits in line with your arguments about US-China relations—is that China is attempting to use COVID as a window of opportunity to boost its position in the world. I think that's a key here. That's driving some of the problems between the US and China these days.

The US sees China as the problem (the source of the virus, yes, but also that China downplayed and covered up the virus for weeks), and cannot stomach that Beiing has the nerve to say that it’s the solution.

For instance, China is now parading around the world touting its "success" in combating the coronavirus and offering medical supplies to needy nations. Many experts see this as evidence that China's using COVID to boost its soft power (Of course, we can question whether these attempts are working, but still..). On top of that, China's engaged with the US in a propaganda war, blaming the US for the virus. While many people outside China aren't moved by Beijing's narrative, I do think it's helping the authorities in China by quieting internal dissent and rancor. Which, in turn, strengthens the Chinese state and Xi's hand—essential things in China's competition with the US. More ominously, China's taking advantage of a distracted US and international community as a whole to seize control over Hong Kong. It's upped its control over Hong Kong over the last few weeks and the latest legislation will effectively wipe out any freedoms and sense of autonomy that the city-state has had. This is a problem by itself, as the US is worried about the fate of Hong Kong (economically and politically), but it also might signify larger ramifications. What's happening in Hong Kong could signal a new turn in China's approach to what it views as "rogue" territories, like Taiwan, if not a more significant change in posture toward parts of Asia. I'm sure alarm bells are going off at the US State Department, Defense, the CIA, hawkish think tanks, and so on.

YS: China is basically snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. And Trump is doing the same: giving China platforms to tout its propaganda, by, for instance, behaving stupidly vis-à-vis the WHO. I understand that the WHO has acted badly in kissing Xi's behind, but by not pushing for multilateral solutions, Trump is basically allowing China to gain the moral high ground. Overall, it is like an old Tom and Jerry cartoon—they both tried to pass bomb to each other—but in this case, they are passing victory to each other and each refuses to accept it due to their own stupidity. 

BN: Before we wrap up this chat, let's look beyond US-China relations to what global politics and security and economics will look like in a COVID (and post-COVID) world. How do you see global politics and security being impacted?

YS: Aside from a short- to medium-term economic crash? People will start paying more attention to global health issue, at least for the next few years.

People are screaming about oil prices tanking, but once the pandemic passes, the demand of oil will rebound. It may hit $100/barrel for a bit, then expect fracking to revive and to push oil price back down. This, however, may hurt Russia badly, so I think we might see retrenchment of Russia. Already there are squabbles between Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus on the future of Russia in Syria.

Overall in global politics, though, I am not sure there will be that much of significant change.

BN: Richard Haass and Stephen Walt both argue that COVID will act as an accelerant on existing trends. I can see how health issues/capabilities in individual states will intensify the focus on domestic concerns, trigger a backlash against "outsiders" and "foreigners," and increase skepticism of global organizations and institutions, like the WHO and UN. All of that could, in turn, lead to a greater push toward nationalist politics, a decline in support for globalization and global institutions, and the world order will continue to crumble. Makes sense, right? However, I do wonder whether the deepening and pervasiveness of these trends will be temporary or enduring.

In many ways, it depends on what happens in November. If Biden wins the election, I can see him using the pandemic, and the resulting health and political fallout, as a rallying point to re-energize global cooperation on several fronts, especially global health. But if he doesn't, then it will be more of the same for the next four years, with China having a free hand to shape the world order as the US pulls back and undermines the very order it created 75+ years ago.

The global economy could be an even bigger problem than global politics. US stock market bettors are gambling that COVID is just a bump in the road, given that the Dow is still over 25,000, but that's more hype than reality, I'm afraid. Small businesses are going to be routed because of COVID, as will stores that make the bulk of their money from in-person transactions. Tourism is going to take a deep hit. If sports teams around the world don't allow fans to attend, then many cities are going to be in dire straits over the next year or more. How long will it take for people to feel comfortable to live their lives as they once did (even when restrictions are fully lifted)? Because if they don't, that will create a huge economic drag--both in individual nations and in the global economy as a whole. And once countries start to open up again, will people who have been laid off or furloughed get their jobs back or find new ones? Maybe not, particularly as businesses adapt and refine themselves in a COVID world of fewer resources.

This is exactly the kind of world that needs a strong, unified, and competent EU, US, and global economic institutions to provide adequate leadership, technical expertise, and $. But these actors are unready and/or unwilling to act on their own or collectively as global economic leaders and problem solvers. Already, there is much talk about supply chains being rerouted away from China (to the extent that’s feasible). While that’s not surprising given this crisis, it’s not a good sign that global cooperation will rule the day.

YS: Health issues will be seen as important in Post-COVID world, though for how long is a big question. The Spanish Flu devastated the world for two years, with very high number of deaths compared to COVID-19, and yet we never think of it as important—heck people laughed at George W. Bush for stressing the perils of pandemics. Jay Leno, I believe, once quipped that when Bush's health secretary talked about the necessity of stockpiling tuna, he said he'd better off getting the plague. So, the one million dollar question is how long and how much devastation this pandemic will cause before it will have a long-term impact.

I see the EU (and the US, should Biden win) wanting to exert more influence in the WHO, given how its current arrangement does not help that much in preventing pandemics. There might be a greater push for international organizations to have more power to intervene in states. Of course, China will do whatever they can to block it, so, yes, at the end of the day, state power still matters more than institutions. I think China will win the battle for COVID but lose the war, especially if the US comes around and declares that it will give more authority to WHO to deal with health issues.

And I agree that the global economy is a wild card. It really depends on how long the pandemic lasts. And now we can only cross our fingers and hope that they will create a vaccine ASAP.

BN: Lastly, how do you see the study of and writings on IR being affected by COVID? Of course, already, there has been some work focusing on (1) the impact of diseases and pandemics on IR, and (2) what a post-COVID world will look like. Do you see any other new or previously underexplored areas of study popping up as a result of COVID? And if not, why not?

YS: Similar to post-9/11, we will see a rush in pandemic studies in IR. There will be renewed attention to how pandemic affects/upends international order (e.g. Justinian Plague that put the nail in the coffin of the revival of Roman Empire, the Black Death that destroyed the Byzantine Empire and heralded the arrival of the Ottoman Empire, Black Death's influence on the collapse of Catholic dominance in Europe, etc.). It is a neglected part of literature that perhaps scholars will take a second look at.

COVID will also renew the debate on whether authoritarianism or democracy is better at tackling crises. And as you previously mentioned, in your last blog post, neoliberal institutionalism will have to answer a lot of problems arises from this virus (e.g. lack of unity in EU, lack of international cooperation despite of decades of institution-trust building all over the world, etc.). Realists will have to account for pandemics and health issues more general in their research programs. Truly, there are a lot of new research projects that I can see from COVID. Of course, the question is whether we will see any COVID-fatigue and how the gatekeepers in the discipline will look at this.

COVID-19 and International Politics

Photo: Kim Kyung-hoon/Reuters 

It’s now been a few months since COVID-19 first appeared and began to spread around the world. The health fallout continues to mount. As of this writing, per the WHO, there are over 150,000 confirmed cases, some 5,700 deaths, and 146 countries/territories have been hit by the virus. Health care facilities and systems worldwide are being stretched to their limits, people are stressed and panicked, and everyday life has been massively disrupted. And making matters worse, the virus doesn’t show any signs of abating anytime soon.

While I am not a medical doctor or professional, which means I can’t credibly address the health and medical side of COVID-19, I am an expert in international politics, and I can reasonably sort through some of the global political implications of the coronavirus. What I’ll do here is focus on one main international political implication: the weakness and failure of international institutions and the liberal order more generally.  

Sounding the alarm about the sorry state of the liberal order has been en vogue for several years now, and these concerns have been voiced and articulated even more loudly and frequently during the Trump era. Unfortunately, COVID-19 just might be the death knell of the existing liberal international order as we know it. Oh, the order might limp on, but any belief that it’s a functioning, effective order is for the deluded and hopelessly Pollyanna.

The liberal order consists primarily of the rules and structures that undergird international relations. These rules and structures often take the form of international institutions, laws, norms, and they are supposed to provide order, stability, and enhanced cooperation in the world, even and at times especially during tumultuous periods. They are designed to fill in the gaps in global problem solving left in the wake of narrow and often selfish behavior and relationships exhibited by states historically. 

Well, right now certainly qualifies as a tumultuous moment, one that’s desperately crying out for global collective action and problem solving. After all, the coronavirus is spreading, people are sick and dying, markets are tanking, and countries are isolating, locking down, and quarantining themselves. According to liberal (international relations) logic, these institutions should be actively responding to the current crisis, addressing the real world health pandemic. They should be greasing the wheels of inter-state crisis coordination, dampening hysteria, and helping distressed people get the care and resources they need.

So is this the case? Is someone/thing leading the effort to coordinate a collective response from the international community? Are international public goods being provided? Regrettably, theory doesn’t always match reality, and this happens to be one of those cases. Indeed, COVID-19 is a glaring example of the failure of current institutions to meet the challenges of today.

Since the end of WWII, the US has acted as a global first responder and public goods provider—in part to expand its influence, and in part because institutions like the UN have shown to be troublingly ineffectual. Arguably, America’s self-appointed role as a first responder and public goods provider has been a mixed bag. On the one hand, it led to meddling in the politics of foreign nations and protracted inter-state wars. On the other hand, US efforts have done some good. During the cold war, the US worked to prop up the nascent world order and stabilize and strengthen the economies, defenses, politics, and overall quality of life of states around the globe, particularly those within its sphere of influence; and as that happened, the US also secured tangible gains as well—a big boost in trade, allies, influence, respect and prestige.

Even so, these globally beneficial actions by the US papered over the weakness and fecklessness of international institutions and allowed them to fly under the radar. Liberal scholars and policymakers deceived themselves into thinking that the global order was strong, popular, effective, and durable. But this order was always overrated. From 1945 until the early days of the post-cold war era, it was a mostly regional democratic order, with democracies in the Americas and Europe as the foundation of it. And when the US attempted to expand this order in the mid-1990s, thereby consolidating its spoils from winning the cold war, it did so through a mixture of diplomatic and coercive tools and policies, which in the end proved to be costly, violent, and deeply counterproductive. 

Donald Trump came into office in January 2017 on a mission to correct these foreign policy excesses. And true to this word, Trump decided to reorient US foreign policy, scrapping old strategic doctrines like liberal hegemony and primacy in favor of a transactional, nationalist approach to the world. A consequence of this new foreign policy has been America’s new tendency to eschew leadership globally—on issues, in institutions, in other multilateral forums, etc. Demonstrating leadership globally, especially on non-security issues, runs counter to Trump's instincts and worldview as well as Trump's nationalist America First strategic doctrine.

While there has been some inconsistency in the application of Trump’s America First, there is clear evidence of it impacting America’s relations with Iran, Europe, Canada, and Mexico, its position on issues like climate change, and its commitment to institutions like NATO, the WTO, the EU, among others. And on COVID-19, we’re seeing more of the same.

Trump’s approach to COVID-19 has been slow, slapdash, and more concerned about scoring domestic political points. Most disturbingly, Trump and his spokespersons spent weeks questioning whether the coronavirus was a hoax, rather than implementing protective health measures, which has played a role in helping the virus to spread in the US. The Trump administration also spent an inordinate amount of time and effort scapegoating China (the “Wuhan virus”) and the Democrats so as to deflect any political blame for the burgeoning health crisis inside the US. And on policies designed to alleviate the burdens of the virus, Trump has relied on nationalist tools, like stopping travel from certain nations. Neither Trump nor his staff has made any effort to spearhead a wider, collective international response to COVID-19. And I am highly skeptical the Trump administration will do so anytime soon, not only for the reasons I discussed above, but also because the domestic political heat is getting hotter for Trump. Americans are now acutely feeling the implications of the virus; there is a health crisis and corresponding health scare, of course, but also deep simultaneous deep economic, cultural, and social disruptions. They want authorities, particularly Trump, to address these problems now. As a result, Trump, an unpopular president in an election year, is further disincentivized to seek collaborative rather than national responses and solutions to the pandemic.

What about China, the world’s number two great power? China is not ready to act as a de facto world government on COVID-19. Much like the US. It began slowly and secretively, drawing widespread criticism domestically and globally, but China eventually got its act together. It has implemented lockdowns, quarantines, and a major economic stimulus. Yes, China’s response has been harsh, rigorously controlling the movement of local goods and millions of people, but the country is now finally healing as new patients are slowing to almost zero daily.

But now that China seems to have the virus under control, it is now seeking to opportunistically take advantage of America's dithering. It’s dabbled in the authoritarian playbook of blame-shifting by claiming the virus was the product and thereby the fault of America’s military. China is also playing up its global efforts, which include aiding Iran, Italy, and Serbia, so as to enhance its soft power and global standing. Of course, these moves display quite a bit of chutzpah, right? The virus originated in China, and Beiing did little in the beginning stages of the outbreak there, which allowed COVID-19 to become a massively huge global problem that everyone now has to deal with. 

Well, what about the world’s relevant international institutions, like United Nations or the World Health Organization or any of the various global economic institutions? Surely they are stepping up to the table to fill in the lack of attention and coordinated action by the international community, right? The UN did recently set up a rapid reaction fund for COVID-19, and Secretary-General Guterres has been an effective communicator. And “the IMF announced last week it would make $50 billion in financing available to bolster health care systems and emergency responses in low-income and emerging countries suffering from the virus.” Similarly, the World Bank "approved today an increased $14 billion package of fast-track financing to assist companies and countries in their efforts to prevent, detect and respond to the rapid spread of COVID-19." These are helpful overtures, to be sure. And these institutions are very good at disseminating information, stimulating public awareness, and generating debate and discussion. But they are hardly panaceas for this global health pandemic. 

In terms of organizing and galvanizing widespread international action, the international system’s institutions are woefully inadequate to deal with challenges of COVID-19. The strength and power of international institutions comes from the extent to which states, especially the great powers, agree to equip, fund, and work through them; they don’t have magical, autonomous abilities to transform international relations. And because the world’s powers have preferred unilateral rather than multilateral and collective responses to COVID-19, these institutions have been mostly relegated to the sidelines, bit players in a massively traumatic global event.

The IMF and World Bank funds are not nearly enough to help burdened economies. The UN and affiliated bodies aren’t acting as a rallying point around which states and non-state actors can link up to work together. Frankly, it is precisely because of this that states are tackling the coronavirus individually, on their own. And that has led to a patchwork of state health policies and initiatives across the world, making the virus even harder to contain than it already is. Ultimately, the problem is that the coronavirus is a transnational disease that cannot be contained or stopped by the actions of states working alone. Nevertheless, the best way to deal with COVID-19 hasn’t been through multilateral or international action but via lessons learned from discrete cases worldwide.

South Korea has been one much-lauded example. Consider this:

Korean officials enacted a key reform, allowing the government to give near-instantaneous approval to testing systems in an emergency. Within weeks of the current outbreak in Wuhan, China, four Korean companies had manufactured tests from a World Health Organization recipe and, as a result, the country quickly had a system that could assess 10,000 people a day.

Korea set up drive-through test stations, an approach only now being launched in the United States. Health officials initially focused their efforts on members of a secretive megachurch in Daegu with a branch in Wuhan, but they then broadened their reach to Seoul and other major cities. As of Saturday, South Korea had tested more than 248,000 people and identified 8,086 cases.

Countries are now trying to mimic all or parts of the Korean example. And in hard-hit states where the Korean case isn’t being copied adequately, like the US, there has been a big push from the media, journalists, scholars, and analysts to get authorities to follow Korea’s lead.

All of this points to what the risk analyst Ian Bremmer has called a "geopolitical recession," which is a product of a leaderless or G-Zero world. He writes, "The challenge we face today is the unwinding of the American-led world order, and the absence of global leadership to step in and take its place. We live in a G-Zero world… and the geopolitical recession is its effect. In a geopolitical recession, fracturing global politics fuels global risks instead of helping solve them." The failure of the world to form a working coalition to tackle the coronavirus is the latest in a string of examples of significant global issues going unaddressed, or addressed in a half-hearted manner: Climate change, North Korea, Russian aggression, cybersecurity, big data/privacy issues, disinformation campaigns—the list goes on. While COVID-19 is a health issue, addressing this problem, at least in a macro sense, is a matter of politics at the local, state, and international levels. The lack of cooperation, the bottlenecks, the refusal to share information, resource shortages, and so on are a function of underperforming political systems across the world.

For now, let’s hope that political authorities worldwide, working in tandem with health professionals, do enough, act quickly enough, to care for those afflicted with the virus and to slow and reduce the transmission of it. But once we get through this, there needs to be a fresh, renewed debate on many parts of the international system, including the role and purpose of international institutions, how the international community can better respond collectively to global crises, and who/what will act as a global public goods provider to states/groups/people in need. It’s time.  

The Trump/Kushner Middle East Peace Plan

JANEK SKARZYNSKI/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Below is a conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman on the recently unveiled US plan to resolve the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian hostilities. This plan has been the pet project of President Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who has been charged by Trump to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian issue. It largely deals with political and security matters and is the second document released by Kushner and his team. The first document, released in June 2019, concentrated on improving economic conditions in the region, with specific attention to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt.

BN: All right, Yohanes, what are your thoughts on the Trump/Kushner plan? I think it's safe to say that the Israelis certainly love the plan. After all, the plan is a pro-Israeli one. It neuters a potential Palestinian state. And the Israelis get all of the concessions, including formal recognition of their settlements in the West Bank (which were previously seen as illegal by the US). The somewhat surprising thing is that there has been little blowback to the plan throughout the broader Middle East. No protests, no violence, etc. Ian Bremmer claims that the ME has moved on from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that looks to be spot on. And behind the scenes some of the Arab states are recommending the Palestinians negotiate with the plan.

At this point, the Israelis, are in a good spot. They are the dominant power in the relationship with the Palestinians, and the mood in the region (at least at the governmental level) is increasingly supportive of the Israelis, with Arab states actually wanting to work with them (on technology, intelligence sharing, containing Iran, etc.). The Trump/Kushner plan reflects, and also instititionalizes, these facts.

YS: The Trump plan shows the realities that nobody—especially the Palestinians—is going to accept. But at the same time, the silence in reaction to the plan is deafening. There are no major anti-US or anti-Israeli demonstrations. It is very different from back in 2000s. While you have the usual suspects (e.g., Palestinians, Turkey, and Iran) against this plan, the rest of the region is very diplomatic. This shows the reality now that Israel is no longer seen as a threat, it’s a status quo power, and in fact the biggest threat in the Middle East is Iran.

After the Arab Spring, the Arab autocrats really fear massive social movements. Not to mention, they see Hamas as Iranian proxy, thus they are less sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, though they do have to maintain the illusion and pay lip service to the Palestinians. So yes, in the larger geostrategic view, the Palestinian issue is no longer a cause for those Arab autocrats, who are secure in their legitimacy and wealth. They no longer want to rock the boat.  For Turkey and Iranians, who aspire for regional leadership, the Palestinian issue remains potent.

BN: Yeah, I agree that worries about internal stability probably are factoring into how regional autocrats have responded to the Trump/Kushner plan. But additionally, the regional environment—of which the Arab Spring is connected to and has shaped—is much different than 10, 15, 20 years ago. It's more violent, conflictual, unstable, and chaotic. And as a result, there are many more things on the radar of the region's despots. The rise of Iran. Yemen. Iraq. Syria. Terrorism. Libya. The Palestinian cause has slipped behind most if not all of these traumatic issues. Also, it doesn't help the Palestinian cause that the biggest issue to the Sunni states—the rise of Iran—has caused them to warm up to Israel and not want to jeopardize relations with Israel. As you mentioned, it's probably up to Iran and Turkey to go to bat for the Palestinians. But those two states, especially Iran, are the worst states to take up the Palestinians' cause, because the US and Israel won't listen or negotiate with them on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

YS: An overlooked factor is the generational change at work in the Middle East. The median age of Middle East people is 26.8 years, meaning more than half of the population was born after 1990 and came of age in the mid-2000s, far removed from the struggle of the Palestinians, the Arab-Israeli wars, etc. When you add in the fact that the economies of many Middle East states are in decline, such that even Saudi Arabia has to engage in economic reforms (e.g., selling part of ARAMCO, the family jewel), I'd hazard to guess that the unending Palestinian struggle no longer significantly registers among young people. 

BN: So where does the moribund peace process go from here? Does the can get kicked down the road once again? Or do you foresee any effort—by either the Israeli or Palestinian side—to engage with the Trump/Kushner plan?

YS: Basically for Trump, it is "my way or the highway." As long as Trump is in the White House, this will basically freeze the status quo. The Palestinians won't negotiate under that proposal anyway, and that gives Israelis the excuse of not doing anything to advance the peace process. In any case, I think the peace process has been long dead, and this is just the final nail in the coffin. Like it or not, the regional security situation has changed drastically and the only group still stuck in the 1970s (unfortunately) are the Palestinians. Like you mentioned, the rest of the region has moved on.

BN: For precisely those reasons, I do wonder if it's in the Palestinians' best interests to engage with the plan and earnestly work toward a final resolution to the hostilities. The power dynamics are tilting greatly toward Israel's advantage and nobody in the region is interested in defending or saving the Palestinians.

Frankly, these facts are what Kushner is hoping will prod the Palestinians to the table. His interviews lately (with Bremmer and Fareed Zakaria, in particular) have argued that the Palestinians can negotiate now, receive aid and other help from the global community, work toward internal political stability, and get their state in a few years; or they can avoid the plan, let the situation on the ground, like in the Gaza Strip, further deteriorate, and face the situation later when the Israelis are in further control of Palestinian lands. If they try to negotiate later, so goes the logic, the Palestinians will do so with far reduced leverage. It's another way of saying to the Palestinians: "You might not like this plan, but you definitely won't like any plan in the future, and in fact you'll probably hate any future settlement, so save yourself the trouble and work with us now."

The US and Israelis are engaging in coercive bargaining with the Palestinians, and the Palestinians know it and are trying to resist it, because they don't want the terms of any deal dictated to them. They feel cornered. Unfortunately for them, they are holding out for more, for a better deal, but that deal will probably never arrive.

YS: It will require much better leaders in both Israel and Palestine to restart talks. The only reason why Arafat agreed to Oslo was because Palestine was totally isolated internationally. He had nowhere to go. Abbas is held hostage by the extremists (e.g. Hamas and Islamic Jihad factions).  In the end, he cannot make any compromise even if he wants to, else he will be deposed.

On the Israelis’ side, the Netanyahu's government is beholden to its political allies on the right, who are very unlikely to give up anything in negotiations with the Palestinians. And with the corruption scandal looming, Netanyahu has to keep appeasing them with hawkish policy positions.

In essence, internationally, the situation is very unfavorable to Palestine, and, domestically, it will be political suicide for both the Israeli and Palestinian governments to compromise. The only viable option right now is to do nothing.

The Assassination of General Soleimani

The aftermath of missile strikes at Baghdad Airport. Iraqi Press Office, via AP.


On Friday, January 3, 2020, the United States assassinated General Qasen Soleimani at Baghdad Airport. Much has already been discussed in the media about this issue. The main point is that as the head of Iran's The Quds Force, an elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and as basically the coordinator of Iran's clients in the Middle East (Hamas, Hezbollah, Assad, and the Houthis) -- or as Andrew Exum called "the adult supervision in the room"-- his killing could open a can of worms and cause even more instability in the Middle East. 

The question, however, is how much pain Iran is willing to inflict on the United States in order to avenge General Soleimani? Is Iran willing to escalate the situation by launching more attacks on Saudi's oil installations, or even hitting Israel?

In order to answer that question, first we need to identify what Iran's interests are. Iran's goal is to maintain its security by establishing and maintaining client states and organizations, notably Lebanon's Hezbollah, Syria's Assad, Yemen's Houthis, and Hamas in Palestine. And in order to control its clients, Iran has to make sure that it is seen as capable of defending those clients.

So far Iran manages to do so by propping up Assad, maintaining Hezbollah's supremacy in Lebanon, supporting Hamas' control over Gaza Strip, assisting the Houthis, and working as the key player behind the scene in Iraq. Iran, in turn, was rewarded by receiving loyalty from those clients. And in some cases, it is willing to assist its clients in causing pain to their opponents, such as by hitting Saudi refineries and, lately, by attacking the American military bases and even an American embassy through its proxies. Iran gambled that as long as it did not escalate things too much, it could increase its prestige at the expense of both the US and the Saudis.

The problem is that the attack on the embassy in Iraq rattled the United States, and was basically was seen by Trump as an attack on his credibility. Keep in mind that Trump was fond of using "Benghazi," an attack on the US consulate in Libya and the murder of the US ambassador there during Obama and Hillary's watch, as a rallying cry to show how weak US credibility was under both Obama and Clinton. The attack on the US Embassy in Iraq  could have been a major embarrassment for Trump. With that in mind,Trump chose to escalate things drastically by assassinating General Soleimani, essentially warning Iran that none of its top leaders would be off limits should push come to shove.

At this point, Iran's choices are unpalatable. It could escalate things further, such as by attacking US military bases, but it would lead to a war that Iran does not want and cannot not afford. Its economy is in shambles, and the recent demonstrations showed that the regime is so deeply unpopular that it had to act violently to maintain order in the country. Embarking on a war with the US would basically decimate the regime. Moreover, it is very doubtful that both Russia and China will be willing to go to the mat against the US for the sake of defending Iran.

At the same time, Iran cannot simply stay silent, as it would risk its credibility among its clients. It would also risk its prestige. After all, what kind of signal does it send if Iran cannot do anything to avenge the killing of its top commander? Furthermore, what if Trump or Netanyahu becomes bold enough to assassinate Iran's important clients such as Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah? 

I suspect Iran could retaliate by escalating low intensity attacks (e.g. using Hezbollah or the Houthis to attack US clients in the region, such as Saudi Arabia). It might hijack oil tankers belonging to Western nations, like what happened a few months ago, or even cause problems with oil shipping in the Gulf. America's lack of response to Iran's attack on Saudi's oil installations basically showed Iran that the US would not retaliate if it could keep the damage low enough. At bottom, Iran will try to make America's life difficult, but its moves will be far short of declaration of war, or even a major attack on US global interests.   

India's Rough and Tumble 2019

Protesters participate in a mass rally against the Indian government's Citizenship Amendment Act in Kolkata on Dec. 16. DIBYANGSHU SARKAR/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

In 2019, Western news has focused on several themes, many of which, not surprisingly, are connected to US President Donald Trump and his policies, such as Trump's impeachment, US-China (trade and technology) relations, the viability and future of NATO, the continued presence of anti-democratic populist leaders, the spike in white nationalism and white nationalist violence, Brexit, and so on. The intense focus on Trump has squeezed out almost any room for several very important but overlooked events and issues in 2019. Here, in this blog post, there's one specific case I'd like to focus on, one that's in need of more attention by a wider audience. In short, in my mind, the country to watch in 2019—and arguably, in 2020, as well—has been India. 

India has been roiled by turmoil and violence this past year. In February, India engaged in a dangerous tit-for-tat military exchange with nuclear-armed neighbor Pakistan over a terrorist bombing in India-administered Kashmir. India went on the offensive and attacked a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Pakistan, Pakistan responded with an air strike across the Line of Control, and the subcontinent looked as if it was on the precipice of a catastrophic war. Indeed, as Paul Staniland points out, "With an Indian pilot in Pakistani hands, the crisis looked as though it might escalate, and there are credible reports that India threatened missile strikes against Pakistan, amidst efforts at crisis management by third parties. Pakistan soon returned the captured pilot to India and the crisis abated." 

In August, under the guise of building a more cohesive Indian state, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by Home Minister Amit Shah, begun deeply tightening its control over Jammu and Kashmir. The government removed article 370 of the constitution, thereby stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its special autonomous status, and relegated the region to the status of "union territory." At the same time, the government cracked down on political dissidents and opponents and enacted an Internet and phone blackout in these two areas. It's a combustible situation that has yet to be fully resolved, as political opponents and human rights activists attest. 

More recently, on December 11, the BJP government passed "The Citizenship Amendment Bill," which "would give many citizens of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh the opportunity to apply for Indian citizenship based on their beliefs alone. But the Bill stipulates they must be Hindu, Christian, Sikh, Jain, Parsi or Buddhist; Muslims are not listed." This, in turn, has triggered waves of protests and demonstrations throughout India, home to roughly two hundred million Muslims who are feeling targeted and repressed by the BJP. But it’s not only Muslims who are on edge, it’s local student and activists and advocates who fear that India is backsliding away from its longstanding commitment to democracy and human rights and moving toward an ethno-religious authoritarian state.

In the end, the bill has predictably turned up the political heat in India, triggering violence, bloodshed, and a heavy-handed crackdown led by the state. According to the Washington Post, “In an effort to try to quell the protests, the Indian government has detained thousands and turned off Internet access in several cities. Those actions appear to have only further incited the protesters and prompted more violence. Friday marked a particularly bloody day for cities in the country’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, as 15 protesters in several cities lost their lives, according to state police officials. Internet in 15 cities remained suspended in the state Saturday. Despite these curbs, the protests show no signs of abating, and at least four demonstrations took place across Delhi, the capital region.”

What's going on here? What's explains India's behavior in 2019? The oft-told story about India nowadays is that the government is helmed by ardent Hindu nationalists who seek to remake the state and society in line with their ethno-politico preferences and interests. According to this narrative, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his BJP are a bunch of hardcore Hindu nationalists, and once they captured power in 2014, they were then in a position to act on their ethno-political dreams. And since coming into office, Modi, through word and legislation and other forms of political action, has operationalized Hindu nationalism as both a political means and a political end to be achieved. Yes, it’s an end, because a Hindu state is the ultimate goal for the BJP.

But it’s also a useful means to various ends, because pro-Hindu policies are popular among the BJP’s base of support and they strengthen the party’s hold onto power, both of which fuel the government’s ability to get its way on politics and policy. Modi himself has wielded Hindu nationalism as a magic wand for his and his party’s advantage. Eurasia Group’s Ian Bremmer nicely captures this point. Bremmer argues that electoral pressures—specifically, the spring 2019 parliamentary elections—and a weakening economy directly led Modi to double down on Hindu nationalism. He writes: “India’s economy began to slow, a product of the external global market environment, continued structural challenges on the domestic front and short-sighted government policies. Modi opted to turn to Hindu nationalism to bolster his poll numbers, a decision that helped him perform better than expected in national elections in spring 2019. And after securing reelection, Modi continued leaning his shoulder into Hindu nationalism, while neglecting issues like land reform or reducing trade barriers.”

The other crucial element here—one that has received far less attention—is that we’re witnessing some of the fits and spurts associated with a power rising on the world stage. History tells us that it can be very disruptive when rising powers, which are usually revisionist to some degree in nature, seek a larger place in the world: the rising power, pushing outward and placing stress on the extant regional and world orders, wants more influence and power; status quo powers, meantime, are reluctant to grant such things, fearing a diminution of their status regionally and globally. We’re now seeing the early stages of this process playing out in India’s rise. India is clearly a rising power and sees itself as such, wants to be recognized as a global power, and it is becoming far less inclined to compromise on what it perceives as its core national interests. Under Modi, India is no longer interested in punching below its weight on global affairs; it seeks a place at the table of great powers, whether they like it or not. Admittedly, while India’s foreign policy isn’t nearly as expansionist or aggressive as China’s is these days, it’s evident that Delhi is flaring its elbows a bit in search of influence and prestige commensurate with its growing material power. This is causing India to butt heads with Pakistan, of course, but also potentially with China, the US, and Russia.

Finally, let’s touch on the implications of all of this. In particular, what is the global impact of all of India’s moves in 2019? And what kind of blowback might India face? There are lots of ways to answer this question. For the sake of brevity, I’ll limit my remarks to three central points.

First, India’s overt Hindu nationalist play risks degrading the nation’s soft power. According to Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson center, “These protests have hurt the government’s image....Global perceptions are shifting-and that’s no small matter for a nation that has long enjoyed a relatively positive image abroad and considerable soft power.” While this is probably true for the short-run, especially as images of violence leak out to the world, it’s less clear that it will hold over the long-term. Ultimately, the global fallout of the domestic turmoil depends on how Modi and his BJP deal with India’s festering social and political divisions. Do they attempt damage control, reaching out and protecting the rights of distressed citizens and inhabitants of India and resisting the siren song of Hindu tyranny—perhaps by limiting the implementation of the proposed National Registry? If they do, foreign countries that value human rights, especially the Western powers consumed with China’s dominance, will be more than happy to forgive and forget India’s rough and tumble 2019.

Second, 2019 has definitively raised the stakes in South Asia. For roughly the past 20 years, Pakistan counted on a level of restraint from India in response to regional events—terror attacks, Kashmir, missile tests, etc.—which has allowed it to poke and prod and undermine Indian interests. It would no longer be wise for Pakistan to assume India will exhibit such restraint going forward, even in its relations with Pakistan. Moreover, it should not assume that nuclear deterrence will necessarily, automatically hold each side at bay. Highly nationalist India and Pakistan are demonstrating a greater willingness to defend and protect their interests, take chances and embrace reckless foreign policies, and accept costs along the way. This is an alarming situation, particularly considering the subcontinent’s history of inter-state rivalry and ethnic divides, stockpiles of nuclear arms, and presence of terror groups.

Third, there is a chance that relations with the US could be adversely impacted. Frankly, at this point, the Trump administration doesn’t seek to pick a fight with India over its domestic policies—which makes sense, given Trump’s policy of mostly staying out of the business of other countries’ internal politics. If Trump turns up the heat on India anytime soon, it will be because of its trade and broader economic policy. Moreover, Trump and his acolytes value India’s role as a potential local counterbalancer to China’s movement and expansion in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. After all, the reason the US government has changed the name of its Asia policy from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” is to highlight India’s growing importance in US foreign policy.

The bigger problem for India are America’s democrats.  Just last week, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar canceled a meeting a US Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee because of the presence of Washington Democrat Pramila Jayapal, who, along with the so-called Squad, has been openly critical of the Modi government, its human rights policy, and its cozy relationship with Donald Trump. Indeed, “Jayapal has introduced a bi-partisan resolution in the House calling for an end to the restrictions in Jammu and Kashmir and for the Government of India to respect international human rights law.” This, as should be expected, has triggered the ire of the BJP.

In general, as long as the Trump White House continues to downplay human rights and the state of global democracy in its foreign policymaking, Congressional Democrats will harp on these issues, as they try to make the case that they, not Trump or his Republican Party, are the only ones in the US capable of formulating and implementing an ethical, moral policy platform. And if a Democrat takes the White House in the November 2020 election, she or he will face pressure from the liberal base to depart from Trump’s convention of turning a blind eye to human rights abuses and democratic backsliding worldwide. My guess is that a Democratic foreign policy will primarily critique and pressure China, North Korea, and Russia, among other nations, though India probably won’t get a free pass from America’s left. That, in turn, will create friction in Delhi-Washington ties, thereby requiring deft diplomacy to ensure relations don’t suffer a severe setback from the previous decade of bilateral progress and momentum.     

The Impact of the Death of al-Baghdadi

Photo: AP.

Below is a conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman on the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It was conducted via email over the last week. 

Brad Nelson: There are a lot of things happening in Syria lately. Basically, it's been non-stop Syria news for the last few weeks or so. Here, in this exchange, let’s focus on much-discussed, much-hyped event: the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the former leader of ISIS. What do you make of it? And what kind of impact will it have on ISIS?

Yohanes Sulaiman: While the death of al Baghdadi is significant in terms of PR for Trump and a blow to the ego of the ISIS, in a larger strategic picture, this does not have that much of an impact. ISIS has been in decline for the past few years. ISIS managed to get big because the conditions were right: Syria was in disarray while Iraq's government has lacking in legitimacy, providing fertile grounds for ISIS to grow and to gain a significant chuck of territory. Due to its brutality, though, ISIS ended up being hated and hounded by everyone. And its opponents have gotten wiser in dealing with it—e.g. attacking its internet propaganda infrastructure, establishing improving deradicalization programs, etc. While ISIS-inspired lone wolf attacks remain a problem, it is not that significant of a threat.

What next for ISIS? I think a collaboration with al Qaeda (AQ) probably its best option. Based on the fact that al Baghdadi was found in a stronghold of AQ in Syria, the two groups probably reached an accommodation of some sort.

BN: I see al-Baghdadi's death as simply accelerating trends that are already in motion. It pushes the group further toward decentralization. As the caliphate crumbled and its fighters have gone underground, ISIS has less sway over its affiliates and franchises. And without a credible leader right now, that's even more so the case. And then there's the prospect that al-Baghdadi's successor will likely lack his military, religious, and organizational credentials. If the next ISIS leader is a step back from al-Baghdadi in terms of respect and prestige, there's the chance that its affiliates will try to take advantage of the situation by broadening and deepening their autonomy from ISIS HQ and a few might even defect, sliding toward AQ. 

There is already lots of talk of ISIS lashing out now--as it seeks to avenge al-Baghdadi's death, remain relevant, and forestall any defections. Sure, we might see an uptick in ISIS-related violence.  However, keep in mind that ISIS was already very violent, wielding violence almost indiscriminantly, so I really don't anticipate too much change there. 

Bruce Hoffman has argued that an AQ-ISIS merger (or really a re-merger) could well happen. I'm a little more skeptical, at least for now. Yes, collaboration is something ISIS could opt for, but it would probably be unwise at the moment. AQ knows that ISIS is in flux (having lost its leader and recently promoted a possible neophyte), and as a result, al-Zawahiri is likely to see ISIS as weakened and desperate. AQ has the bargaining leverage. If ISIS wants to work with AQ, then AQ would be smart to demand it happening on AQ's terms. Would ISIS go for that? It’s unknown at this point, especially since we don't know much about al-Hashemi thus far.

My expectation is this: Rather than working with ISIS, I expect AQ to try to drive the stake in ISIS's heart by attempting to sow further divisions within ISIS and even press ISIS affiliates to switch teams. Why fold (in its competition with ISIS) when AQ has an opportunity to win the game, so to speak?

YS: Keep in mind that ISIS and its ilk can only be successful under narrow main conditions: first is the weaknesses of the states where they operate, and second, when states are simply unprepared to deal with these groups. So, I don't think we will see an emergence of a third group or reemergence of both AQ and ISIS as a global jihadist network at this point. Syria and Iraq are still in a mess, but they are stabilizing, and the populace are totally alienated due to ISIS brutality. Afghanistan remains a weak state, but the Taliban is more of a local phenomenon than an international movement. Same thing with Somalia and Nigeria. Terrorists there are really a product of local movements that tried to link themselves to a global jihadist movement. And nowadays states are far more prepared to deal with the reemergence of the new al-Qaeda or ISIS. Granted, this does not rule out any lone wolf attacks, but as John Mueller notes, especially in the US, the risk of a terrorist attack is very low, and in Europe, the police are much wiser to deal with the threats. And financing, especially from the Gulf States, is drying up. While terrorists may be able to work with local jihadist groups or criminal groups for financing, it seems to me that ISIS might find it harder than al Qaeda due to its extremism.

BN: Iraq and Syria are among the most chaotic, unstable, and violent states in the world. There are ample opportunities for AQ and ISIS to re-emerge there if the metaphorical foot is taken off their throats. Plus, ISIS still has anywhere from 14-18,000 foot soldiers, so that group still has a deep bench, with arms, and millions of dollars the group has squirreled away.

Regarding AQ: AQ is still very strong in Iraq and Syria. Research from Colin Clarke and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, among others, on the political dynamics in Syria says that AQ has embedded itself in local structures and populations in Syria, and it's going to be hard to remove the group. And AQ has had a longstanding presence in Sunni Iraqis areas since shortly after the US invasion in 2003.

All of this, in combination with some of the things I've already said in this exchange, leads me to believe that both groups are still formidable, though ISIS is the more dangerous global terrorist group. It's a desperate, decentralized group looking to remain relevant and important globally. It's very likely seeking quick "wins" right now. AQ is playing a different game. It doesn't have the same short-term, narrow perspective. There is also accumulating evidence that AQ has learned the lessons of its past, learned from the mistakes of ISIS, and learned from the "successes" of groups like Hezbollah. As a result, AQ is biding its time, regrouping and establishing momentum in the broader Middle East. And for those reasons, AQ isn't quite the global threat that ISIS is, in my view. 

BN: The one last point I’d like to make concerns the organizational literature’s thoughts on the death of al-Baghdadi. Jacob Shapiro, Jenna Jordan, and others others, have written on how mature, bureaucratized, layered terrorist organizations that have targeted wellsprings of support can withstand the loss of key leaders. These groups have built-in rules and processes that allow militants to get promoted up the ranks as needed; they also have the requisite base of support to replenish the ranks as militants either get promoted, killed, or simply defect from the organization.

This, of course, doesn’t describe all terror groups. Many groups are young, fragile, and very reliant on a leader. By contrast, ISIS is a classic example of a bureaucratized group with a strong base of support—both locally, regionally, and internationally. ISIS has the infrastructure to move into a post-Baghdadi era. That doesn’t mean it will be easy. But for those expecting ISIS to fade away, well, that’s unlikely. 

The good part, though, is that the group isn't nearly the global menace it was in 2015, it's unlikely to recapture its past glory and power, and it has been plagued by what Max Abrahms calls "stupid" leadership. 

In short, ISIS faces a dilemma. It can go underground, rest and recover, but risk getting eclipsed once again by AQ. This is the safe choice. Or it can continue to act as an impulsive, ultra-violent organization, in order to retain global brand visibility and attention. This is the risky and arguably dumbest choice. Because in remaining violent, killing everyone and everything in its path, ISIS will remain the subject of a harsh counterterrorism measures by states around the world. And those counterterrorism efforts will make life very difficult for the group and its members. They degrade ISIS's capabilities, create a brain drain through attrition, and effectively hem in the group. My guess is that ISIS will chose the second option. This will keep the group in the news and as a global threat to security, but also ensure that it is constantly hounded and on the run.