tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6709124907869985672024-03-13T16:40:01.579-04:00Center for World Conflict and PeaceCenter for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.comBlogger345125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-10759897419411781882021-03-02T18:19:00.000-05:002021-03-02T18:19:10.103-05:00Has Trump Permanently Altered US Foriegn Policy?<p>Last month, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/2021-02-16/has-trump-permanently-altered-us-foreign-policy"><i>Foreign
Affairs</i> posed an interesting question</a> to a panel of experts: Has Trump
permanently altered US foreign policy? If you have a chance to read it—it’s
behind a paywall—we encourage you to do so. You’ll see a wide range of views
from a host of scholars and analysts.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Below Drs. Yohanes Sulaiman and Brad Nelson offer their
thoughts on the same question posed by <i>Foreign Affairs</i>. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Yohanes Sulaiman: Neutral,
confidence level 5. <o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">On the one hand, Trump escalated America’s dispute with
China, which accelerated a downward trend in the relationship between the US
and China. His so-called foreign policy disasters are not as big and widespread
as many people argue, however. Moreover, keep in mind that the rest of the
world still needs the US to maintain order. So despite the world’s distaste of
Trump, they stuck with the US and continue to stick with the US as the lesser
of two evils. You can see it in the <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-State-of-SEA-2021-v2.pdf">ISEAS
“The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report,” </a>that despite declining
trust in the US, Southeast Asia still relies the US for leadership: 48.3% trust
the US, compared to China's 16.5%. And if ASEAN has to pick sides, the
majority of the organization’s members will still pick the US.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In essence, systemic effects matter. Threats, particularly
local threats, matter. Despite Trump, states still pick the US because the
alternatives, like China or Russia, are likely worse. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Brad Nelson: Agree,
Confidence level 5. <o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Yes, it's true that there are some Trump-era policies and
strategies that Biden can reverse. In fact, he's already started this process.
Biden has cozied up to Europe, placed the US back into the Paris Accords,
promised to contribute money to COVAX, extended the New Start nuclear deal,
reduced support for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen and overturned the terrorist
label on the Houthis, and so on. For those who like liberal internationalism,
this is a good start.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">However, there are some policies and initiatives that Trump
has embraced that will be difficult to change or counter. Three immediately
come to mind. First, the "no new wars" crowd has been for years a
fringe element of US politics. Not anymore. Trump added the weight of his
presidency to a "no new wars" position, bringing supporters of this
(on the left and right) out from the cold, and created a growing expectation
among Americans that the US is done with fighting wars that aren't of
self-defense. Sure, 20 years of war has played a role in turning Americans off
to more war. But it's also importantly to note that Trump mainstreamed this
view and effectively made it a new policy status quo, thereby making it harder
than usual to break down the line. Just look at Biden’s recent air strikes on Iranian
proxies in Syria. He’s received significant blowback from folks, including Democratic Congresspersons and supporters, who fear that the US is sleepwalking into a war with
Iran. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Second, we can argue about whether Trump's specific statements
and policies on China were the right ones. But what isn't arguable is that
there's a widespread belief, on the right and left, that his strategic approach
to directly confront China was the right one, and one that's been long overdue.
Going back to a more mealy-mouthed, squishy engagement policy is effectively
ruled out for the foreseeable future. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">And third, the literal idea of America First—that US foreign
policy should first and foremost benefit the US and Americans—is here to stay.
The Washington establishment's desire to work on pet foreign projects—an en
vogue part of US foreign policy for most of the post-cold war era, particularly
in the 1990s and early 2000s—isn't feasible anymore. Trump has forced Americans
to ask whether the policies the US pursues serve the national interest.
Frankly, this is already playing out in the Biden era. It's why his foreign
policy promises to connect US foreign policy to US domestic politics and
economics and to the overall welfare of Americans.<o:p></o:p></p>Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-361057058977981812021-01-25T18:53:00.001-05:002021-01-25T18:53:56.837-05:00What We're Watching in 2021<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIMEUqPv16UACagz3K6SiriIfnW3mOsX08ylLwonWVvAvkiec9oqXSeqrjsvIzB7Nz6bHHGlvbz0A2_qiNQK1c2Uhn9GfbgSYCoHD6HFD7U4jhpYmqpuEPHUClj5aUBBH3F8ay9SSvdXWJ/" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="372" data-original-width="660" height="224" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIMEUqPv16UACagz3K6SiriIfnW3mOsX08ylLwonWVvAvkiec9oqXSeqrjsvIzB7Nz6bHHGlvbz0A2_qiNQK1c2Uhn9GfbgSYCoHD6HFD7U4jhpYmqpuEPHUClj5aUBBH3F8ay9SSvdXWJ/w411-h224/image.png" width="411" /></a></div><br /> <span style="font-size: xx-small;">USA Today</span><br /><p></p><p>Last week, Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman discussed which global issues they have their eye on in 2021. Below is a lightly editied version of that conversation. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>Brad Nelson</b>: Well, we made it. 2021 is here. Before we get too far into this relatively new year, I
thought we'd take a quick look ahead. What do you have your eye on
this year? What are you following? Any predictions for 2021?</p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>Yohanes Sulaiman</b>: First, let me just focus on one thing that
the world will be watching for sure: Biden. 2021 will be a difficult year
for Biden. There are very high expectations for Biden both domestically and
internationally to overturn many of Trump's policies. I won't delve into
America’s domestic affairs, but let me list several international issues that
Biden will face. At some point soon, he will have to focus on re-engaging with international institutions (e.g. Paris
Accord, WHO); reembracing Europe; reassuring Israel, Saudi Arabia, Japan, India,
and Taiwan that he will be as accommodative to them as Trump was; dealing with
North Korea; the Iran nuclear deal; handling Erdogan and Putin; troop
withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia; the repercussions of Pompeo's
declaration that China committed genocide; the trade war with China; and
figuring out where and how Southeast Asia and Australia fits in his policy. And
that's off the top of my head. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: I'm also watching the incoming Biden administration,
especially on domestic matters. How will he deal with the GOP? How will he
handle the leftists in his party? What's his approach to domestic extremists
and terrorists? Which signature domestic policies will Biden look to push
first?</p><p class="MsoNormal">And on Biden foreign policy, as you mentioned, there is much
to monitor. The big issue, of course, is Biden's strategy toward China. Will he
hang tough? Go soft? Try to find a middle ground with Xi? Second, I'll be
tracking Biden's proposed effort to place alliances at the center of US foreign
policy. Will this boost US foreign policy, as establishment thinkers and
academics have argued over the last four years? Or will it turn out to be a
bust?</p><p class="MsoNormal">Additionally, I'm closely watching North Korea. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-biden-missile-test/2021/01/18/25268116-594f-11eb-a849-6f9423a75ffd_story.html">Reports indicate that North Korea might be readying a submarine-launched missile test</a> fairly soon. No surprise, given Kim's propensity to turn up the pressure
on new governments in rival/enemy powers. But Kim's in a particularly tricky
situation. There are conflicting accounts on how much Covid has ravaged North
Korea. North Korea's economy has shrunk even further as the country
self-isolates for fear of the virus entering from China and South Korea. Kim is
apparently frustrated and angry with the US, ticked off that his summit
diplomacy with Trump didn't yield more tangible benefits for him. And Kim knows
that Biden is highly unlikely to give Kim even a fraction of the time and
attention that Trump gave him. So, with all of that in mind, is Kim in an
especially sour mood, ready to lash out? If so, how does Biden respond? How do
the major regional players, like South Korea, Japan, and China, react?</p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>YS</b>: Domestically, if Biden stays in the center, that would
strengthen his position. I think a lot of people are tired of the hyper-partisanship
of the last four years, and if Biden manages to work together with the moderate
GOP, he can cruise to reelection in 2024. I don't think Trump will remain
influential in the next four years despite all the din, unless the Democrats
want to make him a martyr. If I were Biden, I would pardon Trump, showing him
and the rest of the US that I was the better man and smothering the crazies on
the right. Of course, it won't be popular among the left, but that basically
would end Trump. What would be more despicable for him than to be pardoned by
the person he derides? If he refuses the pardon, he would be entangled with all
the legal fights for the rest of his life. If he accepts the pardon, then it
would be a total humiliation and would end his status as a martyr.</p><p class="MsoNormal">If Biden listens to the far left, however, then I could
see him getting shellacked both in the midterms in 2022 and then in 2024. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Covid
will be around for one or two more years. It is interesting
how the politicization of Covid all over the world essentially makes it very
difficult to control the epidemic. Many people don't trust that vaccines will
work thanks to a daily dose of politicized discussion on the efficacy of the
vaccine. The impact of Covid internationally may not be as big as we thought,
aside from intensifying competition between the US and China. And I doubt that
Biden will suddenly try to appease China—that would look terrible
optically. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: I think Biden should wait before even considering to offer a pardon to
Trump. Let's see if Trump is in legal trouble federally. If Trump is, then Biden
should consider a pardon, though I'm not sure he should go ahead with one. Of course, Biden would get serious push-back from the
far left in his party. And any federal pardon won't absolve Trump from any
state crimes, and New York state is coming after him. That said, I'm fully in
support of the thrust of your point. There's no need to act vengefully with
respect to Trump; instead, focus on healing from the Trump years and uniting the
country. I do think Biden gets that. The unity angle is Biden's is not only his
mantra but an integral part of his political persona. Biden admitted that Trump
wrote him a "generous" note (but didn't want to reveal the note's
content's until speaking with Trump), which was nice to hear, and
Biden's <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/20/956922884/bidens-inaugural-address-annotated" target="_blank">inaugural address</a> emphasized similar themes in both
tone and substance. </p><p class="MsoNormal">I'm glad you mentioned Covid. That's the other major issue
I'm watching in 2021. Given the case load and death toll, Covid has almost
become a US rather than a global virus. So what Biden's does on Covid is
important. The US health care system has been stretched to its limits.
Thousands of Americans are still getting sick and dying every day, and
countless Americans are worried about getting sick. At the same time, many
Americans are tired of being cooped up and having their way of life
impacted—even those who fully understand the severity of the
virus, not just the MAGA contingent. If Biden can work out the kinks in
the vaccine distribution, get more money into the hands of Americans, offer
businesses, especially small businesses, vital support, 2021 will be a better
year—for the US and for US partners and allies. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Because Covid isn't solely
an American thing, it'll also be useful to observe how the rest of the world
copes with the pandemic. Europe is having major trouble at the moment, as are Mexico, India, and Brazil, among others. Many of the world's
developing countries might not even gain access to a vaccine for another year
or two. The global powers, the WHO, and other interested parties have to work
to ensure that as many people as people, as fast as possible, no matter where
they live, get access to a vaccine and state-of-the-art medicines and
therapeutics to help sick people recover effectively and in a timely manner.
That's the only way the world can quickly put Covid in its collective rearview
mirror. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-26399917040910926562021-01-08T19:26:00.025-05:002021-01-10T15:32:26.295-05:00The Attack On the Capitol Building<p> </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiL01gcPelTK9_kSRQRNoiCb1MGYkQoUpQBE8-RQGyWKqvs6-DDZNYJHi9wATmT8yCJZ1iJ9Yp9XAYUV0HuLF0QFBj2oAQxQbsuE0jMjYHYFtuLdXuToT8lGmXMwEcfYv7Ikb9Nn0n7ifBj/" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="529" data-original-width="940" height="242" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiL01gcPelTK9_kSRQRNoiCb1MGYkQoUpQBE8-RQGyWKqvs6-DDZNYJHi9wATmT8yCJZ1iJ9Yp9XAYUV0HuLF0QFBj2oAQxQbsuE0jMjYHYFtuLdXuToT8lGmXMwEcfYv7Ikb9Nn0n7ifBj/w496-h242/image.png" width="496" /></a></div><br /><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">Wednesday, January 6 (2021) will be remembered as a seminal catastrophic moment in American politics, much like how history views 9/11 and the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The
foundations of US democracy—both symbolically and literally—were invaded and
attacked. Hundreds of crazed Trump supporters, stirred up by President Trump
and other elected Republican officials and aggrieved by Trump’s election
defeat, attacked the Capitol building—the very seat of America’s legislature,
and arguably the most iconic building in the US—in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55572825">most destructive
attack on the Capitol in roughly two hundred years</a>. Windows were smashed, offices
were vandalized and ransacked, and fights and gun battles erupted, resulting in
the deaths of five people, including <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/brian-sicknick-capitol-police-officer-dies/2021/01/08/5552e036-51bc-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html">US Capitol officer Brian Sicknick</a>, and more than 50 injured. At this point, almost 100 attackers
have been arrested and more will surely suffer the same fate in
the coming days.</p><p class="MsoNormal">Presumably, Trump’s goons believed that by storming the Capitol,
they could unleash a series of moves that would prevent Joe Biden’s electoral
win from becoming official and enable Trump to retain the presidency. The Trump
putsch failed, of course, as police, after a few hours, were able to clear and
secure the Capitol and push the mob of people away from the building. Still, US
democracy suffered a near-fatal blow, and it’s no overstatement to say that it
could take generations for Americans to fully reckon with and recover from the
Trump years and Wednesday’s attack in particular.</p><p class="MsoNormal">Unfortunately, I’m not surprised by the course of events. Back
in late September, <a href="https://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2020/09/">on this
blog</a>, I described the decrepit state of US democracy, US politics, and the
potential for post-election violence. “What will Trump do on Election Day and
beyond? My guess is that he will declare victory, no matter if he's in the lead
or not election night. He'll gin up his base, working them up into a frenzy in
his speeches on his Twitter page. He’ll use all sorts of vague and coded
language, encouraging his supporters to “stay vigilant” and “not let the
Democrats steal the election,” and so on. Then he'll try to get a GOP-leaning
Supreme Court, assuming Amy Coney Barrett takes a seat before November, to toss
out thousands of ballots in battleground states, with the hopes of overturning
the election. I mean, it's crystal clear what he intends to do. During the
debate, he admitted he sees the Supreme Court playing a role in adjudicating
the election. If the courts rule against him, trouble could still loom. All of
the people Trump ginned up will seek an outlet to release their pent up
frustrations and anger. And at that point, there’s the very real prospect of
armed pro-Trump groups taking to the streets.” It was easy to forecast the
coming catastrophe, as Trump himself signaled his intentions to hold on to
power through any means necessary, even if that meant bending the rule of law
to his whim and inciting his followers to commit heinous acts. And that’s
exactly what happened.</p><p class="MsoNormal">Surely, Trump deserves his share of blame. And he’s
deservingly getting it—from the mainstream media, academics and policy wonks, some
Republicans, and Democrats, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55596325">who plan on bringing forth
a second round of impeachment charges very soon</a>. For years, dating back to
the start of his political campaign in 2015, Trump has mainstreamed far-right
political extremism by peddling xenophobic, racist, violent, and lawless
rhetoric. And he’s cozied up to white nationalists and Neo-Nazis, refused to
distance himself from QAnon and other conspiracy theorists, and embraced a wide
swath of homegrown and international political fanatics—exactly the types of
people who attacked the Capitol. Over the years, Trump’s supporters have
responded accordingly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2019/aug/28/in-the-name-of-trump-supporters-attacks-database">by
engaging in or threatening to carry out</a> various hate crimes, terror plots, and
assassinations in his name. In short, then, it’s not as if the Capitol building
attack is something out of the blue for the extremist, fringe element of Trump’s
base.</p><p class="MsoNormal">The proximate cause for Wednesday’s mayhem traces back to Trump’s
November election loss. He has recklessly claimed the election was rigged and
stolen from him, buttressing his claims with a steady stream of lies and conspiracy
theories. On Twitter, in public statements, and at campaign rallies since Election
Day, Trump has encouraged his supporters to resist the election results and prevent
the election from being stolen from him. And on Wednesday, at the “Save America
Rally,” <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-told-supporters-stormed-capitol-hill/story?id=75110558">spoke
for an hour, instigating the crowd</a> “to stand strong,” “to fight,” “to get
tougher,” and “telling supporters to ‘stop the steal’ of the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/alerts/elections" target="_blank">election</a>,
urging them to head to the Capitol to demonstrate against Congress certifying
President-elect Joe Biden's victory.” Many believe these words incited the mob,
only minutes after Trump spoke, to storm the Capitol. </p><p class="MsoNormal">But Trump isn’t the only one to blame for the attacks. The
extremists and insurrectionists who carried out Wednesday’s putsch clearly also
share blame. These are the people who’ve been radicalized—by Trump, by other
radicals, by radical media outlets—to attack the Capitol, fantastically believing
that this would save America’s democracy. And for the past four years, they
have slavishly and cultishly devoted themselves to Trump and his pet causes—hanging
on his every word, turning out in droves to his political rallies, buying Trump
hats and memorabilia, serving as an Internet troll army, and causing death and destruction in
Charlottesville, among other things. In the end, they were duped by Trump to
serve his personal ends and left with little more than red hats, lots of anger,
and a raging pandemic. </p><p class="MsoNormal">The Republican Party also shares some blame. Almost across
the board—except for Mitt Romney and Justin Amash (who later left the Republican
Party)—the GOP has failed to provide effective guardrails on Trump. Instead,
they’ve been perfectly fine with coasting on Trump’s political coattails,
drafting on his popularity within the party, to gain and hold political power. The
GOP’s coddling of Trump has aided and abetted his repeated efforts to subvert America’s
democracy, the spike in white nationalist violence, and the radicalization of
the political right in the US. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Lastly, the far right-wing echo chamber of television,
radio, and social media has played an important role in stirring up trouble in
the US. While Fox News and Fox News personalities, like Sean Hannity and Tucker
Carlson, still dominate the right-wing and far right political discourse, they
are no longer the hegemon, as OANN, Newsmax, Gab, Parler, and other radical Internet
sites and message boards have grown in popularity. All too frequently these
actors serve as veritable mouthpieces for Trump and his administration,
parroting his views, his conspiracy theories, and his outright lies. Moreover, at
times, they independently act to advance Trump’s cause, creating their own
narratives and storylines—sometimes based in fact, but frequently not—to
bolster Trump’s agenda and undermine the Democrats’ policies and political
power. The far right wing mediasphere, much like Trump, plays a pivotal role in
radicalizing Americans, telling them what they want to hear, creating fictitious
enemies, glorifying Trump and the GOP, and ginning them up to be perpetually
angry and aggrieved. In fact, the far right-wing media has helped to foster a
cult-like atmosphere in which Trump is treated as a savior, heaven-sent to
solve America’s problems and to beat back the Democrats and other undesirables.
And that, in turn, has spawned the deification and considerable iconography of
Trump (hats, t-shirts, flags, etc.).</p><p class="MsoNormal">Now, the insurrection is terrible, and the roles the aforementioned
players played in causing or provoking the Capitol attack is also terrible. But
as bad as those things are, there’s an even bigger problem. Trump, the GOP, and
the far right-wing mediasphere have created a monster they can no longer
control. The Capitol attackers were not simply lawbreakers, they were an incredibly
violent group. They possessed materials for napalm, assault weapons, bombs, nooses, zip-ties, and so on. This wasn’t a situation in which peaceful protesters showed up to Washington,
DC, on Wednesday to voice their political views and things suddenly and
accidentally got out of control. No, this was a pre-planned event, according to
online chatter, and the attackers were well-prepared to use violent tools if
necessary. We’re lucky the attack only resulted in five deaths, as it easily
<a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/01/was-there-a-plan-for-hostages-or-killings-at-the-capitol.html">could’ve resulted in a very bloody mass-casualty event</a>. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Additionally, the Trump mob is angrier than ever, seeking
revenge not only against Democrats but against any Republican who, in their
view, has turned on Trump. For instance, <a href="https://twitter.com/jimbourg/status/1347559078831284227">according to a
report</a>, members of the crazed mob were looking for Vice President Mike Pence,
hoping to find him and execute him for his “crimes” of recording the Electoral College
results. Despite years of yeoman’s work of supporting Trump, Lindsey Graham’s recent
declaration to <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/533055-lindsey-graham-says-enough-is-enough-on-trumps-bid-to-overturn-the-election-count-me">“count
him out”</a> has made him, like Pence, an <a href="https://twitter.com/MollyJongFast/status/1347625642150535175">enemy of
hardcore Trumpers</a>. I expect the enemies list to grow as more Republicans
actively denounce Trump and distance themselves from him in the waning days of
his tenure.</p><p class="MsoNormal">Furthermore, just because the violent attackers have now went
home, and some have been arrested, that doesn’t mean they’re done. They’re
riding a major high right now. The Trump mob believes they scored a victory. They
managed to breach Capitol security and get into the building, scared the hell
out of Congress, received days of free media time, and create political chaos. As
a result, the MAGA insurrectionists are emboldened; they are all-in in their
continued fight to defend Trump, dethrone the Democrats, and cause further
bedlam.</p><p class="MsoNormal">Attempts to cope with the fallout and implications of the Capitol
attack cannot come only from the political left in the US. Both parties, in a
united front, must attack the ongoing scourge on US democracy. America cannot
leave far right violent mobs any political space and freedom to operate. While
a comprehensive plan to deal with the ongoing political extremism and strife is
beyond the scope of this post, I can offer a brief list of items that politicians
on the right and left should consider. In particular, bipartisan efforts should
made to: tone down the political rhetoric; condemn violent, seditious political
acts; discourage violent, seditious acts; make it abundantly clear that the
rules, norms, and laws apply equally to far left radicals; work with social
media companies, helping them to create sensible and transparent--rather than ad hoc and reactive--policies that effectively balance free speech protections and the safety of Americans; and ostracize and punish Congresspersons
who endorse/are complicit with extremist language and political acts.</p><p class="MsoNormal">Finally, I also think Congress—and politicians in general,
at the state and local levels—needs to up the fight against Covid-19. Covid is
a separate but related issue to the political struggles America now faces. The fact
that so many Americans are sick, have died, and are out of work has raised the
political temperature by several degrees in the US over the last 12 months. The
faster the Biden administration can make major in-roads in beating back the
virus, the quicker Americans can return to their normal work, school, religious
and entertainment environments. And that will help in dialing down the rage of people
who despise being confined and the restrictions on their personal freedoms. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-86783341713265987482020-12-16T11:17:00.000-05:002020-12-16T11:17:10.806-05:00The Winners and Losers of a Biden Presidency<p> </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1NbPpJaTy2-TIkAOV41ZGSVzowoDFSZzfg2FX5ydsUA9EjGmHz_30NkZfqrHJZtc81CVqFJOSTi6R1QT4jmLhz-V4MePuRW7WGdDSOieCWmO95jEPL9pJLRJrt3AIRAD5EpoN5pluc7mk/" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="619" data-original-width="1100" height="244" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1NbPpJaTy2-TIkAOV41ZGSVzowoDFSZzfg2FX5ydsUA9EjGmHz_30NkZfqrHJZtc81CVqFJOSTi6R1QT4jmLhz-V4MePuRW7WGdDSOieCWmO95jEPL9pJLRJrt3AIRAD5EpoN5pluc7mk/w471-h244/image.png" width="471" /></a></div><br /><p></p><p></p><p class="MsoNormal">Below is a conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman on the global winners and losers of the incoming Biden administration. It was conducted via email over the last week. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>Brad Nelson</b>: Now that the dust has settled on the recent US
presidential election, it's time to take stock of the possible impact of a
Biden administration. In short, who wins and who loses with Biden in the White
House? Let's start with the “winners.” Many scholars and analysts argue that EU
and NATO members will get a big boost with Biden in office. Do you see it that
way? And do you see any other winners from a Biden presidency?</p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>Yohanes Sulaiman</b>: Biden is a traditional type of leader,
surrounded by the usual <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/05/07/blob-abides/" target="_blank">"blob"</a> that has the same strategic outlook of
pushing for multilateralism, cooperating together to get the best result.
And NATO/EU are basically traditional US partners in multilateralism. Unlike
Trump, who doesn't give a darn about getting everyone on board, Biden will make
concessions, cajole, etc. Thus NATO/EU will be a big winner.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://sr.sgpp.ac.id/post/the-biden-doctrine-in-southeast-asia" target="_blank">ASEAN will get more respect and attention from the US</a>. Like
Obama, Biden will push for more engagement between the US and ASEAN, but
the problem is that ASEAN is not likely to get closer to the US, fearing
antagonizing China. So, I suspect the US will push for more engagement, but
ASEAN probably won’t reciprocate. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: Yes, I agree with your choices and I agree with
your rationale. To your discussion on institutionalism and multilateralism, I'd
add the UN. The UN is also poised to benefit from a Biden administration. Biden
is already making promises to beef up its cooperation with the UN on things
like covid-19 and climate change. The UN won't be as hindered and hemmed in by
the US for the next four years. And I've read <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/joe-biden-un-sg-guterres-discuss-need-for-strengthened-us-un-partnership-to-tackle-urgent-global-issues/articleshow/79504449.cms" target="_blank">reports</a> that suggest UN
Secretary-General Guterres--who clearly preferred Biden over Trump--wants to
take advantage of this potential opportunity by embracing a more ambitious
agenda going forward. In addition, it’s likely that the WTO, the WHO, and
other global organizations pilloried and pushed aside by Trump will get a
breather and possibly more from a Biden presidency.</p><p class="MsoNormal">There are two other things to keep in mind. First, Biden is
pro-alliances. Biden and his incoming administration (particularly <a href="https://buildbackbetter.gov/nominees-and-appointees/jake-sullivan/" target="_blank">Jake Sullivan</a>
and <a href="https://buildbackbetter.gov/nominees-and-appointees/antony-blinken/" target="_blank">Antony Blinken</a>) view the Trump White House as weakening and undermining
many of America's traditional alliances, because of his insistence on treating
them as transactional tools and protection rackets. Biden is going to restore
the relationship with its partners, or that's his plan anyway. So, yes, EU
and NATO members will get a boost in time and attention from a Biden
presidency. So will Japan and South Korea and Australia. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Second, it looks like Biden's going to make a big push for
an enhanced role for shared democratic values and ideas in US foreign policy.
That's not very surprising, given the Trump administration's record. His White
House has reduced the role of political reform, human rights, and democracy
promotion in US policy, and Trump himself has arguably treated America's
democratic allies in Europe very roughly and harshly--both of which has
generated widespread criticism of that on the left. The democratic push is part
of Biden's plan to "restore" normalcy in US foreign policy. Biden
plans on convening <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/biden-eyes-2021-summit-as-chance-to-rally-world-democracies/" target="_blank">a major conference with the world's major democracies fairly
early in his administration</a>. I'd also expect Biden to keep the Quad and even
build off it. We may even see a return to democracy promotion efforts, albeit
in a far less militarized fashion. I also anticipate Biden and his
administration to openly critique the human rights records of countries like
Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, and so on--something the
Trump WH rarely did. Given all of this, I'd say the winners here are, once
again, America's democratic allies, but also countries like India and
Indonesia, human rights and political reform organizations and activists, and the
foreign policy establishment in the US.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>YS</b>: The problem with “human rights” is that many states, including Indonesia,
see this less than the US upholding values than a carte blanche to get involved
with other states' internal affairs. Thus Indonesia is largely silent about
China's mistreatment of the Uighur population in Xinjiang, fearing that it
could create a precedent that can be used against Indonesia in places like West
Papua. A Biden administration with human rights' guns blazing from the start
will cause fear that Biden will become another American crusader. And it will
actually be detrimental to America’s interest in facing China's threat in South
China Sea.</p><p class="MsoNormal">On Climate Change: I think the US will go back and rejoin
the Paris agreement. The question, however, is whether the US will go all in on
a climate change agenda or simply kick the can down the road as most US
presidents do, especially considering that China's economy keeps growing.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: Let's turn to the potential “losers” of a Biden
presidency. As I see it, there will be many. To begin, Biden's likely emphasis
on alliances, institutions, and renewed US engagement in the world means that
the neo-isolationists, America Firsters, and pro-unilateralists in the US--a
group that cuts across the left and right--will be pretty unhappy. This could
also ruffle some feathers in Russia and China. After
all, governments in both nations will probably face a more sustained,
collective push back from the US and its allies after four years of American
diplomatic retrenchment under Trump. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Biden's move back into the Iran nuclear deal will surely
tick off Iran hawks in the US (of which there are many), Israel, and the Sunni
powers. </p><p class="MsoNormal">There is no way Biden will give Kim Jong Un a private
audience or even hint at granting him any kind of meaningful concessions.
Biden's probable policy of strategic patience, which harkens back to the Obama
days, won't respond to every North Korean outburst, will deemphasize America's public
attention to NK (unless Kim makes an olive branch opening), and will treat the North Koreans as a nuisance. Kim's window of opportunity to strike a deal with the US is
over for the foreseeable future, and Kim is accordingly going to be very
frustrated by this situation. </p><p class="MsoNormal">The world's dictators will find a much more skeptical and
highly critical America under Biden. I expect Saudi Arabia to find life much
more difficult with Biden in the White House, particularly compared to the
esteemed status it held in US foreign policy during the Trump years.
Besides reviving the Iran deal, the US will end support for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen,
criticize the Saudis on their human rights record, try to rein in MBS's reckless foreign
policy, and aim to distance itself from Riyadh and the Middle East more generally as
it ramps up its efforts to deal with China.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>YS</b>: Good points, but at the same time, I wonder how much
Biden is going to wreck what Trump has done. If he is restarting the nuclear
agreement with Iran that Trump shredded, the risk is that Iran would demand
more compensations, which may hurt Biden's standings both domestically and in
the Middle East. If he alienates the Saudis, both Israel and Saudi may look at
other "patrons" -- not that they are going to align themselves with
Russia or China as they are too deeply embedded to the US security alliance
(e.g. US military bases & weaponry), but they will be much open cooperating
with Russia/China and that will hurt the US national interest. And as we see
with Turkey, even though Turkey is a member of NATO and has a close security
relationship with the US, Erdogan can still make life difficult for the US, though
you can argue it is due to Trump's indifference/naiveté towards Erdogan.</p><p class="MsoNormal">In Kim Jong Un's case, I don't see life will be that different for him with Biden office compared to Trump as president. Keep in mind that despite meeting Trump twice, and
everyone screaming that Trump was going to be played like a fiddle, giving up
everything to Kim, so far the US hasn't given any major concessions to
North Korea. Biden may want to resurrect the Six-Party Talks, but with both
Russia and China's relationship currently in deep freeze with the US, I doubt
it would be successful. In fact, Biden could be seen as more likely to give
concessions, like the Obama administration (of which he was a member) did to
Iran, leading North Korea to raise tensions to eleven to gain
concessions. </p><p class="MsoNormal">I think Biden will find that after Trump, people will think
him as either pushover or as too willing to push for human rights, and that could
make major headaches for his foreign policy. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: Biden is <a href="https://www.axios.com/biden-trump-abraham-accords-israel-bahrain-uae-8d3d3658-0561-4faf-b11a-09cad13c6d5d.html" target="_blank">inclined to keep more of
Trump's Middle East policy</a> than any other of his regional policies. So the idea
of Biden "wrecking" Trump's Middle East gains is probably a bit
hyperbolic. He's not going to move the US embassy back to Tel Aviv. He's going
to continue the push for regional normalization with Israel. I wouldn't be surprised if he continued Trump's draw down from the Middle East. I
suspect Biden is going to be somewhat sensitive to what the Saudis
and Israelis think of the Iran deal. In part, to undercut and diffuse their
opposition, at least a bit, and in part because Biden knows there are going to
be other divisive issues that will come up in the coming years. Getting off on
a very wrong foot immediately on the Iran deal--Biden's going to rejoin the
deal early on--will make life more difficult for him then and later on. That
won't stop Biden from trying to resuscitate it, but he won't run over the
Saudis and Israelis in the way that they perceived Obama as doing. </p><p class="MsoNormal">Not sure that Biden will be seen as a pushover--either in a
vacuum or in comparison to Trump. Maybe, but maybe not. Look, Trump has largely
been seen as someone who's desperately looking to withdraw the US from the
world. He's made decisions to cut and run (Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia) or
withdraw (Paris Accords, TPP, various UN agencies, like the WHO, Iran deal,
etc.) without getting much of anything in return. To me, that sounds like a
pushover, and I suspect many in the world look at Trump similarly. Conceivably,
a more engaged and assertive US under Biden could correct some of these
weaknesses in US foreign policy. </p><p class="MsoNormal">However, if the world thinks the US public is more aligned
with Trump on foreign policy and that the Democrats--especially the progressive
wing of the party--don't have the stomach for global re-engagement, then
Biden's intentions and policies--no matter how good or thoughtful--will founder
and struggle to produce the kind of results he's looking for. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>YS</b>: Well, I am saying Biden will be seen as a pushover if he
bends backward to get a nuclear deal with Iran. And no, Trump's withdrawal from
the various accords like Paris Accords, TPP, etc., was not seen as a sign of a
pushover, it is more a sign of irrationality--that the US has squandering its global
leadership. But by the end of the day, states adapted to Trump, including
Japan. And it will depend on what kind of assertiveness/engagement that Biden
will do to bring American leadership back to the international arena. A return
to the discussion on TPP, climate change, and the WHO will be appreciated, for
sure. But the question from everyone will be: What kind of public goods Biden is
going to supply to the world? And as you noted, does the progressive wing of
the Democratic Party have the stomach for global re-engagement?</p><p></p>Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-75591896337554721672020-09-30T17:57:00.004-04:002020-10-01T10:28:53.218-04:00The Rotting Corpse of American Democracy<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbKfabus2IJIwktomKUjipERO02Hj-02oONx2qBNz1pMc7TrJD7r0QMJO7wPaTm9Ytki6jKEhF8x0KJLA7ajdbyinhnmBsZWR7ZGbl2eOjStJr1XQ5DVjswPAugGFwnhy3JZasGczPmweT/s1200/trumpy.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="1200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbKfabus2IJIwktomKUjipERO02Hj-02oONx2qBNz1pMc7TrJD7r0QMJO7wPaTm9Ytki6jKEhF8x0KJLA7ajdbyinhnmBsZWR7ZGbl2eOjStJr1XQ5DVjswPAugGFwnhy3JZasGczPmweT/s320/trumpy.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p>Arguably, the most disturbing global trend is the slow
death of American democracy. I suspect many observers of Tuesday's alarming
presidential debate--both here in the US and abroad--noticed the stark
decaying of democratic norms and etiquette. I resisted writing on this
subject for a while now, hoping that things in the US would get better. They
haven’t, and the political situation has now reached a fateful moment. It’s
debatable whether the US is a fully functioning democratic state. (Right now, I think
not. The US is more liberal than democratic.) It’s likely that a large portion of US citizens
will view the November election as rigged and illegitimate. Furthermore, the
prospect of post-election court battles, protests, and violence are high.</p><p>America’s dying democracy is the product of many events over
many years, the result of a series of factors that pre-date Donald Trump. The
essential role of big money in politics, the centralization of power in the
presidency, the wide and deep political polarization, the rise of radical political
groups, gerrymandering, and the rise of disinformation tools, among many other
things, have corrupted, weakened, and hijacked America's democratic
institutions, procedures, and norms. The aforementioned factors have
disparate causal roots and have impacted US democracy in different ways. Most
of them stretch back years and years, though they really became political
wrecking balls in the 1990s. No doubt, the US has episodically endured
political turmoil and upheaval throughout its history, from the Civil War to
McCarthyism to Watergate. But it is during the 1990s that America began to
experience the political paralysis and polarization that we see in full-bloom
today. </p><p>The 1990s are often viewed, particularly by the political
left, as the halcyon days of American politics. The US was on top of the world.
It had won the cold war and was about to embark on creating a "new world
order," by expanding its influence in a globally unprecedented way. The US was
led by a supposedly hip young president. Its economy was booming, aided by
the tech sector. And hopes of lasting world peace seemed to be in reach. Unfortunately,
this era of good feelings was brief and masked a darker side of international
relations and US politics. For at the same time as all of those good things
were happening, we also saw genocide in the Balkans, war in Iraq, genocide and
violence in parts of Africa, the crash and burn of Russia's stillborn democracy,
the rise of al-Qaeda as a global terror group, and so on. Domestically, ominous
signs were also emerging. The right, aided in part by talk radio and the newly
created Fox News network, lurched farther to the right, doubling down on faux
Christian conservatism. Political hostilities ratcheted up as Bill Clinton was impeached
and faced continuous political investigations that, in the end, went nowhere. Right-wing
militant groups came out of the woodwork, almost literally, doing battle
against the US government and launching a deadly attack in Oklahoma City. Clinton
posed as a sympathetic figure, an honest leader hounded by the right, but he
wasn't completely innocent. His numerous infidelities and possible assaults, as
well as his appointment of his wife Hillary to reform health care, roiled his
administration and later gave the GOP cover to support a reprobate like Trump
and his nepotistic rule. </p><p>Over the last 20 plus years, things have only gotten worse.
Internal divisions have grown, with bouts of violence and rioting pockmarking
US politics and society more generally. Extremists and radicals on both sides
of the political aisle are dominating the political landscape and even
celebrated in some corners of the internet. Political parties are often extensions of the loudest cranks and no-nothings in their ranks. And
if that isn't bad enough, Democrats and Republicans are rarely able to
cooperate, and meaningful legislation is just a fantasy. The courts have
allowed US politics to become a corporate playground of dark money, which has
further reduced the role and influence of citizens and civic groups in American
political life. </p><p>This polarized and dysfunctional political system described
above is the environment that spawned Donald Trump, and it is the
political environment he's operated in as president. In that sense, then, Trump
is a product of his time. But as president, he has agency. He has the ability
to mold and alter American politics in myriad ways. This isn't automatically a
bad thing, as long as Trump is an agent of positive, benign change. Alas, he is
not. </p><p>Let’s take a quick look at Trump’s record. Below is a brief
sampling—not an exhaustive list; that is beyond the scope of this post—of the
array of anti-democratic anti-liberal statements, actions, and policies of
Trump. Consider the list a greatest hits of Trump’s ethno-nationalist authoritarian
politics and governing style.</p><p>Trump has repeatedly cozied up to far right radicals. He has
defended them and refused to condemn them, even when given the opportunity to
do so. The Proud Boys, Boogaloo Bois, The Oath Keepers, QAnon, and white
supremacists and far right lunatics more generally have benefited from Trump’s
presidency. Just as importantly, take a look at the chatter among far right
extremists online. They believe Trump is on their side, they feel ascendant and
buoyant. Trump’s message last night, during the debate, to the Proud Boys to “stand
back and stand by” was immediately and proudly used by the group on their
social media pages. White supremacists firmly believe that Trump wants them to counter
vigorously, even with force, various protest groups. On his watch, hate crimes
have skyrocketed and domestic terrorism has become the number one security
threat to the US. I don’t know if Trump is a racist, or if he’s simply content
to align with racists for political expediency, but his administration has
created a dangerous, toxic domestic environment. Between his failures on Covid-19
and his winks and nods to white supremacists, Trump has been a national
security nightmare. He is unwilling to do what it takes to keep Americans safe
and secure.</p><p>And that’s just the start. Trump refuses to commit to
peaceful elections. He constantly lies, distorts information, and spouts
conspiracy theories. He governs only his base, particularly areas of the
country that lean “red.” Blue states are the opposition, states to be tolerated
at best, little better foreign opponents. And big blue cities like New York,
Chicago, and Los Angeles are characterized by Trump as enemy compounds. Trump
has made statements and put forward policies that can be reasonably viewed as
anti-minority, xenophobic, and just plain tyrannical. We see evidence of this
in his Muslim Ban, his border policy (with kids in cages), his comment that
African nations are “shithole countries,” and his overt targeting of Black
Lives Matter and Antifa (two nebulous groups whose members are not exclusively
people of color, though people of color play a strong and central role in each). His
latest attack, that a Biden electoral win in November will mean the end of
suburbia, is meant to disparage people of color and frighten white homeowners.
Trump routinely demonizes and portrays as enemies the FBI, the Democratic
Party, the press, among many others. And behind the scenes, he criticizes and
lampoons members of the military, people who make the ultimate sacrifice for
America, calling them losers and suckers. Trump uses his Twitter page to call
out individuals he detests, which leaves them vulnerable to his unmoored and
loony troll army. He views the court system as his personal and political
tools, existing only to do his bidding. His campaign, in the run up to the 2016
election, sought election help from a foreign power. Is he or his campaign doing
it again? And of course, Trump is stoking widespread panic over fears the
upcoming election could be rigged.</p><p>And just as problematic, Trump’s Republican Party refuses to
try to keep him in line and doesn’t criticize or punish him for his various
anti-democratic, anti-liberal words and policies. The GOP is an enabler, put
simply, complicit in Trump taking a scythe to US traditional and longstanding democratic
norms, values, and rules.</p><p>Going forward, there are three things to watch. First, what
will Trump do on Election Day and beyond? My guess is that he will declare
victory, no matter if he's in the lead or not election night. He'll gin up his
base, working them up into a frenzy in his speeches on his Twitter page. He’ll
use all sorts of vague and coded language, encouraging his supporters to “stay
vigilant” and “not let the Democrats steal the election,” and so on. Then he'll
try to get a GOP-leaning Supreme Court, assuming Amy Coney Barrett takes a seat
before November, to toss out thousands of ballots in battleground states, with
the hopes of overturning the election. I mean, it's crystal clear what he
intends to do. During the debate, he admitted he sees the Supreme Court playing
a role in adjudicating the election. If the courts rule against him, trouble
could still loom. All of the people Trump ginned up will seek an outlet to
release their pent up frustrations and anger. And at that point, there’s the very
real prospect of armed pro-Trump groups taking to the streets. </p><p>Second, how do leftists groups respond to a Trump victory?
At a minimum, I expect millions to protest a Trump win. If it’s widely
perceived that Trump stole the election via the courts, then the game changes.
At that point, the chances for violence sharply rise. Unlike Trump, Biden will
attempt to calm his backers, and that will help. But I worry that reassuring
words won’t be enough to mollify the far left.</p><p>Third, even if Biden wins in a relatively smooth contest,
that doesn't mean all is well for American democracy. In part that's because some
of America’s political problems are deep-seated, but it’s also because of the
extent of the destruction of the Trump years. Do not underestimate the trauma
that Trump has inflicted on the American political system and on many Americans
themselves. It will take years to come to grip with the Trump era. In order for
a full reckoning to take place, a number of questions will need to asked and
answered by American citizens, scholars, policy experts, and politicians. For
instance, how did Trump’s rise happen? How did he capture the GOP? How should we understand and process the behavior of Congressional Republicans who've given Trump political cover? What’s the
extent of the political damage of Trump’s tenure? How can the political system
better cope with the next Trump that comes along? How can the government restore
the trust that Americans no longer have in it? And all of those questions are
solely domestic issues. Keep in mind that there are many international issues—like
America’s tarnished image, its badly damaged global credibility, and its ruptured ties with Europe—that have been impacted by the rot of American democracy and the
Trump era. Those too need to be addressed.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-11209732855019471662020-09-08T01:10:00.005-04:002020-09-08T01:36:36.999-04:00Evaluating Trump's Foreign Policy<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgWtXBZiqJuUvOvFiGUpszgy9wt8MIXDDZ8W_dXi2EQGExsp6suuR5ZRtp_I3PFTbVxT7cq2tsFzj7nFG62Ot0Ic_M8mnbIH3rIC4MMZy7DU_BxNf-OhB3lmX21NcJ-FpFYRQETuNryfauy/s2048/Trump.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1365" data-original-width="2048" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgWtXBZiqJuUvOvFiGUpszgy9wt8MIXDDZ8W_dXi2EQGExsp6suuR5ZRtp_I3PFTbVxT7cq2tsFzj7nFG62Ot0Ic_M8mnbIH3rIC4MMZy7DU_BxNf-OhB3lmX21NcJ-FpFYRQETuNryfauy/s320/Trump.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p>Over the last week via email, Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes
Sulaiman discussed US foreign policy during the Trump era. Below is that
conversation. It has been lightly edited for clarity.</p><p><br /></p><p><b>Brad Nelson</b>: We're nearly at the end of Trump's (1st? only?)
term in office, and so it's a good time to look back at his 3 plus years in
office. Given our areas of expertise and interest, let's focus on Trump’s
foreign policy. How would you evaluate his administration's foreign policy?</p><p><b>Yohanes Sulaiman</b>: It is a mixed bag. As many have argued,
his foreign policy is oftentimes impulsive, chaotic, and lacks coherence, as he
is all over the place, pushing for unilateral solutions first before
trying to cobble a patchwork of coalition after things have gone wrong. Such as
his tiff with Iran. His disputes with Japan and South Korea is, I think,
overblown, but is also a bad move, at least optically. And his so-called "great
deal" with North Korea is just a balloon full of hot air, although I
am sure that other US presidents won't do better. </p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In short, he has made a lot of
unnecessary complications and enemies. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">On the other hand, it seems to me that some of what he has been
doing is working. Yes, a stopped clock will be correct twice a day, and his
motives may not be admirable, but it is hard to argue that he is wrong on China.
America’s policy towards China has been too accommodative and it led to
problems not only within the US (e.g. Rust Belt) but also in South and
Southeast Asia. And in an area where Trump doesn't pay much attention,
Southeast Asia, everything is still running okay, though I would attribute
that to the professionalism of the US bureaucracy. Of course, the lack of the
president's attention hurts America's interest—people here have unfavorably
contrasted Trump with previous US Presidents, including George W. Bush. Bush
understood and acknowledged the importance of Southeast Asia.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">And I consider Trump’s hit-job on Iranian General Soleimani
a good call, though Trump got lucky in the end, since Iran was dumb enough to
shoot its own passenger plane, which helped Trump avoid the messy aftermath of
assassinating a high level foreign official. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">So, yes, in terms of foreign policy, Trump is not doing very
well, but it is not a complete disaster either.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: I'll start first with the one major area of the world
you didn't mention, and that's Europe. Arguably, Trump's Europe policy has
probably been the worst part of his administration's foreign policy. When it
comes to Russia, Washington doesn't speak in one voice. Congress and parts of
the government bureaucracy, like Defense and the CIA, want a very tough Russia
policy. And to an extent, they've gotten their way: Sanctions are still in
place and the US has upped its arms to Ukraine. But Trump himself has been extremely
deferential to Putin. It’s one thing for Trump to want good relations with
Russia—something I agree with—it's quite another to take Russia's side on a
host of important issues, like election tampering, intelligence matters,
the relevance of NATO, and so on. And Trump is so loath to criticize Putin.
Whether this disjointed stance toward Russia is a good cop/bad cop
strategy, a product of a conspiracy, or something else, who knows? Admittedly, I
don't. In any case, it's all so bizarre. My guess is that, with Trump at the
helm, Putin feels like he doesn't have to worry much about the US, because he
faces little earnest resistance from Trump, which is in marked contrast to the
Obama years. Putin has a free hand in his backyard, can challenge the US in the
periphery, and continue his monkey business in US politics and
elections. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Just as problematic is Trump's policy toward Western Europe.
Trump has openly questioned the importance of NATO, refused to commit to
upholding NATO's Article V, said that the EU is a "foe," engaged in
trade wars with Europe, and constantly criticized various European leaders. US
relations with Europe are as bad as they've been in decades, possible since the
interwar years. At the beginning of Trump's tenure, Europe took a patient
approach, hoping to avoid his ire and preferring to wait him out until the next
US president takes office. But that's changed a bit, as Europe—worried about a
second Trump term and concerned that Trump isn't a political aberration in the
US—has begun thinking about life without the US. Europe has started discussions
on providing for more of its own defense and carved out policy positions on
various issues, like China and climate change and health/disease prevention,
independent of the US. At bottom, Trump's Europe policy has badly damaged
American credibility in the eyes of Europeans, and any solution to the problem
won't be quick and easy. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I think his Middle East policies are quite shaky. Yeah,
Trump can take credit for the Israel-UAE peace deal and demolishing the Islamic
State caliphate. But the peace deal doesn't change much in the ME. And the
caliphate would've been smashed with or without Trump; Trump's ISIS campaign
was just a continuation of the Obama years. His close hugs of Netanyahu
and MBS and al-Sisi were very risky, given that all three have tons of
baggage. His moving the US embassy to Jerusalem was unnecessary. His moving
troops around Syria and abandoning the Kurds was shameful. His and Jared's
Middle East Plan was dead on arrival. And pulling out of the Iran nuclear
deal was spectacularly ill-advised, as it only encouraged Iran to up its
nuclear activities, and done solely to fulfill a campaign pledge. Indeed, many
of Trump's Middle East moves have been driven largely by US domestic politics
rather than US national interests. But in the end, despite a host of
questionable American decisions, the Middle East isn't any worse off. Trump is
lucky that ISIS is dumb, US allies hate Iran, and most of the region no
longer cares all that much about the Palestinians. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Trump's Asia policy is also on unstable grounds. He's
unnecessarily riled up South Korea and Japan over things like trade and troop
basing. Turns out that US friends in Asia don't like Washington
treating alliances as a protection racket. And not only that, they're
worried the US, under a capricious Trump, will leave them
high and dry to face all the serious local security problems on
their own. His North Korea overtures, despite the great hype, have led to
nowhere. Actually, North Korea is still building nukes and disarmament is
a pipe dream. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Trump's China policy is somewhat understandable, for the reasons
you mention. But I don't get the sense that Trump or his staff (especially
Peter Navarro, Mike Pompeo, and Robert O'Brien) have any idea what they
realistically can get from confronting China. It seems like they're confronting
China just to confront China. I'm sure domestic politics is also rearing its
head here. The Trump administration has constantly scapegoated China as
the big bad enemy that's the source of all of America's ills, from getting sick
to losing jobs. No surprise, I guess, given that this is an election year and
Trump is fighting for his political life. But where has this gotten the US? The
end result of the heated rhetoric, trade war, and the COVID blame-game, among
other things, is terrible relations with China, the worst they've been since
both sides normalized the relationship in 1979. This might not have been so
problematic 15 years ago, but it is now. Trump is paradoxically helping to
foment the kind of cold war with China that he wanted to squash from the
beginning. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: Is there any foreign policy achievement, or series of achievements,
that Trump's accomplished as president? And do those achievements outweigh, in
your view, the bad in Trump's foreign policies?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>YS</b>: Well, sometimes "achievements" can be achieved
when your opponents are pushing a bad policy, making your policy look better
as a result. China's overly nationalistic foreign policy generates a lot of
dislike and distrust in South and Southeast Asia for instance, even though the
governments still grit their teeth and act friendly towards China due to
economic benefits. Or Iran as another example. Iran’s excesses in the Middle
East have caused a rapprochement between the Arab World and Israel, leading to
the establishment of diplomatic relations between UAE and Israel. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Are there any foreign policy successes based on Trump's own
personal intervention? I have been thinking about this for a while, but probably
not. His overture to North Korea generated lots of buzz, sure. While I was wary
of whether Trump was going to concede too much, in the end, the diplomatic
flurry ended with a whimper. <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.academia.edu/34711623/Why_We_Must_Learn_to_Live_With_a_Nuclear_North_Korea">As
I discussed in my article in Global Asia</a></span>, there's no way North Korea
is going to give up its nukes because it would end the Kim's dynasty. Kim only
met Trump because he expected to get lots of money, and Trump of course only
wanted to meet KJU because it showed him as a "dealmaker." In
retrospect, Trump got the better out of it, but I would not call it a foreign
policy success as it maintained the status quo. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Trump's China policy's only success is in showing
the world that you need to be tough with China to get things done. And
even then, as we can see, without Covid, it seemed that Trump had conceded too
much. Probably the only benefit of Covid is that it made states take off their
gloves and start yelling at Beiing. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: I think Trump's willingness to buck the hawks' wishes
for more war is an achievement, honestly. The US has been at war for nearly
every year of the post-cold war period, and every year since 2001, so no new
wars—to me, as a realist in favor of a more sensible and restrained US foreign
policy—is something laudable. As we know, the hawks and the war lobby are
formidable forces inside the US. And they are constantly on high alert,
always looking for the next war to fight. During Trump’s term, hawks have been
pressing for regime change in Iran and Venezuela and North Korea, and wanted
the US to deepen its involvement in Syria. Yet, Trump didn't fall for the siren
song of war, even though he did have domestic political incentives to engage in
various diversionary conflicts. He does deserve credit for that. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The IS caliphate was destroyed on Trump's watch. While his
approach to ISIS was Obama's, only with more bombings, Trump deserves credit
for completing the destruction of ISIS's turf in Iraq and Syria. However, I do
worry that Trump's adopted George W. Bush's "mission accomplished"
attitude on ISIS and is too eager to wipe his hands of anything ISIS. After
all, ISIS isn't completely defeated, and the group has made in-roads in Asia
and Africa. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Lastly, I think Israel is in a better position today than in
2016, something Trump’s base is happy about. Now, is this because of Trump? To
an extent, yes. Improved US-Israeli bilateral ties are directly attributable to
Trump. And the Trump administration played a role in brokering the Israel-UAE
deal. But in other ways, Israel's improved situation doesn't have anything to
do with Trump, but instead with, as you said, Iran's overreach, the
popularity hit Hezbollah has suffered in the aftermath of the Beirut explosion,
the sharply declining salience of the Palestinian issue, and the winding down
of the Syrian civil war. </p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: What are Trump's biggest foreign policy mistake(s)--sins
of either commission or omission? <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>YS</b>: Number 1: Not maintaining the level of engagement with
allies/friendly countries. For example, Trump's failure to visit SE Asia tells the region
that the US is not paying attention to them.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Number 2: Picking fights with fellow allies. Yes, the US may
be paying too much to the Europeans/Japanese/Koreans. But Trump could have
evened the playing field without pissing off the majority of his allies. His
desire for a "win" vis-à-vis these nations ended up hurting America’s
interests in other aspects, such as the absence of a coalition to deal with
China/Russia.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">To be fair, I am not going to say that his impact is as bad
as what his critics have claimed. The US still has significant influence, but
Trump is causing avoidable self-inflicted wounds. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: Yeah, I agree with you. Trump's failure to understand
the importance of peacetime alliances is his biggest foreign policy flaw. As
you said, it's unnecessarily aggravated US relations with its longtime friends.
Perhaps relations with those nations can be easily repaired by Trump's
successor, but that's pure speculation. If Trump is re-elected, that only
ups the burden on his successor. His successor will have to prove that Trump's
the aberration in US foreign policy, something that will be hard to do if he
gets eight years in office. At that point, after two terms of Trump, America's
allies will wonder if, going forward, Trump's successor is the aberration, not
Trump. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Trump's alliance problem has certainly cracked open a window
of opportunity for troublemakers in Europe and China who see the US as
confused and indifferent to what happens outside of its borders. And while
Russia really hasn't seized the moment, China arguably has, given its crackdown
on Hong Kong. Again, I fear what a second term Trump administration might
bring. If Trump is re-elected, he will be unbound, free to act on his craziest
and wildest ambitions. He will likely interpret a second term as validation of
everything he's done in his first term; plus, because he won't have any worries
about re-election, he will feel few constraints on his foreign policy
prerogatives, a domain in which US presidents already have a fairly
free hand. There are rumblings that Trump will pull the US out of NATO if
he gets a second term. What other alliances might he wreck? What other
friendships and partnerships will he pollute? And how will China and
Russia react? As a second term Trump administration winds down, might China, in
the belief it'll never get a golden opportunity again, make moves to strangle
Taiwan's sovereignty if not outright conquer Taiwan? Frankly, it's
possible. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">A secondary problem is Trump's tendency to pull the US out
of agreements, or threaten to do so, without any alternative plans. So, if the
US distances itself from, or, God forbid, leaves NATO, what's the next step? Is
the US going it alone in Europe? Is the US ceding Europe to Russia? Will the US
pursue a mini-alliance, whether formal or informal, with nations Trump believes
he can trust and are worthy of protection? My fear is that Trump will act and
then think about the consequences afterward, when it's too late. We can
apply this same logic to America's role in the WTO, the WHO, New START, and so
on, and so on. The end result will be more room for Russia and China to
maneuver on the world stage, to fill in the power vacuums created by the dearth
of America's leadership and its reluctance to fulfill its commitments. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In the end, I concur that Trump's foreign policy isn't quite
as bad as his critics suggest. Honestly, my biggest concerns involve his
domestic policies and political governing, both of which are fast eroding US
democracy and polarizing America in ways that haven't been seen since
the civil war. But that's another issue for another day. My main worry
about Trump's foreign policy is that what we've seen in his first term portends
something more ominous and dangerous should he get re-elected: continued
American decline, a further slide in US standing and prestige, a leaderless
international system, and a host of US rivals and foes emboldened by America's
full-on retreat from the world. In short, American foreign policy was able to
survive four years of Trump, I'm not so sure that it can withstand another four
years without major ramifications for US and global security.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>YS</b>: I don't think Trump will suddenly be
"liberated" after his second term. Take a look at the second term of
previous US presidents: there's no significant changes in their foreign policy.
Remember Obama's conversation with Medvedev that he would have more flexibility
after the election. At the end of the day, Obama's second term was not that
different from his first term. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I even argue that Trump's second term might see him pushing
for rapprochement with the EU, because now he has an enemy: China. In the
first term, he was doing a scattershot, shooting at everything with the hopes
of hitting a bullseye that would show him as a master "deal maker." If
he sticks with China as his target, his foreign policy will have a focus.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Domestically, though, methinks you worry too much. From
outside the US, the debate is like whether you should eat the egg from the
small side or from the big side. Plus, polarization is like a tango: you can't
have one without the other, and I think it is disingenuous to completely blame
him without considering how the media plays a major role in causing this to
happen (see Bari Weiss and Andrew Sullivan). <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>BN</b>: I hope you are right, but fear that you won’t be.</p><p></p>Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-29684831697899880972020-05-31T20:31:00.140-04:002020-06-12T02:16:57.145-04:00America Is Coming Apart at the Seams<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjTcI36BrMXtgVBfBosOUN90E7iAromoLOaUfdCZtFDWtgTanAj0XRNEj5rZDwkPHBP28O2R8RAvYIBSSs71ku1mbgxRwkP4gIihAk2RcBddU476D2kkpvJtyu-c2ITX2WOvJ_ElD1kO8U2/s1600/protests.webp" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="511" data-original-width="767" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjTcI36BrMXtgVBfBosOUN90E7iAromoLOaUfdCZtFDWtgTanAj0XRNEj5rZDwkPHBP28O2R8RAvYIBSSs71ku1mbgxRwkP4gIihAk2RcBddU476D2kkpvJtyu-c2ITX2WOvJ_ElD1kO8U2/s400/protests.webp" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="color: #666666; font-family: franklin, arial, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"> Protesters demonstrate as a store burns in Minneapolis. (Joshua Lott/The Washington Post)</span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
We are seeing dark and scary times in the US. 100,000 plus
are dead from the coronavirus. There are now than 40 million unemployed
Americans and the unemployment rate hovers around 15%. And Americans are rioting and
cities are burning.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The coronavirus has shut down the US for roughly two months,
and only this week are most states opening back up. The virus, with its grim
death toll, has been headline news for weeks now. And orders by authorities,
such as “shelter-in-place” and wearing masks, and so on, have been subjects of
political fighting between the right and left. With the Americans stuck
indoors, economic life has ground to a halt, with dramatic consequences.
Millions of people are out of work or furloughed, seeking unemployment, and
desperate for life to return to normal. While the majority of
Americans have taken the virus and its effects mostly in stride, understanding the
severity of the health crisis and the need to stay indoors and maintain social
distancing, there’s a pocket of citizens who are angry. Angry at medical
professionals. Angry at politicians. Angry at the WHO. Angry at the virus.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
On top of all of that, we now have another prominent case of
police brutality against a person of color. On May 25th, an African-American man from Minneapolis, Minnesota, George Floyd, apparently,
attempted to make a purchase at a deli using a counterfeit $20 bill. (It’s
still unclear whether he even knew he possessed fake money, or whether he
deliberately tried to swindle the deli). The deli called the police in
response. But the four officers who were dispatched to the scene made a minor
situation far worse. An unarmed Floyd was handcuffed and showed little
resistance, though the police pushed a shoved him around. Eventually, three of
the officers were on top of Floyd (while the other officer stood guard), subduing
an already subdued guy, and one of them grinded his knee into Floyd’s neck for almost nine
full minutes. As this happened, Floyd clearly suffered, claiming he couldn’t
breathe. The police showed little interest in Floyd’s struggles, and he died on
the street, in the exact spot where he was savagely detained. In response, the four cops
were fired. Additionally, the officer who killed Floyd was charged on three counts, including 2nd degree murder, while the three other officers were charged with aiding and abetting 2nd degree murder.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
People of color and their white allies are justifiably angry and
frustrated about the Floyd killing, specifically, but also by the years and years of police brutality and rampant political, economic and social discrimination against non-whites. Additionally, please keep in mind there is also a larger recent context to these developments. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/us/hate-crimes-fbi-report.html">number of hate crimes</a> are way up. The <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/12/white-supremacy-terrorism-in-america-2019.html">presence and activities (in the streets and online) of white nationalists</a> are an increasing domestic threat in the US. On several occasions, President Trump has aided and abetted, even given cover to, violent white racists. Furthermore, the Floyd murder is only the latest in a string of recent killings of African Americans (Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, etc.) by police and/or white Americans. Viewed in context, then, racial tensions have been simmering, and the Floyd murder catalyzed people into action. </div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">Protests and violence
first broke out in Minneapolis, and have spread across the entire US. Since May 26th, protests,
violence, and mayhem have hit the US. Heavily militarized police are on the
streets. <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/06/who-are-they-unmarked-security-forces-dc-spark-fear/165892/">Unmarked security forces</a>--secret police?--are on patrol in Washington, DC. Protesters and police have fought; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/us/politics/trump-st-johns-church-bible.html">police have even used gas against protesters</a>. Buildings and cars have burned.
Stores have been damaged and looted. Cities are in complete turmoil. And the
political, economic, and social effects will reverberate through the US for
years to come.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Most of the protesters have been peaceful and have good
intentions, it seems. They’re protesting injustice and taking to the streets to
vent their agony. A small contingent of protesters are looking to start or participate in illegal activities, like looting damaged stores. More ominously, according to reports, the
protesters have been <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/70497/far-right-infiltrators-and-agitators-in-george-floyd-protests-indicators-of-white-supremacists/">infiltrated
by white nationalists</a> seeking to hijack the moment and cause problems in
their name. The infamous "Boogaloo Bois" have appeared at dozens of protests, looking to menace and threaten protesters. And similarly, unaffiliated armed white dudes have shown up in <a href="https://www.inquirer.com/news/fishtown-george-floyd-protests-philadelphia-bats-hammers-20200602.html">Philadelphia</a> (baseball bats and hammers) and <a href="https://wgntv.com/news/protesters-met-with-armed-onlookers-following-demonstration-in-crown-point/">Indiana</a> (guns). Three white extremists in Las Vegas were <a href="https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2020/06/03/3-held-terror-charges-spark-violence-las-vegas-protests/3139032001/">arrested on terrorism charges</a>, including "conspiring to carry out a plan that began in April in
conjunction with protests to reopen businesses closed because of the
coronavirus and later sought to capitalize on protests over George Floyd." And we know white supremacist social media platforms are actively <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/white-supremacist-telegram-channel-encourages-violence-george-floyd-protests-2020-6">encouraging members to use violence in the hopes of starting a race war</a>--an idea known as <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/02/riots-white-supremacy-and-accelerationism/">"acclerationism"</a> and is popular among white supremacists.</div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p><div class="MsoNormal">It’s easy to take a narrow view and look at all the health
and economic problems as unrelated from the protests and racial issues in the
US. After all, the former two issues (health crisis and the economic fallout) and
the latter one (protests) have different proximate causes—the coronavirus with
respect to the first two, the killing of an unarmed black man regarding the last
one. Moreover, racism, police brutality, and violence against people of color
have a long and distinct history in the US. But are they really different from each
other? </div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I think if we zoom out, we see something different. I do, at
least. I see the internal crises in the US—health, race, political,
economic crises—the result of a profound leadership problem. Simply put, the
ongoing chaos in the US is the impact of bipartisan national leadership
failures. Americans are sharply polarized, increasingly indifferent to the
plight of others on the opposite side of aisle, can’t agree on facts, and can’t
even agree on who or what America is. Why? Because national Democrats and Republicans
have prioritized power above all else, and have engaged in a protracted power
struggle, politicizing everything while failing to stand up for national unity,
America’s democracy, and moral decency and rectitude. I’m willing to place more
blame on the GOP, but the Democrats aren’t blameless here. </div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Let’s look at the culprits in brief detail.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1. Trump is a massive failure. He’s grossly incompetent. He’s a narcissist. He’s a habitual liar. He routinely engages in race baiting. He spouts
conspiracy theories. He’s an authoritarian. And he clearly has little to no
moral backbone. His modus operandi right now is to get re-elected in November.
If that means he has to figuratively or even literally burn down the US in the
process, then so be it.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
His performance on COVID is embarrassing. For weeks, he
downplayed, ignored, and failed to act on guidance given to him by his own
government. His delayed response cost roughly 36,000-54,000 Americans their lives, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/us/coronavirus-distancing-deaths.html">according to research from Columbia University</a>. He’s recommended a host of downright
ridiculous and dangerous home remedies to combat COVID, against the advice of
medical professionals. He’s repeatedly patted himself on the back that ONLY
100,000 Americans have perished from the coronavirus. At this point, Trump’s
more interested in deflecting blame, with China increasingly
feeling Trump’s ire.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Trump has a long and troubled past with respect to racial
issues. In 2017, <a href="https://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2017/08/nazis-in-charlottesville.html">I
wrote</a>: “Well before he was a political figure and had to make political
calculations about his words and actions, Trump had a checkered past with
various identity groups. He (along with his dad and Trump Management) was sued
in the 1970s for housing discrimination, played a part in spreading false
statements and riling up New Yorkers in the Central Park Five case, and aroused
suspicions of bigotry during his Apprentice days. And of course, what helped
Trump rise to political prominence, even before his formal participation in US
politics, was his 'Birther' antics, a xenophobic and racially-tinged
campaign against former President Barack Obama.”</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
And in his time as president, Trump has fared little better.
Trump’s <a href="https://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2017/08/nazis-in-charlottesville.html">support
for white nationalists in Charlottesville in 2017</a> is but one in a string of
examples of his taking the side of violent white Americans. Earlier this year,
when armed protesters stormed the capital and threatened Michigan politicians,
Trump begged the state to take easy on them. He even stoked the fires of
radicalism and violence in April, when <a href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1251169217531056130">he
Tweeted</a>, “LIBERATE MICHIGAN!” Of course, this is a marked and intentional
contrast to his latest Archie Bunkerisms. In <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1266231100780744704">this
recent Tweet from Trump</a>, during an extraordinarily tumultuous time, Trump
wrote: “These THUGS are dishonoring the memory of George Floyd, and I won’t let
that happen. Just spoke to Governor Tim Walz and told him that the Military is
with him all the way. Any difficulty and we will assume control but, when the
looting starts, the shooting starts. Thank you!” His dog whistle here isn’t
very subtle. His answer to the protests supporting the rights of people of
color, ostensibly, is to threaten American citizens with violence—a far cry
from his position on white protesters. Furthermore, the use of the word “thugs,”
in the context in which he used the word, is commonly interpreted nowadays as a
racial slur—akin to the N-word—against African Americans.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Frankly, I’m not so sure that Trump is all that bothered by
the protests and violence. The ongoing chaos in cities across the US allows him
to use tough rhetoric and <a href="https://www.today.com/video/new-details-emerge-about-president-trump-s-photo-op-at-church-84287045548">get a photo-op</a>. Moroever, it enables Trump to play the “law and order” card—used by Nixon and other right-wing politicians
over the years—that he’s very comfortable with. Indeed, <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1267227396341669889">Trump recently tweeted</a>, “Law & Order!” The instability allows him to play the tough-guy, using and abusing police and military forces for political purposes, and
then take credit for cleaning up the mess in the streets once everything has
calmed down. The good part is that some prominent military officials, such as <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/james-mattis-denounces-trump-protests-militarization/612640/">former Secretary of Defense James Mattis</a>, are now speaking out, condemning Trump's politicization of the military and his divisive rule. The downside is that Trump is no longer flirting with authoritarianism, but overtly leaning on the tools and strategies of illiberal dictators, which poses a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/donald-trump-represents-a-bigger-threat-than-ever-to-us-democracy">direct and immediate existential threat to America's democracy</a>. How serious is this political and institutional crisis? Esteemed policy wonk Robin Wright, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/is-america-becoming-a-banana-republic">today in The New Yorker</a>, wonders if America is becoming a Banana Republic.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
2. Congressional Republicans have failed,
too. The GOP has silently abetted and sometimes vocally supported and assisted
Trump in whatever he’s said and done during his presidency. How
many Republicans have challenged Trump? Overall, Mitt Romney has done a decent job. But who else? The Republican party is now the party
of Trump, and so just about every Congressional Republican is worried about running
afoul from the party line, which adheres to strict conformity with and praise
of Trump. The risk of drifting from the party line, mind you, is that deviant
Republicans—those who dare to critique Trump—could get primaried by even “Trumpier”
candidates. All of this has degraded and perverted a formerly esteemed
political party, transforming it into decoration and puppetry. In exchange for degrading their personal and political reputations and integrity, Republicans (both in and out of Congress) try to take solace in knowing they've gotten their tax cuts and two new conservative members of the Supreme Court. But in consumating that deal with the devil, they've unleashed a political virus that's wreaking havoc on conservatism, the Republican Party, and the US. </div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
3. Congressional Democrats have also failed. Yeah, Democrats
only control the House of Representatives, but they are stakeholders here as
well. They can’t just blame Trump and the GOP; they bear some responsibility. And
not only that, national Democrats have consistently allowed Trump to dominate
them. Of course, he has the bully pulpit and tens of millions of Twitter
followers. But if the Democrats were serious—really serious—they could be far
more creative in pressing the case for the policies and values they supposedly
believe in, and communicate clearly and repeatedly those views to the public.
Making television appearances on CNN and MSNBC isn’t enough. Democrats could
hold daily press conferences at symbolic sites; plan and coordinate peaceful national
protests; commit to formulating a comprehensive domestic policy and governing strategy
with meaningful and constant input and buy-in from a cross-section of American
society; engage more frequently with and be much more responsive to the
interests and concerns of local communities—don’t just hold photo-ops; and so
on. This is just a small list of ideas. I’m sure more creative and innovative
folks can think of other, better ideas the Democrats could implement.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
If there is any ray of sunshine at the moment, it’s the role
of some local and state politicians, who are having to clean up the failures of
national, federal officials and politicians. This is evident in the case of COVID,
as it is in the Floyd case and the ongoing protests/riots. I’m thinking
specifically, just off the top of my head, of Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance
Bottoms, Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot, and Ohio Governor Mike DeWine. (There
are others, and I’m sure some of you might have your favorite. Apologies for
overlooking anyone.) They’ve tried to display calm, sensible leadership. But
even the mayors and governors, even the good ones, have been overwhelmed by the
severity of these crises and haven’t been perfect in their decisions. Governors
and mayors of all political stripes have been slow to react to the growing
violence and looting. My guess is that they believed that adding beefed up,
militarized police to a powder keg situation would only exacerbate tensions. Unfortunately, in the absence of strong policing, swaths of the US, extending
from cities into suburban areas, have erupted in anarchy. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The US is at its lowest point in 50 plus years. It’s not
hyperbole to say that America is coming apart at the seams. Americans are out
of work, sick, angry, and frightened. And political authorities are largely indifferent,
feckless, craven, and incompetent. And the worst of the politicians are
actively cheering on the chaos. The answer to the ills of America won’t be
found in new leaders or policies. The solution, I suspect, will require a more
fundamental reassessment and restructuring of American society. We need to
rethink the role of the state, relations between the state and society, and
relations between American citizens. Anything less than that will simply paper
over the existing deep-seated problems in 21<sup>st</sup> century America. </div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal">*Note: this post was updated on June 4th. </div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-22890089026702351152020-05-28T18:44:00.001-04:002020-05-28T18:44:28.924-04:00COVID-19 and US-China Relations<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhSMwgSMALUcOAeI39Q15dkSjEnSa86gMEnem4h2hnNND7_nGQ5AxjwnYEFIra-Ud-f5CrnctBCDogyRnOt3k-68n4sm3Z1nks635hXT89ID4Jrm00W231_YrUQwRxrfXz1iUwD2CPGURHS/s1600/trump+xi.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="524" data-original-width="931" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhSMwgSMALUcOAeI39Q15dkSjEnSa86gMEnem4h2hnNND7_nGQ5AxjwnYEFIra-Ud-f5CrnctBCDogyRnOt3k-68n4sm3Z1nks635hXT89ID4Jrm00W231_YrUQwRxrfXz1iUwD2CPGURHS/s400/trump+xi.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">Photo Credit: Fox News Online </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: xx-small;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: xx-small;"><br /></span></div>
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YS and two of his colleagues at Universitas Jendral Achmad
Yani, Mariane Delanova and Rama Daru Jati, recently finished a paper on
US-China relations in a post-COVID world. Below Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes
Sulaiman discuss the main points of the paper, US-China relations more
generally, and lastly the wider international political and security impact of
COVID. </div>
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<br /></div>
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BN: To start, let's get the big question out of the way. How
do you and your colleagues see COVID-19 impacting US-China relations? What's
your argument?</div>
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<br /></div>
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YS: In essence, it is my argument that COVID is leading to a
decline in trust between the US and China. While it can be argued that ties
between the US and China are deep and can withstand the breakdown due to
COVID-19, I disagree. There won't be a complete breakdown, at least not yet,
even with all of Trump's blustering–and both him and China know it—but in
essence, we will see the beginning of a warmer Cold War. Rather than complete
hostility/containment policies like the US pursued during the Cold War, it will
be a limited containment, with more economic/political engagement than the US had
with the USSR during the Cold War.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: How exactly does COVID "lead to a decline in trust
between the US and China"? What are the key events, processes, etc.,
triggering the decline in trust?</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
YS: As I noted in my paper, the key is the politicization of
the virus. On the one hand, we see China's victory laps in the US and Europe
and its hamfisted attempt to shift the blame from its censorship and cover-ups
and slowness to act initially; while in the US, both Trump and Biden are trying
to show themselves as tough against China. Granted that this can be argued as
just political rhetoric, but with rising distrust toward China within the US
population, it will have significant effects in the aftermath of COVID.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: Is the virus a primary causal factor in the deteriorating
relations between the US and China? Or just another major issue lumped atop of
several major issues (trade, currency, BRI, South China Sea, Taiwan, Huawei,
etc.) that plague the US-China relationship these days?</div>
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<br /></div>
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YS: The virus is basically the proverbial straw that broke
the camel’s back, since it is basically threatens vital US interests—plus, this
is an election year in the US.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: Is this downturn in US-China relations a short-term
thing or something more protracted? After all, the election will be done and
resolved—I hope—by early November. So what happens after that, in either a
second term Trump or a 1st term Biden administration?</div>
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<br /></div>
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YS: This will last a while. Not only due to the election,
but also, like I mentioned, due to various things that China has done. And the
virus has made a number of countries around the world very hostile to China. And
Biden will be tarred and feathered as weak against China should he win and
decide to accommodate China. Even before the virus, during the Democratic
Presidential Debate, virtually everyone on the podium bashed China. Maybe the
Democrats don't mean it, but they are all aware that being soft on China does
not help them at all. Yes, elections are poetry while governing is prose. But
being soft on China will hurt Biden's presidency—similar to the accusation that
Presidents Truman and Carter were soft against the commies.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: I think you’re on to something. In the US, increasingly
the driving force behind souring relations with China is, in my view, a product
of a new American political consensus that China is a growing threat (to the
US, to US allies, and to the world order). Coincidentally, I've read a few
pieces today on the possibility of an emerging Sino-US cold war. And those
articles typically argue that the signs of a new cold war are grounded in
objective facts—economic, political, security policies and statements China has
said and done. But I think that misses the mark a bit. Almost all of those
things, except for China's actions in the early days of the pandemic, have been
present for years. What's changed is America's perception of China. Put simply,
China is a looming threat to the US because key leaders in the US, on both
sides of the political aisle, see China as a threat. The key question is why
have those perceptions changed? I bet Obama wishes he had this consensus behind
him as he tried to implement his Pivot to Asia.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I don't think it's a given that a President Biden goes weak
on China, precisely because of this new American consensus on China. He'll
probably attempt to reset the relationship. But there's no guarantee that will
go well (See: the Obama-Biden-Clinton reset with Russia.) And if he goes weak
on China, he'll get dragged back to a harder line eventually by both R's and
D's and the larger Blob network.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
YS: I will need more data, but I suspect this COVID-19 is
what is causing the fall in US perception towards China. See the Pew Research <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/26/americans-are-critical-of-chinas-handling-of-covid-19-distrust-information-about-it-from-beijing/ft_2020-05-26_chinaviews_01/">graphic below</a>. Of course, the trade
war, among other things, has also influenced America’s increasingly negative view
towards China. I think Trump's trade war does sour people's view towards China—more
and more people now know that China is not a fair economic partner.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
But I'd argue that COVID is the real game changer. While
companies have been grumbling about China's industrial espionage, a majority of
people didn't feel the pain/didn’t care. COVID-19 is the great equalizer, and
everyone sees China as the culprit and China does not want to own it.</div>
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<br /></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgD6ijAqlBqEQoI2-Hn6rxfccEp1bwF0HOJXqIrENYrHpbmyvIANRjY7IreQyZUJNx6e-5zk3x33Uv4-_x8Srq3d1-I1wPlQ91hbKWQjykShyiuJh6VwSIr_EqfX2NSWvHcgJ8whB7tP3bW/s1600/covid+china.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="863" data-original-width="768" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgD6ijAqlBqEQoI2-Hn6rxfccEp1bwF0HOJXqIrENYrHpbmyvIANRjY7IreQyZUJNx6e-5zk3x33Uv4-_x8Srq3d1-I1wPlQ91hbKWQjykShyiuJh6VwSIr_EqfX2NSWvHcgJ8whB7tP3bW/s320/covid+china.png" width="284" /></a></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: Given what you've said, where does all of this lead? How
does the US, its allies, and any other state that's now highly skeptical and
suspicious of China deal with and respond to China going forward? Are we entering
the early days of a "new cold war"?</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
YS: We will end up in a new cold war for sure, which might not
a bad thing. While, yes, the risk of war (and nuclear war) will increase, I
don't think it is all bad, though. China will have to learn to compromise lest
it will find itself isolated. And the US will also have to start focusing on third
world countries like it did during the Cold War.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: One of things I see—and it fits in line with your
arguments about US-China relations—is that China is attempting to use COVID as
a window of opportunity to boost its position in the world. I think that's a
key here. That's driving some of the problems between the US and China these
days.</div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The US sees China as the problem (the source of the virus,
yes, but also that China downplayed and covered up the virus for weeks), and
cannot stomach that Beiing has the nerve to say that it’s the solution.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
For
instance, China is now parading around the world touting its
"success" in combating the coronavirus and offering medical supplies
to needy nations. Many experts see this as evidence that China's using COVID to
boost its soft power (Of course, we can question whether these attempts are
working, but still..). On top of that, China's engaged with the US in a
propaganda war, blaming the US for the virus. While many people outside China
aren't moved by Beijing's narrative, I do think it's helping the authorities in
China by quieting internal dissent and rancor. Which, in turn, strengthens the
Chinese state and Xi's hand—essential things in China's competition with the
US. More ominously, China's taking advantage of a distracted US and
international community as a whole to seize control over Hong Kong. It's upped
its control over Hong Kong over the last few weeks and the latest legislation
will effectively wipe out any freedoms and sense of autonomy that the
city-state has had. This is a problem by itself, as the US is worried about the
fate of Hong Kong (economically and politically), but it also might signify
larger ramifications. What's happening in Hong Kong could signal a new turn in
China's approach to what it views as "rogue" territories, like
Taiwan, if not a more significant change in posture toward parts of Asia. I'm
sure alarm bells are going off at the US State Department, Defense, the CIA,
hawkish think tanks, and so on.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
YS: China is basically snatching defeat from the jaws of
victory. And Trump is doing the same: giving China platforms to tout its
propaganda, by, for instance, behaving stupidly vis-à-vis the WHO. I understand
that the WHO has acted badly in kissing Xi's behind, but by not pushing for
multilateral solutions, Trump is basically allowing China to gain the moral
high ground. Overall, it is like an old Tom and Jerry cartoon—they both tried
to pass bomb to each other—but in this case, they are passing victory to each
other and each refuses to accept it due to their own stupidity. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: Before we wrap up this chat, let's look beyond US-China
relations to what global politics and security and economics will look like in
a COVID (and post-COVID) world. How do you see global politics and security
being impacted?</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
YS: Aside from a short- to medium-term economic crash?
People will start paying more attention to global health issue, at least for
the next few years.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
People are screaming about oil prices tanking, but once the
pandemic passes, the demand of oil will rebound. It may hit $100/barrel for a
bit, then expect fracking to revive and to push oil price back down. This,
however, may hurt Russia badly, so I think we might see retrenchment of Russia.
Already there are squabbles between Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus on the future
of Russia in Syria.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Overall in global politics, though, I am not sure there will
be that much of significant change.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-07/pandemic-will-accelerate-history-rather-reshape-it">Richard Haass</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0iK7o2386i8">Stephen Walt</a> both argue that COVID
will act as an accelerant on existing trends. I can see how health
issues/capabilities in individual states will intensify the focus on domestic
concerns, trigger a backlash against "outsiders" and
"foreigners," and increase skepticism of global organizations and
institutions, like the WHO and UN. All of that could, in turn, lead to a
greater push toward nationalist politics, a decline in support for globalization
and global institutions, and the world order will continue to crumble. Makes
sense, right? However, I do wonder whether the deepening and pervasiveness of
these trends will be temporary or enduring.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In many ways, it depends on what happens in November. If
Biden wins the election, I can see him using the pandemic, and the resulting
health and political fallout, as a rallying point to re-energize global
cooperation on several fronts, especially global health. But if he doesn't,
then it will be more of the same for the next four years, with China having a
free hand to shape the world order as the US pulls back and undermines the very
order it created 75+ years ago.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The global economy could be an even bigger problem than
global politics. US stock market bettors are gambling that COVID is just a bump
in the road, given that the Dow is still over 25,000, but that's more hype than
reality, I'm afraid. Small businesses are going to be routed because of COVID,
as will stores that make the bulk of their money from in-person transactions.
Tourism is going to take a deep hit. If sports teams around the world don't
allow fans to attend, then many cities are going to be in dire straits over the
next year or more. How long will it take for people to feel comfortable to live
their lives as they once did (even when restrictions are fully lifted)? Because
if they don't, that will create a huge economic drag--both in individual
nations and in the global economy as a whole. And once countries start to open
up again, will people who have been laid off or furloughed get their jobs back
or find new ones? Maybe not, particularly as businesses adapt and refine
themselves in a COVID world of fewer resources.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This is exactly the kind of world that needs a strong,
unified, and competent EU, US, and global economic institutions to provide
adequate leadership, technical expertise, and $. But these actors are unready
and/or unwilling to act on their own or collectively as global economic leaders
and problem solvers. Already, there is much talk about supply chains being
rerouted away from China (to the extent that’s feasible). While that’s not
surprising given this crisis, it’s not a good sign that global cooperation will
rule the day.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
YS: Health issues will be seen as important in Post-COVID
world, though for how long is a big question. The Spanish Flu devastated the
world for two years, with very high number of deaths compared to COVID-19, and
yet we never think of it as important—heck people laughed at George W. Bush for
stressing the perils of pandemics. Jay Leno, I believe, once quipped that when
Bush's health secretary talked about the necessity of stockpiling tuna, he said
he'd better off getting the plague. So, the one million dollar question is how
long and how much devastation this pandemic will cause before it will have a long-term
impact.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I see the EU (and the US, should Biden win) wanting to exert
more influence in the WHO, given how its current arrangement does not help that
much in preventing pandemics. There might be a greater push for international
organizations to have more power to intervene in states. Of course, China will
do whatever they can to block it, so, yes, at the end of the day, state power
still matters more than institutions. I think China will win the battle for
COVID but lose the war, especially if the US comes around and declares that it
will give more authority to WHO to deal with health issues.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
And I agree that the global economy is a wild card. It
really depends on how long the pandemic lasts. And now we can only cross our
fingers and hope that they will create a vaccine ASAP.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: Lastly, how do you see the study of and writings on IR
being affected by COVID? Of course, already, there has been some work focusing
on (1) the impact of diseases and pandemics on IR, and (2) what a post-COVID
world will look like. Do you see any other new or previously underexplored
areas of study popping up as a result of COVID? And if not, why not?</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
YS: Similar to post-9/11, we will see a rush in pandemic studies
in IR. There will be renewed attention to how pandemic affects/upends
international order (e.g. Justinian Plague that put the nail in the coffin of
the revival of Roman Empire, the Black Death that destroyed the Byzantine
Empire and heralded the arrival of the Ottoman Empire, Black Death's influence
on the collapse of Catholic dominance in Europe, etc.). It is a neglected part
of literature that perhaps scholars will take a second look at.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
COVID will also renew the debate on whether authoritarianism
or democracy is better at tackling crises. And as you previously mentioned, <a href="https://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2020/03/covid-19-and-international-politics.html">in your last blog post</a>, neoliberal institutionalism will have to answer a lot of problems
arises from this virus (e.g. lack of unity in EU, lack of international
cooperation despite of decades of institution-trust building all over the
world, etc.). Realists will have to account for pandemics and health issues
more general in their research programs. Truly, there are a lot of new research
projects that I can see from COVID. Of course, the question is whether we will
see any COVID-fatigue and how the gatekeepers in the discipline will look at
this.</div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-46399599097014467422020-03-15T20:52:00.002-04:002020-03-19T20:47:01.663-04:00COVID-19 and International Politics<br />
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<img alt="Image result for pictures of people with covid 19 masks" height="225" src="https://media.pri.org/s3fs-public/styles/w2304/public/images/2020/03/health-coronavirus-southkorea.jpg?itok=Het1ElZm" width="400" /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #555555; font-family: "source sans pro" , "helvetica neue" , "helvetica" , "arial" , "nimbus sans l" , sans-serif; font-size: 13.5px;">Photo: Kim Kyung-hoon/Reuters </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It’s now been a few months since COVID-19 first appeared and
began to spread around the world. The health fallout continues to mount. As of
this writing, <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/685d0ace521648f8a5beeeee1b9125cd">per
the WHO</a></span>, there are over 150,000 confirmed cases, some 5,700 deaths,
and 146 countries/territories have been hit by the virus. Health care
facilities and systems worldwide are being stretched to their limits, people
are stressed and panicked, and everyday life has been massively disrupted. And
making matters worse, the virus doesn’t show any signs of abating anytime soon.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
While I am not a medical doctor or professional, which means I can’t
credibly address the health and medical side of COVID-19, I am an expert in
international politics, and I can reasonably sort through some of the global political
implications of the coronavirus. What I’ll do here is focus on one main
international political implication: the weakness and failure of international
institutions and the liberal order more generally. </div>
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<br /></div>
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Sounding the alarm about the sorry state of the liberal
order has been en vogue for several years now, and these concerns have been
voiced and articulated even more loudly and frequently during the Trump era. Unfortunately,
COVID-19 just might be the death knell of the existing liberal international
order as we know it. Oh, the order might limp on, but any belief that it’s a
functioning, effective order is for the deluded and hopelessly Pollyanna.</div>
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<br /></div>
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The liberal order consists primarily of the rules and
structures that undergird international relations. These rules and structures
often take the form of international institutions, laws, norms, and they are
supposed to provide order, stability, and enhanced cooperation in the world, even
and at times especially during tumultuous periods. They are designed to fill in
the gaps in global problem solving left in the wake of narrow and often selfish
behavior and relationships exhibited by states historically. </div>
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<br /></div>
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Well, right now certainly qualifies as a tumultuous moment,
one that’s desperately crying out for global collective action and problem
solving. After all, the coronavirus is spreading, people are sick and dying, markets
are tanking, and countries are isolating, locking down, and quarantining
themselves. According to liberal (international relations) logic, these
institutions should be actively responding to the current crisis, addressing
the real world health pandemic. They should be greasing the wheels of
inter-state crisis coordination, dampening hysteria, and helping distressed
people get the care and resources they need.</div>
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<br /></div>
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So is this the case? Is someone/thing leading the effort to
coordinate a collective response from the international community? Are
international public goods being provided? Regrettably, theory doesn’t always
match reality, and this happens to be one of those cases. Indeed, COVID-19 is a
glaring example of the failure of current institutions to meet the challenges
of today.</div>
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<br /></div>
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Since the end of WWII, the US has acted as a global first
responder and public goods provider—in part to expand its influence, and in
part because institutions like the UN have shown to be troublingly ineffectual.
Arguably, America’s self-appointed role as a first responder and public goods
provider has been a mixed bag. On the one hand, it led to meddling in the
politics of foreign nations and protracted inter-state wars. On the other hand,
US efforts have done some good. During the cold war, the US worked to prop up
the nascent world order and stabilize and strengthen the economies, defenses,
politics, and overall quality of life of states around the globe, particularly
those within its sphere of influence; and as that happened, the US also secured
tangible gains as well—a big boost in trade, allies, influence, respect and
prestige.</div>
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<br /></div>
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Even so, these globally beneficial actions by the US papered
over the weakness and fecklessness of international institutions and allowed
them to fly under the radar. Liberal scholars and policymakers deceived
themselves into thinking that the global order was strong, popular, effective,
and durable. But this order was always overrated. From 1945 until the early
days of the post-cold war era, it was a mostly regional democratic order, with
democracies in the Americas and Europe as the foundation of it. And when the US
attempted to expand this order in the mid-1990s, thereby consolidating its
spoils from winning the cold war, it did so through a mixture of diplomatic and
coercive tools and policies, which in the end proved to be costly, violent, and
deeply counterproductive. </div>
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<br /></div>
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Donald Trump came into office in January 2017 on a mission
to correct these foreign policy excesses. And true to this word, Trump decided
to reorient US foreign policy, scrapping old strategic doctrines like liberal
hegemony and primacy in favor of a transactional, nationalist approach to the
world. A consequence of this new foreign policy has been America’s new tendency
to eschew leadership globally—on issues, in institutions, in other multilateral
forums, etc. Demonstrating leadership globally, especially on non-security
issues, runs counter to Trump's instincts and worldview as well as Trump's
nationalist America First strategic doctrine.</div>
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<br /></div>
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While there has been some inconsistency in the application
of Trump’s America First, there is clear evidence of it impacting America’s
relations with Iran, Europe, Canada, and Mexico, its position on issues like
climate change, and its commitment to institutions like NATO, the WTO, the EU,
among others. And on COVID-19, we’re seeing more of the same.</div>
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<br /></div>
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Trump’s approach to COVID-19 has been slow, slapdash, and
more concerned about scoring domestic political points. Most disturbingly, Trump
and his spokespersons spent weeks questioning whether the coronavirus was a
hoax, rather than implementing protective health measures, which has played a
role in helping the virus to spread in the US. The Trump administration also spent
an inordinate amount of time and effort <a href="https://thethaiger.com/coronavirus/us-and-china-compete-to-control-the-narrative-on-the-origins-of-covid-19">scapegoating
China</a> (the “Wuhan virus”) and the Democrats so as to deflect any political blame
for the burgeoning health crisis inside the US. And on policies designed to
alleviate the burdens of the virus, Trump has relied on nationalist tools, like
stopping travel from certain nations. Neither Trump nor his staff has made any
effort to spearhead a wider, collective international response to COVID-19. And
I am highly skeptical the Trump administration will do so anytime soon, not only
for the reasons I discussed above, but also because the domestic political heat
is getting hotter for Trump. Americans are now acutely feeling the implications
of the virus; there is a health crisis and corresponding health scare, of
course, but also deep simultaneous deep economic, cultural, and social disruptions.
They want authorities, particularly Trump, to address these problems now. As a
result, Trump, an unpopular president in an election year, is further
disincentivized to seek collaborative rather than national responses and
solutions to the pandemic.</div>
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What about China, the world’s number two great power? China is not ready to act as a de facto world government on COVID-19. Much like the US. It began slowly and secretively, drawing widespread criticism domestically and globally, but
China eventually got its act together. It has implemented lockdowns, quarantines, and a major economic stimulus. Yes, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/03/12/china-and-south-korea-models-seem-like-only-way-to-contain-covid-19/#6a963ab647d3">China’s
response has been harsh</a>, rigorously controlling the movement of local goods
and millions of people, but the country is now finally healing as new patients
are slowing to almost zero daily.<br />
<br />
But now that China seems to have the virus under control, it is now seeking to opportunistically take advantage of America's dithering. It’s dabbled in the authoritarian playbook of blame-shifting by <a href="https://thethaiger.com/coronavirus/us-and-china-compete-to-control-the-narrative-on-the-origins-of-covid-19">claiming the virus was the product and thereby the fault of America’s military</a>. <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order">China is also playing up its global efforts</a>, which include aiding Iran, Italy, and Serbia, so as to enhance its soft power and global standing. Of course, these moves display quite a bit of chutzpah, right? The virus originated in China, and Beiing did little in the beginning stages of the outbreak there, which allowed COVID-19 to become a massively huge global problem that everyone now has to deal with. </div>
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<br /></div>
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Well, what about the world’s relevant international
institutions, like United Nations or the World Health Organization or any of
the various global economic institutions? Surely they are stepping up to the
table to fill in the lack of attention and coordinated action by the international
community, right? The UN did recently set up a <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/13-03-2020-who-un-foundation-and-partners-launch-first-of-its-kind-covid-19-solidarity-response-fund">rapid
reaction fund for COVID-19</a>, and Secretary-General Guterres has been an
effective communicator. And “the IMF announced last week it would make <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/09/imf-urges-policies-to-stem-coronavirus-covid-19-economic-impact.html">$50
billion in financing available</a> to bolster health care systems and emergency
responses in low-income and emerging countries suffering from the virus.” Similarly, <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/03/17/world-bank-group-increases-covid-19-response-to-14-billion-to-help-sustain-economies-protect-jobs">the World Bank</a> "approved today an increased $14 billion package of
fast-track financing to assist companies and countries in their efforts to
prevent, detect and respond to the rapid spread of COVID-19." These
are helpful overtures, to be sure. And these institutions are very good at
disseminating information, stimulating public awareness, and generating debate
and discussion. But they are hardly panaceas for this global health pandemic. </div>
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<br /></div>
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In terms of organizing and galvanizing widespread international
action, the international system’s institutions are woefully inadequate to deal
with challenges of COVID-19. The strength and power of international
institutions comes from the extent to which states, especially the great
powers, agree to equip, fund, and work through them; they don’t have magical,
autonomous abilities to transform international relations. And because the
world’s powers have preferred unilateral rather than multilateral and
collective responses to COVID-19, these institutions have been mostly relegated
to the sidelines, bit players in a massively traumatic global event.</div>
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The IMF and World Bank funds are not nearly enough to help burdened
economies. The UN and affiliated bodies aren’t acting as a rallying point
around which states and non-state actors can link up to work together. Frankly,
it is precisely because of this that states are tackling the coronavirus
individually, on their own. And that has led to a patchwork of state health
policies and initiatives across the world, making the virus even harder to
contain than it already is. Ultimately, the problem is that the coronavirus is
a transnational disease that cannot be contained or stopped by the actions of
states working alone. Nevertheless, the best way to deal with COVID-19 hasn’t
been through multilateral or international action but via lessons learned from
discrete cases worldwide.</div>
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South Korea has been one much-lauded example. <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/how-south-korea-scaled-coronavirus-testing-while-the-us-fell-dangerously-behind">Consider
this</a>:</div>
<br />
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Korean officials enacted a key
reform, allowing the government to give near-instantaneous approval to testing
systems in an emergency. Within weeks of the current outbreak in Wuhan, China,
four Korean companies had manufactured tests from a World Health Organization
recipe and, as a result, the country quickly had a system that could assess
10,000 people a day.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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Korea set up drive-through test
stations, an approach only now being launched in the United States. Health
officials initially focused their efforts on members of a secretive megachurch
in Daegu with a branch in Wuhan, but they then broadened their reach to Seoul
and other major cities. As of Saturday, South Korea had tested more than
248,000 people and identified 8,086 cases.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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Countries are now trying to mimic all or parts of the Korean
example. And in hard-hit states where the Korean case isn’t being copied
adequately, like the US, there has been a big push from the media, journalists,
scholars, and analysts to get authorities to follow Korea’s lead.<br />
<br />
All of this points to what the risk analyst <a href="https://time.com/5802033/geopolitical-recession-global-crisis/">Ian Bremmer has called a "geopolitical recession,"</a> which is a product of a leaderless or G-Zero world. He writes, "The challenge we face today is the unwinding of the
American-led world order, and the absence of global leadership to step in and
take its place. We live in a G-Zero world… and the geopolitical recession is
its effect. In a geopolitical recession, fracturing global politics fuels
global risks instead of helping solve them." The failure of the world to form a working coalition to tackle the coronavirus is the latest in a string of examples of significant global issues going unaddressed, or addressed in a half-hearted manner: Climate change, North Korea, Russian aggression, cybersecurity, big data/privacy issues, disinformation campaigns—the list goes on. While COVID-19 is a health issue, addressing this problem, at least in a macro sense, is a matter of politics at the local, state, and international levels. The lack of cooperation, the bottlenecks, the refusal to share information, resource shortages, and so on are a function of underperforming political systems across the world.<br />
<br />
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<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
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For now, let’s hope that political authorities worldwide, working in tandem with health professionals, do enough, act quickly
enough, to care for those afflicted with the virus and to slow and reduce the
transmission of it. But once we get through this, there needs to be a fresh,
renewed debate on many parts of the international system, including the role and purpose of international institutions, how
the international community can better respond collectively to global crises,
and who/what will act as a global public goods provider to states/groups/people in need. It’s
time. </div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-60686765170876108032020-02-13T22:56:00.000-05:002020-02-13T22:56:40.175-05:00The Trump/Kushner Middle East Peace Plan<br />
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<img alt="Image result for jared kushner peace in the middle east" height="253" src="https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/GettyImages-1124868027-JARED-KUSHNER-MIDDLE-EAST-PEACE.jpg?w=720" width="400" /></div>
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<span style="font-family: Solido, Arial, sans-serif; text-transform: uppercase;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">JANEK SKARZYNSKI/AFP/GETTY IMAGES</span></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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Below is a conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes
Sulaiman on the recently unveiled <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf">US
plan to resolve the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian hostilities</a>. This plan
has been the pet project of President Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who
has been charged by Trump to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian issue. It
largely deals with political and security matters and is the second document
released by Kushner and his team. The first document, released in June 2019,
concentrated on improving economic conditions in the region, with specific
attention to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as Lebanon, Jordan,
and Egypt.</div>
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<br /></div>
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<b>BN</b>: All right, Yohanes, what are your thoughts on the Trump/Kushner plan? I think it's safe to say that the Israelis certainly love the plan. After all, the
plan is a pro-Israeli one. It neuters a potential Palestinian state. And the
Israelis get all of the concessions, including formal recognition of their
settlements in the West Bank (which were previously seen as illegal by the US).
The somewhat surprising thing is that there has been little blowback to the
plan throughout the broader Middle East. No protests, no violence, etc. <a href="https://time.com/5773138/trump-israel-palestine-peace-plan/">Ian Bremmer
claims that the ME has moved on from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict</a>, and
that looks to be spot on. And behind the scenes some of the Arab states are
recommending the Palestinians negotiate with the plan.</div>
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<br /></div>
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At this point, the Israelis, are in a good spot. They are
the dominant power in the relationship with the Palestinians, and the mood in
the region (at least at the governmental level) is increasingly supportive of
the Israelis, with Arab states actually wanting to work with them (on
technology, intelligence sharing, containing Iran, etc.). The Trump/Kushner
plan reflects, and also instititionalizes, these facts.</div>
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<br /></div>
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<b>YS</b>: The Trump plan shows the realities that nobody—especially
the Palestinians—is going to accept. But at the same time, the silence in
reaction to the plan is deafening. There are no major anti-US or anti-Israeli
demonstrations. It is very different from back in 2000s. While you have the
usual suspects (e.g., Palestinians, Turkey, and Iran) against this plan, the
rest of the region is very diplomatic. This shows the reality now that Israel
is no longer seen as a threat, it’s a status quo power, and in fact the biggest
threat in the Middle East is Iran.</div>
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<br /></div>
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After the Arab Spring, the Arab autocrats really fear
massive social movements. Not to mention, they see Hamas as Iranian proxy, thus
they are less sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, though they do have to
maintain the illusion and pay lip service to the Palestinians. So yes, in the
larger geostrategic view, the Palestinian issue is no longer a cause for those
Arab autocrats, who are secure in their legitimacy and wealth. They no longer
want to rock the boat. For Turkey and
Iranians, who aspire for regional leadership, the Palestinian issue remains
potent.</div>
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<br /></div>
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<b>BN</b>: Yeah, I agree that worries about internal stability probably
are factoring into how regional autocrats have responded to the Trump/Kushner
plan. But additionally, the regional environment—of which the Arab Spring is
connected to and has shaped—is much different than 10, 15, 20 years ago. It's
more violent, conflictual, unstable, and chaotic. And as a result, there are
many more things on the radar of the region's despots. The rise of Iran. Yemen.
Iraq. Syria. Terrorism. Libya. The Palestinian cause has slipped behind most if
not all of these traumatic issues. Also, it doesn't help the Palestinian cause
that the biggest issue to the Sunni states—the rise of Iran—has caused them to
warm up to Israel and not want to jeopardize relations with Israel. As you
mentioned, it's probably up to Iran and Turkey to go to bat for the
Palestinians. But those two states, especially Iran, are the worst states to
take up the Palestinians' cause, because the US and Israel won't listen or
negotiate with them on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</div>
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<br /></div>
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<b>YS</b>: An overlooked factor is the generational change at work
in the Middle East. The median age of Middle East people is 26.8 years, meaning
more than half of the population was born after 1990 and came of age in the mid-2000s, far removed from the struggle of the Palestinians, the Arab-Israeli
wars, etc. When you add in the fact that the economies of many Middle East states are in decline, such that even Saudi
Arabia has to engage in economic reforms (e.g., selling part of ARAMCO, the
family jewel), I'd hazard to guess that the unending Palestinian struggle no
longer significantly registers among young people. </div>
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<br /></div>
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<b>BN</b>: So where does the moribund peace process go from here?
Does the can get kicked down the road once again? Or do you foresee any effort—by
either the Israeli or Palestinian side—to engage with the Trump/Kushner plan?</div>
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<b><br /></b></div>
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<b>YS</b>: Basically for Trump, it is "my way or the highway." As
long as Trump is in the White House, this will basically freeze the status quo.
The Palestinians won't negotiate under that proposal anyway, and that gives
Israelis the excuse of not doing anything to advance the peace process. In any
case, I think the peace process has been long dead, and this is just the final
nail in the coffin. Like it or not, the regional security situation has changed
drastically and the only group still stuck in the 1970s (unfortunately) are the
Palestinians. Like you mentioned, the rest of the region has moved on.</div>
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<br /></div>
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<b>BN</b>: For precisely those reasons, I do wonder if it's in the
Palestinians' best interests to engage with the plan and earnestly work toward
a final resolution to the hostilities. The power dynamics are tilting greatly
toward Israel's advantage and nobody in the region is interested in defending
or saving the Palestinians.</div>
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<br /></div>
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Frankly, these facts are what Kushner is hoping will prod
the Palestinians to the table. His interviews lately (with <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FyRBJZ32q8">Bremmer</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2020/02/02/0202-gps-jared-kushner-on-trumps-peace-plan.cnn">Fareed Zakaria</a>,
in particular) have argued that the Palestinians can negotiate now, receive aid
and other help from the global community, work toward internal political
stability, and get their state in a few years; or they can avoid the plan, let
the situation on the ground, like in the Gaza Strip, further deteriorate, and
face the situation later when the Israelis are in further control of Palestinian lands.
If they try to negotiate later, so goes the logic, the Palestinians will do so
with far reduced leverage. It's another way of saying to the Palestinians:
"You might not like this plan, but you definitely won't like any plan in
the future, and in fact you'll probably hate any future settlement, so save
yourself the trouble and work with us now."</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The US and Israelis are engaging in coercive bargaining with
the Palestinians, and the Palestinians know it and are trying to resist it,
because they don't want the terms of any deal dictated to them. They feel
cornered. Unfortunately for them, they are holding out for more, for a better
deal, but that deal will probably never arrive.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>YS</b>: It will require much better leaders in both Israel and
Palestine to restart talks. The only reason why Arafat agreed to Oslo was
because Palestine was totally isolated internationally. He had nowhere to go.
Abbas is held hostage by the extremists (e.g. Hamas and Islamic Jihad factions). In the end, he cannot make any compromise
even if he wants to, else he will be deposed.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
On the Israelis’ side, the Netanyahu's government is
beholden to its political allies on the right, who are very unlikely to give up
anything in negotiations with the Palestinians. And with the corruption scandal
looming, Netanyahu has to keep appeasing them with hawkish policy positions.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In essence, internationally, the situation is very
unfavorable to Palestine, and, domestically, it will be political suicide for
both the Israeli and Palestinian governments to compromise. The only viable option
right now is to do nothing.</div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-66212504356819705802020-01-03T19:05:00.000-05:002020-01-03T19:05:27.567-05:00The Assassination of General Soleimani<img alt="The remains of a vehicle hit by missiles outside the Baghdad airport. The commander of Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guards Corps, Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, was killed." height="266" src="https://static01.nyt.com/images/2020/02/02/us/02iraq-airport-sub2/02iraq-airport-sub2-articleLarge-v2.jpg?quality=75&auto=webp&disable=upscale" width="400" /><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">The aftermath of missile strikes at Baghdad Airport. Iraqi Press Office, via AP.</span></span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">On Friday, January 3, 2020, the United States assassinated General Qasen Soleimani at Baghdad Airport. Much has already been discussed in the media about this issue. The main point is that as the head of Iran's The Quds Force, an elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and as basically the coordinator of Iran's clients in the Middle East (Hamas, Hezbollah, Assad, and the Houthis) -- or as <a href="http://theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/iran-loses-qassem-soleimani-its-indispensable-man/604375">Andrew Exum called</a> "the adult supervision in the room"--</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> his killing could open a can of worms and cause even more instability in the Middle East. </span><br />
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The question, however, is how much pain Iran is willing to inflict on the United States in order to avenge General Soleimani? Is Iran willing to escalate the situation by launching more attacks on Saudi's oil installations, or even hitting Israel?</div>
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In order to answer that question, first we need to identify what Iran's interests are. Iran's goal is to maintain its security by establishing and maintaining client states and organizations, notably Lebanon's Hezbollah, Syria's Assad, Yemen's Houthis, and Hamas in Palestine. And in order to control its clients, Iran has to make sure that it is seen as capable of defending those clients.</div>
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So far Iran manages to do so by propping up Assad, maintaining Hezbollah's supremacy in Lebanon, supporting Hamas' control over Gaza Strip, assisting the Houthis, and working as the key player behind the scene in Iraq. Iran, in turn, was rewarded by receiving loyalty from those clients. And in some cases, it is willing to assist its clients in causing pain to their opponents, such as by hitting Saudi refineries and, lately, by attacking the American military bases and even an American embassy through its proxies. Iran gambled that as long as it did not escalate things too much, it could increase its prestige at the expense of both the US and the Saudis.</div>
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The problem is that the attack on the embassy in Iraq rattled the United States, and was basically was seen by Trump as an attack on his credibility. Keep in mind that Trump was fond of using <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-iraq-benghazi-iran-baghdad-new-years">"Benghazi,</a>" an attack on the US consulate in Libya and the murder of the US ambassador there during Obama and Hillary's watch, as a rallying cry to show how weak US credibility was under both Obama and Clinton. The attack on the US Embassy in Iraq could have been a major embarrassment for Trump. With that in mind,Trump chose to escalate things drastically by assassinating General Soleimani, essentially warning Iran that none of its top leaders would be off limits should push come to shove.</div>
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At this point, Iran's choices are unpalatable. It could escalate things further, such as by attacking US military bases, but it would lead to a war that Iran does not want and cannot not afford. Its economy is in shambles, and the recent demonstrations showed that the regime is so deeply unpopular that it had to act violently to maintain order in the country. Embarking on a war with the US would basically decimate the regime. Moreover, it is very doubtful that both Russia and China will be willing to go to the mat against the US for the sake of defending Iran.</div>
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At the same time, Iran cannot simply stay silent, as it would risk its credibility among its clients. It would also risk its prestige. After all, what kind of signal does it send if Iran cannot do anything to avenge the killing of its top commander? Furthermore, what if Trump or Netanyahu becomes bold enough to assassinate Iran's important clients such as Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah? </div>
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I suspect Iran could retaliate by escalating low intensity attacks (e.g. using Hezbollah or the Houthis to attack US clients in the region, such as Saudi Arabia). It might hijack oil tankers belonging to Western nations, like what happened a few months ago, or even cause problems with oil shipping in the Gulf. America's lack of response to Iran's attack on Saudi's oil installations basically showed Iran that the US would not retaliate if it could keep the damage low enough. At bottom, Iran will try to make America's life difficult, but its moves will be far short of declaration of war, or even a major attack on US global interests. </div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-83517248302647236782019-12-22T23:52:00.001-05:002020-01-07T03:30:22.959-05:00India's Rough and Tumble 2019<br />
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<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/india-protest-citizenship-law-GettyImages-1189027414.jpg?w=800&h=533&quality=90" imageanchor="1"><img alt="Protesters participate in a mass rally against the Indian government's Citizenship Amendment Act in Kolkata on Dec. 16." border="0" height="265" src="https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/india-protest-citizenship-law-GettyImages-1189027414.jpg?w=800&h=533&quality=90" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: xx-small;">Protesters participate in a mass rally against the Indian government's Citizenship Amendment Act in Kolkata on Dec. 16. <span class="attribution" style="box-sizing: inherit; padding-left: 0.25em; text-transform: uppercase;">DIBYANGSHU SARKAR/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;">In 2019, Western news has focused on several themes, many of
which, not surprisingly, are connected to US President Donald Trump and his
policies, such as Trump's impeachment, US-China (trade and technology)
relations, the viability and future of NATO, the continued presence of
anti-democratic populist leaders, the spike in white nationalism and white
nationalist violence, Brexit, and so on. The intense focus on Trump has
squeezed out almost any room for several very important but overlooked events
and issues in 2019. Here, in this blog post, there's one specific case I'd like
to focus on, one that's in need of more attention by a wider audience. In
short, in my mind, the country to watch in 2019—and arguably, in 2020, as well—has
been India. </span></div>
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India has been roiled by turmoil and violence this past
year. In February, India engaged in a dangerous tit-for-tat military exchange with
nuclear-armed neighbor Pakistan over a terrorist bombing in India-administered
Kashmir. India went on the offensive and attacked a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp
in Pakistan, Pakistan responded with an air strike across the Line of Control,
and the subcontinent looked as if it was on the precipice of a catastrophic
war. Indeed, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/indias-new-security-order/">as Paul
Staniland points out</a>, "With an Indian pilot in Pakistani hands, the
crisis looked as though it might escalate, and there are credible reports that
India threatened missile strikes against Pakistan, amidst efforts at crisis
management by third parties. Pakistan soon returned the captured
pilot to India and the crisis abated." </div>
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In August, under the guise of building a more cohesive Indian
state, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by Home Minister Amit Shah, begun
deeply tightening its control over Jammu and Kashmir. The government removed
article 370 of the constitution, thereby stripping Jammu and Kashmir of
its special autonomous status, and relegated the region to the status of
"union territory." At the same time, the government cracked down on
political dissidents and opponents and enacted an Internet and phone blackout
in these two areas. It's a combustible situation that has yet to be fully
resolved, as political opponents and human rights activists attest. </div>
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More recently, on December 11, the BJP government passed <a href="https://time.com/5746688/india-citizenship-amendment-bill/">"The
Citizenship Amendment Bill,"</a> which "would give many citizens of
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh the opportunity to apply for Indian
citizenship based on their beliefs alone. But the Bill stipulates they must be
Hindu, Christian, Sikh, Jain, Parsi or Buddhist; Muslims are not listed."
This, in turn, has triggered waves of protests and demonstrations throughout
India, home to roughly two hundred million Muslims who are feeling targeted and
repressed by the BJP. But it’s not only Muslims who are on edge, it’s local student
and activists and advocates who fear that India is backsliding away from its longstanding
commitment to democracy and human rights and moving toward an ethno-religious authoritarian
state.</div>
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In the end, the bill has predictably turned up the political
heat in India, triggering violence, bloodshed, and a heavy-handed crackdown led
by the state. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/how-young-lawyers-are-joining-the-struggle-against-indias-citizenship-law/2019/12/21/c44ac5f6-23f2-11ea-9c2b-060477c13959_story.html">According
to the Washington Post,</a> “In an effort to try to quell the protests, the
Indian government has detained thousands and turned off Internet access in
several cities. Those actions appear to have only further incited the
protesters and prompted more violence. Friday marked a particularly bloody day
for cities in the country’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, as 15 protesters
in several cities lost their lives, according to state police officials.
Internet in 15 cities remained suspended in the state Saturday. Despite these
curbs, the protests show no signs of abating, and at least four demonstrations
took place across Delhi, the capital region.”</div>
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What's going on here? What's explains India's behavior in
2019? The oft-told story about India nowadays is that the government is helmed
by ardent Hindu nationalists who seek to remake the state and society in line
with their ethno-politico preferences and interests. According to this
narrative, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his BJP are a bunch of hardcore Hindu
nationalists, and once they captured power in 2014, they were then in a
position to act on their ethno-political dreams. And since coming into office, Modi,
through word and legislation and other forms of political action, has operationalized
Hindu nationalism as both a political means and a political end to be achieved.
Yes, it’s an end, because a Hindu state is the ultimate goal for the BJP.</div>
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But it’s also a useful means to various ends, because
pro-Hindu policies are popular among the BJP’s base of support and they strengthen
the party’s hold onto power, both of which fuel the government’s ability to get
its way on politics and policy. Modi himself has wielded Hindu nationalism as a
magic wand for his and his party’s advantage. Eurasia Group’s Ian Bremmer nicely
captures this point. Bremmer argues that electoral pressures—specifically, the
spring 2019 parliamentary elections—and a weakening economy directly led Modi
to double down on Hindu nationalism. <a href="https://time.com/5753624/india-narendra-modi-nationalism/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=editorial&utm_term=ideas_&linkId=79434992">He
writes</a>: “India’s economy began to slow, a product of the external global
market environment, continued structural challenges on the domestic front and
short-sighted government policies. Modi opted to turn to Hindu nationalism to
bolster his poll numbers, a decision that helped him perform better than
expected in national elections in spring 2019. And after securing reelection,
Modi continued leaning his shoulder into Hindu nationalism, while neglecting
issues like land reform or reducing trade barriers.”</div>
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The other crucial element here—one that has received far
less attention—is that we’re witnessing some of the fits and spurts associated
with a power rising on the world stage. History tells us that it can be very
disruptive when rising powers, which are usually revisionist to some degree in
nature, seek a larger place in the world: the rising power, pushing outward and
placing stress on the extant regional and world orders, wants more influence
and power; status quo powers, meantime, are reluctant to grant such things,
fearing a diminution of their status regionally and globally. We’re now seeing
the early stages of this process playing out in India’s rise. India is clearly
a rising power and sees itself as such, wants to be recognized as a global
power, and it is becoming far less inclined to compromise on what it perceives
as its core national interests. Under Modi, India is no longer interested in
punching below its weight on global affairs; it seeks a place at the table of
great powers, whether they like it or not. Admittedly, while India’s foreign
policy isn’t nearly as expansionist or aggressive as China’s is these days, it’s
evident that Delhi is flaring its elbows a bit in search of influence and
prestige commensurate with its growing material power. This is causing India to
butt heads with Pakistan, of course, but also potentially with China, the US,
and Russia.</div>
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Finally, let’s touch on the implications of all of this. In particular,
what is the global impact of all of India’s moves in 2019? And what kind of
blowback might India face? There are lots of ways to answer this question. For the
sake of brevity, I’ll limit my remarks to three central points.</div>
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First, India’s overt Hindu nationalist play risks degrading the
nation’s soft power. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-21/government-tries-to-curb-media-coverage-of-india-wide-protests">According
to Michael Kugelman</a>, a South Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson center, “These
protests have hurt the government’s image....Global perceptions are
shifting-and that’s no small matter for a nation that has long enjoyed a relatively
positive image abroad and considerable soft power.” While this is probably true
for the short-run, especially as images of violence leak out to the world, it’s
less clear that it will hold over the long-term. Ultimately, the global fallout
of the domestic turmoil depends on how Modi and his BJP deal with India’s
festering social and political divisions. Do they attempt damage control,
reaching out and protecting the rights of distressed citizens and inhabitants
of India and resisting the siren song of Hindu tyranny—perhaps by limiting the
implementation of the <a href="https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/what-is-nrc-all-you-need-to-know-about-national-register-of-citizens-1629195-2019-12-18">proposed
National Registry</a>? If they do, foreign countries that value human rights,
especially the Western powers consumed with China’s dominance, will be more
than happy to forgive and forget India’s rough and tumble 2019.</div>
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Second, 2019 has definitively raised the stakes in South
Asia. For roughly the past 20 years, Pakistan counted on a level of restraint
from India in response to regional events—terror attacks, Kashmir, missile
tests, etc.—which has allowed it to poke and prod and undermine Indian
interests. It would no longer be wise for Pakistan to assume India will exhibit
such restraint going forward, even in its relations with Pakistan. Moreover, it
should not assume that nuclear deterrence will necessarily, automatically hold
each side at bay. Highly nationalist India and Pakistan are demonstrating a
greater willingness to defend and protect their interests, take chances and
embrace reckless foreign policies, and accept costs along the way. This is an
alarming situation, particularly considering the subcontinent’s history of inter-state
rivalry and ethnic divides, stockpiles of nuclear arms, and presence of terror
groups.</div>
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Third, there is a chance that relations with the US could be
adversely impacted. Frankly, at this point, the Trump administration doesn’t
seek to pick a fight with India over its domestic policies—which makes sense,
given Trump’s policy of mostly staying out of the business of other countries’
internal politics. If Trump turns up the heat on India anytime soon, it will be
because of its <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-wants-india-to-lower-its-tariffs/article30345913.ece">trade
and broader economic policy</a>. Moreover, Trump and his acolytes value India’s
role as a potential local counterbalancer to China’s movement and expansion in
South Asia and the Indian Ocean. After all, the reason the US government has
changed the name of its Asia policy from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” is to
highlight India’s growing importance in US foreign policy.</div>
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The bigger problem for India are America’s democrats. Just last week, External Affairs Minister S.
Jaishankar <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/rift-between-progressive-democrats-in-us-and-modi-government-out-in-open/articleshow/72897482.cms">canceled
a meeting a US Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee</a> because of the
presence of Washington Democrat Pramila Jayapal, who, along with <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Squad_(United_States_Congress)">the
so-called Squad</a>, has been openly critical of the Modi government, its human
rights policy, and its cozy relationship with Donald Trump. Indeed, “Jayapal
has introduced a bi-partisan resolution in the House calling for an end to the
restrictions in Jammu and Kashmir and for the Government of India to respect
international human rights law.” This, as should be expected, has triggered the
ire of the BJP.</div>
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In general, as long as the Trump White House continues to
downplay human rights and the state of global democracy in its foreign policymaking,
Congressional Democrats will harp on these issues, as they try to make the case
that they, not Trump or his Republican Party, are the only ones in the US
capable of formulating and implementing an ethical, moral policy platform. And if
a Democrat takes the White House in the November 2020 election, she or he will
face pressure from the liberal base to depart from Trump’s convention of
turning a blind eye to human rights abuses and democratic backsliding
worldwide. My guess is that a Democratic foreign policy will primarily critique
and pressure China, North Korea, and Russia, among other nations, though India
probably won’t get a free pass from America’s left. That, in turn, will create
friction in Delhi-Washington ties, thereby requiring deft diplomacy to ensure
relations don’t suffer a severe setback from the previous decade of bilateral
progress and momentum. </div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-89212282472845818912019-11-04T21:32:00.001-05:002019-11-04T21:32:30.394-05:00The Impact of the Death of al-Baghdadi<br />
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<img alt="Image result for al baghdadi" height="265" src="https://thenypost.files.wordpress.com/2019/11/al-baghdadi.jpg?quality=90&strip=all&w=618&h=410&crop=1" width="400" /></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Photo: AP.</span></div>
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Below is a conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman on the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It was conducted via email over the last week. </div>
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<b>Brad Nelson</b>: There are a lot of things happening in Syria lately.
Basically, it's been non-stop Syria news for the last few weeks or so. Here, in
this exchange, let’s focus on much-discussed, much-hyped event: the death of Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, the former leader of ISIS. What do you make of it? And what
kind of impact will it have on ISIS?</div>
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<b>Yohanes Sulaiman</b>: While the death of al Baghdadi is significant in terms
of PR for Trump and a blow to the ego of the ISIS, in a larger strategic
picture, this does not have that much of an impact. ISIS has been in decline
for the past few years. ISIS managed to get big because the conditions were
right: Syria was in disarray while Iraq's government has lacking in legitimacy,
providing fertile grounds for ISIS to grow and to gain a significant chuck of
territory. Due to its brutality, though, ISIS ended up being hated and hounded
by everyone. And its opponents have gotten wiser in dealing with it—e.g.
attacking its internet propaganda infrastructure, establishing improving deradicalization
programs, etc. While ISIS-inspired lone wolf attacks remain a problem, it is
not that significant of a threat.</div>
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What next for ISIS? I think a collaboration with al Qaeda (AQ) probably its best option. Based on the fact that al Baghdadi was found in a
stronghold of AQ in Syria, the two groups probably reached an accommodation of
some sort.</div>
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<b>BN</b>: I see al-Baghdadi's death as simply accelerating trends
that are already in motion. It pushes the group further toward
decentralization. As the caliphate crumbled and its fighters have gone
underground, ISIS has less sway over its affiliates and franchises. And without
a credible leader right now, that's even more so the case. And then there's the
prospect that al-Baghdadi's successor will likely lack his military, religious,
and organizational credentials. If the next ISIS leader is a step back from
al-Baghdadi in terms of respect and prestige, there's the chance that its affiliates will try to take advantage of the
situation by broadening and deepening their autonomy from ISIS HQ and a few
might even defect, sliding toward AQ. </div>
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There is already lots of talk of ISIS
lashing out now--as it seeks to avenge al-Baghdadi's death, remain relevant,
and forestall any defections. Sure, we might see an uptick in ISIS-related violence. However,
keep in mind that ISIS was already very violent, wielding
violence almost indiscriminantly, so I really don't anticipate too much change
there. </div>
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<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03-29/coming-isis-al-qaeda-merger">Bruce Hoffman has argued that an AQ-ISIS merger</a> (or really a re-merger) could well happen. I'm a little more skeptical,
at least for now. Yes, collaboration is something ISIS could opt for, but it
would probably be unwise at the moment. AQ knows that ISIS is in flux (having
lost its leader and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/31/middleeast/isis-new-leader-al-qurashi-intl/index.html">recently
promoted a possible neophyte</a>), and as a result, al-Zawahiri is likely to
see ISIS as weakened and desperate. AQ has the bargaining leverage. If ISIS
wants to work with AQ, then AQ would be smart to demand it happening on AQ's
terms. Would ISIS go for that? It’s unknown at this point, especially since we
don't know much about al-Hashemi thus far.</div>
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My expectation is this: Rather than working with ISIS, I
expect AQ to try to drive the stake in ISIS's heart by attempting to sow
further divisions within ISIS and even press ISIS affiliates to switch teams.
Why fold (in its competition with ISIS) when AQ has an opportunity to win the
game, so to speak?</div>
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<b>YS</b>: Keep in mind that ISIS and its ilk can only be
successful under narrow main conditions: first is the weaknesses of the states
where they operate, and second, when states are simply unprepared to deal with
these groups. So, I don't think we will see an emergence of a third group or
reemergence of both AQ and ISIS as a global jihadist network at this point.
Syria and Iraq are still in a mess, but they are stabilizing, and the populace
are totally alienated due to ISIS brutality. Afghanistan remains a weak state,
but the Taliban is more of a local phenomenon than an international movement.
Same thing with Somalia and Nigeria. Terrorists there are really a product of
local movements that tried to link themselves to a global jihadist movement.
And nowadays states are far more prepared to deal with the reemergence of the
new al-Qaeda or ISIS. Granted, this does not rule out any lone wolf attacks,
but as <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-policy-essay-can-terrorists-be-scared-straight">John
Mueller notes</a>, especially in the US, the risk of a terrorist attack is very
low, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-12-19/why-jihadist-attacks-have-declined-europe">and
in Europe</a>, the police are much wiser to deal with the threats. And
financing, <a href="https://www.americansecurityproject.org/how-are-terrorist-organizations-financed/).">especially
from the Gulf States</a>, is drying up. While terrorists may be able to work
with <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/opium-trade-and-patterns-terrorism-provinces-afghanistan-empirical-analysis">local
jihadist groups or criminal groups</a> for financing, it seems to me that ISIS
might find it harder than al Qaeda <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2019/10/04/isis-in-afghanistan-is-still-able-to-field-thousands-of-fighters-despite-hellacious-fight-to-destroy-it/">due
to its extremism</a>.</div>
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<b>BN</b>: Iraq and Syria are among the most chaotic, unstable, and
violent states in the world. There are ample opportunities for AQ and ISIS to
re-emerge there if the metaphorical foot is taken off their throats. Plus, ISIS
still has anywhere from 14-18,000 foot soldiers, so that group still has a deep
bench, with arms, and millions of dollars the group has squirreled away.</div>
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Regarding AQ: AQ is still very strong in Iraq and Syria. Research
from <a href="https://www.amazon.com/After-Caliphate-Islamic-Terrorist-Diaspora/dp/1509533877">Colin
Clarke</a> and <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-07-01/how-win-friends-and-wage-jihad">Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross</a>, among others, on the political dynamics in Syria says
that AQ has embedded itself in local structures and populations in Syria, and
it's going to be hard to remove the group. And AQ has had a longstanding
presence in Sunni Iraqis areas since shortly after the US invasion in 2003.</div>
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All of this, in combination with some of the things I've
already said in this exchange, leads me to believe that both groups are still formidable,
though ISIS is the more dangerous global terrorist group. It's a desperate,
decentralized group looking to remain relevant and important globally. It's
very likely seeking quick "wins" right now. AQ is playing a different
game. It doesn't have the same short-term, narrow perspective. There is also
accumulating evidence that <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/03/how-terrorist-groups-learn-implications-for-al-qaeda.html">AQ
has learned the lessons</a> of its past, learned from the mistakes of ISIS, and
learned from the "successes" of groups like Hezbollah. As a result,
AQ is biding its time, regrouping and establishing momentum in the
broader Middle East. And for those reasons, AQ isn't quite the global threat
that ISIS is, in my view. </div>
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<b>BN</b>: The one last point I’d like to make concerns the organizational
literature’s thoughts on the death of al-Baghdadi. <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Terrorists-Dilemma-Managing-Violent-Organizations/dp/0691166307/ref=sr_1_2?keywords=jacob+shapiro&qid=1572916269&sr=8-2">Jacob
Shapiro</a>, <a href="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00157">Jenna
Jordan</a>, and others others, have written on how mature, bureaucratized, layered
terrorist organizations that have targeted wellsprings of support can withstand
the loss of key leaders. These groups have built-in rules and processes that allow
militants to get promoted up the ranks as needed; they also have the requisite
base of support to replenish the ranks as militants either get promoted,
killed, or simply defect from the organization.</div>
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This, of course, doesn’t describe all terror groups. Many
groups are young, fragile, and very reliant on a leader. By contrast, ISIS is a
classic example of a bureaucratized group with a strong base of support—both locally,
regionally, and internationally. ISIS has the infrastructure to move into a
post-Baghdadi era. That doesn’t mean it will be easy. But for those expecting
ISIS to fade away, well, that’s unlikely. </div>
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The good part, though, is that the group isn't nearly the global menace it was in 2015, it's unlikely to recapture its past glory and power, and it has been plagued by what <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/baghdadis-death-does-not-matter-opinion-1468782">Max Abrahms calls "stupid" leadership</a>. </div>
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In short, ISIS faces a dilemma. It can go underground, rest and recover, but risk getting eclipsed once again by AQ. This is the safe choice. Or it can continue to act as an impulsive, ultra-violent organization, in order to retain global brand visibility and attention. This is the risky and arguably dumbest choice. Because in remaining violent, killing everyone and everything in its path, ISIS will remain the subject of a harsh counterterrorism measures by states around the world. And those counterterrorism efforts will make life very difficult for the group and its members. They degrade ISIS's capabilities, create a brain drain through attrition, and effectively hem in the group. My guess is that ISIS will chose the second option. This will keep the group in the news and as a global threat to security, but also ensure that it is constantly hounded and on the run.</div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-37408687092395755182019-08-18T18:52:00.001-04:002019-08-18T18:52:41.856-04:00Curfewed Nights: An Assessment of the Crisis in Kashmir and Its Implications for Domestic and International Security<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjsm2ymgUxVIxjvGAL8CRhNHdDG5Z7YTHb1U-k_5PUXFGNw2EJIskUjo7khQwk1H_7F25ye6KhxLupxNFuzn1hoUkC0oPE6n3kQl6zOrgC85QlWYWkhKR1o53k0_eHNlXcmMlcCRtbsL0At/s1600/CAB.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="960" data-original-width="1280" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjsm2ymgUxVIxjvGAL8CRhNHdDG5Z7YTHb1U-k_5PUXFGNw2EJIskUjo7khQwk1H_7F25ye6KhxLupxNFuzn1hoUkC0oPE6n3kQl6zOrgC85QlWYWkhKR1o53k0_eHNlXcmMlcCRtbsL0At/s400/CAB.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Author interview in Srinagar, 2011.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Photo: Cornelia-Adriana Baciu</span></div>
<br />
Curfewed Night: A Frontline Memoir of Life, Love and War in Kashmir, the memoir on the conflict in Kashmir by the Indian journalist Basharat Peer which won the Crossword Prize for Non-Fiction and was chosen among the Books of the Year by The Economist and The New Yorker, is the first thing to come into my mind when I think about Kashmir.<br />
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“It is human to feel fatigued. But worse than fatigue was the brutal state repression which ended previous uprisings,” were the words of one respondent from Kashmir in relation to the 2016-2017 uprising in Kashmir, in which more than 100 protesters were killed and 150,000 injured by Indian military and para-military forces, during my field research on both sides of Kashmir, in India and Pakistan in 2010 and 2011. I visited the Kashmir Valley for the first time just after the end of the riots, in November 2010, during my exchange semester at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, and I experienced the curfews for the first time.<br />
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Kashmir has a long history of unrest, and each time “central government forces have entered and ransacked homes and beaten up residents irrespective of age and gender. This kind of brutal suppression is done with a sole objective to quell the uprising,” reported one respondent, who wanted to remain anonymous.<br />
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Previous unrests have not achieved “Azaadi” (in Kashmiri, peace), but they highlighted the Kashmir conflict globally and dismantled the Indian projection that Kashmiris are happy with the Indian rule.<br />
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<b>Art 370. as Peace Dividend in Kashmir</b><br />
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One key finding of my research in Kashmir, when I conducted interviews with leaders of the Kashmiri movement on both sides (India and Pakistan) – including people like Syed Ali Gillani (who was under house arrest at the time of the interview) and Yasin Malik, the leader of the JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) – was related to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government has subtly scrapped on 05 August 2019, only ten days before Indian National Day and 73 years since the independence from British colonial rulers and established of a free Indian state. The move was done amid the imposition of a state of total curfew and lockdown in Kashmir. Demilitarisation of the Kashmir Valley and implementation of Art. 370, which has been gradually eroded over time, emerged as one of the most feasible solutions to stabilise trust relations between Delhi and Srinagar.<br />
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“The demilitarisation of Kashmir or reduction of the number of security forces could bring a sense of freedom among the local population and could lay a stable basis for the consolidation of trust relations between Srinagar and Delhi,” stated one respondent. Ultimately, non-lethal crowd-control measures would better fit to a democracy like India. “India cannot claim to be the largest democracy and at the same time enact brutal oppression against Kashmiri citizens. Its human rights record in Kashmir is going to mar its reputation globally and can also become a stumbling block in the pursuit of covetous membership in Nuclear Suppliers Group and UN Security Council,” related another respondent.<br />
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The re-establishment of the conditions of semi-autonomous status of Kashmir, which was guaranteed under Art. 370 of the Indian Constitution, was believed by the majority of the respondents in the analysed sample to contribute to reduce anti-India resentments. This measure would have had the potential to increase the role of local population in the decision-making process, reassembling the meaning of self-determination and the essential aspiration of Azaadi.<br />
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The righteous and judicious implementation of Art. 370 could have constituted a feasible peace model in the region, even more sustainable than the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 47 of 1948, which, while can be claimed to be still valid (UN decisions are valid until they are invalidated by the organ which took it), probably from a legal perspective is in a state of desuetude. Moreover, the UN resolution had little relevance in the self-determination endeavour of the Kashmiri people, as it only offered two options, either accession to India or to Pakistan (UNSC Resolution 47, S/726, para. 7); there was no option of ‘Azaadi’.<br />
<br />
Internal autonomy guaranteed under Art. 370 was a pre-condition for the (formerly princely state Jammu and Kashmir) accession to India at the time of Partition in 1947. Art. 370, corroborated with constitutional provisions 35a, guaranteed the Kashmiris internal autonomy, with their own parliament, government and even flag, and rights of property acquisition in the region to Kashmiris only. Although initially a temporary provision, Art. 370 was rendered permanent by India’s Supreme Court in 1957.<br />
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The chances of a revocation of the BJP government decision and re-institution of Art. 370 seem very thin, as an appeal at the Supreme Court can be made only by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly but this is currently dissolved, and it is not clear whether the Governor can pursue such procedures.<br />
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<b>Implications for Domestic and International Security</b><br />
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The BJP decision to politically align Jammu and Kashmir with the other Indian states was accompanied by a series of measures by the federal government, such as a total lockdown in the Kashmir, house arrest of previous chief ministers Omar Abdullah (National Congress) and Mehbooba Mufti (Peoples Democratic Party), and the activation of Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibiting gatherings of more than four people. These oppressive measures are likely to increase the sense of frustration and thus the possibility of violent unrest in Kashmir, which is boiling.<br />
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One possibility to overcome the current impasse would be international mediation, and a commission consisting of representatives of the European Union, United States, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and China, could assist in reconciling the issue. However, such a scenario seems rather unlikely, considering that India has explicitly asked international actors and allies not to intervene in what is considered a matter of internal affairs.<br />
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International mediation on the Kashmir issue can be a challenge for the global community, considering the Shimla Agreement of 1972, signed and ratified by India and Pakistan in 1972. According to Art. 4.II of the agreement, “[n]either side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.” But this provision shall not whatsoever become the shield for oppression and human rights violations. The Shimla Agreement also pledges in Art. I. that “the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries [India and Pakistan].” The international community shall keep a close eye on the development in the region and not remain silent in case of violation of such fundamental principles like the UN Charter, as this will weaken its credibility.<br />
<br />
While a potential international mediation might ameliorate the immense tensions, it would probably be illusory to believe that it could solve the decades-long dispute between India and Pakistan. Muslims in South Asia began to fear for their identity since the end of the Mughal Empire, and until a model which guarantees Muslim rights, as Art. 370 did, is found, political uprising and violent confrontation remain an extreme risk. In case of a new unrest in Kashmir, a new crisis between the two nuclear states, as it was the case during the Kargil War in 1999, cannot be completely ruled out, as Pakistan has already pledged its support for the Kashmir cause – with Prime Minister Imran Khan holding an <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/kashmir-pakistans-khan-vows-to-fight-until-the-end/a-50017667">historical speech</a> in Azad Kashmir on 14 August, which coincided with Pakistan Independence Day.Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-23636677939144162172019-08-08T02:13:00.001-04:002019-08-08T02:41:29.392-04:00What to Make of the Attacks in El Paso and Dayton?<br />
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Photograph: Mario Tama/Getty Images</span></div>
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Last Friday, August 3<sup>rd</sup>, two horrific shooting
attacks occurred in El Paso, Texas, and Dayton, Ohio. Combined, 32 people were
killed, and dozens more were hurt and wounded.</div>
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The El Paso attack, ostensibly, was motivated by anti-Hispanic
sentiment. The manifesto posted by the gunman before the shooting indicated his
worry about Hispanics “invading" the US, “replacing” white people over time,
especially in Texas, leading to a single-party dictatorship in the US. These are
standard racist tropes used by white power groups to demonize and justify violence
against non-white populations, whether Hispanics/Latinos, Jews, Muslims, African-Americans, etc. The
motive for the Dayton shooting is less clear. That shooter has expressed left-wing
sympathies, though with no note or manifesto or any other corroboration, it’s
unfair to directly tie his politics to the murders he committed.</div>
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These attacks have roiled the US, and, as you might expect
given the current political climate in America, the political fallout has been
particularly dramatic.</div>
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Republicans—the party of gun rights—and their supporters have
been on the defensive. They’ve blamed mental health issues, violent video
games, and the lack of God in people’s lives as prime factors in the
attacks—traditional conservative arguments that the right trots out to explain away
gun violence. They’ve also attempted to score points by linking the Dayton shooter
to left-wing causes and ideologies. <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-complains-of-double-standard-in-shooting-response-cites-liberal-views-of-ohio-gunman">Trump
himself stated</a>, “The Dayton situation, he was a fan of Antifa, he was a fan
of Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, nothing to do with Trump, but nobody
ever mentions that.”</div>
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As expected, Democrats of all stripes have renewed with
vigor their calls for stricter gun control. They’ve also come out strongly against
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell for blocking various gun bills in Congress.
In fact, Ohio Congressman (and long shot for the Democratic nomination for
president) <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/07/politics/ryan-caravan-gun-control-mitch-mcconnell/index.html">Tim
Ryan announced plans to lead a caravan to Kentucky</a>, McConnell’s
home state, to raise awareness of existing gun bills on the table and to put
pressure on McConnell to take action. Additionally, Democrats have intensely criticized
president Trump for his incendiary rhetoric (both on the campaign trail and
while in office). Presidential contenders Beto O’Rourke and Elizabeth Warren, for example, have taken the gloves off,
labeling Trump a white supremacist who deserves some of the blame for the
violence.</div>
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Quite a bit of left-wing commentary has argued that Trump is
directly connected to the recent spate of right-wing violence and attacks. Which
begs a good question: Is this true? Is Trump to blame for these attacks? I’m sure
for many Americans, including some conservatives, it sure <i>feels </i>like Trump has something to do with the spike in right-wing
violence. After all, trump has routinely lampooned and launched verbal attacks
against Latinos, Muslims, African-Americans, women, Democrats, the media, among many
others. But does all this mean that Trump’s to blame or responsible for last
weekend’s violence? What do we make of Trump’s role? Let’s take a clear-eyed
look at this issue.</div>
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Well, to begin, white power attacks and violence long pre-date
Trump. The US has a sordid and violent history of race relations—with minorities
receiving the brunt of the very negative economic, political, security
consequences. The slavery era, reconstruction, internment camps, the rise of
the Klan, the backlash against civil rights legislation, the prominence of extremist
militia groups, deportations—all of these things span from before the founding
of the US republic and run right through to today. The virus of white power and
supremacy—and the attendant demonization of and violence against the so-called non-white
“other” in society—hasn’t been removed from the US body politic and it in fact still
thrives in dark corners of American life. And while Americans—both citizens and
politicians—became preoccupied with Islamic terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11,
the white power movement, forgotten and overlooked, continued to gather steam. Indeed,
the leading cause of violent mass extremist attacks on American soil since 9/11
have been committed by white power individuals and groups. So this is something
that’s been on the rise well before Trump arrived on the political scene.</div>
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And even when we look at the specifics of recent individual
violent hate crimes and attacks, especially those committed during the Trump
era, it’s difficult to clearly and definitively attribute causal force to Trump—even
though many want to do so. For starters, it’s hard enough to discern motives
and intentions, especially without any kind of manifesto or public statement. And
even in cases in which such a document is present, that’s no guarantee we can
identify a clear motive. Mass murderers, like people more generally, often lie
and dissemble and exaggerate for their own purposes. Plus, the white power
movement presents its own difficulties. Even though the El Paso killer seemed
to use language about minorities that’s consistent with what Trump has used in
the past, it’s also language that’s often and easily found in white power
circles—circles that aren’t only American, but are increasingly transnational. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/politics/grand-replacement-explainer.html">The
“Great Replacement” conspiracy theory</a>, which the El Paso shooter discussed
at length in his manifesto, actually originates from a French writer, Renuad Camus,
and has been picked by other infamous white power types, like the Christchurch, New Zealand shooter.</div>
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To be clear, all of the above is not meant to absolve Trump
of any and all responsibility. Instead, it’s meant to say that Trump is not a singular
direct cause of the white power violence in the US. In my view, it’s better to
view the Trump-white power connection as a complex set of forces.</div>
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In Trump, white racists have found an once-in-a-lifetime
president who publicly espouses views and policies, particularly on race
relations, trade, and immigration, that fit with their political preferences. At
the same time, pockets of white Americans have become disaffected and angry and
fearful, because of globalization, automation, US wars, 9/11, and the drug
crisis, among other factors. In Trump, the disaffected and angry, desperate for
any politician to relieve their burdens and crises, have found someone who proclaimed
to championed their cause and felt their pain. And a booming economy,
conservative Supreme Court justices, along with biased and fake news
disseminated by Russian trolls, mainstream news sources, social media, and POTUS
himself, have kept them loyal to Trump. This is the context in which not only white
racists but also the disaffected and angry have opted for Trump and continue to
support him.</div>
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Trump, in turn, seeing these white voters as his core base
of support—one that’s indispensable to his reelection—has gone out of his way
to appease them and keep them activated by telling them what they want to hear,
regardless of whether his statements bear any resemblance to truth or decency,
and implementing policies, such as the Muslim ban, the wall, and family
separations, they favor. Overall, Trump’s goal has been to create continual
domestic chaos, which keeps his core base ginned up and willing to go to bat
for him—online, at public rallies, and at the polls. One salient way he’s done
this is by making race/ethnicity a key animating feature of us politics and
policymaking. This is the gamble he’s made. Of course, he might be wrong, in
that the chaos and coarseness could turn off just enough independents and
fringe members of the core to turn the election to the Democrats in 2020.</div>
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In the meantime, though, all of this has led to a very
combustible political environment. In short, Trump has fostered a political
climate in white power extremism and violence can flourish. And white racists
and their sympathizers are more prominent than they’ve been in decades.
Certainly, since 2015, they’ve been mainstreamed. And with someone they see as one
of their own in the White House, and with the overwhelming majority of the GOP
(which is in control of the Senate) indefatigable in its defense and support of
Trump and his views and policies, they’re now politically ascendant. They have
representation in both the executive and legislative branches of the US
government. Moreover, it’s evident they feel free to say what they want and to
organize publicly. The fierce confrontation in Charlottesville in 2017 is one of
many sad contemporary examples. </div>
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Or look at Trump’s political rallies. They’ve
been marred by fist fights against anti-MAGA folks, chants of “lock her up” and
“send her back,” and even a reference by a crowd member to shooting “invading”
Hispanics—which generated applause and laughter from both the crowd and Trump.
To which Trump responded, “That’s only in the Panhandle can you get away with
that statement.”</div>
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It’s a troubling situation. What if Trump is reelected in
2020? Maybe he moderates a bit on racial/ethnic issues, just because he doesn’t
have to worry about another political campaign and can focus on burnishing his
legacy as president. Maybe, but maybe not. Perhaps what we’ve seen and heard
from Trump isn’t a political act, but a roughly accurate representation of his
worldview. And if he’s not re-elected? That doesn’t necessarily portend better
news, frankly. The fires Trump has lit won’t burn out once he leaves office,
whenever that is. The US will deal with the political, social, and cultural ramifications
of Trump’s rule well after he leaves the presidency. Healing the nation will
take up considerable time for the next few presidents, much like it took the US
years to recover from the Watergate scandal in the early 1970s. Moreover, there’s
another issue. There are kids, likely living in MAGA households, who <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertsamaha/kids-are-quoting-trump-to-bully-their-classmates">parrot
Trump’s heated rhetoric in schools</a>. These kids will probably grow up to be MAGA
adults. What then? These are rough times with no easy answers.</div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-81058211020830106792019-07-01T22:03:00.000-04:002019-07-01T22:03:26.946-04:00War With Iran? Or Much Ado About Nothing?<br />
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Over the last few weeks, Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes
Sulaiman have engaged in a conversation on a wide range of foreign policy
issues. For the sake of clarity and readability, below is a part of that
conversation that focuses strictly on Iran-US relations.</div>
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BN: Of the various foreign issues that the Trump administration has taken
a hawkish, confrontational position on, arguably the most chaotic is Iran. Lots
of mixed messages from the White House. Trump claims he's not interested in a
war with Iran. In fact, he wants talks with Iran and some kind of negotiated
deal. Yet, at the same time, he's pulled the US from the 2015 nuclear deal,
re-imposed tough sanctions, and has agreed to move more military assets to the
Middle East, expressly with Iran in mind. And meantime, in the background,
advisers, like National Security Adviser John Bolton, are privately
cheerleading the charge for a military intervention. Do you think this approach
to Iran will work? Will it get Trump what he wants? I'm very skeptical.</div>
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YS: At this point, I think Iran is overplaying its hand by declaring
that it will up its enrichment of nuclear materials, thus removing any
incentive for the European Union to actually defend it. At the same time, I am
not sure that the regime is strong enough to deal with more escalations with
the US. It is overextended in Syria and Yemen, and its economy is tottering toward
collapse. Of course, as Venezuela shows, a terrible economy doesn't really
matter much to the longevity of the regime as long as it holds all the levers
of power securely—and Iran is still in a much better position than Venezuela. But
apparently some in the regime are nervous enough to try sabotaging those
tankers.</div>
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At the end of the day, though, I don't think there will be
an Iran-US war. Iran knows that it won't win the war, and Trump is just Trump.</div>
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BN: What do you make of the air strikes that almost
happened, but were apparently called off by Trump?</div>
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YS: I think Trump does not want to escalate this into
something that he cannot pull back from—I believe the argument that he got cold
feet once he heard hundreds could die—because that would mean an escalation
into something that he cannot pull back from. His pattern of behavior is always
the same: he takes the option with less risk, and that allows him to withdraw
while claiming victory, all while hoping his opponents fold first in face the
of his bluster.</div>
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BN: I've come across a few different explanations for
Trump's decision. You mentioned one of them—the prospect of killing 150
Iranians is a disproportionate response, according to Trump himself, for
downing a drone. Another is that Trump got word that the Iranians themselves,
including the Quds force commander Soleimani, are ticked that the US drone was
shot down. Perhaps it really was a mistake, committed by a rogue official or
grunt, and not intended by Tehran. If so, then there's no reason for Trump to
up the ante. At bottom, this argument suggests that Trump values and responds
more to Iranian motives than Iranian actions. A third explanation that's been
bandied about is US politics. In short, Trump got wind that his base would be
displeased with another war in the ME. It also didn't help that Tucker Carlson,
of Trump's beloved Fox News, took time out of a recent show to rail against a
possible war with Iran. For Trump, almost everything he says and does is about
base politics—making sure his core 35% of the electorate stays loyal to him and
energized to support him. The prospect of fracturing that base, that core,
especially given the upcoming presidential dogfight in 2020, dissuaded him from
going ahead with a limited military campaign against Iran.</div>
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Of course, that didn't settle the situation. After all,
Trump believed Iran deserved some punishment for the drone. And then there are
the hawks, who are constantly pushing Trump toward war. And so Trump opted for
a lower cost, more clandestine cyber activities against Iran. Trump is probably
hoping that a non-military response would be viewed by the clerics as a sign
that Trump is willing to calm down the situation and that they'll respond in
kind. The problem, though, is that Trump has engaged in a number of bluffs during
his presidency and the international community is starting to see him as a
paper tiger. Iran could try to drive an even harder bargain based on the
perception that Trump and his core supporters seem so averse to war.</div>
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YS: At the same time, it could be suicidal if Iran pushed
harder against the US. While I agree that Trump's base is completely against
another war in the Middle East, if they hear that the Iranians are downing a
plane full of 35 US soldiers or they hit a carrier, everyone will rally around
the flag and bay for blood. So, to some degree, I agree with you, that Trump's
credibility might be damaged, but at the same time, the 800-pound gorilla is an
800-pound gorilla: the US is so powerful that states are wary to invoke its
wrath.</div>
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BN: Yes, you're right. Iran can't press to hard, too
recklessly, so as to provoke the US in a war for self-defensive reasons. But it
can make life difficult for the US using a variety of tools. And plus, for lots
of reasons, it's in Iran's interest to resist the US. That's why it was so
tough to get the nuclear deal in 2015. Which leads me to a concern about US
Iran policy under Trump. Constant pressure, with no daylight at the end of it
all, will likely only force Iran down the same path it’s treaded for 40 years
now—threats, tensions, and hostilities with the US. Getting Iran to change its
behavior requires the US to have a much more deft diplomatic touch. And I don't
think Trump has the advisors around him who can do that or are willing to do
that. It might take a third party, perhaps like Japan’s Shinzo Abe (who
recently visited Iran), to break the deadlock, defuse tensions, and move
Washington and Tehran toward talks. </div>
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YS: That is only true if Iran is in a good shape. Iran’s
overextended its commitments in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, coupled with its
current economic problems, exacerbated by Trumps' sanctions, mean the Mullahs
are far more worried than they show. Granted, that’s similar to Venezuela, in
that the despots can stay in power despite of a wretched economy, but by this
point the Mullahs have already had 40 years to deliver wealth and freedom to
its citizens, and they have failed. They are running out of time.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: Iran's economy is being wrecked by the sanctions, but
the external commitments, in my view, aren't as problematic. The war in Syria
is just about over. Hezbollah is the major player in Lebanon. And in Yemen,
analysts have long said that the US and Israel have far overstated Iran's role
in propping up the Houthis. Iran has cultivated proxies throughout the ME. The
Soufan Group recently released a great report on precisely this topic. And one
of the punchlines is that, since 2003, Iran has been able to cultivate proxies,
in a very low cost way, who share a similar vision with Iran and are willing to
work with Iran. All of these proxies (in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Sudan, Bahrain, the Palestinian territories) can create chaos in the ME and
harm US interests--and do so in a way that creates at least some plausible
deniability for Tehran.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Moreover, we also need to consider this: the coalition that
originally got Iran to the negotiating table now leans in support of Iran. The
Europeans, Russians, and Chinese doubt US intelligence, think US is making a
phony case for war, and desperately want to do business with Iran. In fact,
they're all looking for ways to do business in Iran in ways that get around US
sanctions. Getting this coalition back together is almost impossible,
especially when they consider the US to blame for sparking the current crisis
by withdrawing from the nuclear deal, reapplying sanctions, and labeling the
IRGC a terrorist group. All of this means that Iran has more room to maneuver,
a bit more flexibility, when confronting the US.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In a recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/world/middleeast/trump-iran.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">New
York Times article</a>, David Sanger touches on my point. He writes, "In
fact, while Iran is weaker economically than it was a year ago, it has
developed skills it did not possess during the last major nuclear crisis. It
can strike ships with more precision and shoot planes out of the air. It now
has a major cyber corps, which over the last seven years has paralyzed American
banks, infiltrated a dam in the New York suburbs and attacked a Las Vegas casino.
These abilities have altered the risk calculations, making the problem Mr.
Trump faces with Iran even more vexing than those that confronted President
George W. Bush or Mr. Obama.”</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
YS: Perhaps Iran's external commitments doesn't hurt it at
all. At the same time, though, the sanctions still bite—hard. I am still unsure
if other states are willing to defy Trump and break the America’s sanctions. I
mean, had the Europeans been willing to defy Trump, they would have done that
when Trump decided to reimpose the sanctions—especially with his popularity at rock
bottom. Instead of assuring their businesses that they could just ignore Trump’s
new sanctions, the Europeans are hemming and hawing, leading Iran to escalate—perhaps
in desperation.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: At this point, what would you recommend to Trump? What
should he do, now that he's in this predicament--a predicament, mind you, that
he played a big part in provoking?</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
YS: What predicament? Just wait. The time is on America’s
side. If Iran shoots down a plane, killing people, then it will give Trump the
carte blanche to bring hell and fury to Iran. If Iran does nothing, then it
will be starved to death and the regime will collapse. If Iran restarts its
nuclear program, then the EU will have no choice but to reimpose sanctions.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Seriously, nobody in Washington or Brussels cares about
Iran. The US is preoccupied with immigration and border issues, while the
Europeans are terrified about the populists and Brexit.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
BN: Well, the predicament is that the drums of war are
beating. Like you, I think the chance for war is low. I think Trump and the
Ayatollah have enough sense to pull back before things get out of hand. Still,
Trump has hawkish advisers cheerleading for a military intervention. There's
always the chance for misperception and miscalculation as hostilities escalate.
And the US media is covering Iran like they did the run-up to the Iraq
war--lots of enthusiasm for a big story, but little critical insight and
analysis of what's happening.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
But I digress. If I was Trump, here's what I'd do. First,
I'd fire Bolton. His views and policy positions are completely antithetical to
Trump's America First program and downright dangerous to US foreign policy and
global security. Second, Trump needs to formulate a clear and coherent Iran
policy and ensure that it's communicated consistently. In fact, given the level
of importance Trump places on the Iran threat, this should've been done way
back in 2017. It's apparent that many states in the Middle East, including
Iran, don't have a clear sense of what the White House wants from Iran. Third,
Trump's team needs to re-engage with China, Europe, and Russia, three actors
that could be enormously helpful in putting pressure on Tehran, if necessary,
and/or drawing Iran back to the negotiating table, which is preferable.</div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-21295101524845256272019-06-05T18:22:00.002-04:002019-06-05T18:22:42.003-04:00An Update on North Korea<br />
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<img alt="Image result for kim jong un" height="225" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/assets/media/img/mt/2019/05/GettyImages_1127697243/lead_720_405.jpg?mod=1559340082" width="400" /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(<span style="color: #5e6a74; font-family: Graphik, -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", "Segoe UI", Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10px; text-transform: uppercase;">SAUL LOEB / AFP / GETTY)</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The diplomatic stalemate with North Korea continues. From
June 2018 through April 2019, the absence of diplomatic progress between Washington
and Pyongyang wasn’t too worrisome. Sure, the heady optimism of the Singapore
summit was fading, particularly after the “failed” Hanoi summit, but there were
still glimmers of hope. Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump had a good relationship.
North Korea ceased nuclear and missile tests. Perhaps both sides were simply
taking a breather, a respite, before getting down to the business of
substantive talks. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Unfortunately, that hasn’t turned out. Since Hanoi, North
Korean-US diplomacy has gone off track. At this point, there is zero discussion
between the American and North Korean “working teams.” This means, then, talks
are at a standstill since Hanoi.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
If you recall, the Hanoi summit broke down without any
diplomatic agreement or even a joint statement. The North Koreans were willing
to shutter bits and pieces of its program in exchange for some sanctions
relief. The US rejected the North Korean proposal, arguing that it wouldn’t offer
any sanctions relief until the Kim regime scrapped entirely its nuclear
program. There was some hope, particularly among the South Koreans, that Trump
was merely posturing, trying to get more bargaining leverage, and that he would
eventually change his mind and pursue a more modest bargain. That hasn’t
happened yet.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Indeed, the way the Hanoi summit unfolded, with Trump
declining North Korea’s offer and abruptly ending talks, has turned out to be a
big deal. It shocked Kim and his aides. And, as it turns out, angered him as
well. So angry was Kim that <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/north-korea-executes-5-officials-over-failed-kim-trump-summit-south-korean-media">recent
reports indicated he executed five senior officials</a>, squarely placing the
blame on them for the lack of a diplomatic breakthrough with the US. However,
whether Kim actually had these five officials killed is the subject of an
ongoing debate. Already, <span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/world/asia/north-korean-purge-kim.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&smtyp=cur">one
of the five (Kim Yong-chol) has been spotted</a></span> on North Korean media.
It is plausible that Kim wanted news of his ruthlessness leaked in order to
communicate—both to his cadre of officials and to the US—his displeasure with
the pace and direction of the talks with the Americans.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Another powerful sign that Kim is currently unhappy with the
US is that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/world/asia/north-korea-missile.html">North
Korea has resumed missile launches in May</a> (May 4<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup>).
Fortunately, the two tests weren’t ICBMs, which gave the Trump administration
enough wiggle room to downplay their significance. Indeed, both Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo and President Trump argued that the short-range tests by North
Korea were fine—despite their violating UN Security Council resolutions—it’s
the long-range rockets that they’d find provocative.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The good part of minimizing the severity of the tests is
that Team Trump didn’t feel forced to counter Kim with retaliatory, escalatory
moves. The ominous part, though, is that it’s clear Kim is frustrated with the US.
The crux of the matter, I suspect, is that Kim expected to receive more
tangible benefits as a result of two meetings with Trump. And at this point,
the relationship with Washington hasn’t fundamentally changed. The status quo
has held. The relationship hasn’t been normalized; sanctions are still intact; and
the US still monitors smuggling and other efforts to circumvent
sanctions—including the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/wise-honest-north-korea-ship-seized.html">recent
seizure of a North Korean vessel</a>. At bottom, the US still has its foot on
the metaphorical throat of the Kim regime.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
To his credit, Trump hasn’t inflamed the situation. Among
other things, he’s refrained from criticizing or threatening North Korea. In
fact, <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/25/trump-japan-border-wall-ruling-1344992">he’s
gone out of his way to praise Kim</a>—something that’s triggered significant
blowback from American media and analysts. Trump has also maintained the shift
toward smaller military exercises with South Korea. In an effort to alleviate
pressure on Kim, Trump has even stated that he’s in no rush to get a deal done
with North Korea</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Where do we go from here? Unfortunately, Trump has unintentionally
isolated himself. By moving so quickly to an in-person meeting with Kim last June,
and then again this past February in Hanoi, it’s pretty evident that <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/n-korea-warns-of-limit-to-our-patience-on-nuke-talks/4946641.html">Kim
wants little to do with Trump’s negotiating teams</a>. North Korea state media
constantly demonizes Pompeo and Bolton, signaling that Kim sees them as
personae non grata. Kim seeks only to deal directly with Trump. So the onus is
on Trump to reassert forward progress. That’s not an optimal way to conduct
foreign policy. US foreign policy—an issue that requires deep experience and
expertise—shouldn’t be a one-man show. Plus, Trump is likely to be a distracted
president over the next 16 or so months, given US domestic politics. He’ll have
little time or patience to devote to intractable issue like North Korea.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Of course, all of this begs a big question: What if Kim
believes he’s not receiving what he thinks is the appropriate level of
attention from a preoccupied Trump? This is where things could quickly go
haywire. Kim could do any of a number of provocative acts, including resuming
nuclear and ICBM tests, so as to place him on Trump’s, and the world’s, radar. If
that happens, we could be back in the “fire and fury” days of 2017.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
To avoid a repeat of those times, I have two recommendations.
First, Trump ought to try to convince Kim and his lead negotiators to take the
American delegation, led by US representative to North Korea Stephen Biegun, much
more seriously. Beigun isn’t Bolton or Pompeo, doesn’t seem like a hawk, and so
there’s little reason to fear him. Plus, this would allow the US and North Korea,
working diligently behind the scenes and away from public attention, to flesh
out areas of common interests and the kind and scope of concessions each side is
prepared to make—things that Trump and Kim are unlikely to
finalize in a one or two day summit. If an insecure and desperate Kim wants
face time with Trump, then Trump should give him a summit or two, as long as the
working teams are meeting and making some progress on salient bilateral issues.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Second, Trump needs to scrap his “go big or go home”
approach to North Korea. The American quest to achieve its maximal desired
outcome (which is still <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/06/06/617619192/complete-verifiable-irreversible-a-tough-goal-for-north-korea-summit">CVID</a> or a variation of it) just isn’t working. After all, North Korea just isn’t willing, and it
probably will never be willing, to shutter completely and irreversibly its
nuclear program. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/world/asia/trump-kim-vietnam-summit.html">But
given the reports on the Hanoi summit,</a> Kim does seem willing to bargain
over parts of it. Instead of looking at this as a sign of Kim’s intransigence,
as Bolton and Pompeo do, the US should see this as a possible window of
opportunity. Trump’s team should be prepared to negotiate with Kim on a
proposal built around freezing/verifying/dismantling parts of Kim’s nuclear
program (facilities, nuclear material, technology, weapons, etc.). Start small,
build mutual confidence in each other, and then move to more ambitious
cooperation.</div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-56786062507593414312019-05-08T21:54:00.003-04:002019-05-08T21:54:48.311-04:00Turmoil in Venezuela<br />
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<img alt="Image result for guaido" height="267" src="https://shawglobalnews.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/lopez-and-guaido-e1556720251355.jpg?quality=70&strip=all&w=512" width="400" /></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Opposition leaders Juan Guaidó and Leopoldo Lopez address a crowd in Caracas on April 30, 2019. EPA: Miguel Gutierrez.</span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br />
The much-hyped coup in Venezuela hasn’t come to pass. Nicolás
Maduro has been more tenacious and his grip on power more durable than many observers
have expected.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Rival leader Juan Guaidó, head of the National Assembly, has
raised global hopes for a transition in power, but so far hasn’t been able to
capitalize on the external support he has from widespread support in the
Americas, including from the Trump administration. Simply declaring himself
president, because the previous presidential elections were rigged, wasn’t
enough to budge Maduro from power. Guaidó has attempted to woo Venezuelan
citizens, elites, and members of the military to his side, but wooing all of
these different actors has been difficult. <a href="https://twitter.com/RyanBergPhD/status/1126190345837064193">While Maduro
is despised</a>, citizens are wary of Guaidó—his motives, interests, and
capabilities as a leader. And they surely haven’t embraced Guaidó enough to get
out into the streets <i>en masse</i>.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
There have been some elite and military defections, but not
enough to swing the internal balance of power to Guaidó’s advantage. It’s clear
that Guaidó believed he had significant military support last week, when he
called for uprising against Maduro. But lacking military support and numbers on
the streets, his attempted putsch went nowhere. Instead, Maduro quickly and
easily put down the few thousands of Venezuelans who responded to Guaidó’s
call.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It’s apparent that Maduro is walking a tightrope. He clearly
wants to preserve his grip on power. At the same time, though, he knows there
are limits on the extent to which he can ask military and security forces to
repress the political opposition. After all, he hasn’t gone after Guaidó, which
he could have done already. And the street battles haven’t been particularly
bloody, despite international worries the country could slide into a
full-fledged civil war. The reason for these realities is that Maduro knows he
can’t make dramatic, hyper-aggressive moves, such as asking his forces to shoot
their fellow countrymen/women, because they could result in a wave of negative
cascading effects. Indeed, one is the prospect that the military could fully
break with Maduro, leaving him vulnerable to being toppled, arrested, or even
losing his life. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Beyond the Guaidó-Maduro battle for power, there’s another
power dynamic in play here: the US and Russian battle for influence in the
Western Hemisphere. The US sees Venezuela as part of its backyard and thus a part
of its sphere of influence. In line with the long-accepted Monroe doctrine, the
US wants all foreign powers out of the Western Hemisphere—demands with which
Russia and China are not complying. Russia, meantime, has a host of political,
military, and economic interests at stake in backing Maduro. Moscow worries
about what might happen to its array of investments in Venezuela if Maduro is
washed aside and a different figure, let alone a reformer, rises to the top. Plus,
Russia sees the ongoing crisis in Venezuela as a vehicle to get the US bogged
down in its own neighborhood, thereby preventing Washington from meddling in affairs
abroad, particularly in Russia’s backyard.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
How this plays out remains to be seen. The optimal solution
is to guide Maduro peacefully out of office—either immediately or via a phased
transition—making way for free and fair democratic elections. It’s what best for
Venezuelans, who desperately want and need new and improved leadership. The
country is less free, wealthy, and stable on his watch. The puzzle, of course,
is how to get to that point.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Up to this point, the US has hoped that recognizing Guaidó,
squeezing Maduro’s oil funds, and refusing to rule out a military intervention
will do the trick. Combined, all of these things have certainly upped the ante
for Maduro, but they haven’t eased him out of power yet. And Guaidó hasn’t
helped matters with his ill-timed attempted coup. What’s needed is a clever
approach that changes the incentives that Maduro and his senior level cadres
currently have about supporting the political status quo.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span class="MsoHyperlink"><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/venezuelas-opposition-debates-new-tactics-as-diplomats-race-to-defuse-crisis/2019/05/07/ba5ca28e-704d-11e9-9f06-5fc2ee80027a_story.html?utm_term=.c63409b84401">According
to the Washington Post</a></span>, Venezuela’s political opposition is trying
to do precisely that by presenting Maduro loyalists a combination of sticks
(rejoining the Rio Treaty) and carrots (the prospect of joining a transitional
government). Concurrently, the opposition is engaged in diplomatic talks with a
host of international actors, including the global powers and various international
institutions. All of this is a good start, though more is needed. Below I briefly
suggest a few more things the opposition ought to consider. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
First, the opposition must recognize that allowing Maduro and
his cabal to exit the corridors of power with some level of face or prestige
intact is one potential concession it may have to make. Yes, that will be a
tough pill to swallow for some of the opposition, but it might be necessary. Put
simply, if Maduro believes he doesn’t have a safe exit option, then, by default,
he’ll cling to power for self-preservation purposes. </div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Second, I’d advise the opposition to tend toward
inclusivity. This is controversial, however. Some opposition members are firmly
against allowing any of Maduro’s cadre, especially the very people responsible
for Venezuela’s plight, a continued role in politics. That’s understandable. But
drawing in the middle and lower strata of Maduro’s circle might be possible,
and shouldn’t be ruled out. Look, there’s already bad blood between Chavez and Maduro
backers and supporters and the opposition; the key now is to try to find ways
to dampen those tensions over both the short- and long-term. Creating an
environment that’s palatable to, perhaps, the outer rungs of the old guard is a
good thing: it can pave the way for all sides to build trust, create a stake in
the changing political system, and move on from the past and look toward the
future.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
To be clear, in the two arguments above, I’m not suggesting
that the opposition should give, without hesitation, Maduro and his acolytes a
blanket clean slate. Of course, a new Venezuelan government should be guided by
the rule of law. But this government will have to make hard decisions. And in
the long-run, it might be best for the nation if some of the old guard are mostly
left alone and permitted to retire in peace or allowed to defect to another
country, rather than seeking retribution through the courts. The latter route,
while maybe legally sensible, risks opening up and deepening existing political
fissures in a nation that’s already fragile, unstable, and trending toward
violence. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Third, Guaidó will have to convince the major external
players, like Cuba and Russia and the US, that their interests won’t be
significantly jeopardized with a new government/regime. Yes, the US will be on
board with what seems to be a reform-minded government, though, even here, Guaidó
will have to sync his positions and policies with those of the Trump
administration. After all, the White House is the biggest and most vigorous international
backer he has right now. Cuba and Russia are a different story. Both countries receive
considerable political and economic benefits from Venezuela as it currently
operates. They will need, at a minimum, a clear statement of how they fit into
a Guaidó administration’s plans and reassurance that they won’t be significantly
adversely impacted if Maduro leaves/is toppled. Otherwise, Guaidó should expect
stiff resistance from Cuba and Russia, and both will undermine his rule until
he plays nice with them. <br />
<br />
The above suggestions aren't the only things Guaidó should do right now. I've simply identified some of the most important immediate tasks in order for him and the opposition to ease Maduro out of power. Keep in mind we're witnessing the first stages in a very long game. For even if Guaidó is successful, the problems and complexities don't end there. An entirely new set of governing challenges will emerge. And those are bound to test even the most astute political leaders. Let's hope that Guaidó, or whomever next takes the reins of power, is ready for the moment.</div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-48685484485770358012019-04-19T17:52:00.002-04:002019-04-19T23:50:47.072-04:00The Mueller Report<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiEXHZHB2GJ9-70f-D9hoHw0PNiusXMAtwpiZcryj4zFU4DxnLKQ8aoiLVCLwfwMWlnC6hi6hRPHC5_hcC3YwDmRstxURoF13Y7Ejh5hcT9OJRMlqxClDZsmlnHbXr-JczkYbemnuTRI9Sy/s1600/Mueller.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="410" data-original-width="618" height="212" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiEXHZHB2GJ9-70f-D9hoHw0PNiusXMAtwpiZcryj4zFU4DxnLKQ8aoiLVCLwfwMWlnC6hi6hRPHC5_hcC3YwDmRstxURoF13Y7Ejh5hcT9OJRMlqxClDZsmlnHbXr-JczkYbemnuTRI9Sy/s320/Mueller.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Photo: Robert Mueller/Getty Images</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Yesterday, at long last, after almost two years of investigations, the <a href="https://apps.npr.org/documents/document.html?id=5955997-Muellerreport">Mueller Report was finally released</a>. Although the Mueller investigation and his report are now done, the
fallout of the Russian election meddling and President Trump's suspect behavior
continues. Why? Put simply, while Trump denies it, the report, while not
finding evidence of criminal collusion, or conspiracy, does make a strong case
for obstruction of justice. In other words, did Trump, or his surrogates,
try to engage in a cover-up? Did he (or they, at his request) hinder the ongoing investigation? The verdict? The report explicitly states that it does not exonerate trump for
such misdeeds. Based on the report, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/18/trump-actions-mueller-spotlighted-potential-obstruction/?utm_term=.3596939f26fd">The
Washington Post has highlighted 10 (10!) instances of possible obstruction of
justice</a>. Despite all of that, Robert Mueller and his team have left it to Congress
to sort out whether Trump obstructed justice and whether to punish Trump if
such acts took place.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Trump argues that if no collusion took place, then there’s
nothing to obstruct. His political opponents disagree, and they do have a case
to be made. Sure, Mueller didn’t find strong enough evidence of obstruction to
take a position, but that’s a separate matter from how Trump acted in response
to the investigations. He still could have tried to scuttle the investigations—either
by getting rid of Mueller and his team or making life difficult for them. And there’s
evidence, if
you’ve read the report, that Trump attempted to do both. Frankly, probably the only
reason Trump didn’t overtly obstruct justice is <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/04/19/714865238/meet-the-people-in-trumps-orbit-who-the-mueller-report-says-ignored-his-orders">because some of his staff, like Don McGahn and Rob Porter, declined to do things</a> they knew were extraordinarily shady if
not outright illegal. <o:p></o:p></div>
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Of course, all of this begs a question: Why would Trump attempt
to obstruct justice? That’s long been a puzzle, based on a list of things
we’ve already known (firings of James Comey and Jeff Sessions, badmouthing Mueller
and his team of “angry democrats,” constantly deflecting attention to “Hillary’s
emails,” etc.) Logically, it seems that either Trump mistakenly believed he
acted illegally, or actually did act illegally and Mueller simply couldn’t pin
down his “crimes and misdemeanors.” Whichever the case, Trump believed his
presidency was in big trouble. After all, after getting word of the appointment
of Robert Mueller as Special Counsel, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/whitehouse/a-beleaguered-trump-feared-the-end-of-my-presidency/2019/04/18/4ad31bd6-6248-11e9-bf24-db4b9fb62aa2_story.html?utm_term=.5775d6fbebd8">Trump reportedly said</a>, “Oh my God. This
is terrible. This is the end of my Presidency. I'm fucked.” This wasn't a guy who thought he was innocent, no matter how much he declared otherwise on Twitter, at his rallies, and elsewhere.</div>
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Because the metaphorical ball has been tossed to Congress,
the proceedings are no longer a legal matter and are now a political one. Which
means that, because of the deeply polarized electorate and legislature,
deciphering the meaning of the report is a partisan affair. Democrats are
lining up to pillory trump; the Republicans are largely standing behind Trump,
seemingly content with Trump’s labeling of the multi-year investigation as a “witch
hunt.”</div>
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Democrats now have a decision to make. Do they want to go
forward and make the case for impeachment—or not? This question is complicated
by the upcoming presidential election in November 2020. A few Democratic
candidates, like Elizabeth Warren and Beto O’Rourke, have admitted that they’ve
only received a few questions about the investigations on the campaign trail,
a sign the democratic base is less interested in this sordid affair
than in basic democratic concerns (health care, income inequality, climate
change, etc.). Moreover, there is no evidence that the Senate would vote to
convict trump on impeachment, so impeachment proceedings,
in the end, would be mostly symbolic. It would be a gut move to
mollify the democratic base.</div>
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Additionally, most Americans, at least to this point, <a href="https://twitter.com/NateSilver538/status/1119313555793293312">don’t support impeaching Trump</a>. Yes, the political left does, but most Americans don't. So going the impeachment route carries big risks. Specifically, an electorate that's tired of investigations could punish the Democrats for overreaching in their efforts to remove Trump from office. And that
could result in the Democrats losing the upcoming presidential race and also the House,
which they just won in 2018.<br />
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My educated guess is that the Democrats won’t move en masse on
impeachment. We will probably see a few push for it, and already <a href="https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1119331295547596800">Elizabeth Warren has called for the House to begin impeachment proceedings</a>. But it's a very risky move. Mostly, they will use the Mueller report as
talking points to hammer Trump and the Republicans and to galvanize their base. In the meantime, though, political polarization will continue to widen and harden in the US. Trump won't take his "win" and let the rest go. He will press the case that he was unfairly targeted by crazed Democrats who seek to destroy Trump and all of MAGA's supposed achievements. And that, in turn, only gins up further Trump's rabid base of supporters. And with the 2020 elections around the corner, this makes for a combustible, toxic political brew. Overall, I fully expect turbulent political times in the US will remain a fixture and possibly worsen as we head toward November 2020. </div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-73361412581494754832019-03-19T20:16:00.001-04:002019-03-21T18:09:50.636-04:00Terror in New Zealand<br />
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<img alt="Jacinda Ardern, wearing a headscarf, walks to mourners" height="266" src="https://www.abc.net.au/news/image/10912728-3x2-700x467.jpg" width="400" /></div>
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<span style="background-color: #f9f9f9; color: #737373; font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern. AAP: SNPA/Martin Hunter</span></span></div>
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On Friday, March 15, an Australian, Brenton Tarrant,
attacked two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, shooting and killing 51 and wounding roughly 50
more. Appallingly, the attacker live streamed his assault on Facebook, allowing
his friends/followers to viscerally follow along. Given what we now know, it's
safe to label this tragedy a terror attack. The attack, committed by
a lone gunman without state support, were aimed against innocent civilians and
carried out for self-described political reasons--all of which is in line with the
standard definition of terrorism. <o:p></o:p></div>
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To be clear, Tarrant's political motivations are of the white
power variety. (Note: In line with scholars like <a href="https://www.kathleenbelew.com/synopsis">Kathleen Belew</a>, I use the term white power rather than white nationalism throughout this post.) In his 70 plus page manifesto (which he posted to the web and
emailed to various people, including the Prime Minister of New Zealand), the attacker ranted
about taking revenge against Muslims, seeking to reverse "white
genocide," and preserving European culture. <a href="https://medium.com/@emilypothast/what-the-christchurch-killers-manifesto-tells-us-about-the-radicalization-of-white-men-c55857149b33">He also suggested a US angle</a>.
"One of his goals is to spark 'conflict over the 2nd amendment and the
attempted removal of firearms rights' which 'will ultimately result in a civil
war that will eventually balkanize the US along political, cultural and, most
importantly, racial lines.'"<o:p></o:p></div>
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What to make of this horrific terrorist attack? Well, frankly, lots of things come to mind. Below I'll address three of the most salient takeaway points.<br />
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1. The New Zealand attack highlights some of the similarities between
jihadist and white power radicalization. Just consider the following. For
both types of terrorism in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, radicalization often
involves an online component. Aspiring and nascent extremists search out dark corners of
the web (social media, web pages, message boards, and so on), where they find
evil, hateful, violent ideologies. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/15/christchurch-shooting-suspect-comes-an-extreme-online-culture/?utm_term=.dd0cd0a72cb9">As Henry Farrell points out</a>, "a new extreme-right online culture has come into being,
shaped by message boards such as 4chan and 8chan." Indeed, just before the Christchurch attack, Tarrant announced his intentions to commit mayhem on 8chan and linked to his manifesto. </div>
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New radicals also typically seek out associations
with like-minded extremists. In some cases, this occurs after they’ve already
dipped their toes in the hate-filled pockets of the web, in other cases, chance
meetings w/extremists are the key to triggering online explorations into
racist, xenophobic forums, videos, and the like. Whether online or in-person, Tarrant claimed to have been in contact with Anders Breivik, the notorious Norwegian terrorist who killed 77, mostly children, in 2011, and some of his sympathizers (the so-called Knights Templar).<br />
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These ideologies, once adopted, give people a mission, a
socio-political purpose, bonds them to like-minded others, and helps them
understand life and their place in it. Usually, conspiracy theories are central
to extremist ideologies, specifying how one’s in-group is being persecuted
and discriminated against by various global enemies. The New Zealand terrorist embraced
the racist, kooky narrative of white genocide, which argues that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/18/racist-terrorists-are-obsessed-with-demographics-lets-not-give-them-talking-points/?utm_term=.ae0ff52b0262">low fertility rates by whites in European nations</a> in combination with an "invasion" of peoples of color to these same lands is leading to a shrinking population of white people and a diminution of power of the white race. And even worse, according to Tarrant and the like, in the case of inter-racial/ethnic
procreation, the blood of the white race is diluted and tainted.<br />
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Over time,
the extremist narratives take shape via a written literature (published works, informal
manifestos, religious tracts, etc.). There is a large white power literature that includes books, magazines, journals, and online works and manifestos. Probably the most prominent is <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/how-the-turner-diaries-changed-white-nationalism/500039/"><i>The Turner Dairies</i></a>, an infamous but obscure book from the 1970s, but more mainstream books like Pat Buchanan's <i>The Death of the West </i>also have received significant attention from racist white groups. Tarrant openly admitted his admiration for
and was influenced by Breivik’s massive 1500 page manifesto left in the wake of his 2011
attack. Experts have even argued that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nz-manifesto-resembles-norway-mass-murderers-text/2019/03/15/6626ee02-470f-11e9-94ab-d2dda3c0df52_story.html?utm_term=.911c7bad4b15">Tarrant’s own manifesto, which he titled "The Great Replacement," was shaped by Breivik’s</a>, as they used similar language and covered similar themes, such as anger at "Islamic migration." </div>
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2. Those who research, think, and write about Sunni Islamic terrorism often frame it as a global, transnational
movement and struggle for power. And justifiably so. Just think about, al Qaeda and ISIS, the kingpins of the Sunni jihadist
world. Both have global ambitions, disseminate messages and videos to followers
worldwide, and have affiliates and cells around the world. Similar stories can
be told about Hezbollah, a Shia militant group. White power movements have similarly
gone global. White power extremists and terrorists aren't just a bunch of dudes with guns hiding out in the woods or other remote areas, as has long been the caricature of American white supremacists. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/15/five-initial-thoughts-on-the-new-zealand-terrorist-attack/">According to Daniel Byman</a>, "many forms of right-wing
terrorism are international terrorism, drawing on international networks,
ideas, and personalities from around the world." We know neo-Nazi groups have international branches and chapters. Prominent white supremacist web sites like the Daily Stormer have a global
audience. And much like in the jihadist world, white power supporters and groups
communicate online, share videos, etc. </div>
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In the case of the New Zealand attacker, he too was caught up and influenced by the global, transnational element of white power. As mentioned above, he drew
inspiration Breivik, but also from other white racist murderers, such as Dylan Roof, Darren Osborne, Luca Traini, among others. But it was Breivik in particular who loomed large for Tarrant. I enourage readers of this blog to check out <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/anders-breivik-new-zealand-right-wing-terrorism-inspiration.html">Colin Clarke's recent piece on the cult that surrounds Breivik</a> within the white power environment. Tarrant <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/the-new-zealand-attack-ratchets-up-pressure-on-europes-anti-immigrant-right/2019/03/19/a9447624-49cf-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html?utm_term=.c8881e993d3f">traveled extensively around Europe</a>, visiting old battlegrounds of the Crusades. Not surprisingly, "Tarrant’s manifesto makes it clear that <a href="https://heavy.com/news/2019/03/brenton-tarrant-anders-breivik-knights-templar/">he sees modern-day immigration to Europe as sort of a modern-day Crusade</a>: A battle of cultures
between the Muslim world and European heritage. What he’s upset by most is that
Muslims have moved into European countries like France; he’s obsessed with what
he sees as declining birthrates in Europe."</div>
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3. Prior to the New Zealand terror attack, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern had a largely superficial political profile, at least internationally. Despite her political achievements, becoming the
prime minister of New Zealand in 2017, media focused on her looks, her youth, her
fashion, and other trivialities. She even became a pop culture celebrity, gracing the cover of magazines and being the subject of major magazine profiles, like <a href="https://www.vogue.com/article/jacinda-ardern-new-zealand-prime-minister-vogue-march-2018-issue">Vogue</a> and <a href="http://time.com/collection/most-influential-people-2018/5217549/jacinda-ardern/">Time</a>, and appearing on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aYsZv9JXmio">late night American television programs</a>. What we've learned over the past few days is that Ardern should be taken very seriously. During this crisis, she demonstrated her political chops. She’s been impressive. Ardern has demonstrated
decisiveness, empathy, grace, and leadership. </div>
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For example, Ardern quickly, without hesitation, called the attacks
terrorism, an issue on which many leaders, including the current one in the White House, often equivocate for fear of alientating particular political groups. She defended Muslims, saying "they are us," and disputed the any
notion that there's a connection between Muslim immigration and violence. On Saturday, she visited members of the Muslim community in Christchurch, lending them support and compassion, sharing in their grief. Significantly, Ardern offered a powerful symbolic gesture by wearing a hijab, which
was lauded worldwide as a "sign of respect" for Muslims.<br />
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Additionally, Ardern
announced a full inquiry into the attacks. She also declared her intention to move
swiftly on gun legislation, and encouraged Kiwis to turn in unwanted weapons. And on Thursday, the 21st, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/first-victims-of-christchurch-shootings-laid-to-rest-as-police-say-gunman-had-planned-another-attack/2019/03/20/fa76af1e-4ad6-11e9-b871-978e5c757325_story.html?utm_term=.4b6890851c16">Ardern declared a trio of moves</a>: a ban on semi-automatic weapons and assualt rifles, fines for those who don't comply with the new law, and a buyback program for the heavy artilery weapons already in circulation. Advocates for a soft touch on gun control, in New Zealand and globally, are unlikely to favor the new gun legislation, though even many of them will probably give Ardern kudos for trying her best in difficult in circumstances to keep New Zealanders safe.<br />
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Whether all of her moves are enough to heal New Zealand and lower the chances of another mass murder/attack remains to be seen. What is certain is that she's offered a great model for leaders worldwide on how to react and respond personally and politically to a major crisis. And even beyond that, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/opinion/jacinda-ardern-new-zealand.html">as suggested by Sushil Aaron</a>, "Ms. Ardern is emerging as the definitive progressive
antithesis to the crowded field of right-wing strongmen like President Trump,
Viktor Orban of Hungary and Narendra Modi of India, whose careers thrive on
illiberal, anti-Muslim rhetoric."<br />
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Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-29176063296751596532019-03-05T18:33:00.002-05:002019-03-05T18:33:52.818-05:00The Hanoi Summit<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEif-UGoZdxjs5NTbRpLrmy2SEKhcjJP3p4p-42XC-6JS1CdprbeKmUv4igsIHdWoNrT2Edoem_10YGweLoRXlfRqC88T2eb3pnquhaifj0AtUAB7Ifi_djOHednHb0chOwW5n6k0MZLsdfT/s1600/hanoi.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="360" data-original-width="640" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEif-UGoZdxjs5NTbRpLrmy2SEKhcjJP3p4p-42XC-6JS1CdprbeKmUv4igsIHdWoNrT2Edoem_10YGweLoRXlfRqC88T2eb3pnquhaifj0AtUAB7Ifi_djOHednHb0chOwW5n6k0MZLsdfT/s400/hanoi.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: xx-small;"> Photo: Getty Images</span></div>
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Below is a recent conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman on last week's Hanoi Summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Did Trump fail, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-s-north-korea-summit-failed-because-he-doesn-t-ncna979461">reports widely indicate</a>? Why were Kim and Trump unable to agree to a nuclear deal? What are some takeaway lessons from the meeting? Brad and Yohanes answer those and more questions/puzzles below. </div>
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BN: Here in the US, there's been almost universal criticism
of Trump's failure to secure a deal--any kind of a deal--in Hanoi with Kim. The
ultimate self-proclaimed dealmaker was unable to finalize a nuclear deal with
Kim. To use Ben Rhodes's term, "The Blob" has spoken. The easy
response is to say that The Blob extremely dislikes Trump, so their unfavorable
reviews of the Hanoi summit aren't really a surprise. I suppose, though, let's
dig a little deeper. The pre-summit worry—almost across the board, on the right
and left, among academics and policy analysts—was that Trump would give Kim a
boatload of concessions in exchange for very little in return from Kim. In
fact, <a href="https://twitter.com/KingstonAReif/status/1100391373985992705">that
was the rumor</a> the day before the summit ended. But Trump didn't make these
concessions. In fact, Trump didn't make any immediate concessions--at least,
none beyond the actual meeting with Kim (which does confer legitimacy to Kim,
DPRK). Yes, days after the fact, Trump did move to scrap large-scale South
Korea-US exercises, replacing them with smaller-scale and virtual ones. But
even here, it’s questionable whether this was an outright concession by Trump
or something that was motivating by his cost-cutting, government waste
obsession.</div>
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It's clear, then, that this was a summit that Trump couldn't
win, no matter what he did. Hence, the story isn't just The Blob's dislike for
Trump, it's that members of The Blob (including prominent academics, serious,
distinguished people) have put forward unreasonable and contradictory positions
to buttress their claims that Trump failed. That's my first take on Trump-Kim
II.</div>
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YS: I agree with you totally. The only thing that I will
blame Trump is his over-euphoria over the summits: Trump thought that he would
be successful due to his charm offensives. He already asked Abe to nominate him
for the Nobel. This mirrors what Bill Clinton did in the last year of his
presidency when he wanted a Nobel. Clinton pushed both Arafat and Barak in negotiations.
Arafat realized that, so he refused to budge, forcing Barak to give all the
concessions, until <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/may/23/israel3,%20https:/www.timesofisrael.com/bill-clinton-palestinians-were-offered-temple-mount-in-2000/).">in
the end</a>, when Barak simply gave up.</div>
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And of course, the DPRK is well known for shifting the
goalpost. Just ask Clinton, Bush, and Obama. And Trump's desperation for the
Nobel was playing into their hands. But at the same time, was it a
disaster? No, I don't see much fallout
from the “failure” of both Singapore and Hanoi summits. China will still help the
DPRK regardless of whether the summits have been successful or not, simply
because Beijing doesn’t want to see the north collapse and refugees streaming across
the border. Russia will keep helping DPRK for the sake of putting the US on the
edge. In short, nothing’s new.</div>
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<a href="https://www.globalasia.org/v12no3/cover/why-we-must-learn-to-live-with-a-nuclear-north-korea_yohanes-sulaiman">As
I noted a couple years ago</a>, there is no way the DPRK will give up its nukes
because it is a crucial part of the regime’s legitimacy, what makes KJU thinks
he can sleep well at night, and giving them is a sign of weakness. Since a lot
of people think Trump is a serial liar, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-usa-northkorea/pompeo-says-north-korea-not-clear-on-scope-of-closing-yongbyon-facility-idUSKCN1QI3F0">I
will take what Pompeo, who is still trusted, said</a>, that the DPRK asked for
full sanctions to be lifted. And this is similar with all previous negotiating tactics
by the north: demand complete sanctions relief, get all the benefits, and then
proceed not to do what they promised—because there is no way the Kim regime
will give up its nukes.</div>
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BN: I blame Trump for short-circuiting the diplomatic
process. He stepped in at the beginning, once Kim made the offer to meet via
South Korea, and believed that fully engaged diplomacy involving teams from
both the US and DPRK wasn't needed. He believed his own hype about his
dealmaking skills; he could solve the nuclear crisis singlehandedly. Which
meant that he sidelined the experts and negotiators from the start. And that's
become an acute problem post-Singapore, as you correctly noted, because of
Trump's enthusiastic embrace of Kim. The North Koreans believe Trump's so
inexperienced and so politically invested—so eager to win a Nobel, as you point
out—in the negotiations with Kim that they believe they can woo Trump, sucker
Trump. They don't want anything to do with American negotiators like Pompeo and
Biegun; they've postponed meetings, stalled talks, etc. And that's led to scant
diplomatic progress the since Singapore. As a result, Trump walked into the
Hanoi summit with little agreed upon, a very unusual circumstance for a
bilateral meeting between world leaders. It's for that reason I didn't expect
much at all to come out the Hanoi talks.</div>
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That said, it's hardly a disaster. Trump, to my surprise,
used careful language to describe the talks and Kim. Similarly, DPRK state
media offered a cheerful take on the summit. Even China's state media put
forward an optimistic view on Hanoi. All are good signs. As Trump pointed out,
neither side stormed out of Hanoi, and both seemed to have departed on good
terms. The downside, of course, is that there are no further talks planned as
of now, and who knows will when they’ll resume.</div>
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YS: At the same time, we have to ask whether this will mean
more intransigence from Trump–he does not take humiliation lightly as we all
know—or less belligerence from Kim, since he finally knows that even Trump has
his limits. If the failure of Hanoi means that both sides will have a more
realistic estimate for each other, I'd chalk this up as just a minor bump in
the road—and as you noted, everyone involved in the talks is careful not to torpedo
them. On the other hand, if the next meeting is a disaster, if there are no
further meetings anytime soon, I think North Korea will again turn in a
bellicose direction. At the same time, if it’s apparent that Trump is going to
lose the 2020 election, or if the investigations place his presidency in
jeopardy, then if I were North Korea, I'd try to get the best deal from Trump
while I can. There won't be any US president who is more sympathetic to North
Korea.</div>
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BN: Exactly. You've led me to another point I wanted to make
here: while Trump has incentives to seal a deal with North Korea over the
status of its nuclear program, Kim also has incentives to seal a deal with the
US. Put simply, as you just mentioned, it's unlikely that Trump's successors
will be anywhere near as friendly and cozy with Kim, and as eager to earn a
political "win" on the DPRK issue. In fact, it's likely that Trump's
successors—especially his immediate successor—will take a much tougher stance
on North Korea's nukes, human rights abuses, the Kim regime, and so on. Kim has
to realize this. Hence, he's got less than two years to finalize a nuclear deal
that allows him to significantly loosen the economic noose around his nation.
If he doesn't beat the clock, he'll take a big gamble that Trump wins another
term or that the diplomatic momentum will carry over to a post-Trump
administration. That’s a very risky bet.</div>
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I suspect Trump's successor will be inclined to uphold any
deal he makes with Kim, as long as Kim abides by the terms of it, but not so
eager to reach an agreement if one isn't clinched by the time they enter
office. For example, a Democratic president in 2021 will face strong pressure
to show his/her toughness, distance the US from global tyrants, prioritize
human rights, and, more generally, junk most of Trump's of foreign policy
platform.</div>
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BN: Lastly, what do you make of Trump's comments on the Otto
Warmbier incident? In my view, taken in isolation, it's somewhat
understandable. Trump's in the middle of negotiations with Kim, and he doesn't
want to do/say anything that might sabotage current/future talks. That led him
to pull his punches on Kim. That said, however, a full-throated defense of Kim—that
Kim didn't know about Warmbier's condition, how he become ill/injured, etc.—is
off-putting, completely tone deaf, and highly unlikely. And of course, it's
difficult to see Trump's comments regarding the Warmbier tragedy in isolation.
Indeed, when we combine these comments with his lavish embrace of Kim over the
last year, his defense of MBS, his praise for Xi Jinping, and his
obsequiousness for Putin, it sure looks like Trump has an affinity for many of
the world's brutal strongmen.</div>
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YS: I agree. Trump wanted to show Kim that he was willing to
bend backward for the sake of negotiations. But I agree: that was a terrible Q&A performance.
Doesn't look good at all.</div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-22233979835198053022019-01-09T16:25:00.000-05:002019-04-19T23:02:03.023-04:00Reflecting on 2018, Looking Ahead to 2019Below is a recent conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and
Yohanes Sulaiman. As you’ll see, they reflect on the major global political
themes from 2018 and look ahead at some of the international storylines that
will likely dominate the news/opinion in 2019.<br />
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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<b>Brad Nelson</b>: So now that 2018's over and done, let's reflect
on it a bit. What were the main world politics takeaways of 2018? Any overriding
themes? Or emerging trends? I suspect you have a long list to pick from.</div>
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<b>Yohanes Sulaiman</b>: People are yelling left and right
that Trump is going to destroy the world, but so far, life goes on. We could
argue either the international system is far more resilient than scholars/analysts/pundits have believed, or
they wildly overestimate Trump's ability to destroy the world.</div>
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<br /></div>
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But seriously, I don't think Trump's influence is really
that huge. The media especially make him way bigger and dangerous than he really is and far inflate his influence. Besides, with or without Trump, there are lots ways that things can go wrong. Take the example
of Brexit, <a href="https://www.indy100.com/article/brexit-explain-cheese-submarine-twitter-thread-people-love-8680191">which
happens without Trump</a>'s rise. Or the Khashoggi scandal. I don't buy the argument
that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/opinion/jamal-khashoggi-mbs-saudi-republicans.html">Trump
emboldens dictators</a> or <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/10/12/donald-trump-anxiety-disorder-pscyhologists-221305">causes
global insanity</a>. But critics need a bogeyman, and Trump provides a
convenient one.</div>
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Putting Trump aside, though, there are several ongoing trends going that I think will have major implications for years to come. First, China is declining. No, China is not going to be like the Soviet
Union in the 1980s. But the fact that Xi Jinping had to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-camps-uighurs.html">crack
down massively on Muslims in Xinjiang</a> and that <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2180366/china-economy-endures-bad-start-2019-private-data-highlights">China's
economy is cooling down</a> are indications that all is not well in China. China's problems started way before Trump's trade war,
though the trade war exacerbated it.</div>
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Second, Iran may be losing in the Middle East's Great Game. Sure, Trump is withdrawing from Syria, or so he claims. But I think this will also lead to Russia
pulling out from Syria. Why? Because Russia is there to prevent the US and EU from challenging it in its sphere of influence. Now that America's threat is withering,
Russia will have the excuse it needs to dump an expensive war it can hardly afford. Iran would be left holding the bag and that would
strain Iran's already crumbling economy hurt by low prices and sanctions. True, Turkey might try to expand its influence in
Syria, but its economy is its Achilles' heel, thereby restricting the scope of Ankara's ambitions. And while a fraying economy
does not necessarily lead to the collapse of the regime (see Venezuela and
Cuba), a prolonged foreign adventure in the midst of such economic struggles could cause major internal instability and turmoil.</div>
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<b>BN</b>: Those are good choices. But in my view, the big story is
the continued divisions in the West--between various Western countries and
within various Western nations. Trump's a big part of this phenomenon. Trump--his policies, governing
style, his personality, and, yes, his tweets--has sparked almost daily chaos and
controversy in the US. And he's been the major source of the political unraveling we're now seeing between the US and France, Germany, Britain, Canada, and
EU/NATO. The various world gatherings and summits in 2018 (NATO summit, UN
annual meeting, G7, G20, Armistice Day), even more so than those in 2017, fully exposed
all of the rifts between Western countries, with Trump at the middle of most of
the disputes and rancor.</div>
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<br /></div>
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But Trump's not solely to blame. Right-wing populist movements
have gathered momentum--due to a mixture of sweeping populism, nationalism, and
country-specific factors--in Sweden, Austria, Poland, Germany, France, and Italy. And this, as we know, has created turmoil across Europe (entrenched
political divides, protests, street violence, a spike in right-wing extremism).
Right now, the West is in a funk, a malaise, which is problematic by itself,
but it's caused terrible rippling effects throughout the international system.
The West is distracted and preoccupied by internal troubles, creating openings
for rivals and enemies and allowing global problems to fester. Climate change,
the Syrian conflict and humanitarian fallout, the possible re-grouping of ISIS,
Russia's resurgence, China's troublesome behavior, the weakening of
international existing norms and rules--all of these things are continuing
apace, and the West, collectively, is doing relatively little about it. The
world's in trouble if we're counting on an outgoing Merkel, or Trudeau, or
Macron to save it.</div>
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Now, turning to 2019, the Trump administration is
probably the number one topic on my radar. According to reports, the Mueller
report should be wrapped up sometime this year. Will it contain any
bombshells? Or will it be a nothing-burger? Of course, except for a select few,
nobody at this point knows what's in the report. But the impact of it could be
dramatic. It could place the Trump presidency in jeopardy. And keep in mind,
already, the Democrats are out for blood and pushing impeachment through the House.
As a result, even if Trump's not ousted this year, it's pretty clear he'll face
significant political heat in 2019. And that heat will inevitably bleed into
his presidency.</div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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Indeed, it's very possible the much-criticized 2017 and 2018
years of Trump's presidency will actually be the calm years of his time in the
White House. Trump will likely be even more erratic, churn out ever crazier
tweets, and lash out even more at real and imagined political foes, both inside
the US and beyond. Will that cause more turnover in the White House? Possibly,
right? And then there are the policy implications of a insecure, threatened
Trump presidency. Does Trump do something rash? Does he manufacture a crisis to
save himself?</div>
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<b>YS</b>: The divisions in the West are not a new
phenomenon, but the group managed to keep it together for years due to good economic
growth. Once the economy faltered in 2008 and the immigration crisis started as a result of the Syrian War, coupled with uninspiring leadership from the moderates, citizens in the West looked for political and economic alternatives. Under these conditions, populism has thrived. We have seen this before, back in the 1920s and 30s, when the moderates failed to lead and both the left and the right populist movements seized the initiative, with grave implications. At the moment, because of Trump, the populist right seems to be dominant, but there is also a leftist populist movement. The populist bent sweeping through the Democratic Party in the US is a perfect example. The moderates can provide a viable political-economic alternative or keep cajoling the extremists, it's their choice. But right now, the populists have the momentum.</div>
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On the Mueller report: no, I don't think it will be a bombshell.
If there was a real smoking gun that implicated Trump, Mueller's team would have wrapped
everything up years ago. All the leaks and indictments so far are just
like a calculated drip to keep people interested. I won't be surprised if it
ends up like the Starr Report, an indictment on a wholly different topic. And Democrats would be crazy to replicate the Republicans' impeachment attempt on Clinton: it will galvanize
Trump's supporters and basically hand the election to Trump in 2020.</div>
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But I agree that this year could be a crazy year. Already, as you suggested, House Democrats are doing anything they can to destroy Trump, the Democrats are fielding contenders to run against Trump in the 2020 presidential election, and the federal government is closed with no sign of the stalemating breaking soon. So like
it or not, 2019 will be another year about Trump, and that will crowd out
everything else again.</div>
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<b>BN</b>: Are you optimistic or pessimistic about 2019?</div>
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<b>YS</b>: Pessimistic, since the moderates are running like
chickens with their heads chopped off: they present no vision, no alternative to the global
slump. Politicians and leaders are pandering to the worst, lowest instincts, not only in the
US, but also in Europe and even in Asia. Merkel is basically a lame duck, and
she hasn't been effective since the beginning of the refugee crisis. Macron is
becoming irrelevant. Putin is a vulture. China is engaging in a knee-jerk foreign policy. Trump is Trump. </div>
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In essence, things will go down, though I will be happy to
be proven wrong.</div>
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<b>BN</b>: Overall, on a macro level, I'm pessimistic. The next 25 years will likely be very rocky for many parts of the world. Ian Bremmer's Eurasia Group recently released its <a href="https://www.eurasiagroup.net/issues/Top-Risks-for-2019">"Top Global Risks" report for 2019</a>, and it presents a dour outlook for the foreseeable future. And I agree. The trend lines on a host of important issues (US-China relations, cybersecurity, US politics, Europe, the global order, climate change, etc.) are all pointing downward. These are big and complicated issues, globally defining issues, that will be extremely difficult solve, and if they're not solved, major catastrophes could result. </div>
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But I'm slightly optimistic about 2019, actually. For
example, the war in Syria is wrapping up. Brexit issues should get resolved one
way or another in the next few months. In the US, the Democrats have the House,
which can help restrain Trump. The Mueller report will be released soon, and at that point we'll know whether Trump will serve out his term
in office. Moreover, it looks like Europe is no longer hoping to woo Trump and
is finally getting its act together by proceeding without the US until the next
American president takes office. The world's most notorious despots are safe
and not going anywhere in 2019. Yes, the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/immersive-story/2019/01/08/storm-clouds-are-brewing-for-the-global-economy">global economy might dip a bit in 2019</a>, but
it doesn't look like anything terribly disruptive will occur. New leaders in Mexico
and Brazil might offer some stability to their battered, corrupt nations. China
is still biding its time regionally, waiting for Taiwan, the US, and the rest
of America's allies in Asia, to weaken and stop resisting Beijing's influence,
so I don't expect anything rash from Xi.<br />
<br />
Russia is a wild card, admittedly. Its
maneuvers in the Kerch Strait in November were concerning, and some Russia
observers fear that Putin is planning on further expanding Russian control over
Ukraine. Perhaps, though Russia's trouble making over the last decade has been
of the plausibly deniable, low-cost variety, so I don't anticipate a full-scale
invasion or anything of the sort. However, watch out for Ukraine's presidential and parliamentary elections later this year. Both offer Russia ample opportunities to disturb, harass, and threaten Ukraine's political systems and its sovereignty--perhaps via cybermeddling in the elections or provoking a security crisis beforehand. </div>
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<br /></div>
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So, overall, there's a decent chance that 2019 could be slightly more stable than last year. But I'm going to add a caveat here. Of course, I'm purely looking at how 2019 might process the problems leftover from 2018. What happens when or if a significant crisis or danger pops up this year? In that case, all bets are off. Put simply, I'm not confident at all in the current batch of global leaders, particularly those in the world's great power nations. I don't see anyone capable of rising to the occasion to lead competently the international community during a crisis. </div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-7505137907513941942018-12-19T20:41:00.000-05:002018-12-20T19:22:11.150-05:00Trump's Syria Decision<br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><img alt="President Donald Trump reacts before speaking at a rally at the Phoenix Convention Center on Tuesday, Aug. 22, 2017. (Alex Brandon/AP)" height="266" src="https://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2017/08/trumpthumbsweb.jpg" width="400" /></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Alex Brandon/AP.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Donald Trump decided to order t<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/19/politics/us-syria-withdrawal/index.html">he withdrawal of all 2000 US Special Forces</a>
stationed in Syria. Really, this shouldn't be a surprise. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">He's wanted
out of Syria for more than a year. Plus, withdrawing from Syria is right in
line with his proto-isolationist America First doctrine that's embraced by his
hardcore base of supporters. For almost two years Trump uncomfortably pressed
on in Syria, despite his policy preferences, deferring instead to the US
military, which advocated for a more open-ended, seemingly indefinite military
commitment. The rationale was that increased air strikes and presence
of US forces were needed to rout ISIS and contain Iran's influence in Syria. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Trump bucked the pressure from the military and decided to do it his way. And
in response, establishment and mainstream journalists and analysts and even
politicians <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/12/19/18148932/trump-syria-isis-withdraw-iran-war">are
up in arms at Trump's decision</a>. They see this as a replay of Barack Obama's 2009
decision to remove US forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, which provided
fertile conditions for al-Qaeda-linked terrorists in Iraq to reconstitute themselves and eventually morph
into the deadly and destructive ISIS. The conventional wisdom is that Obama's decision was a major
strategic blunder by an antsy, naive, foreign policy neophyte. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Trump's decision carries all sorts of risks, critics say. It means Assad has free rein
to do as he pleases in Syria. It gives Russia a decisive stake in Syria, making
it the ultimate power broker there. Iran now has an opportunity to expand its
influence, increasing the chances of Tehran creating its much desired
"Shia crescent" in the Middle East. And without the US in Syria, the foot
has been taken off the metaphorical throat of both al-Qaeda and ISIS, allowing both groups some breathing space to thrive Syria. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Meantime, as you might expect, <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1075397797929775105">Trump has a different take</a>. He claims that it's a good time to get out of Syria, since "We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being
there during the Trump Presidency." <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">What
should we make of these developments?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">First, while ISIS has lost about 90% of the territory it once held in Syria and Iraq, it's still
holding on. It still has a presence in both countries, has thousands of foot
soldiers, and the organization is still alive. So why not stay in longer to
deliver a knockout blow? Okay, but that begs several questions. What’s a
knockout blow? The complete eradication of all ISIS elements in Syria? Fine, but that's going to be more difficult than US hawks believe. As forces on sides close in, the organization on the ground in Syria might fully disappear, but many ISIS foot soldiers and leaders will remain alive and simply disperse, heading underground in Syria or fleeing for safe haven in other nearby failed states. Eventually, it will be like finding a needle in a haystack, and the US will have to cut its losses and leave. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Additionally, </span><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">at this point, al-Qaeda is arguably the bigger problem, as it's embedded itself in various communities in Syria, taking up local causes. And getting rid of al-Qaeda in Syria is no easy thing</span><span style="font-size: 16px;">—something the US should fully know by now, after almost two decades of fighting the group in various global venues</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;">. </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Uprooting al-Qaeda by force could take decades, if not longer, and so using anti-terrorism as a guidepost
is a recipe for the US to remain engaged in an another endless war in the Middle East. Which is a wrongheaded move, on many counts. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">What about
the Russia, Iran, and Assad angles? Shouldn’t Trump be concerned about those things
and work to confront and contain them? Honestly, those are flawed reasons to keep US forces in Syria. For example, Russia is the main power broker in Syria and
has been since 2015, when Vladimir Putin decided to up the ante with the Obama administration
by sending in Russian forces. And both Russia and Iran have considerably more
vested security, economic, and political interests at stake in Syria (in maintaining
their influence there, keeping Syria as a partner, having Assad remain in
power, etc.) than does the US. Furthermore, geographic proximity alone—the much
shorter distance from Russia and Iran to Syria, compared to the US—automatically
means that both nations highly value Syria and are extremely vigilant of what
happens there. Syria, after all, is in Iran and Russia’s neighborhood; that’s hardly
the case for Washington. As a result, the US is not going to dislodge a highly motivated Russia or Iran from Syria, at least not short of a head-to-head catastrophic confrontation inside Syria. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Another important question needs to be asked: Even if motives and interests
were roughly equal between the US and its rivals in Syria, are 2000 Special Forces enough to make life difficult for the tens of thousands of Syrian, Russian,
Iranian, and Hezbollah troops and militants and help the US advance its
interests? So far, yes, but probably not over the long-term. Keep in mind that
Assad, working in concert with his external backers, continues his march to
retake territory that has been seized over the last seven plus years. He’s
making progress and it’s fairly inevitable that all of Syria, except perhaps for
certain pockets here and there, will once again be under his control. Might not
happen soon, but it will likely happen. And at that point, any US troops in Syria
would be a cornered, occupying force, illegally in the country and without permission
from Assad. What happens then? I can think of a number of nightmare scenarios
that could easily come to life.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Well, what
about Assad? Shouldn’t the US remain in Syria to act as a check on Assad’s
brutality? Obama didn’t think so and neither does Trump. And both are right. This
kind of external intervention violates Syria’s sovereignty. It significantly
expands America’s mission to Syria, which would then necessitate a new congressional
authorization. It also runs counter to US national
interests. It’s not the job of America’s military to police the leadership,
politics, and governing structures of Syria. The US doesn’t have the foreign political
capital, the backing of US citizens, and the requisite resources to act as a permanent warden to a failed and violent Syria. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Sure,
withdrawal does carry risks, <a href="https://twitter.com/RichardHaass/status/1075399536812744704">especially for the Kurds</a>, America's main partner in Syria. But the risks of staying much longer
outweigh the benefits of America reducing its footprint there. </span><span style="font-size: 16px;">Frankly, working with America’s counterterrorism partners in the region, in combination with vigorous US air strikes, is probably a better path and one that Trump will likely follow. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The bigger
problem is <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2018/12/19/18149087/trump-syria-troops-iran-war-withdraw-decision">the
chaotic, ramshackle nature of the policy process</a> that produced Trump’s
decision to withdraw from Syria. As we know now, it wasn’t the product of careful deliberation and consultation with defense
and policy experts. There wasn’t a meeting of the minds within the Republican Party. According to the latest reporting, Trump made his
decision unilaterally, keeping almost all other relevant US actors in the dark.
The Pentagon and State Department weren’t consulted. In fact, Secretary of Defense James Mattis was so bothered by Trump's unilateral decision that he resigned his position, citing conflicting views with Trump. </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">GOP members of congress were
caught off guard, and several desperately hope that Trump will reverse course. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: 12pt;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: 12pt;">All of this is one more instance—like Trump’s North Korea dealings, his
climate change stance, his criticisms of the EU and NATO, and so on—of Trump
making a policy announcement and then other parts of the US government, caught
flat-footed, then having to either flesh out the details after the fact or walk back Trump’s comments. As should be obvious, this just isn’t a good way to run a government or to make
policy. Look, the Syria decision and the political fallout, in combination with the dramatic stock market downturn and the prospect of an imminent government shutdown, has effectively created massive instability and a near panic among US political and economic oberservers.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: 12pt;"><br /></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">At bottom, what's happening is a clear example of what James Goldgeier and Elizabeth Saunders call </span><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-08-13/unconstrained-presidency" style="font-size: 12pt;">“The
Unrestrained Presidency.”</a><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> In their Foreign Affairs article, Goldgeier and Saunders lament the lack of constraints on the
ability of US presidents to exercise dominant power and authority on foreign
policy matters. They write:</span></div>
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Going
forward, any attempts to stem the growth of presidential power will have to
confront not just the damage done by Trump but also the deeper problem that
damage has exposed: that the bodies charged with constraining presidential
power have been steadily losing both their willingness and their capacity to
rein in presidents. Many have written eloquently, particularly since 9/11,
about the need for checks on presidential power. But the reality is that
Congress is in no shape to reclaim its role in foreign policy—and neither are
the other traditional sources of constraint on U.S. presidents. It may take a
major shock, such as the rise of China, to reboot the system.</span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">While it’s
beyond the scope of this blog post to give an exhaustive analysis of this
predicament, it’s sufficient to say that the US presidency, especially under Trump, is
demonstrating highly troubling despotic foreign policy tendencies. Do we really
want anyone, let alone Trump—someone who knows little about foreign affairs, has
shown little interest in understanding substantive foreign policy issues, and cares
little about the importance and intricacies of diplomacy—to possess unchecked
power on us national security affairs? I sure don’t. </span></div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-9472385246875608022018-12-07T20:49:00.002-05:002018-12-08T02:08:13.704-05:00Remembering George H. W. Bush<br />
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Over the past few days, Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman held a short conversation over email on the recent death of former US President George H. W. Bush. Below is that conversation. </div>
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<b>Brad Nelson</b>: What are your thoughts on the passing of George
H.W. Bush?<o:p></o:p></div>
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<b>Yohanes Sulaiman</b>: It is the passing of a great man, a world
leader, a mensch, etc.</div>
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Three more thoughts.</div>
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First, the media talk about how Bush Sr.
is different from Trump, and how Bush Jr. wasn’t able to exhibit the kind of
caution and restraint in his foreign policy as hid dad did. So I don't want to
discuss that. What I want to talk about is about the change in global
order. Some argue that without Bush Sr., the collapse of the Berlin Wall might
not have been so peaceful. The Russians, Brits, and French were actually
aghast at the prospect of German unification, and it was only because of Bush’s
diplomacy that those three nations finally allowed Germany to unite. Perhaps
there is a lesson somewhere here about the rise of China?</div>
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Second, it can be argued that Bush was probably the most
prepared foreign policy president, with stints as the head of the CIA, vice
presidency, etc. Compared to the leaders who followed, who lacked any foreign
policy experience, I could argue that Bush Sr.'s foreign policy was successful
because he knew the levers he could pull.</div>
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And third, while it could be argued that Reagan won the
battles to break the Soviet Union, it was Bush who won the war by presiding
over a peaceful transition. Is it a fair assessment, or am I giving too much
credit to Bush?</div>
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<b>BN</b>: My initial reaction is this: During and for years
afterward, George H. W. Bush’s (GHWB) presidency was completely overshadowed by
more electric personalities—first by his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, and then
by his successor, Bill Clinton. Reagan was seen as the modern GOP Jesus, a
conservative exemplar who strengthened the party by bringing evangelicals back
into politics and flipping Midwestern and rust belt democrats into Republicans.
He kept the US out of costly wars, burnished America's image as a beacon of
freedom, and had a hand in winning the cold war. Clinton was young and hip and
cool, understood the plight of the common person, and, oh, and he was credited
for rejuvenating the US economy in the 1990s.</div>
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Bush's legacy was also hamstrung by the fact that he only
served one term. Americans—citizens and academics alike—typically don't view
one-term presidents as successful. It's basically taken as given that
one-termers screwed up somewhere along the way and that's why they weren't
reelected to office. </div>
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Over the last few years, especially since the release of Jon
Meacham's bio of GHWB in 2015, there's been a critical reassessment of Bush's
legacy. And that's allowed Bush's presidency to stand alone, to be evaluated on
its own terms. And rightly so. His presidency wasn't perfect, true, especially
on domestic matters. But Bush accomplished so much in his 4 years. Mostly seamless German unification. NATO kept
intact. Stable Russian-US relations. Norms against conquest upheld. The UN had
one of its few shining moments on his watch. And it's not just the individual,
discrete accomplishments that matter most, it's that Bush applied a steady hand
in a massively changing world, as you point out. He safely, confidently guided
the world as it moved from the cold war to a new unipolar era. And given how
the US prosecuted the Iraq War in 1991, this unipolar era wasn't one to be
feared, as the US wielded its power as a benign hegemon. All credit to Bush.</div>
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And so I agree with you on Bush. While Reagan helped bring
the USSR to the precipice of the end of the cold war, it was Bush who actually
won the cold war. He won it in a literal sense, in that the USSR folded on
Christmas Day 1991. But besides that, Bush had the harder part of dealing with
the reality of a defeated, nuclear great power. There are lots of ways in which
bad things could've happened and then spun out of control. What if Bush had
decided to immediately consolidate US gains in his remaining time in office? He
resisted those temptations. And frankly, that's something Russians remember to
this day and why he's still fondly remembered by them.</div>
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<b>BN</b>: And going back to your first point, the GHWB
administration does offer lessons for the future of US-China relations,
especially for the Chinese. Going forward, China could well be in the position
the US was in the late 1980s/early 1990s: riding high atop the international
system, flush with power advantages and confidence, faced with the dilemma of
what to do about its fallen superpower competitor. Bush showed how a deft touch
toward a defeated great power—via diplomacy, face saving tactics, great power
cooperation—can yield significant benefits. China should take note. Will
Beijing find a way for the US to decline with grace and dignity? Or will it try
to harass and humiliate an enervated US in Asia and globally?</div>
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<b>YS</b>: The problem with the current Chinese leadership is in
their inability to think about what others think. We could argue whether it is
due to China's authoritarian leadership. Or China's culture that emphasizes itself
as the center of the world. Or the idea of the "Century of humiliation.
Whichever is the case, it is a fact that the Chinese leadership is simply
unprepared to face a global backlash against their current policies.
I doubt that the current Chinese leadership could behave like Bush Sr., who
understood what was going on behind the Kremlin walls and tried to make sure
that the Soviet Union didn't overreact to the fall of Berlin Wall, thus
wrapping up the Cold War. And such experience is unfortunately lacking among
current or recent global leadership.</div>
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<b>BN</b>: Are you surprised by the sustained, lavish praise,
especially here in the States, by talking heads, the media, foreign
politicians, and like since GHWB's death?</div>
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<b>YS</b>: Not really. Though from what I observe, the media,
especially CNN, praises Bush to draw contrasts against Trump.</div>
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<b>BN</b>: You're exactly right. The very positive coverage of the
passing of GHWB—whether intentional or not--has been a stinging rebuke of
Trump. Bush was a devoted father and husband. Bush was a fairly decent guy. He
served in war and was a war hero. He was very experienced, in terms of politics
and policy. He was a "true" conservative. He ran an organized WH, one
that was filled with highly qualified people (Haass, Scowcroft, Baker, among others). And so on. All of these things
have been exhaustively discussed and analyzed by the media over the last week,
and they all stand in sharp contrast to Donald Trump and his presidency.</div>
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But the other interesting part is a clear
nostalgia for the late 1980s/early 1990s. The undercurrent of the praiseworthy
reporting on Bush, at least as I see it, is that the Bush presidency was a good
era, particularly for the US. </div>
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It was a simpler, more stable world. Nations were
turning liberal and democratic, enmeshing themselves in the liberal world
order, with only a few minor rogue actors posing a threat to the international
system. The perils of globalization, jihadist terrorism, the rise of China, a
resurgent Russia—these were either minor problems to the US or were light years
away from becoming one. The US sat at the apex of the international system, as
it won the cold war and stood as the unquestioned lone superpower globally. It
quickly and successfully kicked Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, whereby the US
demonstrated its enormous raw might and reach of the American military,
highlighted its role as a careful protector of long-established liberal norms
and rules, and showed sincerity in gaining the requisite buy-in from other
nations, including Muslim-majority nations in the ME, in order to prosecute the
war. The US had good relations with most of the world. The world wanted to be
friends and allies with the US, and the US worked hard at maintaining their
friendship. Despite the economic blip that helped to boot Bush out of office by
November 1992, it was a period when the US felt good about itself, its role in
the world, and saw the promise of better days ahead.</div>
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That's a bygone era we now wistfully look at. By
contrast, the world today is messy, complicated, filled with ghosts and demons
everywhere. The US is turning on itself, as polarization is sky-high. There are
large and deep-seated questions percolating these days throughout the US: Who
is an American? What is America? Does America still have a global mission?
America is engaged in a very self-help dialogue: we're troubled, we need help, but
we don't know what to do or where to go, or who is best equipped to lead us out of the wilderness. That's a far cry from where we were in
the Bush years.</div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-670912490786998567.post-90258698273164501532018-11-07T17:32:00.002-05:002018-11-07T23:47:58.690-05:00Is Donald Trump a Realist?<br />
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<img height="229" src="https://www.motherjones.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/AP_18308771496593.jpg?w=972" width="400" /></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Evan Vucci/AP.</span></div>
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Back in early 2016, Tufts University political science professor and
<i>Washington Post</i> columnist <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/01/so-when-will-realists-endorse-donald-trump/?utm_term=.9c4a2bf5b6d1">Daniel
Drezner posed two interesting questions</a>: Is Donald trump a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realism_(international_relations)">realist</a>?
And if so, why don’t more contemporary realists embrace him as one of their
own?</div>
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At the time, Drezner found that realists, especially those present
in the academy, weren’t coming to trump’s defense. Why was that? Drezner
believed that “if they’re being intellectually honest,” they would openly claim
Trump as one of their own, as this could’ve been realism’s “moment in the sun.”
Given that realists often complain that their views aren’t widely shared within
the US foreign policy establishment, which advocates more interventionist,
activist policy positions, why not back the candidate that seemed to give the
US a chance at correcting America’s litany of foreign policy mistakes?</div>
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Makes sense, I suppose. Based on his message or platform, as
Drezner saw it then, Trump appeared, at least in speech, to be the epitome of
what realists would want in a US president. After all, Trump voiced support for
upgrading US military power, distancing the US from various international institutions
and agreements, focusing on getting Americans back to work and enhancing economic
productivity, confronting economic and security free riders in Europe and Asia,
taking on a rising China, and getting the US out of Syria. All together, these
policy positions signified a shift in US foreign policy to a new era of more restrained
US foreign policy interests, great power competition, and boosting American
power—all of which are consistent with the application of realist logic and
principles to US foreign policy. </div>
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Now that we’re almost two full years into Trump’s
presidency, it’s a good time to reflect on this debate. In 2015/16, Donald
Trump, candidate for the US presidency, seemed like a realist-oriented aspiring
politician. Is that still true today? Is Trump, as US commander in chief and
president, a foreign policy realist? Interestingly, Trump himself has claimed
the realist mantle, arguing that he’s a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/new-national-security-strategy-new-era/">principled realist</a>. Is he right? At this
point, we have more than enough data to make a reasonable critical assessment. To
do so, let’s evaluate trump and his presidency on two dimensions: foreign policy
and leadership.</div>
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On foreign policy, Trump does share some theoretical and logical
similarities with realism. He has carried his skepticism of institutions and
multilateral pacts with him into his presidency. In short, if the US isn’t able
to wield such institutions to its advantage, so goes the logic, then it’s not
worth it to work with or through them. Why? Because most institutions, by
design, attempt to constrain the ability of the great powers to act and wield
power globally. Given this logic, and given his statements on the campaign
trail, it should not be a surprise that, under Trump, the US has pulled out of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris Climate
Agreement, the INF Treaty, and various UN bodies. Trump has also repeatedly
criticized NAFTA, NATO, the WTO, and the EU.<br />
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But that’s not all. He has challenged China on trade. He has
requested, and seems to have gotten, NATO members to begin devoting more
spending to their defense budgets, thereby reducing a tad Washington’s concerns
about Europe’s free riding. He has renegotiated NAFTA with Canada and Mexico,
making slight alterations to the original agreement, to America’s favor. Trump
has also scrapped human rights and democracy promotion abroad, the very things
which, according to realists, have driven the US into a host of costly wars and
quagmires in the post-cold war period. All of these things are connected to
seminal realist concepts and arguments, like relative gains, inter-state
competition, power, the perils of alliance dynamics, and so on.</div>
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Yet, there’s more to the story of Trump’s presidency. Put
simply, despite all of the above, Trump has pursued several policies that are
inconsistent with realism. For instance, Trump placed roughly 2000 troops
inside Syria to fight ISIS, and then expanded the mission, committing to keep
US forces there indefinitely to eliminate ISIS safe havens and guard against
Iran (and its proxy Hezbollah) gaining a permanent foothold in Syria. So while
Trump campaigned on getting out of the Middle East’s protracted conflicts and
reducing America’s footprint there, he’s actually done the opposite, upping US
commitments to the Middle East.</div>
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Furthermore, Trump’s foreign policy lacks strategic focus,
or better known among academics and intellectuals as a grand strategy. Essentially,
realists have written the literature on grand strategy. In their view, it’s
crucial that state leaders have an organizing principles, goals, and interests
to motivate and properly direct the course of their foreign policies, so as to
avoid letting their policies turn adrift, aimless, and costly. Trump, by
contrast, doesn’t operate in a big-picture, comprehensive way. His foreign
policy is purely transactional and driven mostly by Trump’s rapport with fellow
state leaders. If foreign leaders are willing to flatter Trump, stay at his
hotels, say nice things about him, and make minor concessions to US foreign
policy, then America’s POTUS is willing stand with them. Of course, there are
perils to this approach.</div>
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Look at US policy toward the Middle East. Team Trump has decisively
cast his lot with Mohammad bin Salman (MBS). MBS buys America’s weapons, gets
along well with Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner, fashioned himself as a
reformer, and is happily pushing back against Iran, and so the White House has invested
considerably in MBS, betting that he, and he alone, holds the keys to solving
the Middle East’s array of problems. While not optimal, it’s fine, but only as
long as MBS remains in power and free from trouble and misdeeds. We now know
that’s not the case, given his role in the Khashoggi affair. MBS is now on
shaky ground, suffering significant global blowback, including a severely
tarnished image, and we have to wonder if his position domestically is in
jeopardy. If he falls anytime soon, the entirety of America’s Middle East
foreign policy goes down the drain, with possibly dramatic and costly consequences.</div>
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Another policy issue that realists, especially more
internationalist realists, criticize is Trump’s apparent willingness to vacate
US global leadership. Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass
terms this “American abdication.” Trump’s propensity to withdraw from existing
international agreements and institutions, in combination with his team’s widespread
divestment from global diplomacy on a host of issues, has fostered the rise of power
vacuums in Europe and Asia. Under Trump, America is increasingly alone, and so
are its allies, who have to live without the customary assurances that
Washington has their backs. This has, in turn, created an increasingly destabilized
world, with Russia and China pressing outward, fomenting disturbances in their
neighborhood and beyond. This world is exactly the kind of world that realists—who
prize stability and balances of power—abhor.</div>
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Let’s turn to the second angle I’d like to explore: Trump’s
leadership. This is something that has gone largely ignored in the Trump-realism
debate, which has tended to emphasize discrete foreign policies pursued and
adopted by the Team Trump. In a sense, that’s not surprising. Academic and
intellectual realism is usually framed as a systemic, or 3<sup>rd</sup> image,
theoretical framework that “black boxes” things inside the state, like domestic
politics and leadership issues. For many realists, what’s most important are
anarchy, systemic power dynamics, and inter-state interactions. One problem,
however, is that the historical literature, and even some of the old school
theoretical tracts, that informs realism often takes leadership as quite
consequential. And it’s a particular type of leadership that’s most prized by
many realists, especially those who research foreign policy, decision-making,
and narrative case studies: leaders who are rational, wise, strategic, and
tough.</div>
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Think about realism’s embrace of Machiavelli, who is widely
lauded as a master chronicler of pragmatism and power politics. In <i>The Prince</i>, Machiavelli argues that
effective leaders are those who are ruthless about exercising power, value the
health and security of the state over their own pride and glory and morals,
manage well the staffers around him/her, and appreciate how humans and events
really are rather than how they hope them to be.</div>
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Classic examples of this kind of leadership, according to
realists, include Bismarck, Churchill, Reagan, and (George H. W.) Bush 41, among many others.
Today, we can consider Vladimir Putin a contemporary example. He’s ruthlessly wielded
power internally in Russia, stabilized the state, elevated Russia’s status
globally, and has disrupted and undermined the interests of more powerful competitors.
In short, Putin has played a bad hand—think about Russian chaos, instability,
and weakness in the 1990s—into something much greater, allowing Russia to punch
well above its weight internationally. If we’re being honest, Trump comes up
well short in comparison to these leaders.</div>
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Trump’s time in office is notorious for continual chaos—in
his administration, in US politics, and in US society more generally. Trump’s
perpetual lies—numbering in the thousands by now—have eroded his credibility
among large sectors of American voters. His approval rating has hovered around
35-40%—an amazingly low level of support given the strong US economy—and he’s just
lost the House of Representatives to the Democrats. Trump’s erratic
personality—manifested most clearly in his campaign rallies and Twitter
account—results in a constant cycle of outrageous statements and then fierce
blowback by the media. Polling data indicate that Trump’s numbers move in a
more favorable direction during times when he’s relatively quiet and
restrained; his numbers tank during his more irritable, erratic periods. This
trend should be easy to learn, yet Trump’s wild personality and propensity for
self-inflicted errors resurfaces time and again. Trump’s much-hyped management
skills have translated into near-constant turnover in the White House, damaging
leaks by his administration, and in-fighting and bickering among those staffers
who have stuck it out. His close staff is filled with incompetents,
kleptocrats, and suspected criminals. Plus, Trump is still under investigation
for a host of possible criminal activities by Special Counsel Robert Mueller
and the Southern District of New York.</div>
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So where does that leave us? How does trump fare as a
realist? It’s a mixed bag, and that’s being charitable. As prominent realist
scholar Stephen Walt recently stated, Donald Trump is the kind of guy to give
realism a bad name. That’s, in short, how most realists view him. The two
notable exceptions are Ohio State professor <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2018/1/11/16875344/trump-foreign-policy-randall-schweller">Randall
Schweller</a> and Bard College professor <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-realist-syria-strategy-1523915612">Walter
Russell Mead</a>, both of whom have lauded Trump for his realist credentials. But overall, realists today argue that Trump has instincts
that seem to be consistent with realism, but he lacks a strategic vision,
crudely executes foreign policy, and demonstrates little of the leadership
qualities that realists traditionally value. I agree. At best, we have left a
president whose views and policies do overlap a bit with realism, but who isn’t
nearly the realist that he was labeled as years ago.</div>
Center for World Conflict and Peacehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09848386765958182753noreply@blogger.com0