A Primer on Ukraine

As CWCP’s main analyst of Russian and Eurasian affairs, I have been notably silent on the current situation in Ukraine. My main reasons for keeping comment on the situation mostly limited to my Twitter feed are that I had written an article this fall (well before the protests of the Maidan began) published in Ukrainian Quarterly in which I highlighted that Ukraine was coming upon a critical time in its geopolitical orientation, and have focused my more recent writings about countries and issues in Eurasian geopolitics, such as Moldova’s Gagauzia region and Serbia, that tend to be overlooked. Nevertheless, we here at CWCP feel it’s time to make our voice heard on the issue of Ukraine’s Euromaidan.

Ukraine seems to be something of the darling of the community of Eastern Europe/post-Soviet space analysts--even well before the protests, it seems everyone was particularly interested in Ukraine. While some may dismiss this as some sort of “jumping on the bandwagon” in the analytical community, it is not without reason or justification. Not only does the sheer geographic size of Ukraine make it among the most important states in Eastern Europe, but from the standpoint of the geopolitical analyst, in many ways it encapsulates the spirit of the grand geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West.

The media have mostly focused on the battle between protesters in the streets and the Ukrainian security services. As so much focus has tended to be on the actual domestic situation in Ukraine, it’s easy to overlook the broader geopolitical interplay and the implications for Europe as a whole.

In 1795, Ukraine was part of what was known as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Throughout the 18^th century, Poland-Lithuania was subjected to a geopolitical struggle between the Austrian, Prussian (German) and Russian empires. All three kingdoms sought to control the Commonwealth by installing a leader loyal to them by way of Poland-Lithuania’s elective monarchy. During the last third of the 18^th century, there was a series of treaties between the three kingdoms, which led to what we call the “Partitions of Poland.” Insofar as Ukraine is concerned, the eastern half of modern Ukraine was taken by Russia, and the western half by Austria. This history accounts in part for the regional east-west divide in Ukraine today, which has pitted half of the country in favor or closer ties with Europe, and the other half inclined toward Russia. This also explains in part why we have not seen the massive protests we are witnessing in Ukraine in a place like Armenia, which has taken it a step further than Ukraine and stated that they will fully integrate with the Russia-led Customs Union, and that they will not hold bilateral trade talks with the EU, but rather that any commercial discussions between Armenia and the EU will take place in the context of the Customs Union.

A sort of lackadaisical mindset toward Europe, in particular Eastern Europe, seems to have settled into the mindset of the U.S. policy, analytical and other such communities. We tend to think that nothing bad can happen in Europe now that the Cold War is over. NATO has been searching for a purpose since that period. Particularly since so much of Central and Eastern Europe has acceded to the EU and NATO, we tend to overlook that region, and comfortably assume that those parts of the region that have not already joined the West’s supranational structures will soon follow.

I will never forget when I was preparing to apply for graduate school my adviser on the matter, who happened to be a Central Europe specialist, told me I’d be better off focusing on the Caucasus and Central Asia rather than Europe itself, because, my adviser believed, Central and Eastern Europe would be “better behaved” and that not much would come from them. To be sure, this is not 1989, and while it’s true that we shouldn’t expect throngs of protesters jingling their keys in the streets of Prague or Romanians putting their president and his wife on mock trial before live TV cameras, we are currently witnessing a major political crisis not on the periphery of Europe, but at its very heart. Crises that have occurred in Europe since the end of the Cold War have taken place in areas that many dismiss as being pseudo-European or with one foot in Europe and one in the “east” (namely Bosnia and Georgia). Now, however, we cannot deny that Europe itself is facing a majorly unsettling turn of events, and European security is being threatened in an undeniable way at its very core.

The macro-level view of the situation begs two questions: Should Ukraine split into two separate countries? And what is the likelihood of a civil war? To these I can only offer some general insights and cautionary notes. It seems that most level-headed people agree that Ukraine should stay united; this is what I have gathered from both my American colleagues as well as Ukrainians I have spoken to, many of whom are pro-European and hail from the country’s western half. The same argument against Ukrainian division seems to coincide with that concerning the possible severing of Scotland from the UK-- western Ukraine is primarily agricultural, while most of the country’s industry is in the east. A “Republic of Western Ukraine” would not likely survive on its own economically, and would have to depend on the largesse of the EU or Poland in particular.

As to the second question, some spoke of the fear of a civil war in Ukraine ten years ago during the Orange Revolution. While we are witnessing a great deal of violence, to be sure, a civil war does not seem likely or imminent at this point. Having said that, one of the main points of my article is to highlight the fact that the days of American and Western European dismissal of the possibility of violence and instability in Eastern Europe are over. There is a possibility that, if the situation escalates, senior military and police commanders may take their troops and personnel and bring them to the service of the side of the conflict they support, based on their own regional, religious and linguistic background (remember that the eastern half of Ukraine is largely Russian-speaking and Orthodox of the Moscow Patriarchate persuasion, while the west is largely Ukrainian-speaking and adheres to the Ukrainian Catholic or Ukrainian Orthodox Kyiv Patriarchate). Of course, there is the possibility of a repeat of the situation in Bosnia’s conflict when external suppliers came to meet the needs of the warring factions selling them weapons. Already there is one Russian biker gang, the Night Wolves, participating in the anti-Maidan activities.

At the end of the day, our ability to think of Europe as a sunny paradise is over. How far the situation will escalate with of curse depend on domestic political considerations as well as external diplomatic factors. One thing is for sure: the focus in Eurasian geopolitics has undoubtedly shifted toward the “Eur-“ part of the phrase.

Legitimacy Crises and Reform in Indonesian Democracy

A recent article on a handful of semi- and consolidated-democracies in Southeast Asia caught my attention. The article's author, Lin Neumann, argues that instability, gridlock and power-hungry leaders, are harming the political systems in Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia and Indonesia and creating a widespread legitimacy crisis. Given the protests and unrest in Thailand and Cambodia and the one-party rule in Malaysia, it's no surprise Neumann chose to talk about these three countries. What is surprising is that Neumann lumped Indonesia, a seemingly stable and increasingly prosperous country, with Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia.

What's his justification? Neumann's beef is that Jakarta Governor Joko Widowo, or Jokowi as he's known locally, is by far the most popular politician in Indonesia, and with presidential elections right around the corner, it would seem that he would have the inside track to be SBY's heir to the leadership mantle. Alas, that's not necessarily the case. Elders in the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), threatened by Jokowi's rise, could block his road to political advancement.
Here is the money paragraph:

Jokowi is a true outsider and he now enjoys a 30-point lead in several opinion polls over his closest rival for July's election. But his position as a candidate is dependent on the most opaque process possible--former President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the chairman of the party to which Jokowi belongs, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), has the sole power to determine the party's candidate. Should she decide to run for president for a fourth time (she lost in direct elections in 2004 and 2009 and settled for No. 2 in 1999), she would deny the popular will with no recourse for the public unless Jokowi broke ranks with the PDI-P, which is considered highly unlikely.

So what does this mean? All of this could very well put a dent in the armor of Indonesia's democratic political system. According to Neumann, "For many Indonesians, a presidential election without Jokowi could also be seen as illegitimate, just another exercise by the elite to reshuffle the deck chairs out of fear that a genuine reformer might upset cozy deals and bring a commitment to greater transparency into the opaque world of Indonesian governance."

What Neumann is talking about here, broadly speaking, is the notion of a deficit in democracy. This is a common theme in studies of democratic political systems, both mature and young systems. Here in the United States there is considerable talk about how big money--individual and corporate donors--influences and distorts electoral outcomes. Moreover, in unstable democracies, with weak and fragile institutions, we often see leaders pack legislatures and judicial branches with followers and sycophants. There is also the tendency for democratic leaders to use media outlets as their own personal political instrument. It's also not uncommon for senior political elites, as Neumann points out, to block the rise of upstart politicians, forcing them to wait their turn or simply shutting them out altogether from political ascension. I could go on, as the democracy deficit literature is quite voluminous.

It's tempting to suggest that Indonesia political parties ought to decentralize if not democratize the selection of candidates who will run in legislative and presidential elections. That would be a wonderful step. The rub, of course, is that those changes in party decisions must be made at the top, by the very leaders who are currently in a position to subvert democratic processes. As a result, instead, we have to think about altering the incentive structure of party leaders, so that they will find it in their interest to enact intra-party reforms. The answers aren't easy, and I don't have good ones right now. At this point, my hope is that this blog post and Neumann's article begin to spark a vigorous debate on widening democracy within Indonesia's prominent institutions.

Nick Kristof and Academia

Nick Kristof's latest column for the New York Times takes on the role of academics in American society. His point is that they are nowadays largely irrelevant to the "great debates" in the U.S., as they hide in their Ivory Towers. Academics write in arcane language and largely write to each other. They've walled themselves off, so to speak, from the American public. As a result, there are, in his words, "fewer public intellectuals on American university campuses today than a generation ago."

It's a provocative piece, to be sure. But is it on point? As a matter of fact, CWCP's Yohanes Sulaiman and Brad Nelson--two academics who also blog and pen op-eds for wide audiences--believe Kristof has missed a few things. Below are their brief responses to Kristof's take.

Yohanes Sulaiman

Kristof is right to some degree that there's a disconnection between political scientists and real world policy-making. True, part of it can be explained by the focus on quantitative studies and very arcane game theory, but at the same time, he is missing the larger picture.

Most important is tenure. If you want tenure, you need to be published in scholarly publications, period. No college or university gives someone tenure because she/he is on CNN or quoted in the New York Times. This gives academics perverse incentives for scholars to focus on academic research and debates, not policy-advocacy.

Plus, policy advocacy is a dangerous job. Professors can incur the wrath of politicians. And now throw in departmental politics, which can, at times, be unkind toward anyone who doesn't act and speak in line with the conventional role of the serious scholar. Furthermore, speaking one's mind could turn into be a career-ending mistake, which, once again, de-incentivizes scholars to take public positions on policy issues.

At the same time, at least in my field of IR, a growing number scholars are connected and, to some degree, involved policy debates. Think about Foreign Policy magazine, the Monkey Cage blog, and even this blog. Still, the number of scholars active in reaching out to mainstream audiences compared to the total number of academics is pretty low. In that respect, Kristof does make a good point.

Brad Nelson

Overall, I think Kristof's take is rather lazy. He leans on a longstanding tired mantra of academics--that they've insulated themselves from the wider society and could care less about important policy debates in America, that they're out of touch. Some professors, of course, do act this way. But in my view, many don't. I think he's off-base here. Scholars are better connected to the public than ever before via blogging, Twitter, and other social media. Scholars--especially the younger generation of scholars--are actively reaching out to lay audiences; a growing number don't only want to talk to each other. Many are genuinely eager to present and discuss their theories and findings with non-academics in ways that are easy to digest and interesting. A major issue is that in the Internet age, there are so many voices competing to get heard that academics--like most people--get lost in the noise.

Thoughts on Iran, US-Iran ties, and Middle East Politics

With Iran in the news so much these days (the seeming change in Iran's political image, Rowhani's appearance at Davos, the nuclear deal, warming U.S.-Iran ties, Saudi Arabia and Israeli concern about Iran's nuclear program and U.S.-Iran ties, etc.), I've been doing lots of thinking on Iran's politics and foreign and strategic policy as well as Middle East foreign relations. Below are some of my thoughts.

1. It doesn't make sense for the U.S. Senate to pass further sanctions on Iran right now. Why not wait until we observe the results of the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1? If they lead nowhere, with Iran stalling and taking uncompromising positions, then the topic of sanctions and other punishment can then be broached. But at this point, more sanctions only sabotage the implementation of the interim agreement and negotiations on a final, comprehensive nuclear deal. Such moves will prompt the clerics to walk away from the bargaining table. Furthermore, slapping on additional sanctions now risks showing the world that the U.S. isn't negotiating in good faith, thereby generating sympathy for Iran, both inside and outside the country. And of course, there's this little point: the negotiations could succeed. Let's give it some time.

2. I'm not quite sure why more analysts don't voice the idea that tying Iran gradually into international institutional cooperation with the West is a very good thing? This type of cooperation can become routinized. It can also lead to expanded multilateral and bilateral cooperation, as Iran feels more comfortable dealing with foreign institutions and Western diplomats and bureaucrats.

3. Dialing down tensions and seeking a thaw in the cold war with Iran can be good for the U.S. Anytime the U.S. can move a foreign country from foe or enemy to, say, rival or competitor, that's a very good thing. A reduction in tensions and hostilities means a lower likelihood of an Iran-U.S. war and a reduced chance of reckless Iranian policies, at least those directed toward the U.S. It can also provide the foundation for gradual confidence building exercises between Tehran and Washington. And over time, perhaps, just maybe, this can lead to Iran being more productive on issues that matter to the U.S., like events in Syria and Afghanistan and international terrorism. The trick is for Team Obama to convince Israel and Saudi Arabia that a deal is in their interest as well.

4. It appears we're at a favorable moment. Iran has a leader in Rowhani who seeks better relations with the U.S. Iran is dire economic straits and wants relief. And the Ayatollah has given Rowhani long enough rope to work more productively with the U.S. and the West more generally than he has in years. All of this doesn't mean that Iran is about to capitulate to Western demands and interests, but it does seem like conditions are increasingly favorable--though not probable--for Iran to meet the West half-way on a final nuclear deal (if not more than that).

5. To the critics and hysterics out there, Iran-U.S. ties aren't going to change overnight. Iran still says and does things that frustrate and anger Washington. Critics see this as evidence that Iran isn't genuine, that it's really playing a double game with the West. For instance, according to Maseh Zaeif, of the American Enterprise Institute:

"While Secretary Kerry was reprimanding Congress for its effort to increase the credibility of future pressure against Iran and declaring that “this is the time for statesmanship,” his Iranian counterpart, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, was in Beirut offering praise for and laying a wreath at the tomb of Lebanese Hezbollah terrorist Imad Mughniyeh. Mughniyeh was responsible for the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon, among other attacks."

 Okay, but please keep in mind that there are lots of things going on inside Iran, including pressure from hawks and hardliners, especially those in the Revolutionary Guards. The hawks and hardliners are threatened by major changes in Iranian foreign policy. So if Iran warms up to the outside world, or, if it heads in that direction, it will, from time to time, act up and lash out so as to appease these folks. Iranian leaders have to throw them a bone occasionally to muffle their dissent. They must show the hawks and hardliners that changes aren't coming too fast or deep and that they are still valued members of the Iranian state. Otherwise, opening up to the West carries the grave risk of massive political instability, which then would throw the entire project of international engagement into jeopardy.

6. What's the alternative to the current roadmap ? Ramping up political pressure? More sanctions? Threats of war? The use of force--either by the U.S. or Israel? None of these options are particularly good. The first three have already been tried and probably have gotten the U.S. probably about as far as it can go in coercing Iran to make concessions; and the latter one is completely terrible. As pointed out by self-described Iran hawk Jeffrey Goldberg:

Such a strike might end in disaster. While it could set back (though not destroy) Iran’s nuclear program, it could also lead to the complete collapse of whatever sanctions remained in place. In addition, it could unify the Iranian people behind their country’s unelected leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- a particularly perverse outcome. And in some ways, an attack would justify Iran’s paranoia and pursuit of nuclear weapons: After all, the regime could somewhat plausibly argue, post-attack, that it needs to defend itself against further aggression. A military campaign should be considered only when everything else has failed, and Iran is at the very cusp of gaining a deliverable nuclear weapon. 

 7. There's even been criticism that Obama has made a risky bet on Iran playing a role in Middle East security cooperation. The U.S., certainly, would welcome such actions by Iran, but it doesn't expect anything like this anytime soon. Critics are reading more into the administration's comments than is really there. Statements by Secretary of State John Kerry, who suggested that Iran might be able to play a productive role in Syria, were speculative at best. I don't see any evidence that Obama or Kerry, or anyone else on Team Obama, sees or is betting on Iran quickly becoming a source of peace and cooperation in the region.

8. Better relations with Iran, even marginally so, will require Obama  to walk a fine line with Israel and Saudi Arabia, America's longstanding allies in the Middle East. Arguably, reassuring these two countries will be just a tough a task as getting Iran to come in from the cold. Obama will have to show--in word and deed--that the U.S. isn't abandoning Saudi Arabia and Israel, that it has both their backs in times of trouble, and isn't helping to position Iran as the regional hegemon. If this task isn't done or is done in an unconvincing way, both countries are likely to see U.S.-Iran ties as a net strategic loss and will work on their own (though perhaps collaboratively), without the U.S. to enhance their security and standing in the region. Should this happen, the U.S., in effect, would be trading  Israel and Saudi Arabia for Iran. On many counts, this wouldn't be smart foreign or domestic politics for Team Obama.

A Little Spying Among Friends?

Some of the English language’s most famous maxims could easily include a bit about the shadowy world of intelligence. “All’s fair in love, war and espionage," one may say, or “There are only three things certain in life: death, taxes, and that other countries will try to steal your state secrets”. However much we may hate to admit it, espionage is an integral part of international relations; it has been around since time immemorial, and it is documented in ancient histories (including the Bible). I am certainly not endorsing or condoning stealing secrets, and am a big supporter of a rigorous counterintelligence infrastructure for my country. But the fact of the matter is that recent revelations about espionage carried out by the US, while certainly embarrassing and damaging to our credibility, should not be over-dramatized or blown out of proportion.

Edward Snowden recently said in an interview that “the mission is already accomplished”, referring to the changes and re-assessments in US surveillance policy against targets both foreign and domestic. His revelations have drawn the ire of many world leaders, which highlighted US espionage against allies such as Germany, and relatively friendly countries such as Brazil. This is of course completely understandable- no country wants to be spied on any more than an individual wants people to know their credit card or social security numbers. Just this weekend, President Obama gave a personal pledge to Angela Merkel that there would be no ore US spying on Germany, describing previous actions as “a mistake.”

In terms of international relations theory, I personally adhere to what is known as the English School, which is essentially a middle ground between the poles of Liberalism (the idea that countries can and will cooperate for the common good) and Realism (the notion that countries will act only in their own self-interests and that one state’s gain is another state’s loss). Insofar as I adhere to this balanced view, I do tend to lean more toward the Realist side (in spite of some of my previous writings, such as calls for greater Russia-US cooperation). My belief in this theory is based upon the conclusion that I’ve reached that there are some areas in which countries will often cooperate, such as development and human security. Espionage, however, is one of those areas in which is really and truly is every country for themselves. In this there is no honor, and everything is fair.

In the same vein that President Obama apologized to Germany for American espionage against its major ally, Obama nevertheless stated that the US will continue to gather information of interest to know what other governments’ intentions are. "There is no point in having an intelligence service if you are restricted to the things that you can read in the New York Times or Der Spiegel" the President said. (Note: there is a branch of intelligence-gathering known as “open source” intelligence, or OSINT for short, that entails things like reading other countries’ newspapers, etc., and the CIA does hire analysts for this specific purpose. Needless to say, this type of intelligence is rather limited, but it is still a part of the intelligence process).

Some of the US’s strongest allies have engaged in espionage and intelligence gathering against the US. My guess as to why Hebrew is listed as a critical language by the FBI (which is the organization tasked with the bulk of US civilian counter-intelligence operations) is because of the vast Israeli espionage operations against the US, famously personified by former Navy intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard, and more recently exemplified by Israeli eavesdropping on US telecommunications. Technically speaking, the US does not spy on Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. Yet the truth of the matter is, I have often wondered if, in the shadowy, darkest and most profound depths of the CIA or MI6, there is a tiny cadre of people tasked with spying on even these most important allies.

France’s main civilian intelligence agency, the DGSE, was also found to be conducting corporate and economic espionage against the US in the 1990’s, particularly against firms such as Texas Instruments and ABM. (There is a famous case when a young US Marine tackled a French minister at an arms show when the minister tried to wipe his hand against a US stealth aircraft. Had the minister been allowed to touch it, he could have collected a sample of the coating which gave the fighter jet its stealth quality). Of course the biggest targets of intelligence-gathering and espionage for the US are China and Russia--and this intel-gathering goes both ways. The latter want our trade and technology secrets, while we in the US want to know what they’re up to, what their capabilities are and how much of the dirt they already have on us, etc.

The aforementioned points highlight the other side of espionage known as economic or industrial espionage. Many may be more inclined to associate this term with Michael Douglas as Gordon Gekko using an ambitious Bud Fox (Charlie Sheen) to gather insider information on stocks. But this is not simply an issue of Wall Street hotshots and the SEC. Corporate espionage is a very real part of current international espionage, and its execution is not limited to other companies (for more details, check out Luke Bencie’s 2013 book Among Enemies). Governments are just as prone and privy to corporate, economic and industrial espionage as are private companies. In fact, one of the major concerns Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff had was that the US government was conducting such espionage against Brazilian energy company Petrobras; while it’s not, strictly speaking, the same thing as Mobil Oil or Total trying to get inside information on a prospective deal on upstream development operations, it is an example of government espionage and business espionage blurring the lines. Foreign governments are just as interested in the activities of foreign corporations and their subsidiaries as they are the activities of other foreign governments.

As long as there are corporations, countries and governments, there will be spying among them as well. This is not to say that “everybody’s doing it, so it’s okay.” Nevertheless, revelations that the US has conducted espionage against treaty allies is not the absolute worst thing that could happen. It may be a breach of trust, but it is not a direct, vicious assault on another country, either. Revelations that the French government conducted espionage against the US have not unduly damaged the France-US relationship. Those who may point to the less-than-smooth Franco-American saga should note that, from the French side, one does not need to be in lock-step with their friends or partners 100% of the time in order to still be friends. My guess is that sooner or later this embarrassing revelation about US espionage against allies will blow over, and that it will not likely cause irreparable damage to our relationships with our cherished allies.

CWCP Links: 12/30 edition

We are starting a new series of posts that we'll run periodically on the CWCP blog. These posts will consist of links to important world news stories, articles on international events/issues that have flown under the radar, and interesting analytical pieces. We might even throw in links to pop culture or sports articles, particularly if they somehow have a connection to international relations. In general, these links are things that have caught our interest and we would like to share them with you.

Terrorist attacks have hit southern Russia the past two days. Is Doku Umarov the mastermind of the violence?

Last Thursday, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni War Shrine. As expected, China and South Korea are upset. In addition, the U.S. is not pleased with Abe. Sheila Smith, of the Council on Foreign Relations, takes a look at the implications of Abe's visit to Yasukuni.

As you may recall, CWCP's Yohanes Sulaiman recently blogged on the most important events of 2013. In a twist on the usual end of year recap, Harvard's Stephen Walt looks at the major non-events, as he gives his list of most important events of 2013 that didn't happen.

Here's a look ahead to what might happen in 2014. And here's what to watch for in the Asia-Pacific in the coming year.

According to Jay Ulfelder, an independent scholar and researcher, 2013 was a bad year for mass killing.

 

Paul Pillar thinks the American press has given Edward Snowden a free pass.

 

In memoriam: ten American thinkers and practitioners of foreign policy who died in 2013; and ten "world figures" who passed away in 2013.
 

The NYT conducted an extensive investigation of the deadly Benghazi attacks. The Times found no al-Qeada link to the attacks. "The only intelligence connecting Al Qaeda to the attack was an intercepted phone call that night from a participant in the first wave of the attack to a friend in another African country who had ties to members of Al Qaeda, according to several officials briefed on the call. But when the friend heard the attacker's boasts, he sounded astonished, the officials said, suggesting he had no prior knowledge of the assault."

What's happening in Egypt? Considering the Egyptian military is tightening its grip on power and silencing opponents and critics, nothing good, that's for sure.

My former grad school colleague at Ohio State, Bridget Coggins, tries to figure out the signals Kim John Un is sending by executing his uncle.

 

Bonus link: What is going on here? Snoop Dogg and John Kerry sharing a fist bump?!

Most Important Events in 2013

This is the time for our annual list of most important events in 2013--events that will have strong implications for the world in 2014 and beyond. Here it goes.

1. The East is Messy

China's aggressive posturing in both South and East China Seas (the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and China's Air Defense Zone) has begun to spark a backlash. Japan has formed its first National Security Council and started to significantly boost its military spending, adding more than $230 billion to its military expenditure for the next five years. It has also courted ASEAN, trying find an ally in ASEAN, with which it has a long, cordial relationship, in its troubles with China.

Of course, because two ASEAN states, notably Philippines and Vietnam, are also embroiled in a border dispute with China, Japan's courting of ASEAN has caused some concern in Beijing. Not surprisingly, Sino-Japanese tensions became a major issue when the Chinese Defense Minister visited Jakarta in mid-December.

In the meantime, South Korea's reactions to China's new Air Defense Zone has been more measured, as it doesn't see China much of a threat and is more concerned with what happens in North Korea.

2. Kim Jong Un Executed His Uncle Jang

As I mentioned in previous post on this blog, there are two main implications over Jang Song Thaek's unexpected demise: notably, a strong signal to China and a warning to North Korean elites not to cross the young dictator.

However, I question whether Kim Jong Un is competent enough to actually play the deadly games of politics in North Korea, and I expect some disturbances sooner or later.

Recent news reports out of North Korea don't inspire much confidence in the North Korean regime. Apparently Kim Jong Un was drunk when he ordered the execution of his uncle. Not to mention his other antics. As B.R.Myers noted:

For the past two years I’ve been marveling at how bad the propaganda has been. I would call it ill-advised if I thought anyone was stupid enough to advise it. From the first few months of the national mourning period, when Kim Jong Un was laughing it up on the evening news, to his allowing an American basketball player to slouch next to him in cap and sunglasses, it’s been one odd move after another. It might have enhanced his overseas image as a reformer, but that can be done in much safer ways. His father cut his teeth in propaganda work, he had a brilliant grasp of it. He took his wife around with him too, but he had the sense not to put her on the evening news. This young man seems to have lived overseas too briefly to learn anything, but long enough to lose touch with his own country, with the myths that keep him in power.

Granted, North Korea might not collapse in 2014, but I'd expect more purges, especially as the elite grows restless. Should North Korea really collapse, both China and South Korea would be put in difficult position. Would China allow South Korea to sweep in and take over the North entirely? Or would China march to Pyongyang, restore order, and impose a new dictatorship under a malleable figure such as Kim Jong nam, Kim Jong Un's brother?

If that's the case, then South Korea's rather quiet response over China's new Air Defense Zone makes sense. It's better to marshal goodwill in China in order to influence Beijing when the Kim Dynasty finally collapses.

3. Syria, Iran, and the Decline of the Obama's Prestige in the Middle East

Cartoon by a Syrian soldier. The cat in the image is saying: "Where are these American battleships?"

Obama has made so many policy blunders, from the Halls of Pharaohs to the Shores of Libya and to the mountains of Syria, that his prestige is at all-time low in the Middle East.

Al-Bayan (UAE), August 25, 2013

On Syria, his "red line" statement backfired. It made Obama a figure of ridicule in the Middle East. Moreover, Obama has alienated American partners in the region. After he was unwilling to act on Syria, the Saudis were royally upset with what it saw as "lamentable" policies on Syria.

Assad gets a scolding: "Bombard, shell and kill, but no more chemical weapons!"
Aljazeera.net, August 30, 2013

What's more damaging, however, is that this has happened at a point when the possibility of a breakthrough in negotiation with Iran is encouraging. Sure, not everyone is happy with the flawed deal with Iran, but this is an important first step in which one cannot burden it with too many expectations lest the process break.

Unfortunately, with Israel and Saudi Arabia, both key players in the region, doubtful of the United States' intentions and commitment to their interests in light of Syrian fiasco, Obama and John Kerry are having a really tough time persuading them to give the deal a chance to succeed. And then there's the tough task of persuading Congress, where figures in both parties remain hostile to any "appeasement" to Tehran.

At this point, the Saudis seem to remain skeptical of the United States' efforts. Already, the Saudis announced that they were ready for unilateral action on Syria (and by extension, Iran) "with or without West."

The biggest problem with the Saudis' approach is that the Riyadh does not differentiate between the various groups in Syria -- anyone is good enough as long as they are working to defeat Assad. Inadvertently, however, this may restrengthen the Global Jihad movement.

Similar to Afghanistan in the 1980s, the current conflict in Syria attracts many Jihadists from all over the world, including my home Indonesia. Already, there are reports of a good number of Indonesians involved in what Abu Bakar Bashir, the jailed leader of Jamaat Ansharut Tauhid, a radical Islamist group, termed "university for Jihad education."

New recruits are trained and new strategists are educated. In essence, the broken links between al-Qaeda and its decimated affiliates around the world are being renewed in Syria and this will have major long term implications.

That, sadly, might be Obama's legacy.

4. The Fall of Erdogan?

This is a terrible year for Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. First, his image as a strong democratic leader got hit badly when 50 environmentalists began protesting on May 28, 2013, to prevent the demolition of the Gezi Park in Istanbul, a very small park which was to be turned into a shopping mall.

It was supposed to be a non-issue, but the police overreacted, severely cracked down on the protesters, triggering a popular uproar. The next day, the size of protesters grew and following more missteps by Erdogan (such as calling the protesters "looters" (capulcu)), the originally small protest turned into a huge headache for the government.

While there has been some discontent against Erdogan in the past several years, the Gezi Park protest was the breaking point, completely alienating the liberals, secularists and nationalists from Erdogan, who could then only rely on the Islamists for support.

When the Islamists themselves were split, between supporters of Erdogan and Fethullah Gulen, a popular Moslem spiritual leader in exile in Pennsylvania, the crack in Erdogan's armor grew. With a major corruption scandal that might implicate Erdogan exploded in December, Erdogan's grip on power seems tenuous.

Should Erdogan fall from power, the regional implications are huge. The Syrian rebels would lose its patron, and considering the cost of the Syrian conflict to the Turkish economy and stability, the next government might be unwilling to support the rebels anymore. More importantly, this might be a major blow to the Ikhwanul Muslimin brand. Already the Moslem Brotherhood was deposed and branded as terrorist group in Egypt. Should the Turkish branch also fall due to the corruption scandal, it could be a while before the Moslem Brotherhood could regain its credibility as an alternative to the corrupt regimes in the Middle East.

5. Euro: France as a Wild Card

The European Union is staggering along to recovery, with Germany in general picking up the slack while France has been a hindrance to growth. France remains the most serious threat to the European economy due to its unwillingness to reform its labor market, its high tax rate, and lack of strong leadership (except in international affairs, as evidenced by French actions involving Iran, Mali, and the Central African Republic).

While France might maintain status quo for a while due to the overall global economic recovery, this situation can't continue indefinitely. French might have to face the music with massive implications to the European Union as a whole.

6. The Snowden Affair

Honestly, the Snowden Affairs is here on the list mostly because this has been such a huge news in 2013, with diplomatic spats and embarrassments as a result of the leak. But overall, the significance of the Snowden affair has been overstated, in my view.

In 1929, US Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson might have declared that "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." In today's world, however, this would border between naivety and incompetence by the state's intelligence agency.

While there has been some short-term backlash from aggrieved states--such as Indonesia halting military cooperation with Australia, Brazilian President snubbing Obama, and Angela Merkel berating Obama and comparing NSA with Stasi--in the long run, however, this will just be a small bump on the road, as states on all sides (both the spied and those doing the spying) will surely weigh what will fit their interests and behave accordingly.

Moreover, with Snowden behaving more like Carmen Sandiego than a real whistle-blower, the debate has shifted, no longer focused on how to reform an out-of-control agency, but on how do you solve a problem like the prima-donna Snowden, who jumped first to Hong Kong and then Russia in order to defend  freedom.

As the result, Snowden's revelations may keep coming and keep embarrassing the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, etc., but the long term impact will likely be limited, not unlike the Wikileaks fiasco.

7. MAN OF THE YEAR: VLADIMIR PUTIN

The Time Magazine might have put Pope Francis as "Man of the Year" and Edward Snowden as the runner up, but from my perspective, it should go to Vladimir Putin. He managed to humiliate the United States twice, over Snowden and then Syria, allowing Russia to actually return as a pivotal player in the Middle East, which is not unnoticed in the streets of Arab:

"We're going to intervene in Syria" After thinking of Iran, Russia"...without toppling Assad" 
Al-Ittihad (UAE), August 29, 2013

In essence, the Middle East is well aware that, unlike Obama, Putin's actions are louder than his words. As long as Putin wants, Assad will remain the dictator in Syria, and with the Syrian opposition disunited and in shambles, there's no way Assad will agree to hold an election (unless he can manipulate it) or give any concessions of consequence to his opponents.

While Russia will not be able to supplant the United States due to the United States' massive economic and military power advantage, Obama's prestige and credibility problems mean that there is an opportunity that Russia can exploit, and Putin has exploited it masterfully. 

8. Karzai Can Say "No."

In late November, Afghan President Hamid Karzai refused to sign a deal that would allow the United States to leave thousands of US and NATO soldiers in Afghanistan after 2014. Even though many warned him of the perils of not signing the deal, Karzai doubts the United States will leave Afghanistan, and thus, in his view, by holding out he can extract more concessions from the United States. That, I think, is his main goal.

Karzai's gamble, I think, will backfire. The United States is tired of him. Support for war in Afghanistan is at an all time low. While a slim majority of people (55%) are in favor of leaving some troops in Afghanistan, I think that's due to the wording of survey questions (e.g., American troops will be used for "training and anti-insurgency operations.")

If the United States does withdraw from Afghanistan, I expect to see Karzai, should he fail to decamp, to face the fate of his predecessor, Muhammad Najibullah.

9. The Revenge of Qaddafi: the Libyan Arms

In the past couple months, violence has re-emerged in Africa and struck many weak states such as Mali, Central African Republic, and South Sudan. There are many reasons, such as inequality, weak state bureaucracy, etc. Most importantly, however, is the role that Libyan arms are playing throughout Africa.

After the fall of Qaddafi, the new Libyan government was unable to maintain control over the entire country, as the formerly rebel movement splintered into local warlords. In the meantime, the huge stockpile of Qaddafi's weapons were looted. The government tried to get them back, but in general was powerless to disarm the entire population. 

Not surprisingly, some enterprising figures, like warlords desperate for cash, criminal groups or even jihadists, have decided to sell weapons abroad. The United Nations Security Group of Experts' report notes that Libyan weapons are fueling conflicts all over the place:

In the past 12 months, the proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially, even the Horn of Africa," the panel said. Illicit flows from the country are fueling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-state actors, including terrorist groups.

In the past few years, conflicts in Africa have subsided due to the weaknesses of both the government and rebel forces. But with the huge influx of cheap Libyan weapons now coming into the equation, rebel groups have been strengthened. They have managed to launch attacks that threatened or even deposed some weak governments.

Expect more bad news coming from Africa in the next few years.

10. Obama's Very Bad Year

2013 was a terrible year for Obama -- both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the fallout from Obamacare and other scandals, such as the IRS' targeting of the Tea Party and the NSA imbroglio, keeps hurting the credibility and popularity of both Obama and the Democrats. 

In fact, the majority of Americans no longer find Obama to be trustworthy or honest. In the past few years, the media and people in general gave Obama a pass on his missteps he made because they believed that Obama was sincere and trustworthy. But at this point, with the press in uproar over what they see as Obama's Orwellian tendencies and his "Lie of the Year" award, it should not be surprising that Obama has the worst approval rating at this point since Richard Nixon. 

As a result, Obama needs to spend more political capital to get anything done domestically.

This has major implications on US foreign policy. Like it or not, Obama's domestic preoccupations means that other states may feel neglected by the United States, such as when Obama cancelled his plan to attend APEC Summit in Bali in order to focus on the government shutdown. This, in turn, has arguably given openings to China, Russia, and other smaller regional powers such as Iran, to play a much bigger role in international affairs to the detriment of the American interests.