Has Trump Permanently Altered US Foriegn Policy?

Last month, Foreign Affairs posed an interesting question to a panel of experts: Has Trump permanently altered US foreign policy? If you have a chance to read it—it’s behind a paywall—we encourage you to do so. You’ll see a wide range of views from a host of scholars and analysts.

Below Drs. Yohanes Sulaiman and Brad Nelson offer their thoughts on the same question posed by Foreign Affairs.

 

Yohanes Sulaiman: Neutral, confidence level 5.

On the one hand, Trump escalated America’s dispute with China, which accelerated a downward trend in the relationship between the US and China. His so-called foreign policy disasters are not as big and widespread as many people argue, however. Moreover, keep in mind that the rest of the world still needs the US to maintain order. So despite the world’s distaste of Trump, they stuck with the US and continue to stick with the US as the lesser of two evils. You can see it in the ISEAS “The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report,” that despite declining trust in the US, Southeast Asia still relies the US for leadership: 48.3% trust the US, compared to China's 16.5%. And if ASEAN has to pick sides, the majority of the organization’s members will still pick the US.

In essence, systemic effects matter. Threats, particularly local threats, matter. Despite Trump, states still pick the US because the alternatives, like China or Russia, are likely worse.  

 

Brad Nelson: Agree, Confidence level 5.

Yes, it's true that there are some Trump-era policies and strategies that Biden can reverse. In fact, he's already started this process. Biden has cozied up to Europe, placed the US back into the Paris Accords, promised to contribute money to COVAX, extended the New Start nuclear deal, reduced support for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen and overturned the terrorist label on the Houthis, and so on. For those who like liberal internationalism, this is a good start.

However, there are some policies and initiatives that Trump has embraced that will be difficult to change or counter. Three immediately come to mind. First, the "no new wars" crowd has been for years a fringe element of US politics. Not anymore. Trump added the weight of his presidency to a "no new wars" position, bringing supporters of this (on the left and right) out from the cold, and created a growing expectation among Americans that the US is done with fighting wars that aren't of self-defense. Sure, 20 years of war has played a role in turning Americans off to more war. But it's also importantly to note that Trump mainstreamed this view and effectively made it a new policy status quo, thereby making it harder than usual to break down the line. Just look at Biden’s recent air strikes on Iranian proxies in Syria. He’s received significant blowback from folks, including Democratic Congresspersons and supporters, who fear that the US is sleepwalking into a war with Iran.  

Second, we can argue about whether Trump's specific statements and policies on China were the right ones. But what isn't arguable is that there's a widespread belief, on the right and left, that his strategic approach to directly confront China was the right one, and one that's been long overdue. Going back to a more mealy-mouthed, squishy engagement policy is effectively ruled out for the foreseeable future.

And third, the literal idea of America First—that US foreign policy should first and foremost benefit the US and Americans—is here to stay. The Washington establishment's desire to work on pet foreign projects—an en vogue part of US foreign policy for most of the post-cold war era, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s—isn't feasible anymore. Trump has forced Americans to ask whether the policies the US pursues serve the national interest. Frankly, this is already playing out in the Biden era. It's why his foreign policy promises to connect US foreign policy to US domestic politics and economics and to the overall welfare of Americans.

What We're Watching in 2021

                                                               USA Today

Last week, Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman discussed which global issues they have their eye on in 2021. Below is a lightly editied version of that conversation.  

Brad Nelson: Well, we made it. 2021 is here. Before we get too far into this relatively new year, I thought we'd take a quick look ahead. What do you have your eye on this year? What are you following? Any predictions for 2021?

Yohanes Sulaiman: First, let me just focus on one thing that the world will be watching for sure: Biden. 2021 will be a difficult year for Biden. There are very high expectations for Biden both domestically and internationally to overturn many of Trump's policies. I won't delve into America’s domestic affairs, but let me list several international issues that Biden will face. At some point soon, he will have to focus on re-engaging with international institutions (e.g. Paris Accord, WHO); reembracing Europe; reassuring Israel, Saudi Arabia, Japan, India, and Taiwan that he will be as accommodative to them as Trump was; dealing with North Korea; the Iran nuclear deal; handling Erdogan and Putin; troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia; the repercussions of Pompeo's declaration that China committed genocide; the trade war with China; and figuring out where and how Southeast Asia and Australia fits in his policy. And that's off the top of my head. 

BN: I'm also watching the incoming Biden administration, especially on domestic matters. How will he deal with the GOP? How will he handle the leftists in his party? What's his approach to domestic extremists and terrorists? Which signature domestic policies will Biden look to push first?

And on Biden foreign policy, as you mentioned, there is much to monitor. The big issue, of course, is Biden's strategy toward China. Will he hang tough? Go soft? Try to find a middle ground with Xi? Second, I'll be tracking Biden's proposed effort to place alliances at the center of US foreign policy. Will this boost US foreign policy, as establishment thinkers and academics have argued over the last four years? Or will it turn out to be a bust?

Additionally, I'm closely watching North Korea. Reports indicate that North Korea might be readying a submarine-launched missile test fairly soon. No surprise, given Kim's propensity to turn up the pressure on new governments in rival/enemy powers. But Kim's in a particularly tricky situation. There are conflicting accounts on how much Covid has ravaged North Korea. North Korea's economy has shrunk even further as the country self-isolates for fear of the virus entering from China and South Korea. Kim is apparently frustrated and angry with the US, ticked off that his summit diplomacy with Trump didn't yield more tangible benefits for him. And Kim knows that Biden is highly unlikely to give Kim even a fraction of the time and attention that Trump gave him. So, with all of that in mind, is Kim in an especially sour mood, ready to lash out? If so, how does Biden respond? How do the major regional players, like South Korea, Japan, and China, react?

YS: Domestically, if Biden stays in the center, that would strengthen his position. I think a lot of people are tired of the hyper-partisanship of the last four years, and if Biden manages to work together with the moderate GOP, he can cruise to reelection in 2024. I don't think Trump will remain influential in the next four years despite all the din, unless the Democrats want to make him a martyr. If I were Biden, I would pardon Trump, showing him and the rest of the US that I was the better man and smothering the crazies on the right. Of course, it won't be popular among the left, but that basically would end Trump. What would be more despicable for him than to be pardoned by the person he derides? If he refuses the pardon, he would be entangled with all the legal fights for the rest of his life. If he accepts the pardon, then it would be a total humiliation and would end his status as a martyr.

If Biden listens to the far left, however, then I could see him getting shellacked both in the midterms in 2022 and then in 2024. 

Covid will be around for one or two more years. It is interesting how the politicization of Covid all over the world essentially makes it very difficult to control the epidemic. Many people don't trust that vaccines will work thanks to a daily dose of politicized discussion on the efficacy of the vaccine. The impact of Covid internationally may not be as big as we thought, aside from intensifying competition between the US and China. And I doubt that Biden will suddenly try to appease China—that would look terrible optically. 

BN: I think Biden should wait before even considering to offer a pardon to Trump. Let's see if Trump is in legal trouble federally. If Trump is, then Biden should consider a pardon, though I'm not sure he should go ahead with one. Of course, Biden would get serious push-back from the far left in his party. And any federal pardon won't absolve Trump from any state crimes, and New York state is coming after him. That said, I'm fully in support of the thrust of your point. There's no need to act vengefully with respect to Trump; instead, focus on healing from the Trump years and uniting the country. I do think Biden gets that. The unity angle is Biden's is not only his mantra but an integral part of his political persona. Biden admitted that Trump wrote him a "generous" note (but didn't want to reveal the note's content's until speaking with Trump), which was nice to hear, and Biden's inaugural address emphasized similar themes in both tone and substance. 

I'm glad you mentioned Covid. That's the other major issue I'm watching in 2021. Given the case load and death toll, Covid has almost become a US rather than a global virus. So what Biden's does on Covid is important. The US health care system has been stretched to its limits. Thousands of Americans are still getting sick and dying every day, and countless Americans are worried about getting sick. At the same time, many Americans are tired of being cooped up and having their way of life impacted—even those who fully understand the severity of the virus, not just the MAGA contingent. If Biden can work out the kinks in the vaccine distribution, get more money into the hands of Americans, offer businesses, especially small businesses, vital support, 2021 will be a better year—for the US and for US partners and allies. 

Because Covid isn't solely an American thing, it'll also be useful to observe how the rest of the world copes with the pandemic. Europe is having major trouble at the moment, as are Mexico, India, and Brazil, among others. Many of the world's developing countries might not even gain access to a vaccine for another year or two. The global powers, the WHO, and other interested parties have to work to ensure that as many people as people, as fast as possible, no matter where they live, get access to a vaccine and state-of-the-art medicines and therapeutics to help sick people recover effectively and in a timely manner. That's the only way the world can quickly put Covid in its collective rearview mirror.   

The Winners and Losers of a Biden Presidency

 

Below is a conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman on the global winners and losers of the incoming Biden administration. It was conducted via email over the last week. 

Brad Nelson: Now that the dust has settled on the recent US presidential election, it's time to take stock of the possible impact of a Biden administration. In short, who wins and who loses with Biden in the White House? Let's start with the “winners.” Many scholars and analysts argue that EU and NATO members will get a big boost with Biden in office. Do you see it that way? And do you see any other winners from a Biden presidency?

Yohanes Sulaiman: Biden is a traditional type of leader, surrounded by the usual "blob" that has the same strategic outlook of pushing for multilateralism, cooperating together to get the best result. And NATO/EU are basically traditional US partners in multilateralism. Unlike Trump, who doesn't give a darn about getting everyone on board, Biden will make concessions, cajole, etc. Thus NATO/EU will be a big winner.

ASEAN will get more respect and attention from the US. Like Obama, Biden will push for more engagement between the US and ASEAN, but the problem is that ASEAN is not likely to get closer to the US, fearing antagonizing China. So, I suspect the US will push for more engagement, but ASEAN probably won’t reciprocate. 

BN: Yes, I agree with your choices and I agree with your rationale. To your discussion on institutionalism and multilateralism, I'd add the UN. The UN is also poised to benefit from a Biden administration. Biden is already making promises to beef up its cooperation with the UN on things like covid-19 and climate change. The UN won't be as hindered and hemmed in by the US for the next four years. And I've read reports that suggest UN Secretary-General Guterres--who clearly preferred Biden over Trump--wants to take advantage of this potential opportunity by embracing a more ambitious agenda going forward. In addition, it’s likely that the WTO, the WHO, and other global organizations pilloried and pushed aside by Trump will get a breather and possibly more from a Biden presidency.

There are two other things to keep in mind. First, Biden is pro-alliances. Biden and his incoming administration (particularly Jake Sullivan and Antony Blinken) view the Trump White House as weakening and undermining many of America's traditional alliances, because of his insistence on treating them as transactional tools and protection rackets. Biden is going to restore the relationship with its partners, or that's his plan anyway. So, yes, EU and NATO members will get a boost in time and attention from a Biden presidency. So will Japan and South Korea and Australia. 

Second, it looks like Biden's going to make a big push for an enhanced role for shared democratic values and ideas in US foreign policy. That's not very surprising, given the Trump administration's record. His White House has reduced the role of political reform, human rights, and democracy promotion in US policy, and Trump himself has arguably treated America's democratic allies in Europe very roughly and harshly--both of which has generated widespread criticism of that on the left. The democratic push is part of Biden's plan to "restore" normalcy in US foreign policy. Biden plans on convening a major conference with the world's major democracies fairly early in his administration. I'd also expect Biden to keep the Quad and even build off it. We may even see a return to democracy promotion efforts, albeit in a far less militarized fashion. I also anticipate Biden and his administration to openly critique the human rights records of countries like Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, and so on--something the Trump WH rarely did. Given all of this, I'd say the winners here are, once again, America's democratic allies, but also countries like India and Indonesia, human rights and political reform organizations and activists, and the foreign policy establishment in the US.

YS: The problem with “human rights” is that many states, including Indonesia, see this less than the US upholding values than a carte blanche to get involved with other states' internal affairs. Thus Indonesia is largely silent about China's mistreatment of the Uighur population in Xinjiang, fearing that it could create a precedent that can be used against Indonesia in places like West Papua. A Biden administration with human rights' guns blazing from the start will cause fear that Biden will become another American crusader. And it will actually be detrimental to America’s interest in facing China's threat in South China Sea.

On Climate Change: I think the US will go back and rejoin the Paris agreement. The question, however, is whether the US will go all in on a climate change agenda or simply kick the can down the road as most US presidents do, especially considering that China's economy keeps growing.

BN: Let's turn to the potential “losers” of a Biden presidency. As I see it, there will be many. To begin, Biden's likely emphasis on alliances, institutions, and renewed US engagement in the world means that the neo-isolationists, America Firsters, and pro-unilateralists in the US--a group that cuts across the left and right--will be pretty unhappy. This could also ruffle some feathers in Russia and China. After all, governments in both nations will probably face a more sustained, collective push back from the US and its allies after four years of American diplomatic retrenchment under Trump. 

Biden's move back into the Iran nuclear deal will surely tick off Iran hawks in the US (of which there are many), Israel, and the Sunni powers. 

There is no way Biden will give Kim Jong Un a private audience or even hint at granting him any kind of meaningful concessions. Biden's probable policy of strategic patience, which harkens back to the Obama days, won't respond to every North Korean outburst, will deemphasize America's public attention to NK (unless Kim makes an olive branch opening), and will treat the North Koreans as a nuisance. Kim's window of opportunity to strike a deal with the US is over for the foreseeable future, and Kim is accordingly going to be very frustrated by this situation. 

The world's dictators will find a much more skeptical and highly critical America under Biden. I expect Saudi Arabia to find life much more difficult with Biden in the White House, particularly compared to the esteemed status it held in US foreign policy during the Trump years. Besides reviving the Iran deal, the US will end support for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen, criticize the Saudis on their human rights record, try to rein in MBS's reckless foreign policy, and aim to distance itself from Riyadh and the Middle East more generally as it ramps up its efforts to deal with China.

YS: Good points, but at the same time, I wonder how much Biden is going to wreck what Trump has done. If he is restarting the nuclear agreement with Iran that Trump shredded, the risk is that Iran would demand more compensations, which may hurt Biden's standings both domestically and in the Middle East. If he alienates the Saudis, both Israel and Saudi may look at other "patrons" -- not that they are going to align themselves with Russia or China as they are too deeply embedded to the US security alliance (e.g. US military bases & weaponry), but they will be much open cooperating with Russia/China and that will hurt the US national interest. And as we see with Turkey, even though Turkey is a member of NATO and has a close security relationship with the US, Erdogan can still make life difficult for the US, though you can argue it is due to Trump's indifference/naiveté towards Erdogan.

In Kim Jong Un's case, I don't see life will be that different for him with Biden office compared to Trump as president. Keep in mind that despite meeting Trump twice, and everyone screaming that Trump was going to be played like a fiddle, giving up everything to Kim, so far the US hasn't given any major concessions to North Korea. Biden may want to resurrect the Six-Party Talks, but with both Russia and China's relationship currently in deep freeze with the US, I doubt it would be successful. In fact, Biden could be seen as more likely to give concessions, like the Obama administration (of which he was a member) did to Iran, leading North Korea to raise tensions to eleven to gain concessions. 

I think Biden will find that after Trump, people will think him as either pushover or as too willing to push for human rights, and that could make major headaches for his foreign policy.  

BN: Biden is inclined to keep more of Trump's Middle East policy than any other of his regional policies. So the idea of Biden "wrecking" Trump's Middle East gains is probably a bit hyperbolic. He's not going to move the US embassy back to Tel Aviv. He's going to continue the push for regional normalization with Israel. I wouldn't be surprised if he continued Trump's draw down from the Middle East. I suspect Biden is going to be somewhat sensitive to what the Saudis and Israelis think of the Iran deal. In part, to undercut and diffuse their opposition, at least a bit, and in part because Biden knows there are going to be other divisive issues that will come up in the coming years. Getting off on a very wrong foot immediately on the Iran deal--Biden's going to rejoin the deal early on--will make life more difficult for him then and later on. That won't stop Biden from trying to resuscitate it, but he won't run over the Saudis and Israelis in the way that they perceived Obama as doing. 

Not sure that Biden will be seen as a pushover--either in a vacuum or in comparison to Trump. Maybe, but maybe not. Look, Trump has largely been seen as someone who's desperately looking to withdraw the US from the world. He's made decisions to cut and run (Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia) or withdraw (Paris Accords, TPP, various UN agencies, like the WHO, Iran deal, etc.) without getting much of anything in return. To me, that sounds like a pushover, and I suspect many in the world look at Trump similarly. Conceivably, a more engaged and assertive US under Biden could correct some of these weaknesses in US foreign policy. 

However, if the world thinks the US public is more aligned with Trump on foreign policy and that the Democrats--especially the progressive wing of the party--don't have the stomach for global re-engagement, then Biden's intentions and policies--no matter how good or thoughtful--will founder and struggle to produce the kind of results he's looking for. 

YS: Well, I am saying Biden will be seen as a pushover if he bends backward to get a nuclear deal with Iran. And no, Trump's withdrawal from the various accords like Paris Accords, TPP, etc., was not seen as a sign of a pushover, it is more a sign of irrationality--that the US has squandering its global leadership. But by the end of the day, states adapted to Trump, including Japan. And it will depend on what kind of assertiveness/engagement that Biden will do to bring American leadership back to the international arena. A return to the discussion on TPP, climate change, and the WHO will be appreciated, for sure. But the question from everyone will be: What kind of public goods Biden is going to supply to the world? And as you noted, does the progressive wing of the Democratic Party have the stomach for global re-engagement?

COVID-19 and US-China Relations

                                                      Photo Credit: Fox News Online 

YS and two of his colleagues at Universitas Jendral Achmad Yani, Mariane Delanova and Rama Daru Jati, recently finished a paper on US-China relations in a post-COVID world. Below Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman discuss the main points of the paper, US-China relations more generally, and lastly the wider international political and security impact of COVID. 

BN: To start, let's get the big question out of the way. How do you and your colleagues see COVID-19 impacting US-China relations? What's your argument?

YS: In essence, it is my argument that COVID is leading to a decline in trust between the US and China. While it can be argued that ties between the US and China are deep and can withstand the breakdown due to COVID-19, I disagree. There won't be a complete breakdown, at least not yet, even with all of Trump's blustering–and both him and China know it—but in essence, we will see the beginning of a warmer Cold War. Rather than complete hostility/containment policies like the US pursued during the Cold War, it will be a limited containment, with more economic/political engagement than the US had with the USSR during the Cold War.

BN: How exactly does COVID "lead to a decline in trust between the US and China"? What are the key events, processes, etc., triggering the decline in trust?

YS: As I noted in my paper, the key is the politicization of the virus. On the one hand, we see China's victory laps in the US and Europe and its hamfisted attempt to shift the blame from its censorship and cover-ups and slowness to act initially; while in the US, both Trump and Biden are trying to show themselves as tough against China. Granted that this can be argued as just political rhetoric, but with rising distrust toward China within the US population, it will have significant effects in the aftermath of COVID.

BN: Is the virus a primary causal factor in the deteriorating relations between the US and China? Or just another major issue lumped atop of several major issues (trade, currency, BRI, South China Sea, Taiwan, Huawei, etc.) that plague the US-China relationship these days?

YS: The virus is basically the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back, since it is basically threatens vital US interests—plus, this is an election year in the US.

BN: Is this downturn in US-China relations a short-term thing or something more protracted? After all, the election will be done and resolved—I hope—by early November. So what happens after that, in either a second term Trump or a 1st term Biden administration?

YS: This will last a while. Not only due to the election, but also, like I mentioned, due to various things that China has done. And the virus has made a number of countries around the world very hostile to China. And Biden will be tarred and feathered as weak against China should he win and decide to accommodate China. Even before the virus, during the Democratic Presidential Debate, virtually everyone on the podium bashed China. Maybe the Democrats don't mean it, but they are all aware that being soft on China does not help them at all. Yes, elections are poetry while governing is prose. But being soft on China will hurt Biden's presidency—similar to the accusation that Presidents Truman and Carter were soft against the commies.

BN: I think you’re on to something. In the US, increasingly the driving force behind souring relations with China is, in my view, a product of a new American political consensus that China is a growing threat (to the US, to US allies, and to the world order). Coincidentally, I've read a few pieces today on the possibility of an emerging Sino-US cold war. And those articles typically argue that the signs of a new cold war are grounded in objective facts—economic, political, security policies and statements China has said and done. But I think that misses the mark a bit. Almost all of those things, except for China's actions in the early days of the pandemic, have been present for years. What's changed is America's perception of China. Put simply, China is a looming threat to the US because key leaders in the US, on both sides of the political aisle, see China as a threat. The key question is why have those perceptions changed? I bet Obama wishes he had this consensus behind him as he tried to implement his Pivot to Asia.

I don't think it's a given that a President Biden goes weak on China, precisely because of this new American consensus on China. He'll probably attempt to reset the relationship. But there's no guarantee that will go well (See: the Obama-Biden-Clinton reset with Russia.) And if he goes weak on China, he'll get dragged back to a harder line eventually by both R's and D's and the larger Blob network.

YS: I will need more data, but I suspect this COVID-19 is what is causing the fall in US perception towards China. See the Pew Research graphic below. Of course, the trade war, among other things, has also influenced America’s increasingly negative view towards China. I think Trump's trade war does sour people's view towards China—more and more people now know that China is not a fair economic partner.

But I'd argue that COVID is the real game changer. While companies have been grumbling about China's industrial espionage, a majority of people didn't feel the pain/didn’t care. COVID-19 is the great equalizer, and everyone sees China as the culprit and China does not want to own it.

BN: Given what you've said, where does all of this lead? How does the US, its allies, and any other state that's now highly skeptical and suspicious of China deal with and respond to China going forward? Are we entering the early days of a "new cold war"?

YS: We will end up in a new cold war for sure, which might not a bad thing. While, yes, the risk of war (and nuclear war) will increase, I don't think it is all bad, though. China will have to learn to compromise lest it will find itself isolated. And the US will also have to start focusing on third world countries like it did during the Cold War.

BN: One of things I see—and it fits in line with your arguments about US-China relations—is that China is attempting to use COVID as a window of opportunity to boost its position in the world. I think that's a key here. That's driving some of the problems between the US and China these days.

The US sees China as the problem (the source of the virus, yes, but also that China downplayed and covered up the virus for weeks), and cannot stomach that Beiing has the nerve to say that it’s the solution.

For instance, China is now parading around the world touting its "success" in combating the coronavirus and offering medical supplies to needy nations. Many experts see this as evidence that China's using COVID to boost its soft power (Of course, we can question whether these attempts are working, but still..). On top of that, China's engaged with the US in a propaganda war, blaming the US for the virus. While many people outside China aren't moved by Beijing's narrative, I do think it's helping the authorities in China by quieting internal dissent and rancor. Which, in turn, strengthens the Chinese state and Xi's hand—essential things in China's competition with the US. More ominously, China's taking advantage of a distracted US and international community as a whole to seize control over Hong Kong. It's upped its control over Hong Kong over the last few weeks and the latest legislation will effectively wipe out any freedoms and sense of autonomy that the city-state has had. This is a problem by itself, as the US is worried about the fate of Hong Kong (economically and politically), but it also might signify larger ramifications. What's happening in Hong Kong could signal a new turn in China's approach to what it views as "rogue" territories, like Taiwan, if not a more significant change in posture toward parts of Asia. I'm sure alarm bells are going off at the US State Department, Defense, the CIA, hawkish think tanks, and so on.

YS: China is basically snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. And Trump is doing the same: giving China platforms to tout its propaganda, by, for instance, behaving stupidly vis-à-vis the WHO. I understand that the WHO has acted badly in kissing Xi's behind, but by not pushing for multilateral solutions, Trump is basically allowing China to gain the moral high ground. Overall, it is like an old Tom and Jerry cartoon—they both tried to pass bomb to each other—but in this case, they are passing victory to each other and each refuses to accept it due to their own stupidity. 

BN: Before we wrap up this chat, let's look beyond US-China relations to what global politics and security and economics will look like in a COVID (and post-COVID) world. How do you see global politics and security being impacted?

YS: Aside from a short- to medium-term economic crash? People will start paying more attention to global health issue, at least for the next few years.

People are screaming about oil prices tanking, but once the pandemic passes, the demand of oil will rebound. It may hit $100/barrel for a bit, then expect fracking to revive and to push oil price back down. This, however, may hurt Russia badly, so I think we might see retrenchment of Russia. Already there are squabbles between Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus on the future of Russia in Syria.

Overall in global politics, though, I am not sure there will be that much of significant change.

BN: Richard Haass and Stephen Walt both argue that COVID will act as an accelerant on existing trends. I can see how health issues/capabilities in individual states will intensify the focus on domestic concerns, trigger a backlash against "outsiders" and "foreigners," and increase skepticism of global organizations and institutions, like the WHO and UN. All of that could, in turn, lead to a greater push toward nationalist politics, a decline in support for globalization and global institutions, and the world order will continue to crumble. Makes sense, right? However, I do wonder whether the deepening and pervasiveness of these trends will be temporary or enduring.

In many ways, it depends on what happens in November. If Biden wins the election, I can see him using the pandemic, and the resulting health and political fallout, as a rallying point to re-energize global cooperation on several fronts, especially global health. But if he doesn't, then it will be more of the same for the next four years, with China having a free hand to shape the world order as the US pulls back and undermines the very order it created 75+ years ago.

The global economy could be an even bigger problem than global politics. US stock market bettors are gambling that COVID is just a bump in the road, given that the Dow is still over 25,000, but that's more hype than reality, I'm afraid. Small businesses are going to be routed because of COVID, as will stores that make the bulk of their money from in-person transactions. Tourism is going to take a deep hit. If sports teams around the world don't allow fans to attend, then many cities are going to be in dire straits over the next year or more. How long will it take for people to feel comfortable to live their lives as they once did (even when restrictions are fully lifted)? Because if they don't, that will create a huge economic drag--both in individual nations and in the global economy as a whole. And once countries start to open up again, will people who have been laid off or furloughed get their jobs back or find new ones? Maybe not, particularly as businesses adapt and refine themselves in a COVID world of fewer resources.

This is exactly the kind of world that needs a strong, unified, and competent EU, US, and global economic institutions to provide adequate leadership, technical expertise, and $. But these actors are unready and/or unwilling to act on their own or collectively as global economic leaders and problem solvers. Already, there is much talk about supply chains being rerouted away from China (to the extent that’s feasible). While that’s not surprising given this crisis, it’s not a good sign that global cooperation will rule the day.

YS: Health issues will be seen as important in Post-COVID world, though for how long is a big question. The Spanish Flu devastated the world for two years, with very high number of deaths compared to COVID-19, and yet we never think of it as important—heck people laughed at George W. Bush for stressing the perils of pandemics. Jay Leno, I believe, once quipped that when Bush's health secretary talked about the necessity of stockpiling tuna, he said he'd better off getting the plague. So, the one million dollar question is how long and how much devastation this pandemic will cause before it will have a long-term impact.

I see the EU (and the US, should Biden win) wanting to exert more influence in the WHO, given how its current arrangement does not help that much in preventing pandemics. There might be a greater push for international organizations to have more power to intervene in states. Of course, China will do whatever they can to block it, so, yes, at the end of the day, state power still matters more than institutions. I think China will win the battle for COVID but lose the war, especially if the US comes around and declares that it will give more authority to WHO to deal with health issues.

And I agree that the global economy is a wild card. It really depends on how long the pandemic lasts. And now we can only cross our fingers and hope that they will create a vaccine ASAP.

BN: Lastly, how do you see the study of and writings on IR being affected by COVID? Of course, already, there has been some work focusing on (1) the impact of diseases and pandemics on IR, and (2) what a post-COVID world will look like. Do you see any other new or previously underexplored areas of study popping up as a result of COVID? And if not, why not?

YS: Similar to post-9/11, we will see a rush in pandemic studies in IR. There will be renewed attention to how pandemic affects/upends international order (e.g. Justinian Plague that put the nail in the coffin of the revival of Roman Empire, the Black Death that destroyed the Byzantine Empire and heralded the arrival of the Ottoman Empire, Black Death's influence on the collapse of Catholic dominance in Europe, etc.). It is a neglected part of literature that perhaps scholars will take a second look at.

COVID will also renew the debate on whether authoritarianism or democracy is better at tackling crises. And as you previously mentioned, in your last blog post, neoliberal institutionalism will have to answer a lot of problems arises from this virus (e.g. lack of unity in EU, lack of international cooperation despite of decades of institution-trust building all over the world, etc.). Realists will have to account for pandemics and health issues more general in their research programs. Truly, there are a lot of new research projects that I can see from COVID. Of course, the question is whether we will see any COVID-fatigue and how the gatekeepers in the discipline will look at this.

The Trump/Kushner Middle East Peace Plan

JANEK SKARZYNSKI/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Below is a conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman on the recently unveiled US plan to resolve the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian hostilities. This plan has been the pet project of President Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who has been charged by Trump to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian issue. It largely deals with political and security matters and is the second document released by Kushner and his team. The first document, released in June 2019, concentrated on improving economic conditions in the region, with specific attention to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt.

BN: All right, Yohanes, what are your thoughts on the Trump/Kushner plan? I think it's safe to say that the Israelis certainly love the plan. After all, the plan is a pro-Israeli one. It neuters a potential Palestinian state. And the Israelis get all of the concessions, including formal recognition of their settlements in the West Bank (which were previously seen as illegal by the US). The somewhat surprising thing is that there has been little blowback to the plan throughout the broader Middle East. No protests, no violence, etc. Ian Bremmer claims that the ME has moved on from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that looks to be spot on. And behind the scenes some of the Arab states are recommending the Palestinians negotiate with the plan.

At this point, the Israelis, are in a good spot. They are the dominant power in the relationship with the Palestinians, and the mood in the region (at least at the governmental level) is increasingly supportive of the Israelis, with Arab states actually wanting to work with them (on technology, intelligence sharing, containing Iran, etc.). The Trump/Kushner plan reflects, and also instititionalizes, these facts.

YS: The Trump plan shows the realities that nobody—especially the Palestinians—is going to accept. But at the same time, the silence in reaction to the plan is deafening. There are no major anti-US or anti-Israeli demonstrations. It is very different from back in 2000s. While you have the usual suspects (e.g., Palestinians, Turkey, and Iran) against this plan, the rest of the region is very diplomatic. This shows the reality now that Israel is no longer seen as a threat, it’s a status quo power, and in fact the biggest threat in the Middle East is Iran.

After the Arab Spring, the Arab autocrats really fear massive social movements. Not to mention, they see Hamas as Iranian proxy, thus they are less sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, though they do have to maintain the illusion and pay lip service to the Palestinians. So yes, in the larger geostrategic view, the Palestinian issue is no longer a cause for those Arab autocrats, who are secure in their legitimacy and wealth. They no longer want to rock the boat.  For Turkey and Iranians, who aspire for regional leadership, the Palestinian issue remains potent.

BN: Yeah, I agree that worries about internal stability probably are factoring into how regional autocrats have responded to the Trump/Kushner plan. But additionally, the regional environment—of which the Arab Spring is connected to and has shaped—is much different than 10, 15, 20 years ago. It's more violent, conflictual, unstable, and chaotic. And as a result, there are many more things on the radar of the region's despots. The rise of Iran. Yemen. Iraq. Syria. Terrorism. Libya. The Palestinian cause has slipped behind most if not all of these traumatic issues. Also, it doesn't help the Palestinian cause that the biggest issue to the Sunni states—the rise of Iran—has caused them to warm up to Israel and not want to jeopardize relations with Israel. As you mentioned, it's probably up to Iran and Turkey to go to bat for the Palestinians. But those two states, especially Iran, are the worst states to take up the Palestinians' cause, because the US and Israel won't listen or negotiate with them on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

YS: An overlooked factor is the generational change at work in the Middle East. The median age of Middle East people is 26.8 years, meaning more than half of the population was born after 1990 and came of age in the mid-2000s, far removed from the struggle of the Palestinians, the Arab-Israeli wars, etc. When you add in the fact that the economies of many Middle East states are in decline, such that even Saudi Arabia has to engage in economic reforms (e.g., selling part of ARAMCO, the family jewel), I'd hazard to guess that the unending Palestinian struggle no longer significantly registers among young people. 

BN: So where does the moribund peace process go from here? Does the can get kicked down the road once again? Or do you foresee any effort—by either the Israeli or Palestinian side—to engage with the Trump/Kushner plan?

YS: Basically for Trump, it is "my way or the highway." As long as Trump is in the White House, this will basically freeze the status quo. The Palestinians won't negotiate under that proposal anyway, and that gives Israelis the excuse of not doing anything to advance the peace process. In any case, I think the peace process has been long dead, and this is just the final nail in the coffin. Like it or not, the regional security situation has changed drastically and the only group still stuck in the 1970s (unfortunately) are the Palestinians. Like you mentioned, the rest of the region has moved on.

BN: For precisely those reasons, I do wonder if it's in the Palestinians' best interests to engage with the plan and earnestly work toward a final resolution to the hostilities. The power dynamics are tilting greatly toward Israel's advantage and nobody in the region is interested in defending or saving the Palestinians.

Frankly, these facts are what Kushner is hoping will prod the Palestinians to the table. His interviews lately (with Bremmer and Fareed Zakaria, in particular) have argued that the Palestinians can negotiate now, receive aid and other help from the global community, work toward internal political stability, and get their state in a few years; or they can avoid the plan, let the situation on the ground, like in the Gaza Strip, further deteriorate, and face the situation later when the Israelis are in further control of Palestinian lands. If they try to negotiate later, so goes the logic, the Palestinians will do so with far reduced leverage. It's another way of saying to the Palestinians: "You might not like this plan, but you definitely won't like any plan in the future, and in fact you'll probably hate any future settlement, so save yourself the trouble and work with us now."

The US and Israelis are engaging in coercive bargaining with the Palestinians, and the Palestinians know it and are trying to resist it, because they don't want the terms of any deal dictated to them. They feel cornered. Unfortunately for them, they are holding out for more, for a better deal, but that deal will probably never arrive.

YS: It will require much better leaders in both Israel and Palestine to restart talks. The only reason why Arafat agreed to Oslo was because Palestine was totally isolated internationally. He had nowhere to go. Abbas is held hostage by the extremists (e.g. Hamas and Islamic Jihad factions).  In the end, he cannot make any compromise even if he wants to, else he will be deposed.

On the Israelis’ side, the Netanyahu's government is beholden to its political allies on the right, who are very unlikely to give up anything in negotiations with the Palestinians. And with the corruption scandal looming, Netanyahu has to keep appeasing them with hawkish policy positions.

In essence, internationally, the situation is very unfavorable to Palestine, and, domestically, it will be political suicide for both the Israeli and Palestinian governments to compromise. The only viable option right now is to do nothing.

The Impact of the Death of al-Baghdadi

Photo: AP.

Below is a conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman on the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It was conducted via email over the last week. 

Brad Nelson: There are a lot of things happening in Syria lately. Basically, it's been non-stop Syria news for the last few weeks or so. Here, in this exchange, let’s focus on much-discussed, much-hyped event: the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the former leader of ISIS. What do you make of it? And what kind of impact will it have on ISIS?

Yohanes Sulaiman: While the death of al Baghdadi is significant in terms of PR for Trump and a blow to the ego of the ISIS, in a larger strategic picture, this does not have that much of an impact. ISIS has been in decline for the past few years. ISIS managed to get big because the conditions were right: Syria was in disarray while Iraq's government has lacking in legitimacy, providing fertile grounds for ISIS to grow and to gain a significant chuck of territory. Due to its brutality, though, ISIS ended up being hated and hounded by everyone. And its opponents have gotten wiser in dealing with it—e.g. attacking its internet propaganda infrastructure, establishing improving deradicalization programs, etc. While ISIS-inspired lone wolf attacks remain a problem, it is not that significant of a threat.

What next for ISIS? I think a collaboration with al Qaeda (AQ) probably its best option. Based on the fact that al Baghdadi was found in a stronghold of AQ in Syria, the two groups probably reached an accommodation of some sort.

BN: I see al-Baghdadi's death as simply accelerating trends that are already in motion. It pushes the group further toward decentralization. As the caliphate crumbled and its fighters have gone underground, ISIS has less sway over its affiliates and franchises. And without a credible leader right now, that's even more so the case. And then there's the prospect that al-Baghdadi's successor will likely lack his military, religious, and organizational credentials. If the next ISIS leader is a step back from al-Baghdadi in terms of respect and prestige, there's the chance that its affiliates will try to take advantage of the situation by broadening and deepening their autonomy from ISIS HQ and a few might even defect, sliding toward AQ. 

There is already lots of talk of ISIS lashing out now--as it seeks to avenge al-Baghdadi's death, remain relevant, and forestall any defections. Sure, we might see an uptick in ISIS-related violence.  However, keep in mind that ISIS was already very violent, wielding violence almost indiscriminantly, so I really don't anticipate too much change there. 

Bruce Hoffman has argued that an AQ-ISIS merger (or really a re-merger) could well happen. I'm a little more skeptical, at least for now. Yes, collaboration is something ISIS could opt for, but it would probably be unwise at the moment. AQ knows that ISIS is in flux (having lost its leader and recently promoted a possible neophyte), and as a result, al-Zawahiri is likely to see ISIS as weakened and desperate. AQ has the bargaining leverage. If ISIS wants to work with AQ, then AQ would be smart to demand it happening on AQ's terms. Would ISIS go for that? It’s unknown at this point, especially since we don't know much about al-Hashemi thus far.

My expectation is this: Rather than working with ISIS, I expect AQ to try to drive the stake in ISIS's heart by attempting to sow further divisions within ISIS and even press ISIS affiliates to switch teams. Why fold (in its competition with ISIS) when AQ has an opportunity to win the game, so to speak?

YS: Keep in mind that ISIS and its ilk can only be successful under narrow main conditions: first is the weaknesses of the states where they operate, and second, when states are simply unprepared to deal with these groups. So, I don't think we will see an emergence of a third group or reemergence of both AQ and ISIS as a global jihadist network at this point. Syria and Iraq are still in a mess, but they are stabilizing, and the populace are totally alienated due to ISIS brutality. Afghanistan remains a weak state, but the Taliban is more of a local phenomenon than an international movement. Same thing with Somalia and Nigeria. Terrorists there are really a product of local movements that tried to link themselves to a global jihadist movement. And nowadays states are far more prepared to deal with the reemergence of the new al-Qaeda or ISIS. Granted, this does not rule out any lone wolf attacks, but as John Mueller notes, especially in the US, the risk of a terrorist attack is very low, and in Europe, the police are much wiser to deal with the threats. And financing, especially from the Gulf States, is drying up. While terrorists may be able to work with local jihadist groups or criminal groups for financing, it seems to me that ISIS might find it harder than al Qaeda due to its extremism.

BN: Iraq and Syria are among the most chaotic, unstable, and violent states in the world. There are ample opportunities for AQ and ISIS to re-emerge there if the metaphorical foot is taken off their throats. Plus, ISIS still has anywhere from 14-18,000 foot soldiers, so that group still has a deep bench, with arms, and millions of dollars the group has squirreled away.

Regarding AQ: AQ is still very strong in Iraq and Syria. Research from Colin Clarke and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, among others, on the political dynamics in Syria says that AQ has embedded itself in local structures and populations in Syria, and it's going to be hard to remove the group. And AQ has had a longstanding presence in Sunni Iraqis areas since shortly after the US invasion in 2003.

All of this, in combination with some of the things I've already said in this exchange, leads me to believe that both groups are still formidable, though ISIS is the more dangerous global terrorist group. It's a desperate, decentralized group looking to remain relevant and important globally. It's very likely seeking quick "wins" right now. AQ is playing a different game. It doesn't have the same short-term, narrow perspective. There is also accumulating evidence that AQ has learned the lessons of its past, learned from the mistakes of ISIS, and learned from the "successes" of groups like Hezbollah. As a result, AQ is biding its time, regrouping and establishing momentum in the broader Middle East. And for those reasons, AQ isn't quite the global threat that ISIS is, in my view. 

BN: The one last point I’d like to make concerns the organizational literature’s thoughts on the death of al-Baghdadi. Jacob Shapiro, Jenna Jordan, and others others, have written on how mature, bureaucratized, layered terrorist organizations that have targeted wellsprings of support can withstand the loss of key leaders. These groups have built-in rules and processes that allow militants to get promoted up the ranks as needed; they also have the requisite base of support to replenish the ranks as militants either get promoted, killed, or simply defect from the organization.

This, of course, doesn’t describe all terror groups. Many groups are young, fragile, and very reliant on a leader. By contrast, ISIS is a classic example of a bureaucratized group with a strong base of support—both locally, regionally, and internationally. ISIS has the infrastructure to move into a post-Baghdadi era. That doesn’t mean it will be easy. But for those expecting ISIS to fade away, well, that’s unlikely. 

The good part, though, is that the group isn't nearly the global menace it was in 2015, it's unlikely to recapture its past glory and power, and it has been plagued by what Max Abrahms calls "stupid" leadership. 

In short, ISIS faces a dilemma. It can go underground, rest and recover, but risk getting eclipsed once again by AQ. This is the safe choice. Or it can continue to act as an impulsive, ultra-violent organization, in order to retain global brand visibility and attention. This is the risky and arguably dumbest choice. Because in remaining violent, killing everyone and everything in its path, ISIS will remain the subject of a harsh counterterrorism measures by states around the world. And those counterterrorism efforts will make life very difficult for the group and its members. They degrade ISIS's capabilities, create a brain drain through attrition, and effectively hem in the group. My guess is that ISIS will chose the second option. This will keep the group in the news and as a global threat to security, but also ensure that it is constantly hounded and on the run.

War With Iran? Or Much Ado About Nothing?

Over the last few weeks, Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman have engaged in a conversation on a wide range of foreign policy issues. For the sake of clarity and readability, below is a part of that conversation that focuses strictly on Iran-US relations.

BN: Of the various foreign issues that the Trump administration has taken a hawkish, confrontational position on, arguably the most chaotic is Iran. Lots of mixed messages from the White House. Trump claims he's not interested in a war with Iran. In fact, he wants talks with Iran and some kind of negotiated deal. Yet, at the same time, he's pulled the US from the 2015 nuclear deal, re-imposed tough sanctions, and has agreed to move more military assets to the Middle East, expressly with Iran in mind. And meantime, in the background, advisers, like National Security Adviser John Bolton, are privately cheerleading the charge for a military intervention. Do you think this approach to Iran will work? Will it get Trump what he wants? I'm very skeptical.

YS: At this point, I think Iran is overplaying its hand by declaring that it will up its enrichment of nuclear materials, thus removing any incentive for the European Union to actually defend it. At the same time, I am not sure that the regime is strong enough to deal with more escalations with the US. It is overextended in Syria and Yemen, and its economy is tottering toward collapse. Of course, as Venezuela shows, a terrible economy doesn't really matter much to the longevity of the regime as long as it holds all the levers of power securely—and Iran is still in a much better position than Venezuela. But apparently some in the regime are nervous enough to try sabotaging those tankers.

At the end of the day, though, I don't think there will be an Iran-US war. Iran knows that it won't win the war, and Trump is just Trump.

BN: What do you make of the air strikes that almost happened, but were apparently called off by Trump?

YS: I think Trump does not want to escalate this into something that he cannot pull back from—I believe the argument that he got cold feet once he heard hundreds could die—because that would mean an escalation into something that he cannot pull back from. His pattern of behavior is always the same: he takes the option with less risk, and that allows him to withdraw while claiming victory, all while hoping his opponents fold first in face the of his bluster.

BN: I've come across a few different explanations for Trump's decision. You mentioned one of them—the prospect of killing 150 Iranians is a disproportionate response, according to Trump himself, for downing a drone. Another is that Trump got word that the Iranians themselves, including the Quds force commander Soleimani, are ticked that the US drone was shot down. Perhaps it really was a mistake, committed by a rogue official or grunt, and not intended by Tehran. If so, then there's no reason for Trump to up the ante. At bottom, this argument suggests that Trump values and responds more to Iranian motives than Iranian actions. A third explanation that's been bandied about is US politics. In short, Trump got wind that his base would be displeased with another war in the ME. It also didn't help that Tucker Carlson, of Trump's beloved Fox News, took time out of a recent show to rail against a possible war with Iran. For Trump, almost everything he says and does is about base politics—making sure his core 35% of the electorate stays loyal to him and energized to support him. The prospect of fracturing that base, that core, especially given the upcoming presidential dogfight in 2020, dissuaded him from going ahead with a limited military campaign against Iran.

Of course, that didn't settle the situation. After all, Trump believed Iran deserved some punishment for the drone. And then there are the hawks, who are constantly pushing Trump toward war. And so Trump opted for a lower cost, more clandestine cyber activities against Iran. Trump is probably hoping that a non-military response would be viewed by the clerics as a sign that Trump is willing to calm down the situation and that they'll respond in kind. The problem, though, is that Trump has engaged in a number of bluffs during his presidency and the international community is starting to see him as a paper tiger. Iran could try to drive an even harder bargain based on the perception that Trump and his core supporters seem so averse to war.

YS: At the same time, it could be suicidal if Iran pushed harder against the US. While I agree that Trump's base is completely against another war in the Middle East, if they hear that the Iranians are downing a plane full of 35 US soldiers or they hit a carrier, everyone will rally around the flag and bay for blood. So, to some degree, I agree with you, that Trump's credibility might be damaged, but at the same time, the 800-pound gorilla is an 800-pound gorilla: the US is so powerful that states are wary to invoke its wrath.

BN: Yes, you're right. Iran can't press to hard, too recklessly, so as to provoke the US in a war for self-defensive reasons. But it can make life difficult for the US using a variety of tools. And plus, for lots of reasons, it's in Iran's interest to resist the US. That's why it was so tough to get the nuclear deal in 2015. Which leads me to a concern about US Iran policy under Trump. Constant pressure, with no daylight at the end of it all, will likely only force Iran down the same path it’s treaded for 40 years now—threats, tensions, and hostilities with the US. Getting Iran to change its behavior requires the US to have a much more deft diplomatic touch. And I don't think Trump has the advisors around him who can do that or are willing to do that. It might take a third party, perhaps like Japan’s Shinzo Abe (who recently visited Iran), to break the deadlock, defuse tensions, and move Washington and Tehran toward talks. 

YS: That is only true if Iran is in a good shape. Iran’s overextended its commitments in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, coupled with its current economic problems, exacerbated by Trumps' sanctions, mean the Mullahs are far more worried than they show. Granted, that’s similar to Venezuela, in that the despots can stay in power despite of a wretched economy, but by this point the Mullahs have already had 40 years to deliver wealth and freedom to its citizens, and they have failed. They are running out of time.

BN: Iran's economy is being wrecked by the sanctions, but the external commitments, in my view, aren't as problematic. The war in Syria is just about over. Hezbollah is the major player in Lebanon. And in Yemen, analysts have long said that the US and Israel have far overstated Iran's role in propping up the Houthis. Iran has cultivated proxies throughout the ME. The Soufan Group recently released a great report on precisely this topic. And one of the punchlines is that, since 2003, Iran has been able to cultivate proxies, in a very low cost way, who share a similar vision with Iran and are willing to work with Iran. All of these proxies (in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Bahrain, the Palestinian territories) can create chaos in the ME and harm US interests--and do so in a way that creates at least some plausible deniability for Tehran.

Moreover, we also need to consider this: the coalition that originally got Iran to the negotiating table now leans in support of Iran. The Europeans, Russians, and Chinese doubt US intelligence, think US is making a phony case for war, and desperately want to do business with Iran. In fact, they're all looking for ways to do business in Iran in ways that get around US sanctions. Getting this coalition back together is almost impossible, especially when they consider the US to blame for sparking the current crisis by withdrawing from the nuclear deal, reapplying sanctions, and labeling the IRGC a terrorist group. All of this means that Iran has more room to maneuver, a bit more flexibility, when confronting the US.

In a recent New York Times article, David Sanger touches on my point. He writes, "In fact, while Iran is weaker economically than it was a year ago, it has developed skills it did not possess during the last major nuclear crisis. It can strike ships with more precision and shoot planes out of the air. It now has a major cyber corps, which over the last seven years has paralyzed American banks, infiltrated a dam in the New York suburbs and attacked a Las Vegas casino. These abilities have altered the risk calculations, making the problem Mr. Trump faces with Iran even more vexing than those that confronted President George W. Bush or Mr. Obama.”

YS: Perhaps Iran's external commitments doesn't hurt it at all. At the same time, though, the sanctions still bite—hard. I am still unsure if other states are willing to defy Trump and break the America’s sanctions. I mean, had the Europeans been willing to defy Trump, they would have done that when Trump decided to reimpose the sanctions—especially with his popularity at rock bottom. Instead of assuring their businesses that they could just ignore Trump’s new sanctions, the Europeans are hemming and hawing, leading Iran to escalate—perhaps in desperation.

BN: At this point, what would you recommend to Trump? What should he do, now that he's in this predicament--a predicament, mind you, that he played a big part in provoking?

YS: What predicament? Just wait. The time is on America’s side. If Iran shoots down a plane, killing people, then it will give Trump the carte blanche to bring hell and fury to Iran. If Iran does nothing, then it will be starved to death and the regime will collapse. If Iran restarts its nuclear program, then the EU will have no choice but to reimpose sanctions.

Seriously, nobody in Washington or Brussels cares about Iran. The US is preoccupied with immigration and border issues, while the Europeans are terrified about the populists and Brexit.

BN: Well, the predicament is that the drums of war are beating. Like you, I think the chance for war is low. I think Trump and the Ayatollah have enough sense to pull back before things get out of hand. Still, Trump has hawkish advisers cheerleading for a military intervention. There's always the chance for misperception and miscalculation as hostilities escalate. And the US media is covering Iran like they did the run-up to the Iraq war--lots of enthusiasm for a big story, but little critical insight and analysis of what's happening.

But I digress. If I was Trump, here's what I'd do. First, I'd fire Bolton. His views and policy positions are completely antithetical to Trump's America First program and downright dangerous to US foreign policy and global security. Second, Trump needs to formulate a clear and coherent Iran policy and ensure that it's communicated consistently. In fact, given the level of importance Trump places on the Iran threat, this should've been done way back in 2017. It's apparent that many states in the Middle East, including Iran, don't have a clear sense of what the White House wants from Iran. Third, Trump's team needs to re-engage with China, Europe, and Russia, three actors that could be enormously helpful in putting pressure on Tehran, if necessary, and/or drawing Iran back to the negotiating table, which is preferable.

The Hanoi Summit

                                                                                                   Photo: Getty Images

Below is a recent conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman on last week's Hanoi Summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Did Trump fail, reports widely indicate? Why were Kim and Trump unable to agree to a nuclear deal? What are some takeaway lessons from the meeting? Brad and Yohanes answer those and more questions/puzzles below. 

BN: Here in the US, there's been almost universal criticism of Trump's failure to secure a deal--any kind of a deal--in Hanoi with Kim. The ultimate self-proclaimed dealmaker was unable to finalize a nuclear deal with Kim. To use Ben Rhodes's term, "The Blob" has spoken. The easy response is to say that The Blob extremely dislikes Trump, so their unfavorable reviews of the Hanoi summit aren't really a surprise. I suppose, though, let's dig a little deeper. The pre-summit worry—almost across the board, on the right and left, among academics and policy analysts—was that Trump would give Kim a boatload of concessions in exchange for very little in return from Kim. In fact, that was the rumor the day before the summit ended. But Trump didn't make these concessions. In fact, Trump didn't make any immediate concessions--at least, none beyond the actual meeting with Kim (which does confer legitimacy to Kim, DPRK). Yes, days after the fact, Trump did move to scrap large-scale South Korea-US exercises, replacing them with smaller-scale and virtual ones. But even here, it’s questionable whether this was an outright concession by Trump or something that was motivating by his cost-cutting, government waste obsession.

It's clear, then, that this was a summit that Trump couldn't win, no matter what he did. Hence, the story isn't just The Blob's dislike for Trump, it's that members of The Blob (including prominent academics, serious, distinguished people) have put forward unreasonable and contradictory positions to buttress their claims that Trump failed. That's my first take on Trump-Kim II.

YS: I agree with you totally. The only thing that I will blame Trump is his over-euphoria over the summits: Trump thought that he would be successful due to his charm offensives. He already asked Abe to nominate him for the Nobel. This mirrors what Bill Clinton did in the last year of his presidency when he wanted a Nobel. Clinton pushed both Arafat and Barak in negotiations. Arafat realized that, so he refused to budge, forcing Barak to give all the concessions, until in the end, when Barak simply gave up.

And of course, the DPRK is well known for shifting the goalpost. Just ask Clinton, Bush, and Obama. And Trump's desperation for the Nobel was playing into their hands. But at the same time, was it a disaster?  No, I don't see much fallout from the “failure” of both Singapore and Hanoi summits. China will still help the DPRK regardless of whether the summits have been successful or not, simply because Beijing doesn’t want to see the north collapse and refugees streaming across the border. Russia will keep helping DPRK for the sake of putting the US on the edge. In short, nothing’s new.

As I noted a couple years ago, there is no way the DPRK will give up its nukes because it is a crucial part of the regime’s legitimacy, what makes KJU thinks he can sleep well at night, and giving them is a sign of weakness. Since a lot of people think Trump is a serial liar, I will take what Pompeo, who is still trusted, said, that the DPRK asked for full sanctions to be lifted. And this is similar with all previous negotiating tactics by the north: demand complete sanctions relief, get all the benefits, and then proceed not to do what they promised—because there is no way the Kim regime will give up its nukes.

BN: I blame Trump for short-circuiting the diplomatic process. He stepped in at the beginning, once Kim made the offer to meet via South Korea, and believed that fully engaged diplomacy involving teams from both the US and DPRK wasn't needed. He believed his own hype about his dealmaking skills; he could solve the nuclear crisis singlehandedly. Which meant that he sidelined the experts and negotiators from the start. And that's become an acute problem post-Singapore, as you correctly noted, because of Trump's enthusiastic embrace of Kim. The North Koreans believe Trump's so inexperienced and so politically invested—so eager to win a Nobel, as you point out—in the negotiations with Kim that they believe they can woo Trump, sucker Trump. They don't want anything to do with American negotiators like Pompeo and Biegun; they've postponed meetings, stalled talks, etc. And that's led to scant diplomatic progress the since Singapore. As a result, Trump walked into the Hanoi summit with little agreed upon, a very unusual circumstance for a bilateral meeting between world leaders. It's for that reason I didn't expect much at all to come out the Hanoi talks.

That said, it's hardly a disaster. Trump, to my surprise, used careful language to describe the talks and Kim. Similarly, DPRK state media offered a cheerful take on the summit. Even China's state media put forward an optimistic view on Hanoi. All are good signs. As Trump pointed out, neither side stormed out of Hanoi, and both seemed to have departed on good terms. The downside, of course, is that there are no further talks planned as of now, and who knows will when they’ll resume.

YS: At the same time, we have to ask whether this will mean more intransigence from Trump–he does not take humiliation lightly as we all know—or less belligerence from Kim, since he finally knows that even Trump has his limits. If the failure of Hanoi means that both sides will have a more realistic estimate for each other, I'd chalk this up as just a minor bump in the road—and as you noted, everyone involved in the talks is careful not to torpedo them. On the other hand, if the next meeting is a disaster, if there are no further meetings anytime soon, I think North Korea will again turn in a bellicose direction. At the same time, if it’s apparent that Trump is going to lose the 2020 election, or if the investigations place his presidency in jeopardy, then if I were North Korea, I'd try to get the best deal from Trump while I can. There won't be any US president who is more sympathetic to North Korea.

BN: Exactly. You've led me to another point I wanted to make here: while Trump has incentives to seal a deal with North Korea over the status of its nuclear program, Kim also has incentives to seal a deal with the US. Put simply, as you just mentioned, it's unlikely that Trump's successors will be anywhere near as friendly and cozy with Kim, and as eager to earn a political "win" on the DPRK issue. In fact, it's likely that Trump's successors—especially his immediate successor—will take a much tougher stance on North Korea's nukes, human rights abuses, the Kim regime, and so on. Kim has to realize this. Hence, he's got less than two years to finalize a nuclear deal that allows him to significantly loosen the economic noose around his nation. If he doesn't beat the clock, he'll take a big gamble that Trump wins another term or that the diplomatic momentum will carry over to a post-Trump administration. That’s a very risky bet.

I suspect Trump's successor will be inclined to uphold any deal he makes with Kim, as long as Kim abides by the terms of it, but not so eager to reach an agreement if one isn't clinched by the time they enter office. For example, a Democratic president in 2021 will face strong pressure to show his/her toughness, distance the US from global tyrants, prioritize human rights, and, more generally, junk most of Trump's of foreign policy platform.

BN: Lastly, what do you make of Trump's comments on the Otto Warmbier incident? In my view, taken in isolation, it's somewhat understandable. Trump's in the middle of negotiations with Kim, and he doesn't want to do/say anything that might sabotage current/future talks. That led him to pull his punches on Kim. That said, however, a full-throated defense of Kim—that Kim didn't know about Warmbier's condition, how he become ill/injured, etc.—is off-putting, completely tone deaf, and highly unlikely. And of course, it's difficult to see Trump's comments regarding the Warmbier tragedy in isolation. Indeed, when we combine these comments with his lavish embrace of Kim over the last year, his defense of MBS, his praise for Xi Jinping, and his obsequiousness for Putin, it sure looks like Trump has an affinity for many of the world's brutal strongmen.

YS: I agree. Trump wanted to show Kim that he was willing to bend backward for the sake of negotiations. But I agree: that was a terrible Q&A performance. Doesn't look good at all.

Reflecting on 2018, Looking Ahead to 2019

Below is a recent conversation between Drs. Brad Nelson and Yohanes Sulaiman. As you’ll see, they reflect on the major global political themes from 2018 and look ahead at some of the international storylines that will likely dominate the news/opinion in 2019.

Brad Nelson: So now that 2018's over and done, let's reflect on it a bit. What were the main world politics takeaways of 2018? Any overriding themes? Or emerging trends? I suspect you have a long list to pick from.

Yohanes Sulaiman: People are yelling left and right that Trump is going to destroy the world, but so far, life goes on. We could argue either the international system is far more resilient than scholars/analysts/pundits have believed, or they wildly overestimate Trump's ability to destroy the world.

But seriously, I don't think Trump's influence is really that huge. The media especially make him way bigger and dangerous than he really is and far inflate his influence. Besides, with or without Trump, there are lots ways that things can go wrong. Take the example of Brexit, which happens without Trump's rise. Or the Khashoggi scandal. I don't buy the argument that Trump emboldens dictators or causes global insanity. But critics need a bogeyman, and Trump provides a convenient one.

Putting Trump aside, though, there are several ongoing trends going that I think will have major implications for years to come. First, China is declining. No, China is not going to be like the Soviet Union in the 1980s. But the fact that Xi Jinping had to crack down massively on Muslims in Xinjiang and that China's economy is cooling down are indications that all is not well in China. China's problems started way before Trump's trade war, though the trade war exacerbated it.

Second, Iran may be losing in the Middle East's Great Game. Sure, Trump is withdrawing from Syria, or so he claims. But I think this will also lead to Russia pulling out from Syria. Why? Because Russia is there to prevent the US and EU from challenging it in its sphere of influence. Now that America's threat is withering, Russia will have the excuse it needs to dump an expensive war it can hardly afford. Iran would be left holding the bag and that would strain Iran's already crumbling economy hurt by low prices and sanctions. True, Turkey might try to expand its influence in Syria, but its economy is its Achilles' heel, thereby restricting the scope of Ankara's ambitions. And while a fraying economy does not necessarily lead to the collapse of the regime (see Venezuela and Cuba), a prolonged foreign adventure in the midst of such economic struggles could cause major internal instability and turmoil.

BN: Those are good choices. But in my view, the big story is the continued divisions in the West--between various Western countries and within various Western nations. Trump's a big part of this phenomenon. Trump--his policies, governing style, his personality, and, yes, his tweets--has sparked almost daily chaos and controversy in the US. And he's been the major source of the political unraveling we're now seeing between the US and France, Germany, Britain, Canada, and EU/NATO. The various world gatherings and summits in 2018 (NATO summit, UN annual meeting, G7, G20, Armistice Day), even more so than those in 2017, fully exposed all of the rifts between Western countries, with Trump at the middle of most of the disputes and rancor.

But Trump's not solely to blame. Right-wing populist movements have gathered momentum--due to a mixture of sweeping populism, nationalism, and country-specific factors--in Sweden, Austria, Poland, Germany, France, and Italy. And this, as we know, has created turmoil across Europe (entrenched political divides, protests, street violence, a spike in right-wing extremism). Right now, the West is in a funk, a malaise, which is problematic by itself, but it's caused terrible rippling effects throughout the international system. The West is distracted and preoccupied by internal troubles, creating openings for rivals and enemies and allowing global problems to fester. Climate change, the Syrian conflict and humanitarian fallout, the possible re-grouping of ISIS, Russia's resurgence, China's troublesome behavior, the weakening of international existing norms and rules--all of these things are continuing apace, and the West, collectively, is doing relatively little about it. The world's in trouble if we're counting on an outgoing Merkel, or Trudeau, or Macron to save it.

Now, turning to 2019, the Trump administration is probably the number one topic on my radar. According to reports, the Mueller report should be wrapped up sometime this year. Will it contain any bombshells? Or will it be a nothing-burger? Of course, except for a select few, nobody at this point knows what's in the report. But the impact of it could be dramatic. It could place the Trump presidency in jeopardy. And keep in mind, already, the Democrats are out for blood and pushing impeachment through the House. As a result, even if Trump's not ousted this year, it's pretty clear he'll face significant political heat in 2019. And that heat will inevitably bleed into his presidency.

Indeed, it's very possible the much-criticized 2017 and 2018 years of Trump's presidency will actually be the calm years of his time in the White House. Trump will likely be even more erratic, churn out ever crazier tweets, and lash out even more at real and imagined political foes, both inside the US and beyond. Will that cause more turnover in the White House? Possibly, right? And then there are the policy implications of a insecure, threatened Trump presidency. Does Trump do something rash? Does he manufacture a crisis to save himself?

YS: The divisions in the West are not a new phenomenon, but the group managed to keep it together for years due to good economic growth. Once the economy faltered in 2008 and the immigration crisis started as a result of the Syrian War, coupled with uninspiring leadership from the moderates, citizens in the West looked for political and economic alternatives. Under these conditions, populism has thrived. We have seen this before, back in the 1920s and 30s, when the moderates failed to lead and both the left and the right populist movements seized the initiative, with grave implications. At the moment, because of Trump, the populist right seems to be dominant, but there is also a leftist populist movement. The populist bent sweeping through the Democratic Party in the US is a perfect example. The moderates can provide a viable political-economic alternative or keep cajoling the extremists, it's their choice. But right now, the populists have the momentum.

On the Mueller report: no, I don't think it will be a bombshell. If there was a real smoking gun that implicated Trump, Mueller's team would have wrapped everything up years ago. All the leaks and indictments so far are just like a calculated drip to keep people interested. I won't be surprised if it ends up like the Starr Report, an indictment on a wholly different topic. And Democrats would be crazy to replicate the Republicans' impeachment attempt on Clinton: it will galvanize Trump's supporters and basically hand the election to Trump in 2020.

But I agree that this year could be a crazy year. Already, as you suggested, House Democrats are doing anything they can to destroy Trump, the Democrats are fielding contenders to run against Trump in the 2020 presidential election, and the federal government is closed with no sign of the stalemating breaking soon. So like it or not, 2019 will be another year about Trump, and that will crowd out everything else again.

BN: Are you optimistic or pessimistic about 2019?

YS: Pessimistic, since the moderates are running like chickens with their heads chopped off: they present no vision, no alternative to the global slump. Politicians and leaders are pandering to the worst, lowest instincts, not only in the US, but also in Europe and even in Asia. Merkel is basically a lame duck, and she hasn't been effective since the beginning of the refugee crisis. Macron is becoming irrelevant. Putin is a vulture. China is engaging in a knee-jerk foreign policy. Trump is Trump. 

In essence, things will go down, though I will be happy to be proven wrong.

BN: Overall, on a macro level, I'm pessimistic. The next 25 years will likely be very rocky for many parts of the world. Ian Bremmer's Eurasia Group recently released its "Top Global Risks" report for 2019, and it presents a dour outlook for the foreseeable future. And I agree. The trend lines on a host of important issues (US-China relations, cybersecurity, US politics, Europe, the global order, climate change, etc.) are all pointing downward. These are big and complicated issues, globally defining issues, that will be extremely difficult solve, and if they're not solved, major catastrophes could result. 

But I'm slightly optimistic about 2019, actually. For example, the war in Syria is wrapping up. Brexit issues should get resolved one way or another in the next few months. In the US, the Democrats have the House, which can help restrain Trump. The Mueller report will be released soon, and at that point we'll know whether Trump will serve out his term in office. Moreover, it looks like Europe is no longer hoping to woo Trump and is finally getting its act together by proceeding without the US until the next American president takes office. The world's most notorious despots are safe and not going anywhere in 2019. Yes, the global economy might dip a bit in 2019, but it doesn't look like anything terribly disruptive will occur. New leaders in Mexico and Brazil might offer some stability to their battered, corrupt nations. China is still biding its time regionally, waiting for Taiwan, the US, and the rest of America's allies in Asia, to weaken and stop resisting Beijing's influence, so I don't expect anything rash from Xi.

Russia is a wild card, admittedly. Its maneuvers in the Kerch Strait in November were concerning, and some Russia observers fear that Putin is planning on further expanding Russian control over Ukraine. Perhaps, though Russia's trouble making over the last decade has been of the plausibly deniable, low-cost variety, so I don't anticipate a full-scale invasion or anything of the sort. However, watch out for Ukraine's presidential and parliamentary elections later this year. Both offer Russia ample opportunities to disturb, harass, and threaten Ukraine's political systems and its sovereignty--perhaps via cybermeddling in the elections or provoking a security crisis beforehand. 

So, overall, there's a decent chance that 2019 could be slightly more stable than last year. But I'm going to add a caveat here. Of course, I'm purely looking at how 2019 might process the problems leftover from 2018. What happens when or if a significant crisis or danger pops up this year? In that case, all bets are off. Put simply, I'm not confident at all in the current batch of global leaders, particularly those in the world's great power nations. I don't see anyone capable of rising to the occasion to lead competently the international community during a crisis.