If you recall, in my last blog post, I referred to an opinion piece written by my colleague Yohanes for the publication Strategic Review. In that piece, he makes a number of interesting arguments, including one that connects Indonesian foreign policy to the future viability of Asean. Specifically, he worries that having an "all friends but no enemies" approach to foreign policy might undermine and weaken the unity and strength of Asean in the future.
I wish Yohanes explored this argument in more detail, but, of course, he was hamstrung by space limitations. In only 750-1000 words, it's impossible to adequately discuss and explain every side argument. With that in mind, in this blog post, I'd like to pick up where he left off.
To begin, let's clarify a couple of terms. When Yohanes refers to the organizational unity and strength of Asean, he seems to be talking about the ability of Asean member countries to agree on various policy issues and to collectively wield power (diplomatic, military, economic, and so on) in response to these issues. After all, Yohanes' concern is that Asean will suffer divisions and fractures, which would limit the organization's potential to get anything substantive done.
Now, on to the matter at hand. I do agree with Yohanes' assertion that Indonesian foreign policy could weaken Asean. But I suspect that this could occur because Indonesia's policymaking, at least for about the last 20 years, has tended to be passive and reactionary. Indonesia desires to hold a leadership position in East Asia and Asean, in particular, but hasn't really taken the reins on policy issues pertaining to the region. Instead, it has let other countries, whether Japan or China or South Korea, take the initiative by setting the agenda for East Asia, if not beyond. And inside Asean, Indonesia has been a vigorous participant in meetings and conferences, but again I don't see much evidence of the country taking a leadership role.
Sure, Indonesia played a strong role in Asean in 2011. It held the chairmanship, and, among other conferences and meetings, hosted two Asean Summits and the East Asian Summit. Indonesia also was integral in getting the U.S. to shift its attention to Asia and tightening its cooperation with Asean (a part of which included America's signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation).
That said, aside from 2011, Indonesia hasn't dominated Asean, at least not the way I would expect based on its economic power and the importance that Jakarta places on the organization in its overall foreign policy. It's acted as one among equals. And really, a case could made that countries such as Malaysia have taken on a bigger, more prominent role in Asean over the last 20 years. At bottom, in my view, Indonesia has essentially dealt with Asean much as it does with foreign countries and issues: mostly in a passive manner, taking a backseat to others.
This kind of an approach to foreign policy could turn problematic if sharp differences between Asean members do surface. Indonesia likely won't do enough to keep countries in line and working together. And if it does begin to assert itself in situations like this, given Indonesia's disinclination, it will likely be too late, letting differences deepen and positions harden. Hence, in this case, the unity and strength of Asean would depend on what other Asean member countries do. If these countries don't value Asean as much as Indonesia does, and if they don't seize the leadership mantle to bring everyone together, the organization could be doomed. Emerging differences could easily further widen and deepen and tensions harden, causing intractable splits and divisions in the bloc.
If we move beyond Indonesia, there could be any of a number of other factors that might play a role in enervating the unity and strength of Asean. Indeed, there are so many different potential variables and so many different possible contexts or conditions that I can imagine a score of ways in which Asean could endure internal fissures and difficulties. Of course, a blog post isn't appropriate to undertake an exhaustive examination of all these different factors; a much longer treatment of the future of Asean would be better suited for that.
That said, I can identify one event that has the strongest likelihood of impacting Asean stability, and it's the 800 lb gorilla, or perhaps panda, in the room: the rise of China. Let's face it, the China issue is so important that, no matter how each responds to Beijing--whether in unison or not--it will surely lurk in the background, if not the foreground, of just about everything the bloc discusses and undertakes in the coming years.
China is going to continue to grow in both absolute and relative terms, just as it has for the past 35 years. Whether it finally achieves great power status is actually irrelevant to this discussion. Why? Put simply, unless something catastrophic occurs, China is going to dominate the region in a way that approximates America's power predominance in its own backyard. China's economic and eventually its military power will likely far exceed the might of other countries in East Asia, Asia-Pacific, and certainly within Asean member countries.
This impending situation is going to create new realities on the ground and in Asean capitals. Countries will face new constraints, new opportunities, and new pressures. And they will have to make a strategic calculation about how to deal with China's dominance. Certainly, Asian countries are already contemplating the implications of China's ascent and their responses to it. But as we move forward into the future, the changes and shifts in regional politics will carry a much greater sense of urgency for Asean member countries to come with a plan and react accordingly.
So what will Asean do? Will member countries attempt to balance against Beijing? Might they try to remain above or outside the fray by staying on the sidelines, preferring to mind their own business, or serving as mediators between China and its rivals in the region? Or perhaps, if one or more countries is bullied or sees an opportunity to profit, some could see bandwagoning as the best strategic option.
The problem, at least with respect to the topic at hand, is that there is no guarantee all Asean members will see the rise of China similarly and respond to China in a similar fashion. There is no reason to assume that Asean--that is, all Asean members--will necessarily seek to balance against China's rising and potentially overwhelming power. It's possible, sure, though by no means guaranteed. Strategic calculations are a product of a country's goals, interests, values, geography, material power, and perceptions of reality, among other things. And each of these indicators can vary, and vary greatly, from country to country in the region. So some countries in Asean might fear China, see it as a strategic threat, and form a policy based on that assessment; but others could very well read the situation much differently, opting to pursue policies that look little like those from their more insecure and pessimistic Asean partners. And if Asean member countries aren't walking in unison on the China issue, instead choosing different strategic paths, then Asean could endure--perhaps prolonged--bouts of dissension.
To be clear, and this applies to both the Indonesia and China examples, potential discord and fissures in Asean could be more or less severe, depending on a host of factors. And these internal organizational problems could take many different forms. We might see Asean reach a breaking point at which the bloc is hanging together by a thread, just waiting for the right trigger to cause a complete implosion. But at the less extreme end of the spectrum, we could observe a political stalemate in Asean. But regardless of the type and severity of the divisions in Asean, their mere presence will hamper the organization's ability to exercise and project power.
Center for World Conflict and Peace
Saturday, April 28, 2012
Sunday, April 15, 2012
A Grand Strategy for Indonesia
About a month ago, my colleague Yohanes penned a piece in Strategic Review that lamented Indonesia’s lack of a grand strategy. He suggested that Indonesia’s current foreign policy is aimless and reactionary. After the article’s publication, Yohanes revealed that he wondered what an effective, coherent Indonesian grand strategy would look like. Admittedly, he poses an interesting query. And after thinking it over, I have a few ideas.
To begin, Indonesia would be best served by focusing first and foremost on continuing its economic ascent. Toward this end, it should increase its commitment to economic development, good governance, uprooting corruption, and containing and thwarting local terrorism. Indonesia also ought to build off its recent efforts to engage multilateral institutions by taking on more active and assertive roles in international and regional bodies. If it became especially ambitious, Indonesia could even assist in writing new rules and principles that govern the world order of the 21st century.
To be clear, all of the above mentioned things are interrelated. They would likely help Indonesia to keep jobs aplenty, bolster tourism, bring more respect and admiration, and allow it to pursue its interests effectively.
In my view, Indonesia should aim to operate something, though certainly not exactly, like Japan. This would loosely fit with where Indonesia’s elites want the country to go. Avoid trouble, be friends with foreign countries, seek to be a mediator when possible, and, most importantly, serve as an economic engine to the world.
By going the "economy first" route, Indonesia really can benefit in important ways. First, as has been written at length by scholars and analysts, money and power will likely flow from the West to the East, Asia in particular, during the 21st century. Arguably, this is already happening. What this means is that Asia is where jobs, investment, and growth are all shifting. Moreover, it’s becoming clear, especially with America’s so-called pivot to Asia, that the region is where the most important diplomatic jockeying and intrigues will take place. Combined, we a get a picture of countries, businesses, groups, and people falling over themselves to get a piece of Asia, because that’s where the action is at.
If Indonesia gets its domestic political and economic act together, it can piggyback off the success of the entire region. Investors, speculators, businesses, organizations, and countries already attuned to the rise of Asia and looking for more activity there could eventually move with gusto to Indonesia. Furthermore, for those actors preferring to deal with a vibrant, emerging democracy, or for those wary of abetting the rise of the Red Panda, Indonesia might eventually function as suitable regional alternative to China for international economic, business, and political affairs.
Second, Indonesia might be able to develop its own version of soft power. Remember, for the last several centuries, the West has held a commanding advantage in both material power and soft power. People worldwide have wanted to be like the West. They wanted to be wealthy, sure, but also live in a free and democratic society. Because China lacks these features, many scholars and analysts already speculate that China will never hold much soft power, and that the lack of it will hold the country back. Put simply, without significant soft power, China won’t be able to maximize its influence in the world.
Perhaps, but that says nothing about Indonesia. And in fact, if Indonesia goes about its foreign and domestic politics and economics in a effective manner, as the largest Muslim country in the world, it has a decent prospect at possessing considerable soft power. It can be a shining beacon to Asia but also to Muslim countries. In this way, Indonesia could be a major global player. It possesses the potential, even if it seems unlikely at the moment, to influence countries near and far away.
One more point on soft power: for country that lacks a really strong military and isn't a top-flight economy, holding a lot of soft power could enable Indonesia to punch above its weight, so to speak, in regional and international politics. Soft power could enable Jakarta to do more things than we would predict solely by looking at measures of Indonesia’s hard power.
Where does Indonesia’s military fit in this picture? Over the long-term it will likely be in Indonesia's best interests not to strive to have a very powerful military. I’m not suggesting that Indonesia slash its military budget. To the contrary, it might even make sense to make increases to it, though this should be in line with any expansion in Indonesia’s economy. The bottom line: just enough of a military presence to patrol borders, protect the homeland, participate in disaster relief, and take care of anti-terror operations. Indonesia should keep enough of a military presence to maintain security, peace and calm, but not so much as to throw gobs money down the military industrial complex drain. All this would do is further entrench the military’s role in Indonesia’s politics and economics.
In the end, though, this would require bargaining with and between the military. On the one hand, the military would have to be convinced, likely with various creative inducements, that it will no longer be the face of country to its citizens or to the rest of the world. And on the other hand, I envision some kind of informal accord between the navy and the army. The army has traditionally gotten the bulk of the military budget, and would likely resist changes to how it operates and the resources it procures. But in crafting a better, more economical foreign policy, the Indonesian government ought to begin the transition to emphasizing the role of the navy. Given the country’s location and its geography, it just makes the most sense. After all, it’s the navy that safeguards the country’s borders and waterways and trade routes, and can offer humanitarian assistance as needed. To make this transition work, the navy and army must agree that Indonesia’s naval forces and power should be strengthened and modernized.
There are a host of specific regional and international issues on which Indonesia will have to take position in the future. One such issue is the coming superpower competition between China and the U.S. By acting as a neutral friend to Beijing and Washington and seeking to be a mediator in their likely disputes, it’s possible that Indonesia can be a positive force, one that muffles the potential for a catastrophic great power conflict in Asia.
Of course, this is one among many ways that Indonesia won’t function like Japan. Japan has a strong alliance with the U.S.; Indonesia doesn’t want to pick sides. It wants to remain above the fray. Certainly, there are pitfalls with this approach. For instance, declining to pick a side risks drawing the ire of both China and America. The key for Indonesia is to remain consistent (both over time and in private and public statements) and communicate with clarity, so as to avoid uncertainty regarding Jakarta's intentions and actions. Additionally, if the region experiences bipolarization, as frequently happens in great power contests for power and influence, Indonesia could face external pressure to pick a side. It could even feel internal pressure to pick side should China or America appear on the verge of becoming the dominant player in Asia. What Indonesia must do is stick to its evolving interests and values. These include maintaining foreign policy independence, avoiding conflict, encouraging negotiation over violence, and supporting multilateral solutions.
To begin, Indonesia would be best served by focusing first and foremost on continuing its economic ascent. Toward this end, it should increase its commitment to economic development, good governance, uprooting corruption, and containing and thwarting local terrorism. Indonesia also ought to build off its recent efforts to engage multilateral institutions by taking on more active and assertive roles in international and regional bodies. If it became especially ambitious, Indonesia could even assist in writing new rules and principles that govern the world order of the 21st century.
To be clear, all of the above mentioned things are interrelated. They would likely help Indonesia to keep jobs aplenty, bolster tourism, bring more respect and admiration, and allow it to pursue its interests effectively.
In my view, Indonesia should aim to operate something, though certainly not exactly, like Japan. This would loosely fit with where Indonesia’s elites want the country to go. Avoid trouble, be friends with foreign countries, seek to be a mediator when possible, and, most importantly, serve as an economic engine to the world.
By going the "economy first" route, Indonesia really can benefit in important ways. First, as has been written at length by scholars and analysts, money and power will likely flow from the West to the East, Asia in particular, during the 21st century. Arguably, this is already happening. What this means is that Asia is where jobs, investment, and growth are all shifting. Moreover, it’s becoming clear, especially with America’s so-called pivot to Asia, that the region is where the most important diplomatic jockeying and intrigues will take place. Combined, we a get a picture of countries, businesses, groups, and people falling over themselves to get a piece of Asia, because that’s where the action is at.
If Indonesia gets its domestic political and economic act together, it can piggyback off the success of the entire region. Investors, speculators, businesses, organizations, and countries already attuned to the rise of Asia and looking for more activity there could eventually move with gusto to Indonesia. Furthermore, for those actors preferring to deal with a vibrant, emerging democracy, or for those wary of abetting the rise of the Red Panda, Indonesia might eventually function as suitable regional alternative to China for international economic, business, and political affairs.
Second, Indonesia might be able to develop its own version of soft power. Remember, for the last several centuries, the West has held a commanding advantage in both material power and soft power. People worldwide have wanted to be like the West. They wanted to be wealthy, sure, but also live in a free and democratic society. Because China lacks these features, many scholars and analysts already speculate that China will never hold much soft power, and that the lack of it will hold the country back. Put simply, without significant soft power, China won’t be able to maximize its influence in the world.
Perhaps, but that says nothing about Indonesia. And in fact, if Indonesia goes about its foreign and domestic politics and economics in a effective manner, as the largest Muslim country in the world, it has a decent prospect at possessing considerable soft power. It can be a shining beacon to Asia but also to Muslim countries. In this way, Indonesia could be a major global player. It possesses the potential, even if it seems unlikely at the moment, to influence countries near and far away.
One more point on soft power: for country that lacks a really strong military and isn't a top-flight economy, holding a lot of soft power could enable Indonesia to punch above its weight, so to speak, in regional and international politics. Soft power could enable Jakarta to do more things than we would predict solely by looking at measures of Indonesia’s hard power.
Where does Indonesia’s military fit in this picture? Over the long-term it will likely be in Indonesia's best interests not to strive to have a very powerful military. I’m not suggesting that Indonesia slash its military budget. To the contrary, it might even make sense to make increases to it, though this should be in line with any expansion in Indonesia’s economy. The bottom line: just enough of a military presence to patrol borders, protect the homeland, participate in disaster relief, and take care of anti-terror operations. Indonesia should keep enough of a military presence to maintain security, peace and calm, but not so much as to throw gobs money down the military industrial complex drain. All this would do is further entrench the military’s role in Indonesia’s politics and economics.
In the end, though, this would require bargaining with and between the military. On the one hand, the military would have to be convinced, likely with various creative inducements, that it will no longer be the face of country to its citizens or to the rest of the world. And on the other hand, I envision some kind of informal accord between the navy and the army. The army has traditionally gotten the bulk of the military budget, and would likely resist changes to how it operates and the resources it procures. But in crafting a better, more economical foreign policy, the Indonesian government ought to begin the transition to emphasizing the role of the navy. Given the country’s location and its geography, it just makes the most sense. After all, it’s the navy that safeguards the country’s borders and waterways and trade routes, and can offer humanitarian assistance as needed. To make this transition work, the navy and army must agree that Indonesia’s naval forces and power should be strengthened and modernized.
There are a host of specific regional and international issues on which Indonesia will have to take position in the future. One such issue is the coming superpower competition between China and the U.S. By acting as a neutral friend to Beijing and Washington and seeking to be a mediator in their likely disputes, it’s possible that Indonesia can be a positive force, one that muffles the potential for a catastrophic great power conflict in Asia.
Of course, this is one among many ways that Indonesia won’t function like Japan. Japan has a strong alliance with the U.S.; Indonesia doesn’t want to pick sides. It wants to remain above the fray. Certainly, there are pitfalls with this approach. For instance, declining to pick a side risks drawing the ire of both China and America. The key for Indonesia is to remain consistent (both over time and in private and public statements) and communicate with clarity, so as to avoid uncertainty regarding Jakarta's intentions and actions. Additionally, if the region experiences bipolarization, as frequently happens in great power contests for power and influence, Indonesia could face external pressure to pick a side. It could even feel internal pressure to pick side should China or America appear on the verge of becoming the dominant player in Asia. What Indonesia must do is stick to its evolving interests and values. These include maintaining foreign policy independence, avoiding conflict, encouraging negotiation over violence, and supporting multilateral solutions.
Sunday, April 1, 2012
Nuclear Diplomacy and the North Korea Puzzle
Shortly before the death of Kim Jong il last December, North Korea and the U.S. made progress toward a deal on nuclear and missile testing. Ostensibly, Pyongyang agreed to halt nuclear tests and experiments and missile launches and allow the return of IAEA officials, in exchange for food and other humanitarian assistance and the possibility of improving North Korean-American relations. Kim's death put the deal on hold, while the country mourned and Kim's son began the process of consolidating political power. In late February, once North Korea's politics started to stabilize, Washington and Pyongyang revived the deal. Before long, Team Obama proudly announced that both sides had restarted and finalized the so-called Leap Day Deal.
Unfortunately, latest news out of North Korea has given, once again, the skeptics and pessimists much fodder. This time, government spokesmen have announced that North Korea will conduct an allegedly peaceful, non-threatening satellite launch some time between April 12-16. The North Koreans claim the purpose of the launch, timed to commemorate the (100th) birth of nation founder Kim il Sung, is to collect weather data and estimate crop yields.
But the U.S. and its friends in Asia believe the launch violates the deal that was struck just a few weeks ago. Reports and satellite images apparently that the North Korea is preparing to launch something that's far less innocuous and more military-related than Pyongyang has admitted thus far. Indeed, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs Peter Lavoy reported to the U.S. House of Representative Armed Services Committee that the launch will likely violate the Leap Day Deal: "This planned launch is highly provocative because it manifests North Korea's desire to test and expand its long-range missile capability."
So while the names atop North Korea's leadership might have changed, the way Pyongyang does foreign policy likely hasn't. North Korea continues its cat and mouse routine with America. Time and again it sucks Washington into time and labor intensive diplomatic discussions, agrees to a deal, raises U.S. expectations, then eventually backs out of or cheats on the agreement. This pattern has held for the past two decades, dating back to the infamous 1994 accords, which brought heavy embarrassment to and criticism of the Clinton administration. In fact, knowing full well that it would only ratchet up the tensions even further, and giving countries more reasons to doubt and question Pyongyang's motives, last Thursday North Korea fired two short-range missiles.
In response to the April launch, the U.S. has already taken a number of steps. It has suspended efforts to recover the remains of American war dead from the Korean War, a deal that was agreed upon last October. According to Pentagon press secretary George Little: "When there are suggestions that they might launch ballistic missiles, when they make bellicose statements about South Korea and engage in actions that could be construed as provocative, we think that it's not the right time to undertake this effort."
President Obama himself has publicly stated his disapproval of the planned launch. He called on North Korea to scrap the launch and warned of severe counter-responses, which might include tighter sanction, and the risk of international condemnation and isolation.
Moreover, Washington has already suspended its food aid to North Korea. The U.S. argues that this isn't a direct response to the planned missile test but instead a reaction to the prevailing view that North Korea is unwilling to uphold its international commitments, which include, of course, the Leap Day Deal. Put simply, the U.S. just doesn't trust North Korea to match its words with deeds. According to state department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland: "We don't have confidence in their good faith. If they want to restore our confidence in their good faith, they can cancel the plans to launch this satellite."
North Korea has announced that the satellite will travel south toward the Philippines or Indonesia. This bit of news has, understandably, alarmed American allies in the region. Let's look at a few examples.
Both Japan and South Korea have said that they might shoot down any part of the satellite/rocket that infringes on their territory. In the words of Yoon Won-shik, a vice spokesman at the South Korean Defense Ministry: "We are studying measures such as tracking and shooting down (parts) of a North Korean missile in case they stray out of their normal trajectory....We cannot help viewing (the launch) as a very reckless, provocative act" that undermines peace on the Korean peninsula."
The Philippines have protested the rocket launch to North Korean representatives in various international forums. Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, in agreement with recent comments from Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, said the planned rocket launch violated UN resolution 1874.
As expected, Indonesia also is concerned and wants North Korea to halt its missile launch. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Wardana has declared that Indonesia is monitoring the North Korean situation. Mahfudz Siddiq, chairman of the House of Representatives Commission I overseeing national security and a member of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), said that the SBY government “must urge North Korea...not to launch the missile....The plan itself has already raised tension in the region. I am afraid that the launch could eventually ignite new conflict."
To this point, the SBY government hasn't publicly criticized North Korea's planned launch. It has opted to use extreme caution and operate under the radar. Indonesia considers the launch a sensitive bilateral issue. It also wants the best of both worlds: it wants to have good relations with North Korea as well as with the U.S. and its Asian allies. Additionally, the SBY government clearly wants policy flexibility, which would be limited by deliberately choosing sides in public. We should also keep in mind that Indonesia see itself as a mediator and not a participant in this dispute, which suggests that the SBY administration is looking to remain above or outside of the fray.
Perhaps most significantly, China, North Korea's primary political, diplomatic and economic sponsor, is concerned. China has discussed the situation with North Korea's ambassador in March. And it has called on all parties to demonstrate "cool and restraint." China has long argued that the extent of its leverage over Pyongyang has been overstated in the West, mostly to duck putting much pressure on its client and neighbor out of fear of destabilizing the entire North Korean political system. Maybe Beijing more fully realizes, at least in this case, that sometimes some pressure is needed to push North Korea into acting in ways that are consistent with existing international rules and norms.
Unsurprisingly, the responses and reactions have upset North Korea. Surely, Pyongyang must be unnerved by the criticisms, protests, and warnings made by the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. And we know that Pyongyang is bothered by America's words and actions. North Korea has called Obama's words confrontational. North Korea's news agency KCNA called America's move to suspend food aid an overreaction, one that has "gone beyond the limit." North Korea argues that Washington promised not to link political and strategic issues with humanitarian issues, which is what it believes America is now doing by suspending food aid. North Korean officials claim that the suspension of food aid nullifies the Leap Day Deal, "as it is a violation of the core articles of the February 29 DPRK-U.S. agreement." Interestingly, North Korea also insists the deal "does not include satellite launches for peaceful purposes."
How will this play out? Certainly, North Korea could be bluffing and decide not to go ahead with the launch. For that to happen, though, Washington will need to devise a way for Kim Jong Un to save face. It could happen. But it will take intensive diplomatic discussions with North Korea, which means that the U.S. needs access to the reclusive government in Pyongyang--either directly or perhaps via an interlocutor like China. And it will require young Kim and his military coterie to exhibit some policy flexibility.
But if North Korea proceeds with the launch, it will be important to observe the responses of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. Will Asian countries really mobilize their defenses and shoot down a rocket over their airspace? Will the U.S. push for a UN resolution condemning the launch? Will Team Obama look to place tighter, stronger international sanctions on North Korea? And if these things happen, what does North Korea do? Does it lash out militarily again? What America and its allies must keep in mind is that assertive responses to North Korea, while understandable, does run the great risk of re-running the cat and mouse game, escalating the dispute, even putting the entire region on the brink of war.
Instead, at least for now, it's probably better if Washington and its friends in Asia do not focus and obsess on the types of punitive measures to be applied on North Korea. They ought to treat the launch with caution, monitor it, and treat it for it is: a provocative act that could be much worse. Hint: think nuclear tests. The best route is not to give the launch massive headlines and escalate the situation but to downplay it. There's no need to add fuel to the steady fire that is contemporary nuclear and Korean politics. As long as it seems relatively harmless, let North Korea lash out for the moment. Let Kim have his day, which can legitimize him and help to stabilize North Korean politics. This can be a very good thing, on a number of levels.
Overall, this approach makes it harder for North Korea's military to argue that foreign enemies are out to get them; can undermine the military's hardline policy orientation; and maybe even over time disempower the hardliners. This approach, along with dialog, some reason, and a dash of luck, could subtlely lead North Korea to search for new, perhaps better and more peaceful and less confrontational, ways to deal with their neighbors and the West.
To be clear, I'm not suggesting that countries not secure themselves or deprioritize national defense. And it will be tough for proximate countries like Japan and South Korea to downplay the launch, especially because they have sour relations with North Korea. The U.S. will have a tough time doing this as well. It's election season. In any crisis, but especially now, Obama will want to show that he's not weak on national security, and he will face incentives and pressures to take strong measures against Pyongyang. If North Korea ramps up its aggressiveness and bellicosity, then, without a doubt, it's time to reassess and perhaps plot out a new strategy. But we're not there yet. So in the meantime, everyone should calm down, relax, and exercise prudence.
*Please note: a version of this blog post has been published by Strategic Review. You can find the article here.
Unfortunately, latest news out of North Korea has given, once again, the skeptics and pessimists much fodder. This time, government spokesmen have announced that North Korea will conduct an allegedly peaceful, non-threatening satellite launch some time between April 12-16. The North Koreans claim the purpose of the launch, timed to commemorate the (100th) birth of nation founder Kim il Sung, is to collect weather data and estimate crop yields.
But the U.S. and its friends in Asia believe the launch violates the deal that was struck just a few weeks ago. Reports and satellite images apparently that the North Korea is preparing to launch something that's far less innocuous and more military-related than Pyongyang has admitted thus far. Indeed, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs Peter Lavoy reported to the U.S. House of Representative Armed Services Committee that the launch will likely violate the Leap Day Deal: "This planned launch is highly provocative because it manifests North Korea's desire to test and expand its long-range missile capability."
So while the names atop North Korea's leadership might have changed, the way Pyongyang does foreign policy likely hasn't. North Korea continues its cat and mouse routine with America. Time and again it sucks Washington into time and labor intensive diplomatic discussions, agrees to a deal, raises U.S. expectations, then eventually backs out of or cheats on the agreement. This pattern has held for the past two decades, dating back to the infamous 1994 accords, which brought heavy embarrassment to and criticism of the Clinton administration. In fact, knowing full well that it would only ratchet up the tensions even further, and giving countries more reasons to doubt and question Pyongyang's motives, last Thursday North Korea fired two short-range missiles.
In response to the April launch, the U.S. has already taken a number of steps. It has suspended efforts to recover the remains of American war dead from the Korean War, a deal that was agreed upon last October. According to Pentagon press secretary George Little: "When there are suggestions that they might launch ballistic missiles, when they make bellicose statements about South Korea and engage in actions that could be construed as provocative, we think that it's not the right time to undertake this effort."
President Obama himself has publicly stated his disapproval of the planned launch. He called on North Korea to scrap the launch and warned of severe counter-responses, which might include tighter sanction, and the risk of international condemnation and isolation.
Moreover, Washington has already suspended its food aid to North Korea. The U.S. argues that this isn't a direct response to the planned missile test but instead a reaction to the prevailing view that North Korea is unwilling to uphold its international commitments, which include, of course, the Leap Day Deal. Put simply, the U.S. just doesn't trust North Korea to match its words with deeds. According to state department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland: "We don't have confidence in their good faith. If they want to restore our confidence in their good faith, they can cancel the plans to launch this satellite."
North Korea has announced that the satellite will travel south toward the Philippines or Indonesia. This bit of news has, understandably, alarmed American allies in the region. Let's look at a few examples.
Both Japan and South Korea have said that they might shoot down any part of the satellite/rocket that infringes on their territory. In the words of Yoon Won-shik, a vice spokesman at the South Korean Defense Ministry: "We are studying measures such as tracking and shooting down (parts) of a North Korean missile in case they stray out of their normal trajectory....We cannot help viewing (the launch) as a very reckless, provocative act" that undermines peace on the Korean peninsula."
The Philippines have protested the rocket launch to North Korean representatives in various international forums. Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, in agreement with recent comments from Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, said the planned rocket launch violated UN resolution 1874.
As expected, Indonesia also is concerned and wants North Korea to halt its missile launch. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Wardana has declared that Indonesia is monitoring the North Korean situation. Mahfudz Siddiq, chairman of the House of Representatives Commission I overseeing national security and a member of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), said that the SBY government “must urge North Korea...not to launch the missile....The plan itself has already raised tension in the region. I am afraid that the launch could eventually ignite new conflict."
To this point, the SBY government hasn't publicly criticized North Korea's planned launch. It has opted to use extreme caution and operate under the radar. Indonesia considers the launch a sensitive bilateral issue. It also wants the best of both worlds: it wants to have good relations with North Korea as well as with the U.S. and its Asian allies. Additionally, the SBY government clearly wants policy flexibility, which would be limited by deliberately choosing sides in public. We should also keep in mind that Indonesia see itself as a mediator and not a participant in this dispute, which suggests that the SBY administration is looking to remain above or outside of the fray.
Perhaps most significantly, China, North Korea's primary political, diplomatic and economic sponsor, is concerned. China has discussed the situation with North Korea's ambassador in March. And it has called on all parties to demonstrate "cool and restraint." China has long argued that the extent of its leverage over Pyongyang has been overstated in the West, mostly to duck putting much pressure on its client and neighbor out of fear of destabilizing the entire North Korean political system. Maybe Beijing more fully realizes, at least in this case, that sometimes some pressure is needed to push North Korea into acting in ways that are consistent with existing international rules and norms.
Unsurprisingly, the responses and reactions have upset North Korea. Surely, Pyongyang must be unnerved by the criticisms, protests, and warnings made by the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. And we know that Pyongyang is bothered by America's words and actions. North Korea has called Obama's words confrontational. North Korea's news agency KCNA called America's move to suspend food aid an overreaction, one that has "gone beyond the limit." North Korea argues that Washington promised not to link political and strategic issues with humanitarian issues, which is what it believes America is now doing by suspending food aid. North Korean officials claim that the suspension of food aid nullifies the Leap Day Deal, "as it is a violation of the core articles of the February 29 DPRK-U.S. agreement." Interestingly, North Korea also insists the deal "does not include satellite launches for peaceful purposes."
How will this play out? Certainly, North Korea could be bluffing and decide not to go ahead with the launch. For that to happen, though, Washington will need to devise a way for Kim Jong Un to save face. It could happen. But it will take intensive diplomatic discussions with North Korea, which means that the U.S. needs access to the reclusive government in Pyongyang--either directly or perhaps via an interlocutor like China. And it will require young Kim and his military coterie to exhibit some policy flexibility.
But if North Korea proceeds with the launch, it will be important to observe the responses of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. Will Asian countries really mobilize their defenses and shoot down a rocket over their airspace? Will the U.S. push for a UN resolution condemning the launch? Will Team Obama look to place tighter, stronger international sanctions on North Korea? And if these things happen, what does North Korea do? Does it lash out militarily again? What America and its allies must keep in mind is that assertive responses to North Korea, while understandable, does run the great risk of re-running the cat and mouse game, escalating the dispute, even putting the entire region on the brink of war.
Instead, at least for now, it's probably better if Washington and its friends in Asia do not focus and obsess on the types of punitive measures to be applied on North Korea. They ought to treat the launch with caution, monitor it, and treat it for it is: a provocative act that could be much worse. Hint: think nuclear tests. The best route is not to give the launch massive headlines and escalate the situation but to downplay it. There's no need to add fuel to the steady fire that is contemporary nuclear and Korean politics. As long as it seems relatively harmless, let North Korea lash out for the moment. Let Kim have his day, which can legitimize him and help to stabilize North Korean politics. This can be a very good thing, on a number of levels.
Overall, this approach makes it harder for North Korea's military to argue that foreign enemies are out to get them; can undermine the military's hardline policy orientation; and maybe even over time disempower the hardliners. This approach, along with dialog, some reason, and a dash of luck, could subtlely lead North Korea to search for new, perhaps better and more peaceful and less confrontational, ways to deal with their neighbors and the West.
To be clear, I'm not suggesting that countries not secure themselves or deprioritize national defense. And it will be tough for proximate countries like Japan and South Korea to downplay the launch, especially because they have sour relations with North Korea. The U.S. will have a tough time doing this as well. It's election season. In any crisis, but especially now, Obama will want to show that he's not weak on national security, and he will face incentives and pressures to take strong measures against Pyongyang. If North Korea ramps up its aggressiveness and bellicosity, then, without a doubt, it's time to reassess and perhaps plot out a new strategy. But we're not there yet. So in the meantime, everyone should calm down, relax, and exercise prudence.
*Please note: a version of this blog post has been published by Strategic Review. You can find the article here.
Wednesday, March 21, 2012
The United Nations and Syria
American conservatives have long criticized the United Nations (UN) as a talking workshop, a debating society, that fails to get almost anything of substance done. Liberal scholars, analysts, and pundits have dismissed these arguments, seeing them as products of the hawkish right-wing of U.S. politics. Perhaps, but conservatives do have a legitimate beef, and the events in Syria, to be sure, are providing another example of the weaknesses and sluggishness of the UN.
In short, the UN has failed on Syria. There have been lots of meetings and lots of talk, but little agreement and even less leadership and action. Russia and China have twice thwarted efforts to pass strongly worded resolutions that might have helped the situation in Syria. Both countries are more interested in protecting their interests and coddling murderous tyrant Bashar al-Assad than ending the bloodshed. And the UN-Arab League representative to Syria, Kofi Annan, has engaged in shuttle diplomacy with the Syrian government, but has been stymied by Assad's unwillingness to take the talks seriously.
Yes, after weeks of complaints and scoldings from the West, it now appears Russia and China are softening their stances. Both have publicly expressed concern about the violence and a desire to see it end immediately. And in a surprise move, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently offered blunt words for Assad: "We believe the Syrian leadership reacted wrongly to the first appearance of peaceful protests and ... is making very many mistakes."
Today, Russia and China, along with the rest of the UN Security Council, backed a French-drafted statement of support for Annan's peace drive. The statement requests Assad and the Syrian rebels to "implement fully and immediately" Annan's six-point peace plan, which includes a cease-fire and access for humanitarian aid groups and organizations. Further, the statement proclaims the Security Council will "consider further measures" if Syria fails to comply with Annan's plan.
This is good news, certainly, but let's not get carried away just yet. Russia still supplies arms to Assad, arms that are likely being used to mow down the Syrian opposition. It doesn't support the idea of Assad stepping down immediately, and thinks that his departure is something that should only be broached in the context of negotiations with the opposition. Even worse, Russia effectively watered down and weakened diplomatic efforts at the UN. At Russia's behest, the UN statement does not condemn the violence but expresses "gravest concern" at the government-sponsored violence and "profound regret" at the death toll. Additionally, Russia signaled it would back the UN statement, but only on two conditions: that there were no ultimatums in the text and that Annan publicly specify the details of his peace plan.
Meantime, recent reports suggest that energy-hungry China is concerned that its foreign policy position on Syria risks angering oil giant Saudi Arabia and the other oil producing Gulf countries. This is why China reconsidered its strategy toward Syria, going so far as to support the UN statement. Even so, I have grave reservations about China's role in Syria. After all, Beijing really didn't want to sell out its buddy and ally in Damascus.
My guess: to appease Gulf countries, China will do just enough to appear as if its part of the solution, but at the same time act as enough of an obstructionist force to prevent the dynamics on the ground in Syria from changing significantly. As an example, it will be interesting to see how China, and Russia too, responds if Syria doesn't comply with Annan's plan. In this case, the likely scenario is that both countries will seek to block any punitive measures from being applied to Syria, which thus means there won't be any credible enforcement mechanism in place.
And undoubtedly, please let's not forget the major problem here: it took 8500 people to die and Assad to retake territory seized by the rebels, which allowed him to consolidate his position in power, before the UN could find consensus on a diluted statement that likely lacks teeth. Truly sad.
Arguably, the most helpful and productive institution on Syria has been the Arab League (AL). The AL has publicly expressed concern and dismay at the level of violence. It has even suspended Syria's membership. The AL put forward a multi-pronged template to deal with the ongoing conflict and violence in Syria. Among other things, this template places blame on the Assad regime, calls for an immediate cease-fire, and recommends a political transition to a post-Assad Syria. These recommendations have served as the bedrock of the various resolutions which have been debated and blocked at the UN, and they continue to inform diplomatic discussions. Clearly, though, the AL hasn't been a savior. Much like the UN statement, the Arab League’s plan lacks a method to ensure Assad's compliance, which gives him an easy out to continue his mayhem and remain in power.
In the end, I wonder if this set of events says something about future international relations (IR). In particular, does this foreshadow a greater, more prominent role for regional institutions? Anne-Marie Slaughter has put forward a similar claim about future IR. But her argument rests on the belief that regions will be inspired by the "successes" of the EU and that world problems are becoming so complex as to require time and effort from various regional players, not just the great powers.
One part of Slaughter's logic is dubious, however. Regional institutionalization won't flourish because countries see the EU as a success story. The EU is an enfeebled, debt-laden body that's slow to react to crises, even those at home or in its backyard. Which countries are inspired by that? Instead, I see a number of other possible factors at work. Culture, politics, complexity, sure, and desires for dominance and respect, are possible drivers of enhanced, strengthened regional multilateralism
Another potential driver could be the failure of the UN to address important issues. Simply put, the UN's failures have created a vacuum of leadership and responsible action in IR, and regional institutions are more than willing to insert themselves into this gap, for a couple of reasons. One, regional bodies can respond to problems in ways and at speeds that the UN, as it exists today, simply can't. And two, by undertaking more roles and responsibilities in the world, regional institutions can garner greater prestige and respect--two very useful, fungible currencies in IR. The case of present-day Syria, with the AL attempting to seize the moment, nicely illustrates my point.
It is certainly plausible that the rise of regional institutions like the Arab League, the African Union, and ASEAN, among others, follows from the aforementioned logic. Each are filling a need in the world, carving out their own space, and steadily becoming more esteemed and relied upon by major international actors, including the UN. This is a trend that could very well endure. And it is a topic to be followed and studied more closely in the future.
In short, the UN has failed on Syria. There have been lots of meetings and lots of talk, but little agreement and even less leadership and action. Russia and China have twice thwarted efforts to pass strongly worded resolutions that might have helped the situation in Syria. Both countries are more interested in protecting their interests and coddling murderous tyrant Bashar al-Assad than ending the bloodshed. And the UN-Arab League representative to Syria, Kofi Annan, has engaged in shuttle diplomacy with the Syrian government, but has been stymied by Assad's unwillingness to take the talks seriously.
Yes, after weeks of complaints and scoldings from the West, it now appears Russia and China are softening their stances. Both have publicly expressed concern about the violence and a desire to see it end immediately. And in a surprise move, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently offered blunt words for Assad: "We believe the Syrian leadership reacted wrongly to the first appearance of peaceful protests and ... is making very many mistakes."
Today, Russia and China, along with the rest of the UN Security Council, backed a French-drafted statement of support for Annan's peace drive. The statement requests Assad and the Syrian rebels to "implement fully and immediately" Annan's six-point peace plan, which includes a cease-fire and access for humanitarian aid groups and organizations. Further, the statement proclaims the Security Council will "consider further measures" if Syria fails to comply with Annan's plan.
This is good news, certainly, but let's not get carried away just yet. Russia still supplies arms to Assad, arms that are likely being used to mow down the Syrian opposition. It doesn't support the idea of Assad stepping down immediately, and thinks that his departure is something that should only be broached in the context of negotiations with the opposition. Even worse, Russia effectively watered down and weakened diplomatic efforts at the UN. At Russia's behest, the UN statement does not condemn the violence but expresses "gravest concern" at the government-sponsored violence and "profound regret" at the death toll. Additionally, Russia signaled it would back the UN statement, but only on two conditions: that there were no ultimatums in the text and that Annan publicly specify the details of his peace plan.
Meantime, recent reports suggest that energy-hungry China is concerned that its foreign policy position on Syria risks angering oil giant Saudi Arabia and the other oil producing Gulf countries. This is why China reconsidered its strategy toward Syria, going so far as to support the UN statement. Even so, I have grave reservations about China's role in Syria. After all, Beijing really didn't want to sell out its buddy and ally in Damascus.
My guess: to appease Gulf countries, China will do just enough to appear as if its part of the solution, but at the same time act as enough of an obstructionist force to prevent the dynamics on the ground in Syria from changing significantly. As an example, it will be interesting to see how China, and Russia too, responds if Syria doesn't comply with Annan's plan. In this case, the likely scenario is that both countries will seek to block any punitive measures from being applied to Syria, which thus means there won't be any credible enforcement mechanism in place.
And undoubtedly, please let's not forget the major problem here: it took 8500 people to die and Assad to retake territory seized by the rebels, which allowed him to consolidate his position in power, before the UN could find consensus on a diluted statement that likely lacks teeth. Truly sad.
Arguably, the most helpful and productive institution on Syria has been the Arab League (AL). The AL has publicly expressed concern and dismay at the level of violence. It has even suspended Syria's membership. The AL put forward a multi-pronged template to deal with the ongoing conflict and violence in Syria. Among other things, this template places blame on the Assad regime, calls for an immediate cease-fire, and recommends a political transition to a post-Assad Syria. These recommendations have served as the bedrock of the various resolutions which have been debated and blocked at the UN, and they continue to inform diplomatic discussions. Clearly, though, the AL hasn't been a savior. Much like the UN statement, the Arab League’s plan lacks a method to ensure Assad's compliance, which gives him an easy out to continue his mayhem and remain in power.
In the end, I wonder if this set of events says something about future international relations (IR). In particular, does this foreshadow a greater, more prominent role for regional institutions? Anne-Marie Slaughter has put forward a similar claim about future IR. But her argument rests on the belief that regions will be inspired by the "successes" of the EU and that world problems are becoming so complex as to require time and effort from various regional players, not just the great powers.
One part of Slaughter's logic is dubious, however. Regional institutionalization won't flourish because countries see the EU as a success story. The EU is an enfeebled, debt-laden body that's slow to react to crises, even those at home or in its backyard. Which countries are inspired by that? Instead, I see a number of other possible factors at work. Culture, politics, complexity, sure, and desires for dominance and respect, are possible drivers of enhanced, strengthened regional multilateralism
Another potential driver could be the failure of the UN to address important issues. Simply put, the UN's failures have created a vacuum of leadership and responsible action in IR, and regional institutions are more than willing to insert themselves into this gap, for a couple of reasons. One, regional bodies can respond to problems in ways and at speeds that the UN, as it exists today, simply can't. And two, by undertaking more roles and responsibilities in the world, regional institutions can garner greater prestige and respect--two very useful, fungible currencies in IR. The case of present-day Syria, with the AL attempting to seize the moment, nicely illustrates my point.
It is certainly plausible that the rise of regional institutions like the Arab League, the African Union, and ASEAN, among others, follows from the aforementioned logic. Each are filling a need in the world, carving out their own space, and steadily becoming more esteemed and relied upon by major international actors, including the UN. This is a trend that could very well endure. And it is a topic to be followed and studied more closely in the future.
Thursday, March 15, 2012
A Debate on Syria
As Bashar al-Assad's rampage continues, even escalates, and more rebels and innocent civilians get killed, discussions of intervention in Syria have become louder and more numerous in academic and policy circles. Scholarly blogs and opinion pieces and magazine articles, as well as policymaker speeches and statements, have all touched on this topic. As one example, last week hawkish senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Joe Lieberman--arguably the most prominent group to publicly contribute to the intervention debate so far--called for greater diplomatic, political, and military support (including U.S. air strikes) for the Syrian rebels.
What all of these statements and writings have in common is an effort to determine the costs and benefits of intervention versus those of non-action. Those advocating some form of intervention believe that the costs of non-action are greater than intervening in Syria, and that intervention provides larger benefits over standing-by and letting the situation resolve according to the internal dynamics in syria. Those against intervention reverse the aforementioned relationship, to varying degrees, between costs and benefits.
In the March 12 issue of Time magazine, I came across a particularly illuminating debate on the pros and cons of intervention between Shadi Hamid (Brookings Instituion) and Marc Lynch (prof. at GWU). It's a nice, instructive conversation precisely because Hamid and Lynch incorporate, and at times expand on, many of the existing arguments in the intervention debate. (Unforunately, the Hamid-Lynch debate is behind a subscriber paywall. For those who subscribe to Time, you can find this debate on pages 16-17; and for those who don't, you can get the gist of their arguments by perusing their blogs (Hamid, Lynch).)
Hamid argues in favor of intervention. In his view, the costs of not doing so are significant. He believes the moral dimension of the internal struggle, in particular that the international community has a responsibility to assist and protect endangered Syrian populations, as well as the geostrategic context necessitates action. Regarding the latter point, Hamid writes: "Syria today is in danger of becoming a failed state. The regime has lost control over large swaths of territory. Al Qaeda and other extremists are hoping to take advantage of the growing power vacuum. Can the world afford a failing state and protracted civil war in such a vital region?"
Hamid calls for the U.S., working with other countries, presumably local Arab nations and Turkey, to take the initiative to intervene in and stabilize Syria. He sees this happening in two steps. First, to enable the rebels to better defend themselves, this American-led coalition would send light arms and more advanced weaponry. Second, the coalition would create safe havens, or "liberated zones," along Syria's border with Turkey. To accomplish this and defend these areas, Hamid admits, airpower, a naval blockade, and even troops (from Arab countries or Turkey) could be required.
The goal, according to Hamid, isn't regime change, but "to demonstrate international resolve, encourage regime defections and compel the Syrian government to alter its calculations about the use of force." More specifically, he believes a strong and committed intervention can demonstrate to Assad and his cronies that they can't win by using force and violence, which might put sufficient pressure on the regime to back down. It might cause Assad to come to the negotiating table or, at a minimum, agree to a cease-fire. The idea is that murderous tyrants like are only going to start being a part of the solution when they are confronted with overwhelming coercive power.
Lynch, by contrast, makes the case against intervention. He argues that "arming the opposition or using western airpower against Syrian territory will likely only play into Assad's hands," potentially empowering his regime. Moreover, carving out safe havens isn't easy and will require more military airpower than is typically suggested. And just as Yohanes has written, Lynch doesn't think distributing arms is the answer either. "By funneling arms to the rebels in the absence of any unified leadership, we could not hope to even the military balance of power." Lastly, intervention in Syria runs the grave risk of intensifying the fighting, making the conflict even bloodier, and hardening the political positions of both sides, which would only make a political/diplomatic settlement much tougher to reach.
Instead, Lynch thinks that helping the rebels to better organize themselves is the way to go. The rebels will never be an effective fighting force as long as they remain a divided and fragmented bunch of independent groups. They also must "persuade the undecided middle ground of Syrians, many of whom continue to support Assad out of fear for the future, to abandon the regime." Lynch contends that the rebels, in response to this problem, should focus their time and effort on formulating a political plan, one that aims "to reassure minorities and other uncommitted communities of their place in a post-Assad Syria."
From Lynch's perspective, the goal is to create "the conditions for a relatively smooth transition after [Assad] falls. This is why he's mostly concerned about the political cohesion among the rebels and their supporters and the depth of the opposition's support. It is these things that will determine whether the rebels will successfully oust Assad and if they can ensure the safety and stability of Syrian politics going forward.
Here is my take. I think Hamid is spot on to point out the moral and strategic interests at stake. And while his plans are completely understandable and normatively admirable, they are probably not doable in practice, at this at this point. Putting extreme coercive pressure on Assad could very well end the bloodshed. And it certainly satisfies a visceral temptation to lash out at evil wrongdoers like Assad. But Hamid overstates Arab support for intervention or at least doesn't parse out what specific actions they do support. Arms? Sure. But air strikes and boots on the ground? Highly doubtful. And there doesn't seem to be much citizen and policymaker support for invasive intervention in the West. Hamid's main contribution is to add to the growing chorus of people who believe that the status quo is Syria is not working or sustainable.
Lynch's more cautious approach dutifully takes into account the unpredicatable and often disastrous consequences of military interventions, which is important point often overlooked by foreign policy hawks. That said, Lynch's ideas are probably too passive to change Syria much in the near term. Furthermore, they leave more questions unanswered than solved. For example, how should the U.S. and its allies help the Syrian opposition organize itself? Lynch is very vague on this. He also never addresses how we will likely arrive at a post-Assad Syria. Will he step down? Will the rebels overthrow him? Or will Assad crack under international pressure?
Additionally, Lynch doesn't adequately explain how the "middle ground of Syrians" will switch sides, transferring their loyalties from the regime to the opposition. It is not a matter of persuasion, as Lynch indicates. The determining factor is whether the rebels can make enough military progress to inspire hope that they will win the conflict and oust Assad. This is the key, for the Syrian people will only side with whichever side they think will win. The risks are far too great to behave otherwise. Just consider this: if groups ally with the opposition and the rebels aren't successful in their resistance, then they will very likely be revenge targets (harassment, imprisonment, assassination) after the conflict has ended, if not before then.
We have to face the world as it is right now. One part of that is recognizing that Syria isn't Libya. Assad possesses far more political and military power than Gaddafi did before his demise. We should also note that the Syrian rebels don't really hold any territory (never really did, and Assad has retaken most of what the rebels seized), unlike the Libyan militias, which managed to take and hold large areas of land, making it easier for NATO forces to disburse assistance. Syria is a tougher nut to crack.
Also keep in mind that the world does not seem to have much taste for another intervention on the order of what occurred in libya. The West seems content to let the Saudis arm the rebels while they undertake under the radar diplomatic and political moves to help organize the rebels, just like Lynch recommended. I don't doubt that these efforts could be of value when Assad finally does fall from power, but they only minimally address the immediate problem of the ongoing violence committed by the Assad regime. In short, they don't sufficiently shift the balance of forces and capabilities on the ground. The rebels are still getting routed and Assad is still firmly in power, buttressed by his military power and the considerable "assistance" via Iran. Given this situation, Assad thinks he can win the struggle for power and sees no need to make compromises. Hence, he is unwilling to implement a cease-fire or come to the bargaining table.
It will be interesting to see how the Arab states, Turkey, and the West, and the U.S. in particular, will respond should the Assad-sponsored violence, death, and destruction persist relatively unabated. Will they remain firmly against measures like air strikes and safe zones? Will they allow the Russians and Chinese to continue to set the agenda, which, of course, allows Assad to buy more time to crush his opponents and consolidate his grip on the country. Or is there a breaking point that will trigger stronger international action against Syria?
My guess is that, as usual, it will be up to Washington to take a much bigger overt leadership position. If anything gets done here, it will likely only come from America's urging and instiagtion and its military power (either the threat/application of it). Indeed, U.S. military power might be the only coercive tool that can credibly signal the international community's rejection of the Assad regime and its resolve to restore order. Does Team Obama have the stomach to deepen its commitment to Syria? The safety and security of thousands of lives might depend on it.
What all of these statements and writings have in common is an effort to determine the costs and benefits of intervention versus those of non-action. Those advocating some form of intervention believe that the costs of non-action are greater than intervening in Syria, and that intervention provides larger benefits over standing-by and letting the situation resolve according to the internal dynamics in syria. Those against intervention reverse the aforementioned relationship, to varying degrees, between costs and benefits.
In the March 12 issue of Time magazine, I came across a particularly illuminating debate on the pros and cons of intervention between Shadi Hamid (Brookings Instituion) and Marc Lynch (prof. at GWU). It's a nice, instructive conversation precisely because Hamid and Lynch incorporate, and at times expand on, many of the existing arguments in the intervention debate. (Unforunately, the Hamid-Lynch debate is behind a subscriber paywall. For those who subscribe to Time, you can find this debate on pages 16-17; and for those who don't, you can get the gist of their arguments by perusing their blogs (Hamid, Lynch).)
Hamid argues in favor of intervention. In his view, the costs of not doing so are significant. He believes the moral dimension of the internal struggle, in particular that the international community has a responsibility to assist and protect endangered Syrian populations, as well as the geostrategic context necessitates action. Regarding the latter point, Hamid writes: "Syria today is in danger of becoming a failed state. The regime has lost control over large swaths of territory. Al Qaeda and other extremists are hoping to take advantage of the growing power vacuum. Can the world afford a failing state and protracted civil war in such a vital region?"
Hamid calls for the U.S., working with other countries, presumably local Arab nations and Turkey, to take the initiative to intervene in and stabilize Syria. He sees this happening in two steps. First, to enable the rebels to better defend themselves, this American-led coalition would send light arms and more advanced weaponry. Second, the coalition would create safe havens, or "liberated zones," along Syria's border with Turkey. To accomplish this and defend these areas, Hamid admits, airpower, a naval blockade, and even troops (from Arab countries or Turkey) could be required.
The goal, according to Hamid, isn't regime change, but "to demonstrate international resolve, encourage regime defections and compel the Syrian government to alter its calculations about the use of force." More specifically, he believes a strong and committed intervention can demonstrate to Assad and his cronies that they can't win by using force and violence, which might put sufficient pressure on the regime to back down. It might cause Assad to come to the negotiating table or, at a minimum, agree to a cease-fire. The idea is that murderous tyrants like are only going to start being a part of the solution when they are confronted with overwhelming coercive power.
Lynch, by contrast, makes the case against intervention. He argues that "arming the opposition or using western airpower against Syrian territory will likely only play into Assad's hands," potentially empowering his regime. Moreover, carving out safe havens isn't easy and will require more military airpower than is typically suggested. And just as Yohanes has written, Lynch doesn't think distributing arms is the answer either. "By funneling arms to the rebels in the absence of any unified leadership, we could not hope to even the military balance of power." Lastly, intervention in Syria runs the grave risk of intensifying the fighting, making the conflict even bloodier, and hardening the political positions of both sides, which would only make a political/diplomatic settlement much tougher to reach.
Instead, Lynch thinks that helping the rebels to better organize themselves is the way to go. The rebels will never be an effective fighting force as long as they remain a divided and fragmented bunch of independent groups. They also must "persuade the undecided middle ground of Syrians, many of whom continue to support Assad out of fear for the future, to abandon the regime." Lynch contends that the rebels, in response to this problem, should focus their time and effort on formulating a political plan, one that aims "to reassure minorities and other uncommitted communities of their place in a post-Assad Syria."
From Lynch's perspective, the goal is to create "the conditions for a relatively smooth transition after [Assad] falls. This is why he's mostly concerned about the political cohesion among the rebels and their supporters and the depth of the opposition's support. It is these things that will determine whether the rebels will successfully oust Assad and if they can ensure the safety and stability of Syrian politics going forward.
Here is my take. I think Hamid is spot on to point out the moral and strategic interests at stake. And while his plans are completely understandable and normatively admirable, they are probably not doable in practice, at this at this point. Putting extreme coercive pressure on Assad could very well end the bloodshed. And it certainly satisfies a visceral temptation to lash out at evil wrongdoers like Assad. But Hamid overstates Arab support for intervention or at least doesn't parse out what specific actions they do support. Arms? Sure. But air strikes and boots on the ground? Highly doubtful. And there doesn't seem to be much citizen and policymaker support for invasive intervention in the West. Hamid's main contribution is to add to the growing chorus of people who believe that the status quo is Syria is not working or sustainable.
Lynch's more cautious approach dutifully takes into account the unpredicatable and often disastrous consequences of military interventions, which is important point often overlooked by foreign policy hawks. That said, Lynch's ideas are probably too passive to change Syria much in the near term. Furthermore, they leave more questions unanswered than solved. For example, how should the U.S. and its allies help the Syrian opposition organize itself? Lynch is very vague on this. He also never addresses how we will likely arrive at a post-Assad Syria. Will he step down? Will the rebels overthrow him? Or will Assad crack under international pressure?
Additionally, Lynch doesn't adequately explain how the "middle ground of Syrians" will switch sides, transferring their loyalties from the regime to the opposition. It is not a matter of persuasion, as Lynch indicates. The determining factor is whether the rebels can make enough military progress to inspire hope that they will win the conflict and oust Assad. This is the key, for the Syrian people will only side with whichever side they think will win. The risks are far too great to behave otherwise. Just consider this: if groups ally with the opposition and the rebels aren't successful in their resistance, then they will very likely be revenge targets (harassment, imprisonment, assassination) after the conflict has ended, if not before then.
We have to face the world as it is right now. One part of that is recognizing that Syria isn't Libya. Assad possesses far more political and military power than Gaddafi did before his demise. We should also note that the Syrian rebels don't really hold any territory (never really did, and Assad has retaken most of what the rebels seized), unlike the Libyan militias, which managed to take and hold large areas of land, making it easier for NATO forces to disburse assistance. Syria is a tougher nut to crack.
Also keep in mind that the world does not seem to have much taste for another intervention on the order of what occurred in libya. The West seems content to let the Saudis arm the rebels while they undertake under the radar diplomatic and political moves to help organize the rebels, just like Lynch recommended. I don't doubt that these efforts could be of value when Assad finally does fall from power, but they only minimally address the immediate problem of the ongoing violence committed by the Assad regime. In short, they don't sufficiently shift the balance of forces and capabilities on the ground. The rebels are still getting routed and Assad is still firmly in power, buttressed by his military power and the considerable "assistance" via Iran. Given this situation, Assad thinks he can win the struggle for power and sees no need to make compromises. Hence, he is unwilling to implement a cease-fire or come to the bargaining table.
It will be interesting to see how the Arab states, Turkey, and the West, and the U.S. in particular, will respond should the Assad-sponsored violence, death, and destruction persist relatively unabated. Will they remain firmly against measures like air strikes and safe zones? Will they allow the Russians and Chinese to continue to set the agenda, which, of course, allows Assad to buy more time to crush his opponents and consolidate his grip on the country. Or is there a breaking point that will trigger stronger international action against Syria?
My guess is that, as usual, it will be up to Washington to take a much bigger overt leadership position. If anything gets done here, it will likely only come from America's urging and instiagtion and its military power (either the threat/application of it). Indeed, U.S. military power might be the only coercive tool that can credibly signal the international community's rejection of the Assad regime and its resolve to restore order. Does Team Obama have the stomach to deepen its commitment to Syria? The safety and security of thousands of lives might depend on it.
Sunday, March 11, 2012
Update: Bashir's Sentence is reinstated back to 15 years
On February 24, 2012, the United States classified Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) as a terrorist group. While Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa tried to downplay this issue, declaring that the "US decision only applies in the United States, Mr. Bashir himself probably does not relish this attention, as he found his sentence reinstated back to 15 years by the Supreme Court, overturning the High Court's earlier decision to slash his sentence to 9 years.
Not surprisingly, many, including Bashir, saw this reinstatement as the Indonesian government bending to the US pressure.
Yet, the remarkable thing about this decision is that it was greeted with a collective yawn in Indonesia. A few newspapers that carried this news buried it somewhere in the middle sections. For many, the United States seemed to be beating a dead horse, as the organization has been in decline ever since indications of its involvement in the Cirebon Mosque Bombing.
Apparently, the public and the media are far more interested in the stories on the corruption within the ruling Democratic Party, with a brief interruption, of course, by the rumor of a possible coup that was first spread by the Democratic Party itself.
As I mentioned in my earlier posts on Abu Bakar Bashir's lengthy sentence and the sentence reduction, Mr. Bashir's popularity has long been declining. As this excellent report from the International Crisis Group noted, even his popularity had declined among other radical groups, such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, in which he was previously had the rank of amir, the commander/leader of the group. With many questioning his leadership style, he decided to create JAT as a way to remain in control of the jihadi movement.
But this begs a question: is JAT the new JI? Yes and no. JAT in essence is a splinter of JI under Abu Bakar Bashir. JAT consists of many people in JI, though it has to be stressed that Abu Bakar Bashir is also one of the leaders of the JI. As a spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir has knowledge of but isn't in total control of the organization. In fact, JAT had criticized JI for their lack of inaction in the past few years, as the JI members became demoralized after the death and imprisonment of many of its leaders, and ended up doing jihad through pen, writing radical tracts, books, etc., rather than taking up arms.
Still, this does not mean that Abu Bakar Bashir will openly fight Indonesia. JAT itself spent much of its resources doing preaching, recruiting radical terrorists, and running a secret military training camp in Aceh that was supposed to only provide some basic martial arts and physical fitness.
But here again, Bashir ran into problems. First, even though he was the main leader of the JAT, he could not completely control the group, just as he couldn't completely control JI. The problem with radical organizations like JAT is that it tends to attract, well, the radical elements in society that would prefer using violence. While these people also tend to be charismatic and able to recruit lots of followers, they are also hard to control, as evident in the church bombing in Solo and mosque bombing in Cirebon, which were done by terrorists with links to the JAT.
The mosque bombing is the main reason why Bashir and JAT's popularity plummeted. Even though the mosque is located inside the regional police headquarters, it was basically a breach of a taboo to attack a mosque. Thus the crackdown on JAT, and the arrest on the Abu Bakar Bashir: the goal was to chop the head off the snake.
Not surprisingly, many, including Bashir, saw this reinstatement as the Indonesian government bending to the US pressure.
Yet, the remarkable thing about this decision is that it was greeted with a collective yawn in Indonesia. A few newspapers that carried this news buried it somewhere in the middle sections. For many, the United States seemed to be beating a dead horse, as the organization has been in decline ever since indications of its involvement in the Cirebon Mosque Bombing.
Apparently, the public and the media are far more interested in the stories on the corruption within the ruling Democratic Party, with a brief interruption, of course, by the rumor of a possible coup that was first spread by the Democratic Party itself.
As I mentioned in my earlier posts on Abu Bakar Bashir's lengthy sentence and the sentence reduction, Mr. Bashir's popularity has long been declining. As this excellent report from the International Crisis Group noted, even his popularity had declined among other radical groups, such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, in which he was previously had the rank of amir, the commander/leader of the group. With many questioning his leadership style, he decided to create JAT as a way to remain in control of the jihadi movement.
But this begs a question: is JAT the new JI? Yes and no. JAT in essence is a splinter of JI under Abu Bakar Bashir. JAT consists of many people in JI, though it has to be stressed that Abu Bakar Bashir is also one of the leaders of the JI. As a spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir has knowledge of but isn't in total control of the organization. In fact, JAT had criticized JI for their lack of inaction in the past few years, as the JI members became demoralized after the death and imprisonment of many of its leaders, and ended up doing jihad through pen, writing radical tracts, books, etc., rather than taking up arms.
Still, this does not mean that Abu Bakar Bashir will openly fight Indonesia. JAT itself spent much of its resources doing preaching, recruiting radical terrorists, and running a secret military training camp in Aceh that was supposed to only provide some basic martial arts and physical fitness.
But here again, Bashir ran into problems. First, even though he was the main leader of the JAT, he could not completely control the group, just as he couldn't completely control JI. The problem with radical organizations like JAT is that it tends to attract, well, the radical elements in society that would prefer using violence. While these people also tend to be charismatic and able to recruit lots of followers, they are also hard to control, as evident in the church bombing in Solo and mosque bombing in Cirebon, which were done by terrorists with links to the JAT.
The mosque bombing is the main reason why Bashir and JAT's popularity plummeted. Even though the mosque is located inside the regional police headquarters, it was basically a breach of a taboo to attack a mosque. Thus the crackdown on JAT, and the arrest on the Abu Bakar Bashir: the goal was to chop the head off the snake.
Sunday, March 4, 2012
Bridging the Academic-Civilian Gap
One of the things that has struck me about the debates and comments on Iran has been the sharp disagreement between the American academy and American civilians. Look at the comments below any article about Iran and you will find many of them express hardline views about Islam, the Iranian regime, and the use of force against Iran. But its more than just talk by a handful of Americans. According to a Gallup poll, respondents stated that Iran is America's biggest state-based enemy. And a CNN/Opinion Research Corporation survey is even more revealing: 71 percent of Americans believe Iran has nuclear weapons; 60 percent want the U.S. to pursue economic and diplomatic efforts to get Iran to shutter its nuclear activities, while only 25 percent support immediate military force against Iran. But if these efforts do not succeed, "support for military action rises to 59 percent, with only 39 percent opposing military action under those circumstances."
Meantime, a number of academics, such as Colin Kahl, John Mueller, Stephen Walt, Jacques Hymans, and Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah Kreps, have been trying to induce some caution on the Iran debate. In short, they are against the use of force (either by the U.S. or Israel) against Iran, for a number of reasons. They don't see Iran an as immediate threat. Air strikes on would probably only delay and invigorate, not scupper, Iran's work to join the nuclear club, assuming that this is what Tehran really wants. Moreover, they see military force as causing unnecessary deaths and casualties, disastrous regional consequences, and danger to American interests. In fact, some scholars don't even think there's a good justification for force against Iran. Mueller, for instance, argues that the Iranian threat is far overblown.
And of course, there is the longstanding argument, made popular by Kenneth Waltz, that seemingly crazy leaders, like Ahmadinejad and the clerics in Iran, are far more rational and calculating than conventional wisdom often suggests. If Iran does acquire the capability to weaponize and launch nuclear weapons, so goes the logic, it's leaders are not going to do anything too destabilizing to world politics and human security. The politico-religious regime will not blow up Israel or Saudi Arabia or any other country. Iranian leaders know that using force--either nuclear weapons or conventional means under the cover of its nuclear arsenal--carries great risks. Iran could face a devastating counter-attack that targets its military and communication installations. The clerics could face regime change, and possibly find their personal freedom and security in peril, by countries that have long sought a justification to topple the anti-Western political system. Additionally, overtly militant and reckless actions against foreign opponents, if unpopular enough, run the risk of stirring up and provoking opponents back home into agitating against the state.
In the end, as Mueller writes, "Iran would most likely "use" any nuclear capacity in the same way all other nuclear states have: for prestige (or ego‑stoking) and to deter real or perceived threats. Historical experience strongly suggests that new nuclear countries, even ones that once seemed hugely threatening, like communist China in the 1960s, are content to use their weapons for such purposes."
My take: What if these scholars are right? Shouldn't they and (the many, I suspect) other like-minded scholars aim to communicate to wider audience, at least more often they currently do? Simply put, the issue of Iran and its nuclear capabilities is extremely serious and important, and they have specialized knowledge. Why sit back and let the Iran issue be dominated by political partisanship and demagoguery (from inside and outside the U.S.)? With a more focused and substantial effort, academics might be able to play a relatively prominent, perhaps decisive, role in the current debates on Iran.
In some ways, these questions remind me of the work Alexander George completed on academic-policymaker relations. George in part explored how academics could better communicate with policymakers by making their research more digestible and consumable by decision makers in Washington. Here, in this blog post, I'm interested in how academics can "bridge the gap" with ordinary citizens. What can academics do to reach out to citizens and explain their research and writings and thoughts in a clear and intelligible manner.
In this vein, there are multiple things academics can do. They can author blogs. They can write opinion pieces and magazine articles in mainstream, popular publications. Academics can produce manuscripts for publication at popular presses like Random House and W.W. Norton. They can make appearances on news/current affairs shows on television and radio. They can organize and participate in community conferences and meetings. And if they want to get really ambitious, they could coordinate their outreach activities, making them more powerful. All of these are ways for academics to disseminate their work and ideas jargon-fee to a larger, non-academic audience.
To be clear, some scholars do some of what I mentioned above. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Joseph Nye, Andrew Bacevich, and Vali Nasr, among others, routinely pen incisive opinion pieces in leading American newspapers. And some academics do actively blog. Slaughter, Stephen Walt, Daniel Drezner, Joshua Landis, Juan Cole and Walter Russell Mead have excellent blogs. And there are several collaborative efforts, such as The Monkey Cage and The Duck of Minerva. Scholars are also periodic guests on NPR and Charlie Rose and The Daily Show.
But let's not kid ourselves. The bulk of what academics do is churn out work that's primarily directed at other scholars. As we all know, they are specialists conducting research and writing on narrow scholarly debates and literatures
Unfortunately, my proposal for improved engagement between academics and civilians does not come without problems. Let's briefly look at some of them.
(1) There are academic disincentives to get more involved in public policy debates. Academics don't get professionally rewarded for penning blog posts, opinion pieces, or magazine articles. All of those things are work outside of their standard, expected scholarly responsibilities. And they take up time for things that academics usually get rewarded for--publishing, teaching, university service, and so on.
(2) Many scholars don't see themselves as participants in politics, that they're outside of the game, serving as observers, analysts, and critics. As a result, they are disinclined to participate in foreign policy advocacy.
(3) Even if more academics spend more of their time in foreign policy debates, Americans have to seek out what they say and pay attention. Which isn't something we should assume will happen. After all, we know that Americans tend to stick to their preferred niche sources of information (by issue area, ideology, etc.), and those sources understandably rarely include work from academia. The hardest group to attract will likely be hardcore conservatives, who view academics as biased and liberal.
(4) Relatedly, even if Americans access information from academics, as the psychology literature shows us, it is unlikely that they'll change their minds about policy issues, especially if they are really committed in their beliefs. Instead, the group to target is probably the uncommitted, those who don't have a set of beliefs that's already entrenched and resistant to change.
In sum, there are no easy solutions. It would be helpful if academic schools and departments more greatly valued non-academic work (blogging, opinion pieces, etc.) when making decisions about tenure and pay raises. It would change incentive structures, and might alter how academics view themselves. But even here, this doesn't come without a host of problems. For instance, academics might resist changes in how they conduct their business. Bureaucratic changes in how departments and schools operate takes a long time. And with more academic voices in the field, we're likely to see public disagreements among scholars, which would only create confusion among citizens. Who do we believe? Which academic, which expert, is right? (Matthew Kroenig's piece in Foreign Affairs is the most prominent example right now of an academic stoking the fires of war against Iran.)
In this post, above all, I'm mostly hoping to start a conversation about the role of academics in pressing policy debates, such as possible military conflict in Iran. Clearly, they can engage more with American citizens. But do they want to? And do they have a responsibility to do so, as I suggested above?
What do you think? Let us know.
Meantime, a number of academics, such as Colin Kahl, John Mueller, Stephen Walt, Jacques Hymans, and Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah Kreps, have been trying to induce some caution on the Iran debate. In short, they are against the use of force (either by the U.S. or Israel) against Iran, for a number of reasons. They don't see Iran an as immediate threat. Air strikes on would probably only delay and invigorate, not scupper, Iran's work to join the nuclear club, assuming that this is what Tehran really wants. Moreover, they see military force as causing unnecessary deaths and casualties, disastrous regional consequences, and danger to American interests. In fact, some scholars don't even think there's a good justification for force against Iran. Mueller, for instance, argues that the Iranian threat is far overblown.
And of course, there is the longstanding argument, made popular by Kenneth Waltz, that seemingly crazy leaders, like Ahmadinejad and the clerics in Iran, are far more rational and calculating than conventional wisdom often suggests. If Iran does acquire the capability to weaponize and launch nuclear weapons, so goes the logic, it's leaders are not going to do anything too destabilizing to world politics and human security. The politico-religious regime will not blow up Israel or Saudi Arabia or any other country. Iranian leaders know that using force--either nuclear weapons or conventional means under the cover of its nuclear arsenal--carries great risks. Iran could face a devastating counter-attack that targets its military and communication installations. The clerics could face regime change, and possibly find their personal freedom and security in peril, by countries that have long sought a justification to topple the anti-Western political system. Additionally, overtly militant and reckless actions against foreign opponents, if unpopular enough, run the risk of stirring up and provoking opponents back home into agitating against the state.
In the end, as Mueller writes, "Iran would most likely "use" any nuclear capacity in the same way all other nuclear states have: for prestige (or ego‑stoking) and to deter real or perceived threats. Historical experience strongly suggests that new nuclear countries, even ones that once seemed hugely threatening, like communist China in the 1960s, are content to use their weapons for such purposes."
My take: What if these scholars are right? Shouldn't they and (the many, I suspect) other like-minded scholars aim to communicate to wider audience, at least more often they currently do? Simply put, the issue of Iran and its nuclear capabilities is extremely serious and important, and they have specialized knowledge. Why sit back and let the Iran issue be dominated by political partisanship and demagoguery (from inside and outside the U.S.)? With a more focused and substantial effort, academics might be able to play a relatively prominent, perhaps decisive, role in the current debates on Iran.
In some ways, these questions remind me of the work Alexander George completed on academic-policymaker relations. George in part explored how academics could better communicate with policymakers by making their research more digestible and consumable by decision makers in Washington. Here, in this blog post, I'm interested in how academics can "bridge the gap" with ordinary citizens. What can academics do to reach out to citizens and explain their research and writings and thoughts in a clear and intelligible manner.
In this vein, there are multiple things academics can do. They can author blogs. They can write opinion pieces and magazine articles in mainstream, popular publications. Academics can produce manuscripts for publication at popular presses like Random House and W.W. Norton. They can make appearances on news/current affairs shows on television and radio. They can organize and participate in community conferences and meetings. And if they want to get really ambitious, they could coordinate their outreach activities, making them more powerful. All of these are ways for academics to disseminate their work and ideas jargon-fee to a larger, non-academic audience.
To be clear, some scholars do some of what I mentioned above. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Joseph Nye, Andrew Bacevich, and Vali Nasr, among others, routinely pen incisive opinion pieces in leading American newspapers. And some academics do actively blog. Slaughter, Stephen Walt, Daniel Drezner, Joshua Landis, Juan Cole and Walter Russell Mead have excellent blogs. And there are several collaborative efforts, such as The Monkey Cage and The Duck of Minerva. Scholars are also periodic guests on NPR and Charlie Rose and The Daily Show.
But let's not kid ourselves. The bulk of what academics do is churn out work that's primarily directed at other scholars. As we all know, they are specialists conducting research and writing on narrow scholarly debates and literatures
Unfortunately, my proposal for improved engagement between academics and civilians does not come without problems. Let's briefly look at some of them.
(1) There are academic disincentives to get more involved in public policy debates. Academics don't get professionally rewarded for penning blog posts, opinion pieces, or magazine articles. All of those things are work outside of their standard, expected scholarly responsibilities. And they take up time for things that academics usually get rewarded for--publishing, teaching, university service, and so on.
(2) Many scholars don't see themselves as participants in politics, that they're outside of the game, serving as observers, analysts, and critics. As a result, they are disinclined to participate in foreign policy advocacy.
(3) Even if more academics spend more of their time in foreign policy debates, Americans have to seek out what they say and pay attention. Which isn't something we should assume will happen. After all, we know that Americans tend to stick to their preferred niche sources of information (by issue area, ideology, etc.), and those sources understandably rarely include work from academia. The hardest group to attract will likely be hardcore conservatives, who view academics as biased and liberal.
(4) Relatedly, even if Americans access information from academics, as the psychology literature shows us, it is unlikely that they'll change their minds about policy issues, especially if they are really committed in their beliefs. Instead, the group to target is probably the uncommitted, those who don't have a set of beliefs that's already entrenched and resistant to change.
In sum, there are no easy solutions. It would be helpful if academic schools and departments more greatly valued non-academic work (blogging, opinion pieces, etc.) when making decisions about tenure and pay raises. It would change incentive structures, and might alter how academics view themselves. But even here, this doesn't come without a host of problems. For instance, academics might resist changes in how they conduct their business. Bureaucratic changes in how departments and schools operate takes a long time. And with more academic voices in the field, we're likely to see public disagreements among scholars, which would only create confusion among citizens. Who do we believe? Which academic, which expert, is right? (Matthew Kroenig's piece in Foreign Affairs is the most prominent example right now of an academic stoking the fires of war against Iran.)
In this post, above all, I'm mostly hoping to start a conversation about the role of academics in pressing policy debates, such as possible military conflict in Iran. Clearly, they can engage more with American citizens. But do they want to? And do they have a responsibility to do so, as I suggested above?
What do you think? Let us know.
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