Is China a Great Power?

Most public accounts, especially articles by journalists and pundits, either treat China as a great power or a country well on its way to being one in the near future. The problem is that there has been little public debate about this characterization of china. China's rise to the top is treated more as an assumption rather than something that needs investigation and observation. But is it true?

To answer this question, we need to define (or more accurately, operationalize) the term "great power." In other words, how do we translate the concept "great power" into the real world? How do we know a great power when we see it? Let's take a stab at this subject by looking at several well-known efforts to conceptualize "great power."

Academics typically measure great power status based on relative power capabilities. One straightforward approach is to compute the economic and military power, among other things, of all countries in the international system, based on various numeric indicators, to a get a picture of where power is concentrated in the world. Here, the emphasis is on hard power: the capabilities that can be used to bribe, aid, threaten, and fight others.

Kenneth Waltz suggests an even simpler method. To be considered a great power, a country must be at the top or very close to the top in a battery of indicators of power, all of which touch on a country's technological, economic, political, and military capacity and sophistication. In Waltz's view, a great power can't lag in one category, which makes sense. Think about late 1980s Japan. To be sure, Japan was an emerging economic powerhouse, but its weak military and its foreign policy passivity prevented its climb up the great power ladder. Japan's ineffectual national security apparatus limited the country's influence and doomed it to be follower rather than leader in world politics.

For those of you less interested in data gathering and number crunching and looking more for simple rules of thumb, I have two more options. John Mearsheimer contends that great powers dominate their own regions. They are able to redesign their environments, to varying degrees, to serve their interests. As examples, they carve out spheres of influences and create regional economic and security institutions that enshrine, and often advance, their power and standing in the world. Less dominant, yet still powerful, countries usually face obstacles--both internal and external--that prevent them from from tinkering with their environments. Of particular importance is the presence of other powerful countries in the same region. Such countries--either by themselves or via alliances--can act as effective counterweights to any other member in the region, potentially circumscribing the latter's behavior and limiting its influence and power maximization possibilities.

Here is another approach: does a country look and act like a great power? Is it active in international relations? Does it have its own sphere of influence? Does it frequently set the agenda in the world? Does it seek to expand its interests? This logic follows roughly from the work of Hans Morgenthau, arguably, the father of modern international relations scholarship. Morgenthau posits a one-to-one relationship between state power and interests. Weak countries are usually primarily concerned with what happens inside of and proximate to their borders; much stronger and more powerful countries have the requisite capabilities to be global players. And they usually act as such, when opportunities arise. Great powers, and aspiring great powers, want the respect, prestige, and other perks associated with international dominance. Furthermore, they also realize that it is better to write the rules of international order rather than have those mechanisms foisted upon them.

Unfortunately, a proper and thorough assessment of the above attempts to define "great power" is beyond the scope of this blog post. But here is what we can say: China is the second most powerful country in the world, a rising power, and a potential contender to great power status. China has the second largest economy, it has embarked on a large-scale program to modernize and expand its military and power projection capabilities, especially its naval ones, and it has taken the lead in creating green technologies. China has become more assertive in international relations, putting its stamp--in one form or another, and for better and worse--on a host of issues: the world economy, violence in Syria, the transition in power in North Korea, reconstruction in Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation, territorial and waterway claims in the South China Sea, and so on. China's lust for new energy resources has led it to complete trade deals in far away places like Africa and South America. Equally important, China is now treated as an emerging great power by the international community. Most notably, worried about the rise of China, under Barack Obama, the U.S. has reoriented its foreign policy by implementing a "pivot" toward Asia.

All of this said, China's continued rise over the long-term is by no means guaranteed. Despite the breathless, practically cheerful, proclamations that the 21st century will be dominated by China, that the sun is setting on America's empire, a post-American world so to speak, there are few good reasons to assume these things will be true. America could once again show its political and economic resilience and vitality by rebounding from a tough last decade. And China has a host of obstacles to overcome. As a result, I am not quite ready to anoint China as the next big thing in international relations. China is still a relatively poor country, lacks the ability to mobilize and project military power into distant lands/waterways, and has not demonstrated the creative and innovative capacity--at least to this point--to be a business hub to the world.

And that's not all. As I wrote last October, I have other concerns:

China's economy could overheat. Its economy can't continue to grow at 10% for the foreseeable future, right? After all, it's an export-led market that depends on a healthy and vibrant U.S. and European economies, China's two largest markets, and both are struggling and expected to struggle for the next several years. Economists have long suspected that the unemployment rates in China are far higher than what Chinese bureaucrats routinely report to the world. Like America and Europe, China also has a debt problem. With the large number of future seniors, China likely has a upcoming workforce problem. Most of the world's most polluted cities, not surprisingly, are in China; attempts to remedy this, according to experts, could cause a 2-3% annual drag on the Chinese economy. The shift to urbanization, the impending move of hundreds of millions of people, won't be easy and could prove to be traumatic. China frequently experiences protests and demonstrations, some of which are violent. Any sharp negative changes in the Chinese economy or political system could exacerbate this situation, thereby eroding the political and social cohesion of China.

Now add in China's chaotic politics. Its impending leadership transition, due to take place later this year, seems to have fractured Beijing's elites. The Bo Xilai fiasco has revealed the extent of deep corruption embedded in the Chinese system. The treatment and eventual defection of Chen Guangcheng clearly highlighted the tyrannical ruthlessness of local and national leaders. Going forward, if these issues are not handled better, it would not be surprising to see a host of negative repercussions for China: an unraveling of social and political unity and cohesion, a delegitimized Chinese state, and, by extension, and a greater difficulty in extracting and appropriating resources in an efficient manner.

And of course, don't forget about regional politics. China does not dominate the region in line with Mearsheimer's expectations. And that's primarily because it is located in a region, broadly defined, that contains several other powerful countries (India, Russia, Japan, and even Indonesia, South Korea, Australia, Vietnam). A rising China automatically triggers wariness and concern within the region. But an overly assertive, perhaps aggressive, China will trigger counterbalancing behavior. In fact, this has already happened.

America's so-called pivot to Asia has generated support from from U.S. allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. These countries want tighter political and security ties and enhanced military to military cooperation, and that is exactly what Washington is willing to give each country. Asian countries are already looking for ways to prevent the possibility of being politically, militarily, and economically dominated by China. And when push comes to shove, don't be surprised to see other countries, particularly India and even Russia, cultivate stronger ties with America as a way to balance against China. This kind of counterbalancing could very well ensure that China gets bogged down in regional politics/security affairs, effectively preventing Beijing from having a sufficient global focus to challenge the U.S. for hegemony.

In the end, does knowing that China is a rising power tell us anything? It tells us that there will be increased competition and rivalry in world between China and the U.S. and its allies in Asia. This is inevitable, no matter if Beijing's intentions turn out to be mostly friendly and benign. After all, as China searches for new trade and energy deals, it is going to encroach on the turf of the U.S., ruffling its feathers. Additionally, even if China listens to America's exhortations and becomes a "responsible stakeholder" in world politics, the U.S. won't be happy about this, as this means Washington will have to share international leadership with Beijing. Similarly, if China wants greater influence in internationally or regionally, again, Washington won't be pleased.

All of these scenarios, and many more, involving China could be relatively innocuous yet unnerve American elites. They might believe that China's rise comes at the expense of America. Moreover, because the intentions of Chinese leaders are by definition private and not completely knowable to outsiders, the U.S. will be wary of China's motives, at least as long as China remains a rising power.

Saying anything more than the above depends on your views on the U.S., China, bipolarity, great power relations, China-U.S. relations, and so on. In reality, Sino-American relations are not predestined to prolonged hostility or conflict, even if China makes the leap to great power status. While many associate tension, hostility, and cold wars with the bipolar era of Soviet and American dominance, this says nothing about a hypothetical period of Chinese and American supremacy. Indeed, Sino-American relations could veer toward hostility and conflict, but it is not the only possible outcome. America and China could simply become rivals and competitors, each learning over time to peacefully coexist with the other.

In this case, the cold war era could prove very valuable, serving as a powerful reminder of the disasters that can easily occur if superpower relations are not properly managed. Let's hope future Chinese and American leaders internalize these lessons.


*UPDATE: A version of this piece was published by Strategic Review. You can find it here.

Indonesia's Rising Religious Intolerance?

In the past few weeks, the so-called Indonesia model of "Islamic Democracy" is under close scrutiny. The New York Times recently published two opinion pieces--"Indonesia's Rising Religious Intolerance" and "No Model for Muslim Democracy"--describing the rising radicalism and attacks on atheists and religious minorities, and questioning whether moderation will hold. My colleague, Brad Nelson, also devoted a post on the attack on Irshad Manji in Indonesia.

I may sound like an Indonesian apologist here in this post, but I have to note that the majority of people here remain tolerant and moderate. Unlike in the Middle East, most Indonesians are either Sufi (a blend of Islam with local mysticism) or moderate Sunnis, where the attitude toward other religions can be summed as c'est la vie. The aforementioned three articles/posts should not be seen as an indictment of the Indonesian population as a whole.

Still, I am not going to go on Suryadharma Ali's path. It is totally stupid and naive to discount the seriousness of recent incidents, that it is true that there have been growing religious extremism and intolerance in Indonesia, especially in the last five years.

The root, however, is not in religious intolerance per se, but in politics. Even since the beginning of Indonesian independence, political Islam has been a potent political force. There has always been a myth of a single Muslim bloc, that should the politicians get it right, they could attract the vote from the Muslims of Indonesia, which comprises about 85% of the population.

After the fall of Suharto in 1998, politicians were hoping to tap this "huge bloc" by establishing parties that were supposed to represent Muslims. In turn, they were also afraid of offending this "majority," that they were afraid to be labeled as un-Islamic, and this contributed to their aversion to tackle vigilante groups that supposedly "defended" the Islamic faith -- two of the most notorious were the Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defender Front (FPI).

Still, this does not explain why many people think the situation has deteriorated badly in the past few years if politicians have been afraid to offend and tackling radical Islamists since 1998? In fact, if we pay more attention, closely scrutinize the entire period since 1998, the situation in 2012 is actually much better than in 1999, when we literally had ethno-religious wars in the Moluccas and Poso and al-Qaeda affiliated Jamaah Islamiyah ran unchecked.

First, we have the problem of perception of presidential power. Between 1998-2001, during the height of Indonesian ethno-religion conflicts, the central government's power was very weak. For instance, regardless of his intention to stop the conflicts, President Gus Dur's directives went unheeded due to the intractable tensions between him and the military, which was still in the middle of transition from being a politicized entity to a more professional organization. International Crisis Group, for instance, argued that some elements in the military was training and backing the combatants.

By 2009, the presidency under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was considered to be very strong. Mr. Yudhoyono was elected with 60.8% of the votes and he had support from many elements in society, including the military. He was expected to act decisively and pursue much needed reforms -- basically making a clean break from the dirty past.

When these expectations were not met--he is now seen as just another spineless politician--the blow back has been harsh. When he did not act against radical groups, people no longer saw him as a strong decisive leader, but rather a ditherer. His unwillingness to act, in turn, has only emboldens radical groups to raise the stakes. Mr. Yudhoyono himself, seeing his poll numbers plummeting, became even more hesitant to do anything drastic, wary that it would antagonize the "majority" further.

In addition, unlike past "grand coalitions," which were dominated by two large parties (e.g. Megawati's PDI-P-Golkar Party and SBY's first term's Democratic Party-Golkar), the second term of Mr. Yudhoyono was a coalition of parties, with the Democratic Party only as its core. Should the Golkar Party, which is currently also part of the coalition and at the same time the second largest party in the parliament) decide to join up with the opposition PDI-P, both of them combined would have 201 seats out of 560 total seats in the parliament, compared to Democratic Party's 148 seats. This would make the Islamist parties extremely important to the coalition.

Second, note the argument in my article in the Jakarta Globe, which I quote here in full:

The mass organizations, however, would not have lasted long if politicians had no use for them. They are mostly used for helping the politicians garner votes, and they are particularly helpful when someone contesting an election is virtually unknown among the electorate. 

In short, you want votes? You need to cultivate ties to any "mass" organization, as you need it to garner much needed votes. There is this unholy alliance between politicians and violent groups, one type of mass organization, making it very difficult to crack down on them.

Finally, it is widely believed that the police and the FPI are working hand-in-hand. The police are funding the FPI and using it to do things that it normally cannot do in exchange for allowing the FPI a free hand to do what it wants. It is a political/economic relationship.

Therefore, Indonesia's supposedly rising intolerance is driven less by religious intolerance, but more by the weaknesses of the government itself, particularly its unwillingness to uphold the rule of law and to crack down on the extremist groups due to political considerations.

North Korea in Indonesia: Something Terrible This Way Come?

Last week, President of North Korea Kim Yong Nam visited Indonesia, officially with the purpose of hoping to drum up investment from Indonesia.

Such a trip, however, must be seen under the backdrop of several recent strategic developments that have been very detrimental to North Korea's position.

For the North Koreans, this year has already started badly. First, they botched their rocket launch. Originally, it was hoped that the launch would be a harbinger of a glorious new era under Kim Jong Un while continuing his father's legacy. The launch, however, was a disaster, enraging everyone, even China (there's no way in hell this article could be published, especially in Global Times, without any official approval -- China rarely criticizes North Korea, even with a mild rebuke, regardless how idiotic North Korea acts).

In turn, this lead to another diplomatic headache, another tit-for-tat, where North Korea signaled its displeasure by arresting Chinese fishermen. How this works out in the end will remain to be seen, but this incident shows how angry North Korea is with its patron and at the same time, this "biting the hand that feeds it" policy will probably cause more estrangement, especially from China's side..

Another problem for North Korea is that the President of Myanmar, after having met the President of South Korea, decided to stop purchasing arms from North Korea. From Myanmar's perspective, now that it's reestablishing a relationship with the United States, it is a logical next step to build closer ties to South Korea, especially with South Korea investing all over the place in Southeast Asia. The impoverished Myanmar, of course, would love to have a slice of that South Korean investment.

In my view, a salient question is: what can Indonesia do to help North Korea? While Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa downplayed North Korea's belligerence, arguing that it boiled down to misunderstandings, such an interpretation is questionable at best, as it is unclear if Pyongyang really wants to be a productive and cooperative member of the international community. It certainly rings hollow in Seoul and Washington. Moreover, unlike Myanmar, there does not seem any domestic politics changes that would provide opening for Indonesia to help "democratize" North Korea in ways similar to Myanmar nowadays.

North Korea's latest move is likely a product of two motives. On the one hand, it is probably trying to avoid total isolation. Indonesia is one of the very few countries that still maintain cordial relations with North Korea, a relationship that dates back to the Sukarno era; deepening these ties might make North Korea feel less alone and insecure. In addition, considering the cordial relationship that Indonesia has with both China and South Korea, Pyongyang likely wants to use Indonesia to gauge the reactions of both Beijing and Seoul, two regional powers that sit right on North Korea's doorstep and profoundly impact its national security.

Irshad Manji, a Threat to Indonesian Public Order?

via id.berita.yahoo.com


Don't worry, we have not forgotten about the blog, I promise! Yohanes and I have been busy the last 2-3 weeks finishing a paper (on Indonesian grand strategy) for publication. While working on that project, I did come across a story that captured my attention. It concerned Irshad Manji's adventures in Indonesia.

I'm sure some of you are familiar with Irshad Manji, a liberal public intellectual who has written popular books and appeared on television shows and networks like Real Time with Bill Maher, CNN, Fox News, and so on. She's Canadian, and also a Muslim and a lesbian. Apparently, the combination of these things--specifically, the fact that she's liberal, Muslim, and a lesbian--has upset the delicate world of a group of Muslim extremists in Indonesia. Let's review what happened.

On May 4, at a location in South Jakarta, Manji was scheduled to give a talk on her new book. About 15 minutes into the event, just before she began to speak, Indonesian police stepped in and canceled the rest of the proceedings, claiming that the organizers had failed to secure the proper permits to have a foreign speaker at the gathering.

At about the same time the police intervened, a number of local extremist agitators, upset and angry, began to cause a disturbance--apparently, both inside and outside the venue--allegedly because a lesbian Muslim planned to speak to a public audience. To the extremists, who are also Muslim, the idea of a lesbian Muslim is heretical. And the thought of Manji giving a public speech is even worse. After all, they wondered, what was the point of her talk? Did she plan on indoctrinating the Indonesian masses in her liberal, homosexual lifestyle?! According to a spokesman of the Islam Defender Front (FPI), a group whose members were among the rabble-rousers:

his group disregarded Irshad’s sexual identity but rejected her way to spread her principle, adding that her liberal standpoint is unacceptable. “We don’t mind her sexuality as long as she keeps it to herself. However, as she decides to spread her views [that Islam should accept homosexuality], it is a different story,” he told The Jakarta Post.

The next day, in defending , the police offered quite a a different reason for halting the book talk. No longer was the sole focus on the issue of permits. Jakarta Police spokesman Sr. Comr. Rikwanto stated:

There have been rejections from the local neighborhood and community units as well as an organization [FPI] against the book discussion. The locals urged that the event be ended because it discussed a sensitive issue.  

Besides, Irshad Manji is a lesbian activist and she was going to talk about a book that will offend what the majority of Muslims believe. We saw a potential for a public order disruption.

Unfortunately for Manji, her book launch continued to suffer setbacks while in Indonesia. On Saturday, May 5, she gave an hour long talk on her book. But while that took place, the venue was guarded by 50 members of Muslim youth organization (Banser NU), who applied a watchful eye on 100 members of FPI who stood in the rain to protest against Manji's book and the discussion of it.

There were other troubling signs. Consider this:

FPI Jakarta branch secretary-general Habib Novel insisted that the Canadian activist had been spreading views that Islam should accept homosexuality, which the group deemed “unacceptable”.

“Irshad Manji must leave this country, otherwise we will keep looking for her,” he said.

On Wednesday, the 9th, Manji's book discussion in Gadjah Mada University (UGM) in Yogyakarta was canceled by university leaders for "security reasons." To Manji's supporters, like activist and politician Budiman Sudjatmiko, this was one more example of the hardliners and extremists--or religious fascists, as as Budiman called them--putting undue pressure on authorities, getting them to cave in to their demands. Budiman expressed his disappointment to The Jakarta Post: "This is a setback for all of us since universities should take a stand against any form of violence against the freedom of expression."

On the evening of that same day, May 9th, hundreds of people from the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) attacked participants in Manji's book discussion at the LKiS publishing office in Yogyakarta. Thugs broke down the door to the gathering, and once inside, vandalized the publisher’s office and Manji's books that were prominently and openly displayed. Even worse, though her supporters tried to protect her, Manji and her assistant suffered minor injuries from the attack; and dozens of people at the book event were beaten by the mob of Islamic extremists. According to The Jakarta Post, the MMI offered the following justification for the attack:

The MMI said Irshad’s so-called liberty and lesbianism propaganda was blasphemous toward Islam and that her teachings represented covert atheist propaganda

They also considered all those who facilitated Irshad’s event in Indonesia to be enemies of religion and the state.

So what does this chain of events mean? Some might claim that this says something about the state of Indonesian democracy. Maybe, but we have to be careful here. It's not that Islamists are derailing democracy, as some in the West might be tempted to say. After all, Islamist parties and candidates, especially extremist ones, have been marginalized though peaceful, democratic means. Indonesian voters have eschewed them, for the most part, and empowered more secular groups and candidates. Furthermore, Indonesians don't support violence, even violence committed in the name of Islam. And the threat from Islamic terrorists has been capably managed by Detachment 88, with able assistance from the U.S.

All of this tells us that Islamic extremism and violence has been effectively boxed in, contained, and as a result, both pose little to no existential threat to the Indonesian state or Indonesia's burgeoning democratic political system.

The events surrounding Manji show a different problem, though one that does impact Indonesian politics. Specifically, Indonesian institutions and leaders do not function as effectively, optimally as the country and its citizens need them to.

Here are some things to think about. Why wasn't Manji better protected by the police throughout her stay in the country? It's not as if the police were unaware of what could happen.Threats to her events and to her safety were public and well-known. More to the point, in the attack on the 9th, the police were supposedly notified ahead of time about threats to Manji. Yet there was no police presence at the book talk to deter the MMI thugs. Moreover, the police seemed to pin the blame for the constant threats, hostilities, and eventual violence on the victims rather than the perpetrators. Is this because the police force is simply an apathetic institution? Or did individual police officers side with the extremists? Or maybe the police is just an incompetent force? Whichever the case, there's trouble in the police ranks.

We should also consider the the role of failed leadership. What were regional and national leaders thinking? One would think there would be sufficient incentives for them to act, as the failure to do so only puts a stain on their political reputations. There were four days between the initial fiasco and the attack on the 9th. That's more than enough time for leaders to be aware of the dangers that Manji faced, coordinate with police on the ground, and put an action-plan in place to cope with the threats. Yet they failed.

In this environment, if few leaders and officials do their job, it's not too surprising that a small group of motivated Islamic extremists and criminals can wield some semblance of power. The dereliction of responsibilities can create a law and order vacuum that's waiting to be filled, even by misfits and criminals on a short-term basis.

Another result is that, as Amika Wardana recently pointed out, Indonesian hardliners have effectively put Islam in a straitjacket. Anything other than extremely conservative orthodoxy is ruled out and off limits. Concepts such as pluralism, liberalism, and secularism are rejected, and those who dabble in these areas are subject to punishment, usually by the hardliners, of course. This in turn encourages "anti-intellectualism, which clearly violates the freedom of religion and freedom of speech, the primary features of a democratic society."

This isn't just an Indonesian phenomenon, however. It's part of a broader trend in the world that plagues Islam today. Here's how: the very vocal and violent hardliners and extremists often dominate the public discourse of Islam. The moderates, fearful for their lives, unfortunately remain silent, afraid to confront the hardliners on their actions and views. They are more willing to voice their concerns and views outside of the eye of the hardliners, preferring, for instance, to operate in closed academic debates or quietly among friends and family. Yes, there are extremely brave people who do publicly stand up to the extremists, but they are usually the minority and too often suffer inhuman risks and consequences.

This situation has caused the West to malign the moderates unfairly, in my view. Over the last 11 years, scores of so-called pundits and analysts have wondered why Islamic moderates have not done more to counteract the hardliners. The implication, of course, is that by sitting on the sidelines, the moderates are also involved, serving as complicit co-conspirators to extremism and violence. This is nonsense. More properly, blame should be placed on the elites and leaders in Muslim countries. It is up to them to give the moderates enough space, freedom, and protection most importantly, to take on the hardliners and extremists when necessary. Under these conditions, the moderates can more easily coordinate with each other, speak their voice in public, and offer enough compelling counter-narratives to drown out the ideas and arguments of the crazies.

In this vein, I hope Indonesian authorities have learned enough from the incidents involving Manji to be more solicitous of the plight of Muslim moderates. It doesn't matter that the overwhelming majority of Indonesians have dismissed the hardliners as cranks and criminals and that the hardliners have been de-legtimized. The failure to protect and secure moderates--and by extension, the appearance that political elites lack political will--gives hardliners enough of an opening to spout dangerous anti-democratic, violent ideas, and can, in turn, embolden extremists to commit heinous acts.

The Organizational Unity and Strength of Asean

If you recall, in my last blog post, I referred to an opinion piece written by my colleague Yohanes for the publication Strategic Review. In that piece, he makes a number of interesting arguments, including one that connects Indonesian foreign policy to the future viability of Asean. Specifically, he worries that having an "all friends but no enemies" approach to foreign policy might undermine and weaken the unity and strength of Asean in the future.

I wish Yohanes explored this argument in more detail, but, of course, he was hamstrung by space limitations. In only 750-1000 words, it's impossible to adequately discuss and explain every side argument. With that in mind, in this blog post, I'd like to pick up where he left off.

To begin, let's clarify a couple of terms. When Yohanes refers to the organizational unity and strength of Asean, he seems to be talking about the ability of Asean member countries to agree on various policy issues and to collectively wield power (diplomatic, military, economic, and so on) in response to these issues. After all, Yohanes' concern is that Asean will suffer divisions and fractures, which would limit the organization's potential to get anything substantive done.

Now, on to the matter at hand. I do agree with Yohanes' assertion that Indonesian foreign policy could weaken Asean. But I suspect that this could occur because Indonesia's policymaking, at least for about the last 20 years, has tended to be passive and reactionary. Indonesia desires to hold a leadership position in East Asia and Asean, in particular, but hasn't really taken the reins on policy issues pertaining to the region. Instead, it has let other countries, whether Japan or China or South Korea, take the initiative by setting the agenda for East Asia, if not beyond. And inside Asean, Indonesia has been a vigorous participant in meetings and conferences, but again I don't see much evidence of the country taking a leadership role.

Sure, Indonesia played a strong role in Asean in 2011. It held the chairmanship, and, among other conferences and meetings, hosted two Asean Summits and the East Asian Summit. Indonesia also was integral in getting the U.S. to shift its attention to Asia and tightening its cooperation with Asean (a part of which included America's signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation).

That said, aside from 2011, Indonesia hasn't dominated Asean, at least not the way I would expect based on its economic power and the importance that Jakarta places on the organization in its overall foreign policy. It's acted as one among equals. And really, a case could made that countries such as Malaysia have taken on a bigger, more prominent role in Asean over the last 20 years. At bottom, in my view, Indonesia has essentially dealt with Asean much as it does with foreign countries and issues: mostly in a passive manner, taking a backseat to others.

This kind of an approach to foreign policy could turn problematic if sharp differences between Asean members do surface. Indonesia likely won't do enough to keep countries in line and working together. And if it does begin to assert itself in situations like this, given Indonesia's disinclination, it will likely be too late, letting differences deepen and positions harden. Hence, in this case, the unity and strength of Asean would depend on what other Asean member countries do. If these countries don't value Asean as much as Indonesia does, and if they don't seize the leadership mantle to bring everyone together, the organization could be doomed. Emerging differences could easily further widen and deepen and tensions harden, causing intractable splits and divisions in the bloc.

If we move beyond Indonesia, there could be any of a number of other factors that might play a role in enervating the unity and strength of Asean. Indeed, there are so many different potential variables and so many different possible contexts or conditions that I can imagine a score of ways in which Asean could endure internal fissures and difficulties. Of course, a blog post isn't appropriate to undertake an exhaustive examination of all these different factors; a much longer treatment of the future of Asean would be better suited for that.

That said, I can identify one event that has the strongest likelihood of impacting Asean stability, and it's the 800 lb gorilla, or perhaps panda, in the room: the rise of China. Let's face it, the China issue is so important that, no matter how each responds to Beijing--whether in unison or not--it will surely lurk in the background, if not the foreground, of just about everything the bloc discusses and undertakes in the coming years.

China is going to continue to grow in both absolute and relative terms, just as it has for the past 35 years. Whether it finally achieves great power status is actually irrelevant to this discussion. Why? Put simply, unless something catastrophic occurs, China is going to dominate the region in a way that approximates America's power predominance in its own backyard. China's economic and eventually its military power will likely far exceed the might of other countries in East Asia, Asia-Pacific, and certainly within Asean member countries.

This impending situation is going to create new realities on the ground and in Asean capitals. Countries will face new constraints, new opportunities, and new pressures. And they will have to make a strategic calculation about how to deal with China's dominance. Certainly, Asian countries are already contemplating the implications of China's ascent and their responses to it. But as we move forward into the future, the changes and shifts in regional politics will carry a much greater sense of urgency for Asean member countries to come with a plan and react accordingly.

So what will Asean do? Will member countries attempt to balance against Beijing? Might they try to remain above or outside the fray by staying on the sidelines, preferring to mind their own business, or serving as mediators between China and its rivals in the region? Or perhaps, if one or more countries is bullied or sees an opportunity to profit, some could see bandwagoning as the best strategic option.

The problem, at least with respect to the topic at hand, is that there is no guarantee all Asean members will see the rise of China similarly and respond to China in a similar fashion. There is no reason to assume that Asean--that is, all Asean members--will necessarily seek to balance against China's rising and potentially overwhelming power. It's possible, sure, though by no means guaranteed. Strategic calculations are a product of a country's goals, interests, values, geography, material power, and perceptions of reality, among other things. And each of these indicators can vary, and vary greatly, from country to country in the region. So some countries in Asean might fear China, see it as a strategic threat, and form a policy based on that assessment; but others could very well read the situation much differently, opting to pursue policies that look little like those from their more insecure and pessimistic Asean partners. And if Asean member countries aren't walking in unison on the China issue, instead choosing different strategic paths, then Asean could endure--perhaps prolonged--bouts of dissension.

To be clear, and this applies to both the Indonesia and China examples, potential discord and fissures in Asean could be more or less severe, depending on a host of factors. And these internal organizational problems could take many different forms. We might see Asean reach a breaking point at which the bloc is hanging together by a thread, just waiting for the right trigger to cause a complete implosion. But at the less extreme end of the spectrum, we could observe a political stalemate in Asean. But regardless of the type and severity of the divisions in Asean, their mere presence will hamper the organization's ability to exercise and project power.

A Grand Strategy for Indonesia

About a month ago, my colleague Yohanes penned a piece in Strategic Review that lamented Indonesia’s lack of a grand strategy. He suggested that Indonesia’s current foreign policy is aimless and reactionary. After the article’s publication, Yohanes revealed that he wondered what an effective, coherent Indonesian grand strategy would look like. Admittedly, he poses an interesting query. And after thinking it over, I have a few ideas.

To begin, Indonesia would be best served by focusing first and foremost on continuing its economic ascent. Toward this end, it should increase its commitment to economic development, good governance, uprooting corruption, and containing and thwarting local terrorism. Indonesia also ought to build off its recent efforts to engage multilateral institutions by taking on more active and assertive roles in international and regional bodies. If it became especially ambitious, Indonesia could even assist in writing new rules and principles that govern the world order of the 21^st century.

To be clear, all of the above mentioned things are interrelated. They would likely help Indonesia to keep jobs aplenty, bolster tourism, bring more respect and admiration, and allow it to pursue its interests effectively.

In my view, Indonesia should aim to operate something, though certainly not exactly, like Japan. This would loosely fit with where Indonesia’s elites want the country to go. Avoid trouble, be friends with foreign countries, seek to be a mediator when possible, and, most importantly, serve as an economic engine to the world.

By going the "economy first" route, Indonesia really can benefit in important ways. First, as has been written at length by scholars and analysts, money and power will likely flow from the West to the East, Asia in particular, during the 21^st century. Arguably, this is already happening. What this means is that Asia is where jobs, investment, and growth are all shifting. Moreover, it’s becoming clear, especially with America’s so-called pivot to Asia, that the region is where the most important diplomatic jockeying and intrigues will take place. Combined, we a get a picture of countries, businesses, groups, and people falling over themselves to get a piece of Asia, because that’s where the action is at.

If Indonesia gets its domestic political and economic act together, it can piggyback off the success of the entire region. Investors, speculators, businesses, organizations, and countries already attuned to the rise of Asia and looking for more activity there could eventually move with gusto to Indonesia. Furthermore, for those actors preferring to deal with a vibrant, emerging democracy, or for those wary of abetting the rise of the Red Panda, Indonesia might eventually function as suitable regional alternative to China for international economic, business, and political affairs.

Second, Indonesia might be able to develop its own version of soft power. Remember, for the last several centuries, the West has held a commanding advantage in both material power and soft power. People worldwide have wanted to be like the West. They wanted to be wealthy, sure, but also live in a free and democratic society. Because China lacks these features, many scholars and analysts already speculate that China will never hold much soft power, and that the lack of it will hold the country back. Put simply, without significant soft power, China won’t be able to maximize its influence in the world.

Perhaps, but that says nothing about Indonesia. And in fact, if Indonesia goes about its foreign and domestic politics and economics in a effective manner, as the largest Muslim country in the world, it has a decent prospect at possessing considerable soft power. It can be a shining beacon to Asia but also to Muslim countries. In this way, Indonesia could be a major global player. It possesses the potential, even if it seems unlikely at the moment, to influence countries near and far away.

One more point on soft power: for country that lacks a really strong military and isn't a top-flight economy, holding a lot of soft power could enable Indonesia to punch above its weight, so to speak, in regional and international politics. Soft power could enable Jakarta to do more things than we would predict solely by looking at measures of Indonesia’s hard power.

Where does Indonesia’s military fit in this picture? Over the long-term it will likely be in Indonesia's best interests not to strive to have a very powerful military. I’m not suggesting that Indonesia slash its military budget. To the contrary, it might even make sense to make increases to it, though this should be in line with any expansion in Indonesia’s economy. The bottom line: just enough of a military presence to patrol borders, protect the homeland, participate in disaster relief, and take care of anti-terror operations. Indonesia should keep enough of a military presence to maintain security, peace and calm, but not so much as to throw gobs money down the military industrial complex drain. All this would do is further entrench the military’s role in Indonesia’s politics and economics.

In the end, though, this would require bargaining with and between the military. On the one hand, the military would have to be convinced, likely with various creative inducements, that it will no longer be the face of country to its citizens or to the rest of the world. And on the other hand, I envision some kind of informal accord between the navy and the army. The army has traditionally gotten the bulk of the military budget, and would likely resist changes to how it operates and the resources it procures. But in crafting a better, more economical foreign policy, the Indonesian government ought to begin the transition to emphasizing the role of the navy. Given the country’s location and its geography, it just makes the most sense. After all, it’s the navy that safeguards the country’s borders and waterways and trade routes, and can offer humanitarian assistance as needed. To make this transition work, the navy and army must agree that Indonesia’s naval forces and power should be strengthened and modernized.

There are a host of specific regional and international issues on which Indonesia will have to take position in the future. One such issue is the coming superpower competition between China and the U.S. By acting as a neutral friend to Beijing and Washington and seeking to be a mediator in their likely disputes, it’s possible that Indonesia can be a positive force, one that muffles the potential for a catastrophic great power conflict in Asia.

Of course, this is one among many ways that Indonesia won’t function like Japan. Japan has a strong alliance with the U.S.; Indonesia doesn’t want to pick sides. It wants to remain above the fray. Certainly, there are pitfalls with this approach. For instance, declining to pick a side risks drawing the ire of both China and America. The key for Indonesia is to remain consistent (both over time and in private and public statements) and communicate with clarity, so as to avoid uncertainty regarding Jakarta's intentions and actions. Additionally, if the region experiences bipolarization, as frequently happens in great power contests for power and influence, Indonesia could face external pressure to pick a side. It could even feel internal pressure to pick side should China or America appear on the verge of becoming the dominant player in Asia. What Indonesia must do is stick to its evolving interests and values. These include maintaining foreign policy independence, avoiding conflict, encouraging negotiation over violence, and supporting multilateral solutions.

Nuclear Diplomacy and the North Korea Puzzle

Shortly before the death of Kim Jong il last December, North Korea and the U.S. made progress toward a deal on nuclear and missile testing. Ostensibly, Pyongyang agreed to halt nuclear tests and experiments and missile launches and allow the return of IAEA officials, in exchange for food and other humanitarian assistance and the possibility of improving North Korean-American relations. Kim's death put the deal on hold, while the country mourned and Kim's son began the process of consolidating political power. In late February, once North Korea's politics started to stabilize, Washington and Pyongyang revived the deal. Before long, Team Obama proudly announced that both sides had restarted and finalized the so-called Leap Day Deal.

Unfortunately, latest news out of North Korea has given, once again, the skeptics and pessimists much fodder. This time, government spokesmen have announced that North Korea will conduct an allegedly peaceful, non-threatening satellite launch some time between April 12-16. The North Koreans claim the purpose of the launch, timed to commemorate the (100th) birth of nation founder Kim il Sung, is to collect weather data and estimate crop yields.

But the U.S. and its friends in Asia believe the launch violates the deal that was struck just a few weeks ago. Reports and satellite images apparently that the North Korea is preparing to launch something that's far less innocuous and more military-related than Pyongyang has admitted thus far. Indeed, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs Peter Lavoy reported to the U.S. House of Representative Armed Services Committee that the launch will likely violate the Leap Day Deal: "This planned launch is highly provocative because it manifests North Korea's desire to test and expand its long-range missile capability."

So while the names atop North Korea's leadership might have changed, the way Pyongyang does foreign policy likely hasn't. North Korea continues its cat and mouse routine with America. Time and again it sucks Washington into time and labor intensive diplomatic discussions, agrees to a deal, raises U.S. expectations, then eventually backs out of or cheats on the agreement. This pattern has held for the past two decades, dating back to the infamous 1994 accords, which brought heavy embarrassment to and criticism of the Clinton administration. In fact, knowing full well that it would only ratchet up the tensions even further, and giving countries more reasons to doubt and question Pyongyang's motives, last Thursday North Korea fired two short-range missiles.

In response to the April launch, the U.S. has already taken a number of steps. It has suspended efforts to recover the remains of American war dead from the Korean War, a deal that was agreed upon last October. According to Pentagon press secretary George Little: "When there are suggestions that they might launch ballistic missiles, when they make bellicose statements about South Korea and engage in actions that could be construed as provocative, we think that it's not the right time to undertake this effort."

President Obama himself has publicly stated his disapproval of the planned launch. He called on North Korea to scrap the launch and warned of severe counter-responses, which might include tighter sanction, and the risk of international condemnation and isolation.

Moreover, Washington has already suspended its food aid to North Korea. The U.S. argues that this isn't a direct response to the planned missile test but instead a reaction to the prevailing view that North Korea is unwilling to uphold its international commitments, which include, of course, the Leap Day Deal. Put simply, the U.S. just doesn't trust North Korea to match its words with deeds. According to state department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland: "We don't have confidence in their good faith. If they want to restore our confidence in their good faith, they can cancel the plans to launch this satellite."

North Korea has announced that the satellite will travel south toward the Philippines or Indonesia. This bit of news has, understandably, alarmed American allies in the region. Let's look at a few examples.

Both Japan and South Korea have said that they might shoot down any part of the satellite/rocket that infringes on their territory. In the words of Yoon Won-shik, a vice spokesman at the South Korean Defense Ministry: "We are studying measures such as tracking and shooting down (parts) of a North Korean missile in case they stray out of their normal trajectory....We cannot help viewing (the launch) as a very reckless, provocative act" that undermines peace on the Korean peninsula."

The Philippines have protested the rocket launch to North Korean representatives in various international forums. Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, in agreement with recent comments from Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, said the planned rocket launch violated UN resolution 1874. 

As expected, Indonesia also is concerned and wants North Korea to halt its missile launch. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Wardana has declared that Indonesia is monitoring the North Korean situation. Mahfudz Siddiq, chairman of the House of Representatives Commission I overseeing national security and a member of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), said that the SBY government “must urge North Korea...not to launch the missile....The plan itself has already raised tension in the region. I am afraid that the launch could eventually ignite new conflict."

To this point, the SBY government hasn't publicly criticized North Korea's planned launch. It has opted to use extreme caution and operate under the radar. Indonesia considers the launch a sensitive bilateral issue. It also wants the best of both worlds: it wants to have good relations with North Korea as well as with the U.S. and its Asian allies. Additionally, the SBY government clearly wants policy flexibility, which would be limited by deliberately choosing sides in public. We should also keep in mind that Indonesia see itself as a mediator and not a participant in this dispute, which suggests that the SBY administration is looking to remain above or outside of the fray.

Perhaps most significantly, China, North Korea's primary political, diplomatic and economic sponsor, is concerned. China has discussed the situation with North Korea's ambassador in March. And it has called on all parties to demonstrate "cool and restraint." China has long argued that the extent of its leverage over Pyongyang has been overstated in the West, mostly to duck putting much pressure on its client and neighbor out of fear of destabilizing the entire North Korean political system. Maybe Beijing more fully realizes, at least in this case, that sometimes some pressure is needed to push North Korea into acting in ways that are consistent with existing international rules and norms.

Unsurprisingly, the responses and reactions have upset North Korea. Surely, Pyongyang must be unnerved by the criticisms, protests, and warnings made by the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. And we know that Pyongyang is bothered by America's words and actions. North Korea has called Obama's words confrontational. North Korea's news agency KCNA called America's move to suspend food aid an overreaction, one that has "gone beyond the limit." North Korea argues that Washington promised not to link political and strategic issues with humanitarian issues, which is what it believes America is now doing by suspending food aid. North Korean officials claim that the suspension of food aid nullifies the Leap Day Deal, "as it is a violation of the core articles of the February 29 DPRK-U.S. agreement." Interestingly, North Korea also insists the deal "does not include satellite launches for peaceful purposes."

How will this play out? Certainly, North Korea could be bluffing and decide not to go ahead with the launch. For that to happen, though, Washington will need to devise a way for Kim Jong Un to save face. It could happen. But it will take intensive diplomatic discussions with North Korea, which means that the U.S. needs access to the reclusive government in Pyongyang--either directly or perhaps via an interlocutor like China. And it will require young Kim and his military coterie to exhibit some policy flexibility.

But if North Korea proceeds with the launch, it will be important to observe the responses of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. Will Asian countries really mobilize their defenses and shoot down a rocket over their airspace? Will the U.S. push for a UN resolution condemning the launch? Will Team Obama look to place tighter, stronger international sanctions on North Korea? And if these things happen, what does North Korea do? Does it lash out militarily again? What America and its allies must keep in mind is that assertive responses to North Korea, while understandable, does run the great risk of re-running the cat and mouse game, escalating the dispute, even putting the entire region on the brink of war.

Instead, at least for now, it's probably better if Washington and its friends in Asia do not focus and obsess on the types of punitive measures to be applied on North Korea. They ought to treat the launch with caution, monitor it, and treat it for it is: a provocative act that could be much worse. Hint: think nuclear tests. The best route is not to give the launch massive headlines and escalate the situation but to downplay it. There's no need to add fuel to the steady fire that is contemporary nuclear and Korean politics. As long as it seems relatively harmless, let North Korea lash out for the moment. Let Kim have his day, which can legitimize him and help to stabilize North Korean politics. This can be a very good thing, on a number of levels.

Overall, this approach makes it harder for North Korea's military to argue that foreign enemies are out to get them; can undermine the military's hardline policy orientation; and maybe even over time disempower the hardliners. This approach, along with dialog, some reason, and a dash of luck, could subtlely lead North Korea to search for new, perhaps better and more peaceful and less confrontational, ways to deal with their neighbors and the West.

To be clear, I'm not suggesting that countries not secure themselves or deprioritize national defense. And it will be tough for proximate countries like Japan and South Korea to downplay the launch, especially because they have sour relations with North Korea. The U.S. will have a tough time doing this as well. It's election season. In any crisis, but especially now, Obama will want to show that he's not weak on national security, and he will face incentives and pressures to take strong measures against Pyongyang. If North Korea ramps up its aggressiveness and bellicosity, then, without a doubt, it's time to reassess and perhaps plot out a new strategy. But we're not there yet. So in the meantime, everyone should calm down, relax, and exercise prudence.


*Please note: a version of this blog post has been published by Strategic Review. You can find the article here.