Early last month, in the newspaper Izvestia, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced plans to form a Eurasian Union, a close political and economic partnership between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Ostensibly, this union would build on the existing, but clearly expanding, close ties between the three countries. Already, there is a customs union, which was established in 2009, and a "United Economic Space" that will be launched in 2012.
The idea of a Eurasian Union has piqued the interest of other countries. Tajikistan reportedly expressed interest in it and its government is exploring its prospects. And Kyrgyzstan’s outgoing president President Roza Otunbayeva recently said the country would likely join the custom's union and might even join the proposed Eurasian Union. Kyrgyzstan sees security and economic benefits from even tighter ties to Russia. But at the same time, perhaps this proposed arrangement is just a natural progression from current economic relations with Russia and its neighbors. After all, according to Otunbayeva, "The natural flow of the work force, services and movement of capital is of course all directed to Russia and Kazakhstan."
Initially, publications like the Financial Times described Putin's plans as a challenge, perhaps a more appealing option, to the struggling European Union. But on a closer examination, while it's clear that Putin has modeled the Eurasian Union after Europe's EU, he probably has China on his mind. Indeed, he and other Russian politicians are justifiably concerned about the competition for power and influence in and near its neighborhood. After all, both Russia and China "have extensive Central Asian borders, and have strong interests, with China seeking energy suppliers and control over potential bases for militants from the Muslim region of Xinjiang." Add to this the fear that China's growing wealth and expanding energy needs make Beijing a good match for Russia's neighbors now and over the long haul. So with that in mind, "Putin likely hopes, by offering market access and political support now, Russia can get these countries 'locked in' to a deal that will make him the gatekeeper for China’s energy projects and political dealings in Central Asia. An economic or even currency union with Russia at its core would guarantee his continued relevance in an Asia that now looks like to be dominated by China in the coming century."
Is Putin serious about creating a Eurasian Union? Maybe, maybe not. But even if he is, this project is likely more aspirational than operational, at least for now. Why? I'm not sure that Russia has the political will to construct a Eurasian Union. For example, does Russia really want to create the perception that it's reforming the old Soviet Union? In the end, Moscow might decide that it would possibly create more suspicions and tensions that it would be worth. And after tasting independence for about the last 20 years, prospective Eurasian Union members might balk at the notion of restricting their autonomy and subverting their will to their Russian big brother. They might want to retain the freedom of choice and action, including doing deals with China.
All of that said, we must not forget that Belarus and Kazakhstan are weak and poor countries dependent on Russia for a variety of things. Would they consider it worthwhile to form stronger bonds with China at the expense of a good relationship with Russia? Probably not. Even if they believe China is the wave of the future, likely establishing dominance in the area, Belarus and Kazakhstan know that China probably won't be as nearly solicitous to their needs as Russia has been.
Arguably, the most damaging stumbling block would be the huge economic disparities between Russia on the one hand and Belarus and Kazakhstan on the other. Yes, tighter linkages gives Russia more influence over them; but meantime, they would also make Russia a significant stakeholder in their welfare, responsible for their political and economic and security ups and downs in ways far beyond it already is. This isn't necessarily a good thing. Indeed, this very possibility could doom the project to even more trouble than the EU faces today. Think about it. At this moment, the EU is wracked by the dilemma in which the stable, more prosperous countries, like Germany and France, have to bail out their poorer, less economically efficient EU brothers and sisters, like Greece and Italy and Spain and Portugal, just to ensure that the current economic problems don't cascade any further. As expected, this has caused frustration in France and Germany, is unsustainable over the long-term, and has led commentators to speculate about the fate, and possibly the demise, of the Euro and the EU as viable entity.
Let's apply this logic to a Eurasian Union. What happens if the economies of Belarus and Kazakhstan hit rock bottom? How does Russia respond? Does Russia bail them out, propping up their economies? If so, for how long? Keep in mind Russia doesn't have the economic wherewithal to do this forever. So what happens if Russia can't stabilize these countries somewhat quickly? Does Russia opt to divest itself of the problem, thereby pulling the rug on the Eurasian Union? Certainly, this is all conjecture, but it also suggests that Putin's Eurasian Union begs more questions than offers answers at this point.
Now, whether or not this project actually goes forward and moves into a real coordination and implementation phase, the mere suggestion of a Eurasian Union is revealing, on a few different counts. Let's look at three factors that appear to drive Putin's new project.
A Eurasian Union is representative of Russian external balancing against China. It can allow Russia to pool its economic power with the other two member countries. It can extend and deepen Russia's influence into areas near China. Indeed, the borders of a Eurasian Union "will encompass much of China’s northwest and give Russia power over China’s access to Central Asian markets and energy supplies." And surely, close cooperation on economic and political issues can spillover into even tighter, more cohesive cooperation on military and security affairs, potentially producing a full-fledged military alliance. What does this mean? A Eurasian Union can reduce China's freedom of choice and action. It can block China's encroachment into Russia's turf, limit the spread of its influence, and hamper its power projection capabilities.
2. Right after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, political leaders in Moscow, including Washington's so-called friend Boris Yeltsin, issued critical remarks about America's world dominance. At that point, Russia no longer drove the pace and direction world politics, and its leaders were well aware of this. Russia was a declawed, fallen power, relegated to the sidelines, while the U.S. consolidated its grip on world hegemony. There was real remorse about this reality, and the Russians wanted to reclaim their day in the sun.
Putin's project is just the latest expression of these sentiments. Russia still wants to be recognized as a great power, still wants the attendant status and prestige of such a ranking. The only difference now is that Russia has realized the limitations of its power. Put simply, Putin knows Russia can't achieve great power status on its own, though its own individual actions and efforts, so he has decided to merge Russia's power with Belarus and Kazakhstan with the hope of getting there. Just look at his comments. As one example, according to Putin: "We suggest creating a powerful supra-national union capable of becoming a pole in the modern world, and at the same time an effective bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific Region."
3. We should also not rule out the role that domestic politics is playing in Putin's calculations. Specifically, he's likely trying to find ways to boost his and his inner circle's approval ratings. Consider the following. Elections to the Russian Duma will be held in December and presidential elections are slated for March 2012. Russian President Demitry Medvedev has stated his intention not to run to for reelection and proposed Putin as a candidate in the 2012 election. (Putin's candidacy reportedly will be made official later this month.) The election normally wouldn't be a major issue for Putin, but the ground is shifting a bit in Russia. "[Putin] is in a very difficult situation because the popularity ratings [of the authorities] are on a downward turn, and the same goes for his own personal rating...He needed to find a card to play that would engage the electorate."
In a country in which nationalism runs high, and there is a sense of longing for the past, it makes sense to tap into "society's nostalgia for the Soviet Union," which is what the idea of the Eurasian Union does. It recalls a time when Russia was strong and powerful, a major mover and shaker in world politics. While many Russians were impoverished and repressed during the cold war, at least they could be proud of their country's geostrategic importance. Now, they're just poor and lack freedom, at least that's the perception among many Russians today.
In this sense, Putin is smart. He may legitimately have an authoritarian personality and at times support what we think of as retrogressive policies. But he also knows what Russians want to see and hear. Internally, he positions himself as a law and order guy; and vis-a-vis foreign countries, he gives the impression that he's willing to stand up to bullies and aggressors. Additionally, we shouldn't be surprised when Putin performs all sorts of macho, tough guy acts for public consumption, like parading around shirtless, going deep sea diving, riding horses, climbing trees, and engaging in combat with a tiger, among other things. This is good politics. Putin realizes that Russians eat all of this up. In my view, we can see the Eurasian Union through this same lens. He knows that the idea of it will likely play well domestically, which is good for him politically.
Mr. Silvio Berlusconi rose to power back on March 1994 thanks to three things: namely, the voters' disgust with the massive corruption in the long-lasting coalition government under the Christian Democrats; his savvy use of the media; and the lack of a political alternative in Italy, as the Democratic Party of the Left, the successor of the Italian Communist Party, was completely discredited due to the fall of the Soviet Union.
His 1994 victory was supposed to herald the reformation of an Italian political system that was rife with corruption and lethargy, causing the Italian economy to be less developed compared to the other economic giants of the Europe, notably Germany. In the end, however, Berlusconi was proven to be another "creature" of Italian politics, as he blended in rather than reformed the dysfunctional social and political system, which is lampooned in the following parody:
In thinking about the long career of Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, one cannot help but to recall Orson Welles' (in)famous line from the movie The Third Man:
You know what the fellow said – in Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder and bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci and the Renaissance. In Switzerland, they had brotherly love, they had five hundred years of democracy and peace – and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.
The entire line about the Swiss now applies to Italy, as it essentially pinpoints the problem with Italian political system: governments prefer internal peaceful coexistence over making the rough and tough changes necessary to produce better Italian politics. The government only has a very narrow majority, and it only rules thanks to the weaknesses of the opposition. To make situation worse, the government itself is based on a very loose coalition of parties with vastly divergent platforms, with one major partner, Umberto Bossi's Lega Nord per l'Indipendenza della Padania (North League for the Independence of Padania), advocating a complete independence of Northern Italy.
Yet Italy is stubbornly resistant to reform. The indolent political generation brought forth by Mr Berlusconi may finally be booted out, but there is no obvious replacement.
It is possible that the next Italian government will be willing to face the music and force the nation to eat the bitter pill of political and economic reform, but as the Greek resistance showed, the country might revolt and this could jeopardize the entire European Union experiment.
Pundits and bloggers and scholars have put forward a number of supposed "lessons learned" from the recent events in Libya (and the Arab Spring more generally). Here, in this blog post, I'd like to focus on two of the more interesting of them. In fact, not only are they interesting, at least to me, but they're topically and logically connected. In particular, both lessons outline principles that dictators might have learned about leadership/government responses to opposition movements and uprisings.
1. If dictators want to remain in power and relatively hassle-free, then they shouldn't give political opponents and their supporters a window in which they begin to think the government is weak and unwilling to retaliate against them. This window allows the opposition to overcome its fears of the regime, publicly voice its grievances, and eventually take to the streets. In essence, it removes some of the major collective action barriers in authoritarian states. And as this situation persists, more people will flock to anti-government groups, they will feel more confident, and they might even up their demands against the state. And why not? In addition to the reduced fear of being targeted, keep in mind that dictatorships are brutal forms of governance, so the opposition's grievances are probably widely viewed as legitimate and likely resonate with many of their fellow citizens.
To avoid this issue, if we play the logic out, we would expect dictators to clamp down on political opponents at the first sign of trouble. (Stephen Walt, among others, has voiced this and similar concerns). They will forcibly contain if not outright repress their opponents, preventing them from gaining momentum and growing in numbers and power. Moreover, we'd anticipate dictators attempting to sow fear within their countries. At bottom, they'll aim to make people afraid to openly criticize and contest the power and legitimacy of the government and communicate the grave consequences of doing so.
So dictators might send in armed forces to confront protesters, perhaps even arrest and harm them, especially if they appear unruly, just to signal the state's intentions and clarify any political red lines. Dictators might also find it beneficial to target opposition leaders, those who are the brains and inspiration behind anti-government activities. More often than not, all of these actions will drive significant numbers of the opposition back into their homes, work places, and schools, and can cause internal rifts within the opposition. Combined, this undercuts the strength of the resistance. And a weakened opposition is no match against a state apparatus that has a monopoly over the use of force.
It is quite obvious that a few Middle Eastern leaders have recently opted to forcibly halt the advance of opposition movements in ways that are consistent with the logic stated above. Bahrain and Syria and Iran have witnessed especially bloody crackdowns. Arguably, the clerics in Iran, in league with their armed thugs, have led the way, pounding the 2009 Green Movement into submission and throwing many of its supporters and leaders in prison or placing them under house arrest. Under such coercive pressure, the Green Movement has completely lost steam, though it still labors at the fringes of Iranian politics and in underground settings.
If the dictators in the Middle East didn't internalize the lesson of Iran, then they surely understood it well by February 2011. Though the Arab Spring didn't produce any pronounced spillover effects in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Royal Family was on heightened alert for any signs of large demonstrations through the spring and summer. The monarchy in Bahrain violently stopped the nascent but growing pro-democracy movement, and was eventually supported in its effort by thousands of Saudi troops.
And by the spring, Libya only reinforced these trends to the trigger-happy dictators in the region. Simply put, Gaddafi showed how not to deal with a gathering storm. He unwittingly allowed the rebels enough time and space to create the foundation for a successful rebellion. His weak central authority enabled rebel forces to quickly organize and then seize and hold Libyan turf. And by relying on a divided military and a rag-tag group of mercenaries and government loyalists, Gaddafi was never able to stop the forward march of the rebels. And it is this progress, along with the invitation from the NTC and the Arab League, that gave NATO the go-ahead to put the finishing touches on the Gaddafi era.
And now, of course, Syria is engulfed in bloodshed and mayhem, following in same path as Iran and Bahrain. Bashar al-Assad is making the same bet that the others have made. He wants to cripple the protest movement and force it to negotiate on his terms. Because al-Assad hit the opposition hard from the beginning, it hasn't had a chance to metastasize in numbers or on a large-scale. Which means that the opposition is left fighting a valiant but losing conflict against a murderous state.
2. What if leaders are unable to quash a rebellion and it gathers steam? At a certain point, it could threaten the government and the entire political system. If things get too hairy, too out of control, should the opposition put up a formidable, somewhat organized bellicose resistance, then dictators should realize from the Libyan case that it's better to step down from office than fight a prolonged internal conflict. This is point made by Charles Krauthammer in his last Washington Post column. The risks are too high to fight and cling to power. For if dictators are captured during a struggle for power, they will likely be killed. Gaddafi learned this lesson the hard way.
In my view, Krauthammer's on the mark here. In my dissertation, this is an argument that I discussed. See, the academic literature on regime survival tends to focus on whether governments will receive punishment for indiscretions, wrongdoings, and bad policies. The conventional wisdom is that democracies have routine, periodic elections in which voters can "punish" elected officials for actions, decisions, and events they don't like. And so democratic leaders have to be careful about what they do while in office. By contrast, leaders in authoritarian regimes, which lack public means to sanction leaders, have a freer hand to do as they wish. Mostly, they simply have to worry about satisfying their core elite base of support. Authoritarian politics is all about behind the scenes, out of the media's eye, coalition building and maintenance. This goes even for the most powerful autocrat, for even this individual, at a minimum, has to build bridges to the people with the guns and preferably bring them into his/her camp.
Sounds sensible, right? But what's overlooked in this logic is the type of punishment that officials can potentially face, because this impacts how we look at both democratic and authoritarian states. For the purposes of this blog post, let's focus on authoritarian states. The chances that authoritarian leaders will face punishment for any wrongheaded decision is possible, but mostly unlikely. The immediate source of such punishment will come from people (family, ethnic kin, co-religionists, bureaucrats) who depend on these leaders for wealth, power, and prestige. They might voice their frustrations and disagreement, but probably won't rock the boat. There's too much at stake for them.
Yet at rare moments, there are events so repugnant and so momentous as to galvanize and stimulate grassroots anti-government movements into political action. Such events also risk degrading elite support for the government and emboldening dissenting elites to compete for domestic political power. If grassroots and/or elite opponents put enough pressure on dictators, making the prospect of punishment seem likely, then leadership incentives begin to change.
Consider the following quote from my dissertation, which contains the punchline:
The type of nondemocratic punishment could be severe and harsh. Aside from the instances in which transitions in power are managed in private by elites (such as 19th century Spain, contemporary China, and so on), a major mode of engineering nondemocratic change is through internal revolt, which carries the threat of punishment, exile, and death to existing nondemocratic elites. Obviously, a number of cases throughout non-first world countries fit this description today. To take one current newsworthy illustration, Pervez Musharraf took power in Pakistan via a military coup in October 1999, which led to the ousting of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who then went into exile abroad. But since then, in the absence of elections in a country with pockets of politico-religious extremists, Musharraf himself has been the target of several assassination attempts. In general, severe punishment could occur for several reasons. The opposition-turned-ruling elite might seek revenge for previous repression. Severe punishment might be viewed as a vehicle to deter future repressive activities and exclusionary control by nondemocratic elites. And finally, it might be employed to prevent the old guard from re-constituting itself and coordinating behavior by rallying around former leaders and their associates. Nondemocratic elites have an incentive to avoid deeply unpopular situations... which over time could inflame anti-government sentiment and action, for they potentially place the life of themselves, as well as their friends, associates, and family, in jeopardy.
So what should dictators do under these circumstances? They ought to take measures to preserve and guarantee their personal safety, not escalate disputes with their opponents. At this point, dictators can't undo past misdeeds, can't make sincere apologies or take back policies. It's too late. These things won't be enough to satisfy the opposition. It would be more sensible to back down to opposition demands, typically by stepping down from office, whether via a negotiated exit or by unilaterally fleeing the country. This is what Hosni Mubarak and Ben Ali did and it saved their lives, and it also placed their countries in a better position to pursue political stability and democratic reforms.
Now, this doesn't mean leaders will necessarily act according to the logic indicated above. They could ignore these incentives and pressures, for various reasons. As examples, ego, lust for power, belief in their invincibility, and so on, might trump any punishment concerns. And so leaders like al-Assad or Ali Abdullah Saleh might not step aside, even though they and their country would be better off in the end. But should they go this route, preferring to fight until the end, they'll make a huge gamble, one that could cost them their lives.
Let's look at Saleh's situation in more detail. I have no idea what choice Ali Abdullah Saleh, the embattled President of Yemen, will make, though he should clearly understand the point I'm making here. His country has been ripped apart by the Arab Spring, along with other factors, and he's already suffered serious wounds from a June attack on the presidential compound, which forced him to head to Saudi Arabia for surgery and recovery. Many foreign affairs observers believed that Saleh would remain in Saudi Arabia, thereby valuing his health and security over any hubristic interests. Yet in late September, Saleh arrived back in Yemen, where conflict and violence is ongoing. If Saleh doesn't agree to a transition in power and negotiated departure from Yemen sometime very soon, the chances are that he'll get killed in some fashion. The writing is on the wall.
An email has been circulating lately, stating how life was beautiful under Qaddafi:
16 Things Libya Will Never See Again
There is no electricity bill in Libya; electricity is free for all its citizens.
There is no interest on loans, banks in Libya are state-owned and loans given to all its citizens at zero percent interest by law.
Having a home considered a human right in Libya.
All newlyweds in Libya receive $60,000 dinar (U.S.$50,000) by the government to buy their first apartment so to help start up the family.
Education and medical treatments are free in Libya. Before Gaddafi only 25 percent of Libyans were literate. Today, the figure is 83 percent.
Should Libyans want to take up farming career, they would receive farming land, a farming house, equipments, seeds and livestock to kick start their farms are all for free.
If Libyans cannot find the education or medical facilities they need, the government funds them to go abroad, for it is not only paid for, but they get a U.S.$2,300/month for accommodation and car allowance.
If a Libyan buys a car, the government subsidizes 50 percent of the price.
The price of petrol in Libya is $0.14 per liter.
Libya has no external debt and its reserves amounting to $150 billion are now frozen globally.
If a Libyan is unable to get employment after graduation the state would pay the average salary of the profession, as if he or she is employed, until employment is found.
A portion of every Libyan oil sale is credited directly to the bank accounts of all Libyan citizens.
A mother who gives birth to a child receive U.S.$5,000.
40 loaves of bread in Libya costs $0.15.
25 percent of Libyans have a university degree.
Gaddafi carried out the world’s largest irrigation project, known as the Great Manmade River project, to make water readily available throughout the desert country.
Is it true? Did NATO demolish an Eden on earth, and was Qaddafi actually a really nice, generous guy? Hmm, let check some facts, shall we?
Note that I cannot find confirmation for some of these 16 assertions nor evidence against them. In those cases, I tend to think of them as something the writer pulled from the thin air, but then again, I would love to have a real native Libyan to check this list and correct me if I am wrong.
1. There is no electricity bill in Libya; electricity is free for all its citizens.
During the summer of 2004, Libya was hit by widespread blackouts as power plants could not keep up with demand. To prevent such blackouts in the future and to meet surging power consumption, Libya's state-owned General Electricity Company (GECOL) has plans to spend $3.5 billion through 2010 building eight new combined cycle and steam cycle power plants. As of late 2004, however, construction had started at only one of the new plants, in part due to the fact that GECOL has serious financing issues due in part to low, subsidized electricity prices (around 0.02 Libyan Dinars per kilowatt hour) and also to the fact that only 40% of Libyans pay their power bills.
Whaddya know. They did have to pay power bills, though only 40% paid them. Plus, as the old adage that "there is no such thing as a free lunch," the low electricity bill made it difficult for the power company to invest in new generators.
2. There is no interest on loans, banks in Libya are state-owned and loans given to all its citizens at zero percent interest by law.
4. The board of directors of the Central Bank of Libya has taken several resolutions , in which it reconsidered some of the utilizations and rates of monetary policy tools that have been applied prior to the year 2004, including the following:
- Resolution no. (8) of the year 2004 related to cutting down the rediscount rate applied by the Central Bank of Libya from 5.0% to 4.0%.
- Resolution no. (16) of the year 2004 related to cutting down the minimum interest rate on loans and credits granted for productive purposes from 7.0% to 3.0%.
- Resolution no. (28) of the year 2004 related to the permission to the commercial banks for granting loans and credits for the foreign companies executing projects in Libya.
- Resolution no.(15) of the year 2005 related to cutting down the interest rate given by the Central Bank of Libya on the commercial banks deposits with the bank from 2.5% to 1.75%, in order to motivate them to seek other domestic investment and finance areas that help in achieving the desired economic growth.
- Resolution no.(36) of the year 2005 related to the liberalization of the interest rates on deposits, letting the negotiations over these rates to the bank and his customers.
- Resolution no.(39) of the year 2005 concerning the uniformity of debited interest rates on all loans and credits granted by the commercial banks to be equivalent to the rediscount rate of the Central Bank of Libya plus a percentage not exceeding 2.5%.
Even Islamic Banking had to generate some profit and use various means to disguise loans in their operations, as noted in Wikipedia's article on Islamic Banking:
Because Islam forbids simply lending out money at interest (see riba), Islamic rules on transactions (known as Fiqh al-Muamalat) have been created to avoid this problem. The basic technique to avoid the prohibition is the sharing of profit and loss, via terms such as profit sharing (Mudharabah), safekeeping (Wadiah), joint venture (Musharakah), cost plus (Murabahah), and leasing (Ijar).
3. Having a home considered a human right in Libya.
Property ownership is a public interest. But according to Qadhafi’s Green Book (Manifesto), private ownership is recognized as long as it is non-exploitative. In May 1978, a law was passed granting each citizen the right to own one house.
The Libyan government eliminated all private property rights and most private businesses in 1978. The renting of property was declared illegal, and ownership of property was limited to a single dwelling per family, with all other properties being redistributed. The judiciary is not independent, the private practice of law is illegal, and all lawyers must be members of the Secretariat of Justice. There is little land ownership, and the government has the power to renationalize any property that has been privatized.
Plus, why don't you check this house and this description, and wonder if everyone in Libya could live in places like that.
4. All newlyweds in Libya receive $60,000 dinar (U.S.$50,000) by the government to buy their first apartment so to help start up the family.
I cannot find anything confirming or disproving this sentence. That's what annoying about claims like this: you cannot trace the insinuation back to its source.
5. Education and medical treatments are free in Libya. Before Gaddafi only 25 percent of Libyans were literate. Today, the figure is 83 percent.
The reality of Libya’s health sector to those who know it is far from it. In fact the GPC for Health’s own website - www.health.gov.ly – carries an attachment of a United Nations World Health Organisation (WHO) 2007 report on the Libyan health sector which is very critical.
The report which engages in detailed analyses of Libya’s health sector informs that ‘in comparison to its MENA (Middle East North Africa) peers, Libya spends much less on health care as a % of GDP - about 3.3% - but a similar amount in absolute terms. When adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries, Libya spends only USD 222 per person per annum’.
It goes on to reveal that ‘the Government spends 60 million Libyan dinars (LD) annually for medical treatment of Libyan citizens abroad. More is spent out-of-pocket (privately) by Libyans traveling for treatment to Arab countries and Europe’.
‘Despite guaranteed free medical care in the public sector, Libyans are opting to purchase private medical care, in order to receive a higher level of service. This money is spent in two main areas. There is a small but growing private health care sector in Libya.
This mostly provides primary and basic secondary care through 431 outpatient clinics and 84 inpatient clinics, with the bed capacity of 1361’.
However, the report concludes that this ‘small but growing (Libyan) private health sector continues to be hampered by the lack of an overall policy approach to the sector from the health authorities.’
According to a UNESCO report from 2007, Libya ranks 113th in the world in terms of illiteracy levels. And although Libya's illiteracy rate of 17.6 percent is one of the lowest in North Africa, and although it has the third highest number of people in higher education of any Arab country apart from Jordan and Palestine, this oil-rich, sparsely populated country has a real problem when it comes to its education system – and that is its low quality.
6. Should Libyans want to take up farming career, they would receive farming land, a farming house, equipments, seeds and livestock to kick start their farms are all for free.
Since 1977 families receive enough land to satisfy their personal requirements; this policy was designed to prevent large private sector farms and end using fertile "tribal" lands for grazing. Partly as a result of these policies and Islamic inheritance law, which stipulate each son receive an equal share of land upon the father's death, in 1986 farms tended to be fragmented and too small to efficiently use water. This was especially severe in the Jifara Plain, which has been Libya's single most productive agricultural region.
7. If Libyans cannot find the education or medical facilities they need, the government funds them to go abroad, for it is not only paid for, but they get a U.S.$2,300/month for accommodation and car allowance.
I cannot find anything supporting or disproving this assertion.
8. If a Libyan buys a car, the government subsidizes 50 percent of the price.
Nothing on this either. Though, to be honest, I think this assertion is stupid. If true, this could be the worst policy ever thought by any paper-pusher in any ministry because this encourages gas-guzzling culture and traffic jams, not to mention a huge drain on foreign reserves due to the lack of domestic car industry in Libya.
Besides, if the price of cars are really low in Libya, why doesn't everyone there ride in expensive Ferraris or Jaguars? And even with the 50% discount, the rate of car ownership is still low. I'd say something is wrong with the economy.
In 2000, Qaddafi lifted a longtime ban on S.U.V.s, and prosperous Libyans went out and imported Hummers and Range Rovers. Three months later, the Leader decided that he had made a mistake, and he outlawed them again, leaving a large number of privileged Libyans owning vehicles that it was illegal to drive. “You can tell if you’ve reached the top,” a young Libyan told me, “if you listen to a lot of conversation about S.U.V.s rusting in the garage.”
9. The price of petrol in Libya is $0.14 per liter.
Petrol is very cheap in Libya, which compensates for all the above costs: one of the cheapest in the world. Some tourists find it "bizarre" that alcohol-free beer costs 5 Libyan dinars, when 10 litres of petrol cost 2 Libyan dinars. As in any other country, imported goods are generally more expensive than goods produced locally.
Petrol : 20p a litre (0.20 LYD). Diesel : 15p a litre (0.15 LYD).
Update: (March 2011):
Libya has slashed petrol prices in Libya by 25%. The price of one litre of petrol is now 15 pence, down by 5 pence from 20 pence.
Still, this does not prove that life was beautiful under Qaddafi. Many authoritarian countries have learned to keep the price of both bread and gasoline low, in order to prevent social unrest.
10. Libya has no external debt and its reserves amounting to $150 billion are now frozen globally.
Mostly true. (PDF report from Rabo Bank). However, the total amount of reserve is US$100 billion.
11. If a Libyan is unable to get employment after graduation the state would pay the average salary of the profession, as if he or she is employed, until employment is found.
The civil service, which employs about twenty per cent of Libyans, is vastly oversubscribed; the National Oil Company, with a staff of forty thousand, has perhaps twice the employees it needs. Though salaries are capped, many people are paid for multiple jobs, and, if those jobs are overseen by members of their tribe, failure to show up is never questioned. On the other hand, because food is heavily subsidized, people can get by on very little money, enabling them to refuse jobs they consider beneath them. Heavy labor is done by sub-Saharan Africans, and slightly more skilled work by Egyptians.
“We have a paradoxical economy, in which we have many unemployed Libyans”—the official unemployment rate is almost thirty per cent—“and two million foreigners working,” Ghanem said. “This mismatch is catastrophic.” The combination of an imported workforce with high domestic unemployment is typical of oil-rich nations, but the problem is especially urgent in Libya because its population is growing rapidly—it is not unusual to meet people with fourteen children in a single marriage. Roughly half the population is under the age of fifteen.
In essence, Libya's job market under Qaddafi was simply so messed up thanks to nepotism and low quality of education.
12. A portion of every Libyan oil sale is credited directly to the bank accounts of all Libyan citizens.
No information available, but I find it very doubtful.
13. A mother who gives birth to a child receive U.S.$5,000.
Can't confirm or reject this claim. Again, no information available.
Oil money continues to make possible Libya’s subsidy programs—the socialism in the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya concept. NASCO pays twenty-six dinars for a hundred-and-ten-pound bag of flour and sells it to bakers for two dinars; you can buy a loaf of bread for two cents. Rice, sugar, tea, pasta, and gasoline are also sold for a fraction of their cost. Economic reform will involve scaling back these subsidies (which currently amount to about six hundred million dollars a year) without impoverishing or starving people—which is all the more difficult given that wages have been frozen since 1982. Meanwhile, there is little credit available in Libya: no Libyan-issued credit cards can be used internationally; no financial institution meets international banking standards.
Compounding the problem of graft is a shortage of basic operational competence. I went to a session of a leadership training program in Tripoli, organized by Cambridge Energy Research Associates and the Monitor Group, two American consulting firms that are advising the Libyan government. The foreign organizers had been determined to include the people they thought had the strongest leadership potential, but some local officials wanted to choose on the basis of connections. The compromise was neither wholly meritocratic nor purely corrupt. To some in the group, capitalism was still a novelty; others were ready for corner offices at Morgan Stanley. They role-played. They made speeches through crackly microphones under gigantic portraits of the Leader. Some described sophisticated financial instruments and drew flow charts; there was talk of “leveraged buyouts” and “institutional investors” and “a zero-sum game.” On the other hand, one participant, dressed in a shabby suit and a bright tie, was asked how he would fund a construction project, and replied, vaguely, “Don’t banks do that?” Another was surprised to learn that international backers usually expect interest or profit-sharing in return for risking their money. Libyan business, it’s clear, will be led by people of impressive competence and by people of no competence.
16. Gaddafi carried out the world’s largest irrigation project, known as the Great Manmade River project, to make water readily available throughout the desert country.
Still, even people considered as horrible dictators still did many great public works. Autobahn during Hitler's era? Stalin's many public works? Oh, feel free to ignore some minor historical inconveniences such as the gulags.
-------------
So what's my conclusion?
1. Many of the assertions in the lists are either wrong or true only with qualification. Several of them simply have no basis at all.
2. What's really interesting is that this list omits the fact that there was an extreme lack of political freedom under Qaddafi.
3. People should learn to use a nifty tool called "google.com." By doing some research, people can easily find out many factual errors in the list that in the end bring into question the credibility of the assembler of this list.
EDIT:
I received some comments from my email. Posted here:
--A libyan friend replied, clarifying the truth
1) electricity has never been free
2) we don’t have any Islamic banks , not even one, if u wanna loan, enjoy the interset because it’s ur only option. that’s way no one goes for this option
3) A tent?? Go count how many houses each of his sons have in every area in libya
4)the forth point is really funny,, if it was true I wud’ve been a madam now. It’s totally the opposite
5) yeah yeah that’s why we all run to Tunisia if we get a common cold…sad to mention but the education n treatment suck
6) hahahhahahahah yes good luck farming in the desert because all the lands r possessed by his relatives n ppl from his hometown
7) huh??? What the hell?? U r lucky if u could treat urself in the government hospital (one of ur relatives must be SOMETHING there )
8)well I would say that cars r a bit cheaper than here but never dream to get a RM ..I mean a Dinar from the government
9)yes Libya is the cheapest in terms of petrol but u should know that the whole petrol profit including the imported goes directly to gaddafi’s pocket n he declared it in one of his speech saying: the petrol profit is non of ur business
10) I’m not sure about that but,, the country lacks the basic n the simplest facilities so the external debts is the last thing to mention
11) WRONG! Look at the number of unemployed ppl ,, well my brother is oil engineer (in an oil producing country) n he’s not employed yet and there’s no onepaying him even one dinar.
12) hahahahahahahahahahahah
13) wow,, my mother gave birth 12 times(mashallah) n she never received a cent
14) well it’s cheap …to be precise 40 loaves cost 6 RM
15) 25% ????? I don’t understand ,, refer to the P-value
16)hahahahaha yes the contaminated dirty water that no one use …n that he calls ( the 8th wonder of the world)
This next reaction is edited. I hate all-caps answer.
Where do I start? I'm married to a Libyan and have lived here since 1983. Like everyone else in the country, 1. We pay for electricity. We average 34 Dinars a month. But that can double in winter because of heating and in summer with the use of air conditioning.
2. There have not been no-interest loans since the late seventies.
3. Having a home should be a human right but just less than half a mile form here, many Libyan homeless families live in dilapidated shacks abandoned by a company years ago. Some have lived there for years in squalor.
4. Newlyweds don't get one red cent towards an apartment, my son in low converted two rooms form his parents' apartment into a tiny studio for my daughter and he. This story is repeated nationwide for many couples, some with children.
5. No way is 83 percent of the population literate. Most women over 60 are not educated. Neither are about one fifth of the women beneath and many children leave without graduating, often languishing in same grade for years. School is not compulsory.
6. A select few were given farms in the late seventies. However, they weren't allowed to hire help, therefore making it difficult to break even.
7. If you need medical help outside or want to study, you need clout on the board as these things are decided by a committee. Lack of confidence in health system has resulted in pushing people into debt in order to get treatment outside popular destinations are Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia due to affordability.
8. The Libyan government pays nothing towards the cost of a car. But those in the right circles may get one at cost price.
9. Finally something close to the truth. Libyans pay no more at the petrol pumps than about 150 dirhams per liter depending on type.
10. Right again! Libyan assets abroad exceeded 150 Billion and they have no debt. Nether should they have, considering how little of its enormous wealth has trickled down to the marginalized majority.
11. Once upon a time, no one who graduated waited longer than a few weeks for a job within the civil service or the nationalized industries. However, I only know of benefit being paid where the father is unemployed, retired, or dead. However, I do know that undergraduates could apply for seasonal work and get paid sometimes without having to do the job. Corruption was rife this time of opportunity was kept on the down low and nepotism and cronyism meant that those in charge kept most of the money in the family, quietly sidelining many possibly entitled students.
12. That a portion of the receipts from oil sales is credited to every Libyan citizen's bank account is an outright lie.
13. And it is another outrages lie that mothers in Libya receives $5,000 every time she gives birth.
14. Bread is cheap. 40 small cost 1 Dinar in point of fact flour, rice, oil and tomato paste were all hugely subsidized by the government until a couple of years ago and the subsidies were being gradually reintroduced to try and avoid a backlash to the global price rises. Libyans eat meals that are high in carbohydrates because they are economical as opposed to high protein meals which are expensive. This has led to a high incidence of obesity and type-2 diabetes.
15. 25 percent of people do not have a degree but perhaps 25 percent of high school graduates go on to college but not all complete that.
16. The great man made river project was a white elephant that cost a fortune and hasn't delivered as it should. A bunch of desalinization plants up and down the coast would have sufficed at a fraction of the cost and consider how easy it was for Gadhaffi's militias to cut off the water supply of any city they attacked.
Four months ago, terrorist ring leader, founder of Jemaah Islamiah, Mr. Abu Bakar Bashir was sentenced to 15 years prison. Back then, I stressed the fact that his organization was no longer important and thus the court was willing to gave such a long sentence on him.
Today, it was reported that apparently the higher court reduced his sentence to nine years in prison. There was no explanation for this reduction, though according to VIVAnews, the reduction was based on humanitarian grounds, that Bashir is a 73-year old man. This means that should the Supreme Court uphold this new sentence, Bashir could be free as early as by the end of 2017.
Considering the fact that there is a lack of transparency in the Indonesian justice system, trying to understand the court's rationale is like reading tea-leaves, as it gives more questions than answers. Still, let me offer a few thoughts on this case.
First, being a judge in a higher court is a thankless job. His or her decision is not final: it can still be appealed further to the Supreme Court. Worse, unpopular decisions can serve as a death knell to a judge's career. In contrast, judges in lower court have more leeway, and besides, they are low ranking officials anyway with a lot of cases to decide. A few stupid or unpopular decisions won't hurt their careers to the same extent as judges higher up the ladder.
Bashir's trial is to some degree a hot potato. True, Bashir's influence has been declining and he doesn't pose the same kind of pernicious threat to Indonesia he did about a decade ago. But he does have some very vocal supporters, and some unscrupulous politicians likely want to court them to further their own self-interests. And in the process of doing so, these politicians will criticize and vilify the judges. Meantime, the judges look out for their long-term interests (e.g. a Supreme Court Justice nomination), trying to prevent any chance that their rulings may later backfire on them. So what happens? The courts cave into existing political pressures.
I'd also hazard to guess that the reduction was simply the court's way of telling Bashir's supporters and other fundamentalists to go away and kicked the can further down the road to the Supreme Court. A six year reduction in sentence isn't particularly extensive, but at the same time, it's still significant, considering Mr. Bashir's age. The court is likely covering its back, and letting the Supreme Court take the heat on whatever sentence he'll finally receive.
Thus, Bashir's saga is interesting, not that it shows that Bashir is still relevant, but because it reveals the dysfunctional Indonesian justice system, in that the court can still be influenced and bullied by either popular will or political pressures.
Over the last few days, Former CIA chief and current U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta trekked to Asia for a series of security meetings. Panetta first visited Indonesia, where he met Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro (pictured above with Panetta). While in Bali, Panetta also visited the ten defense secretaries in town for an ASEAN meeting. He then moved on to meet with senior-level officials in Japan and South Korea, including Prime Minister Naoto Kan and President Lee Myung-bak.
This is the latest salvo in the Obama administration’s very public efforts to highlight the importance of Asia to American foreign policy. Just look at the effort that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, just by herself, has invested in Asia. In less than three years on the job, Clinton has already traveled seven times to the region. She recently penned a lengthy article in Foreign Policy magazine, in which she outlined Washington’s intentions to devote substantially more diplomatic, economic, and security resources to Asia in the coming years. In a prior visit to Indonesia, in 2009, Clinton signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation on behalf of America.
But beyond Clinton, the U.S. more generally has taken on a more active role in Asia. It has upgraded its status in and commitment to Asian institutions like ASEAN and APEC. Washington just completed a much-valued trade deal with South Korea. America has launched the bilateral "Strategic and Economic Dialogue" with China, which is designed as a problem-solving workshop for the two countries. The U.S. has clearly beefed up its ties with India. America has worked to enhance its security and military ties to such countries as Australia and Singapore. And an An array of high-profile U.S. officials from the Obama administration have already visited Indonesia, including Panetta, former Defense head Robert Gates, Clinton, and Barack Obama. And Obama will be back there this November, when he participates in the upcoming East-Asia Summit.
What does all of these moves, including Panetta’s visit, mean?
First, Washington sees Asia as a crucial hub for a number of important, arguably global-defining, matters, including trade and finance issues, economic growth, security affairs, nuclear proliferation, cybersecurity, territorial and maritime disputes, climate change, and human rights.
Second, Obama wants to solidify America’s leadership in the region. The U.S. is now beginning to transition away from focusing so much on the Middle East. It’s soon ending its war in Iraq and in the process of drawing down its forces in Afghanistan. And in place of its near obsession with the politics and violence of the Middle East, the Obama administration wants to spend more time and energy to Asia.
Many American academics, journalists, bureaucrats, and elected officials, including Obama himself, seem convinced that the 21st century will be defined by countries like China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia.
This is an area of the world that can’t be ignored. Military might, economic growth, and population expansion–three key indicators of power–all tell us that power is likely, though not by no means definitively, shifting Eastward. If the U.S. is not fully engaged in the region, and is instead distracted and preoccupied with other world affairs, other parts of the world, then it risks having the world pass it by.
And lastly, we ought not forget the China factor. While there are some bureaucrats in Washington who fear the rise of China, the White House doesn’t. But it does have doubts and suspicions about China. And so the U.S. is pursuing a policy approach known widely as "hedged integration." It's been adopted by The White House, both Republican and Democratic administrations, for decades. According to David Lampton:
"The concrete manifestation of this policy has been the combination of "balance" and "integration", as Joseph Nye put it in a recent address at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "Balance" refers to the use of all instruments of power, particularly hard instruments, to prevent the dominance of others, while "integration" refers to the use of all instruments of power, particularly soft ones, to bring China into an interdependent international system in which it hopefully will develop shared responsibility for system maintenance"
Hence, hedged integration works in two steps. First, U.S. has tried to envelop China in a web of interdependencies via a host of bilateral and multilateral ties. The prevailing wisdom is that these ties, mostly though not exclusively economic in nature, will make it too costly for China to wreck relations with the U.S. and other countries in Asia. Rather, these ties will push China toward supporting the international and regional status quo.
But just in case this doesn’t work, America has a back-up plan, a second step in its policy toward China. Over decades it has created, sustained, and enhanced security relations with many Asian countries. After all, consider the following. The U.S. has thousands of troops in the region, is a major supplier of arms and defense capabilities, and has good military contacts with its counterparts in Asia. This is the coercive element to America's approach to China and is done to keep China in check.
Clearly, Panetta’s visit can be seen in this light. While Clinton and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner work to reassure China in various ways, Panetta looks to galvanize support from Asian defense officials for America. This alerts China that, despite its growing power, it faces constraints and limitations in Asia. It must not act too aggressively, because there’s potentially a counter-coalition of countries, U.S. included, that might confront Beijing.
This potential outcome, in turn, will be influenced by the one million dollar question: how did Qaddafi die? Did he die in his attempt to escape or was he was executed in cold-blood? The answer to the question likely determines whether the tribes that had the strongest bonds with Qaddafi will grudgingly accept the new government or resist it.
Should Qaddafi die with his dignity intact, the tribes might grumble, but in the end, they will likely accept the authority of the new government. If Qaddafi was humiliated and executed, however, it might create a huge uproar, and the death of Qaddafi would be used as a rallying point to fight the new Libyan government. Combined with the inability of the NTC to keep the tribes united, this would be a lethal combination for an extended violent conflict.
What should the NTC do? First, it needs to treat Qaddafi's remains with dignity. It is very tempting to desecrate the remains of someone who treated you harshly for decades, but in the end, Qaddafi still had many supporters and the last thing the NTC currently needs at this point is to foment an uprising. It needs to conduct a thorough investigation on how Qaddafi died, and make sure should there be some misconduct, the NTC should take appropriate measures.
Second, the NTC should start building a strong and professional army and police forces. Together, both could go a long way toward attempting to impose order and disarm the militias, thereby creating a peaceful environments for the population. As long as the militias remain running unhindered with arms, these groups will create long-term troubles.
