Brad made a good rebuttal to my points, but here is my counter-response to him.
First, I think Brad missed my point of the "Osama Bump" for Obama. No credible analyst will ever claim that Obama can win the 2012 election based on his accomplishment on nabbing Osama alone. The economy is important, and Bush, Sr. found this out to his chagrin back in 1992.
What Obama squandered was the idea that the Republicans could no longer assail Democrats on "weak foreign policy," that Republicans always get the job done and Democrats always mess things up. Here, Obama showed that he managed to clean up the mess that he inherited from Bush. Thus, he would be able to show a contrast that he's a results-oriented president.
He squandered his mojo by his ill-timed speech on Israel. I agree that he did the speech to preempt the Palestinians from pushing it in the United Nations on September. Still, why then? Why a day before Netanyahu visited the United States and a few days after Mitchell resigned? Why he didn't invest some of his time dealing with this issue last year? He had snubbed Netanyahu in his last visit and in doing this speech, he did that twice, and not surprisingly, the Republicans just smelled blood and the Democrats went on the defensive. Had Obama really been serious in dealing with Israeli-Palestinian issue, he'd have put a lot of backing behind Mitchell (e.g. by trying to mend bridges with Netanyahu, while at the same time trying to strengthen Abbas' position). Instead, he waited until the PA decided to drop a bombshell by making an agreement with Hamas.
That's what I call a clueless foreign policy. Instead of leading, he is reacting to developments. It is not the no-cookie-cutter approach that I dislike. Frankly, I hate a cookie cutter approach, as each country has its own characteristics, making a cookie cutter approach another disaster in the making. The problem is that there is simply no leadership, that he does not seem to be engaged with neither the region nor the leaders. Even after he engaged with the region, he had to confront Israeli-Palestinian problem at the worst possible time.
Interestingly though, even though people might have hated Bush's foreign policy, and Bush's worldwide popularity was horrid, he was surprisingly able to build good working relationships with leaders all over the world.
I may be heading to a rough spot here, but I argue that one can only lead if he/she knows where they are headed. Thus, I argue that Obama's lack of leadership in the Middle East is because he simply has no idea of what to do and where to go. He has no foreign policy and that's because he is ignorant to the developments there. He is surrounded by great people, such as Hillary Clinton, Samantha Power, George Mitchell, Dennis Ross, and various other experts (who disagree with each other), and yet he was caught flatfooted for weeks after the uprising in Tunisia started and after the revolution struck Cairo.
That's what I call lack of leadership.
Center for World Conflict and Peace
Saturday, June 11, 2011
Obama Foreign Policy: A Response to Yohanes
Here are a few quick thoughts, comments, and questions in response to Yohanes’ post on Obama.
1. Sure, a number of American commentators did wonder if the death of bin Laden enhanced Obama’s reelection chances. But let’s not overplay this. As early as a few days after Osama’s killing, that specific speculation about Obama in 2012 was displaced by different a prognostication. Indeed, most now argue that no matter what Obama does on foreign policy, his reelection will likely be determined by whether America's sluggish economic growth and high unemployment improves. Indeed, I've heard quite a few comparisons between the current plight of Obama and the predicament in which George H.W. Bush found himself in 1991-92, which should please Republicans and their supporters.
2. With that in mind, I don’t think Obama "squandered" his bump in approval as much as he was overtaken by events on other issue-areas. It was inevitable, given the poor U.S. economy.
3. Did the Obama and his associates try to "soak credit" for killing bin Laden? Or were they simply trying to get out an important story as quickly as possible? The answers to these questions are heavily dependent on how one views Team Obama.
4. Sure, there have been missteps, but it is an overstatement to say that all of Obama's recent moves have yielded bad news. Here are a few examples: There's good news from Libya. The so-called rebels are continuing to advance, making progress toward ousting Gaddafi. Obama's speech to AIPAC received good reviews. Obama's plan for economic assistance to Egypt and Tunisia is key to ensuring that democracy and liberalism are gradually but firmly anchored in both countries. These might not be enough to satisfyYohanes, but they do count for something.
5. I think Obama's intentions regarding Israel are misunderstood or mischaracterized (or both) by the American right. Arguably, he forced the issue of peace talks a bit with Israel out of concern for that country. He knows that Israel could find itself even more isolated (a point I made here) if the status quo continues to hold until September, the time at which the Palestinians might push the issue of statehood at the UN. This is a view shared by Tony Blair. And as Israel’s main supporter and benefactor, Obama also knows that if Israel takes a hit internationally, so will Washington, possibly from many different directions. Saudi Arabia has already promised "disastrous consequences" for its relations with the U.S. should Washington veto the Palestinian bid for statehood at the UN.
6. Yohanes claims that Obama’s not an expert on foreign policy. But how would we know if Obama is indeed such an expert? By the decisions he makes? Bad decisions don't mean Obama lacks sufficient foreign policy knowledge, just as good decisions don’t necessarily imply he has a wealth of foreign policy expertise. Take the example of Jimmy Carter. The conventional wisdom is that he made bad policy decisions but possessed a good understanding of international politics. The punchline: decision-making is an inadequate proxy for it doesn't adequately capture what's in the head of leaders. By the way, out of fairness, I believe my argument here should be applied to George W. Bush, someone who was widely panned as a foreign policy dolt. Maybe he was, maybe he wasn't. That's almost beside the point. The more important issue is how we would operationalize "knowledge" or "understanding."
7. It seems the main argument Yohanes makes is really less about Obama's foreign policy ideas and knowledge and more about the overall foreign policy process in the Obama administration. That is, his real concern is about how Obama engages with the policy process, how he interacts with staff and cabinet, and the messaging from the administration. In my view, for reasons I previously cited here, I see this as a very legitimate criticism. After more than two years in office, it's disappointing that the U.S. foreign policy process under Obama doesn't function more smoothly and efficiently.
8. By now, it is apparent Obama does have a plan for the Arab Spring. It’s just one that Yohanes and others, especially people in the region, might not like, and that's understandable. Obama wants to treat each case of democratization on its own terms. The justification for this singular approach is that each case is shaped by its own set of external and internal variables. Cookie cutter solutions, so goes the logic, are ill-suited to deal with the Arab Spring. That’s the plan. The downfall is that, to his critics, this approach doesn’t seem like much of a plan. Perhaps. And it also leaves people in the Arab world extremely disappointed, because Obama, despite his repeated soaring appeals to democratic ideas and institutions and so on, won’t advocate for democracy equally across the Middle East. It only reinforces the notion that the U.S. is a hypocritical country.
1. Sure, a number of American commentators did wonder if the death of bin Laden enhanced Obama’s reelection chances. But let’s not overplay this. As early as a few days after Osama’s killing, that specific speculation about Obama in 2012 was displaced by different a prognostication. Indeed, most now argue that no matter what Obama does on foreign policy, his reelection will likely be determined by whether America's sluggish economic growth and high unemployment improves. Indeed, I've heard quite a few comparisons between the current plight of Obama and the predicament in which George H.W. Bush found himself in 1991-92, which should please Republicans and their supporters.
2. With that in mind, I don’t think Obama "squandered" his bump in approval as much as he was overtaken by events on other issue-areas. It was inevitable, given the poor U.S. economy.
3. Did the Obama and his associates try to "soak credit" for killing bin Laden? Or were they simply trying to get out an important story as quickly as possible? The answers to these questions are heavily dependent on how one views Team Obama.
4. Sure, there have been missteps, but it is an overstatement to say that all of Obama's recent moves have yielded bad news. Here are a few examples: There's good news from Libya. The so-called rebels are continuing to advance, making progress toward ousting Gaddafi. Obama's speech to AIPAC received good reviews. Obama's plan for economic assistance to Egypt and Tunisia is key to ensuring that democracy and liberalism are gradually but firmly anchored in both countries. These might not be enough to satisfyYohanes, but they do count for something.
5. I think Obama's intentions regarding Israel are misunderstood or mischaracterized (or both) by the American right. Arguably, he forced the issue of peace talks a bit with Israel out of concern for that country. He knows that Israel could find itself even more isolated (a point I made here) if the status quo continues to hold until September, the time at which the Palestinians might push the issue of statehood at the UN. This is a view shared by Tony Blair. And as Israel’s main supporter and benefactor, Obama also knows that if Israel takes a hit internationally, so will Washington, possibly from many different directions. Saudi Arabia has already promised "disastrous consequences" for its relations with the U.S. should Washington veto the Palestinian bid for statehood at the UN.
6. Yohanes claims that Obama’s not an expert on foreign policy. But how would we know if Obama is indeed such an expert? By the decisions he makes? Bad decisions don't mean Obama lacks sufficient foreign policy knowledge, just as good decisions don’t necessarily imply he has a wealth of foreign policy expertise. Take the example of Jimmy Carter. The conventional wisdom is that he made bad policy decisions but possessed a good understanding of international politics. The punchline: decision-making is an inadequate proxy for it doesn't adequately capture what's in the head of leaders. By the way, out of fairness, I believe my argument here should be applied to George W. Bush, someone who was widely panned as a foreign policy dolt. Maybe he was, maybe he wasn't. That's almost beside the point. The more important issue is how we would operationalize "knowledge" or "understanding."
7. It seems the main argument Yohanes makes is really less about Obama's foreign policy ideas and knowledge and more about the overall foreign policy process in the Obama administration. That is, his real concern is about how Obama engages with the policy process, how he interacts with staff and cabinet, and the messaging from the administration. In my view, for reasons I previously cited here, I see this as a very legitimate criticism. After more than two years in office, it's disappointing that the U.S. foreign policy process under Obama doesn't function more smoothly and efficiently.
8. By now, it is apparent Obama does have a plan for the Arab Spring. It’s just one that Yohanes and others, especially people in the region, might not like, and that's understandable. Obama wants to treat each case of democratization on its own terms. The justification for this singular approach is that each case is shaped by its own set of external and internal variables. Cookie cutter solutions, so goes the logic, are ill-suited to deal with the Arab Spring. That’s the plan. The downfall is that, to his critics, this approach doesn’t seem like much of a plan. Perhaps. And it also leaves people in the Arab world extremely disappointed, because Obama, despite his repeated soaring appeals to democratic ideas and institutions and so on, won’t advocate for democracy equally across the Middle East. It only reinforces the notion that the U.S. is a hypocritical country.
The other side of the globe: On Spratly
Before someone decides to rename this blog "Center for Middle Eastern Conflict and Peace," let us move to the diplomatic standoff between China and both the Philippines and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands. For the past few days, angry words have been traded between Beijing, Manila, and Hanoi over clashes between Chinese "fishing boats" and Vietnamese exploration vessels.
The situation is dicey because the status of the Spratly Islands is currently under dispute between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippine, Malaysia, and even Brunei. The reason? It is strategically positioned, right in the middle of commercial shipping lanes and one of the world's most productive areas for fishing. Still, the best part is that it has tons of oil and natural gas (fourth largest reserve bed in the world), with major windfalls for energy-hungry Asian nations.
While the dispute has been ongoing for decades, it is only in the past few years that the surrounding countries have started to complain that China is overtly aggressive in staking its claim over the islands. Even though at this point it is still doubtful whether China is capable to dominate the entire islands with its current strength vis-a-vis an alliance of the states with claims over the islands, what important here is the calculation of the states that China's power will keep increasing, and correspondingly, also its territorial appetites. Thus, it is better to complain bitterly and loudly today, to attract the attention of the only power that is capable of balancing against China at this point of time, which is the United States.
Not surprisingly, when departing U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates attended the Shangri-La Dialogue at Singapore, he found both General Phung Quang Thanh, Vietnam’s defense minister, and his counterpart from Philippines, Mr. Voltaire, Gazmin were clamoring for a greater American presence in the region. Regardless of the tumultuous past between the U.S. and Vietnam, the Vietnamese have been busy courting the U.S., and both countries have even staged a joint military exercise. The Philippines also have mostly abandoned their anti-U.S. position and embraced America, which, they believe, could bring the stability to the region.
At this point, China is experiencing what the U.S. had experienced right after the end of the Cold War, that its neighbors suddenly find themselves living next to a 8,000 ton gorilla. With the world perceiving America's power as declining, thanks to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and not to mention the subprime mortgage mess, everyone is starting to take a second look at China.
It is true that China's trade is growing, and that people grow rich from trading with China. China is willing to trade with anyone and anywhere, uncaring about all these human rights hassles, which is a welcomed development by isolated countries such as Myanmar. On the other hand, people are also starting to complain that low-cost Chinese goods starting to flood the local markets and that Chinese corporations exploit countries all over the world (sound familiar?).
Even though China has been assuring its neighbors that in its thousands years of history, China has never embarked on an expansionist foreign policy, it is still seen a growing threat by everyone in the neighborhood. China is no longer seen as a partner to balance the brash, uncontrollable, and unilateral United States, but a future threat that may surpass the U.S. and dominate the world, starting with its immediate neighborhood.
Thus, these concerns are at the root of the current conflict on Spratly.
The situation is dicey because the status of the Spratly Islands is currently under dispute between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippine, Malaysia, and even Brunei. The reason? It is strategically positioned, right in the middle of commercial shipping lanes and one of the world's most productive areas for fishing. Still, the best part is that it has tons of oil and natural gas (fourth largest reserve bed in the world), with major windfalls for energy-hungry Asian nations.
While the dispute has been ongoing for decades, it is only in the past few years that the surrounding countries have started to complain that China is overtly aggressive in staking its claim over the islands. Even though at this point it is still doubtful whether China is capable to dominate the entire islands with its current strength vis-a-vis an alliance of the states with claims over the islands, what important here is the calculation of the states that China's power will keep increasing, and correspondingly, also its territorial appetites. Thus, it is better to complain bitterly and loudly today, to attract the attention of the only power that is capable of balancing against China at this point of time, which is the United States.
Not surprisingly, when departing U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates attended the Shangri-La Dialogue at Singapore, he found both General Phung Quang Thanh, Vietnam’s defense minister, and his counterpart from Philippines, Mr. Voltaire, Gazmin were clamoring for a greater American presence in the region. Regardless of the tumultuous past between the U.S. and Vietnam, the Vietnamese have been busy courting the U.S., and both countries have even staged a joint military exercise. The Philippines also have mostly abandoned their anti-U.S. position and embraced America, which, they believe, could bring the stability to the region.
At this point, China is experiencing what the U.S. had experienced right after the end of the Cold War, that its neighbors suddenly find themselves living next to a 8,000 ton gorilla. With the world perceiving America's power as declining, thanks to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and not to mention the subprime mortgage mess, everyone is starting to take a second look at China.
It is true that China's trade is growing, and that people grow rich from trading with China. China is willing to trade with anyone and anywhere, uncaring about all these human rights hassles, which is a welcomed development by isolated countries such as Myanmar. On the other hand, people are also starting to complain that low-cost Chinese goods starting to flood the local markets and that Chinese corporations exploit countries all over the world (sound familiar?).
Even though China has been assuring its neighbors that in its thousands years of history, China has never embarked on an expansionist foreign policy, it is still seen a growing threat by everyone in the neighborhood. China is no longer seen as a partner to balance the brash, uncontrollable, and unilateral United States, but a future threat that may surpass the U.S. and dominate the world, starting with its immediate neighborhood.
Thus, these concerns are at the root of the current conflict on Spratly.
Monday, June 6, 2011
President Saleh has left the building....
So it seems, after he got injured in a surprise shelling on his palace. The question is, then, what happens next?
Well, first, while the government went to great lengths to note that Mr. Saleh's departure was temporary and that once he got well, he would assume his post back, I am willing to bet that Mr. Saleh has left for good. As a leader in precarious condition, leaving the county usually spells the end of his/her time in office. If leaders want to remain in power, then they ought to stay, giving the illusion that they are still in command and in control of the situation. Therefore, regardless the excuses, once they leave the building, they are gone for good, and what's left is to make-up any safe-facing excuses. That's it.
Not surprisingly, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, Mr. Saleh's vice president, immediately called for cease-fire, for Mr. Saleh's departure has emboldened the opposition and demoralized his remaining supporters. The cease-fire offer was immediately accepted, likely because the opposition realized that they were united only in their dislike of Saleh. In reality, they are divided among many clans, each of which have different, sometimes competing, interests.
At the same time, Saleh's son and relatives were backed into a corner, and for them, a cease-fire was not something they welcomed. They looked at Egypt, saw that Mubarak and his family ended up arrested after he resigned, and ostensibly decided that they wanted to avoid his fate. As a result, they launched attacks, trying to show they're still powerful, to bolster up the claim that Saleh will return later, and to get some concessions out of the opposition. It's a desperation move.
So, what's next for Yemen?
Mr. Hadi will keep trying to make peace with the opposition. The problem for Mr. Hadi is that the opposition will want him to rein in Mr. Saleh's loyalists, which is something he can't really do because he has no power over them.
Here, the Saudis and the U.S. should actually jump in to pressure Mr. Saleh to realize that his game is up. At the same time, Mr. Hadi and the opposition should agree to make a clean break from the past. Regardless of how appalling this might sound, the opposition should declare a blanket amnesty on Mr. Saleh's supporters, which might split the loyalists further and set the stage for reconciliation in the future.
Still, we should expect Yemen to remain in turmoil for the next few months, as Mr. Saleh's departure leaves a huge vacuum of power and the clan-based Yemen politics make it difficult to create an effective unity government. We can only hope that a new caretaker government has enough foresight to create an inclusive government so as to avoid the pitfalls of countries like Iraq. Additionally, it would nice if both the US and the Saudis promised to pump in some economic assistance to help stabilize the country. Otherwise, what we have here is a failed state in the making. And given the presence of al-Qaeda on Yemen soil, as well as American interests in the region, this is something I hope Yemen avoids.
Well, first, while the government went to great lengths to note that Mr. Saleh's departure was temporary and that once he got well, he would assume his post back, I am willing to bet that Mr. Saleh has left for good. As a leader in precarious condition, leaving the county usually spells the end of his/her time in office. If leaders want to remain in power, then they ought to stay, giving the illusion that they are still in command and in control of the situation. Therefore, regardless the excuses, once they leave the building, they are gone for good, and what's left is to make-up any safe-facing excuses. That's it.
Not surprisingly, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, Mr. Saleh's vice president, immediately called for cease-fire, for Mr. Saleh's departure has emboldened the opposition and demoralized his remaining supporters. The cease-fire offer was immediately accepted, likely because the opposition realized that they were united only in their dislike of Saleh. In reality, they are divided among many clans, each of which have different, sometimes competing, interests.
At the same time, Saleh's son and relatives were backed into a corner, and for them, a cease-fire was not something they welcomed. They looked at Egypt, saw that Mubarak and his family ended up arrested after he resigned, and ostensibly decided that they wanted to avoid his fate. As a result, they launched attacks, trying to show they're still powerful, to bolster up the claim that Saleh will return later, and to get some concessions out of the opposition. It's a desperation move.
So, what's next for Yemen?
Mr. Hadi will keep trying to make peace with the opposition. The problem for Mr. Hadi is that the opposition will want him to rein in Mr. Saleh's loyalists, which is something he can't really do because he has no power over them.
Here, the Saudis and the U.S. should actually jump in to pressure Mr. Saleh to realize that his game is up. At the same time, Mr. Hadi and the opposition should agree to make a clean break from the past. Regardless of how appalling this might sound, the opposition should declare a blanket amnesty on Mr. Saleh's supporters, which might split the loyalists further and set the stage for reconciliation in the future.
Still, we should expect Yemen to remain in turmoil for the next few months, as Mr. Saleh's departure leaves a huge vacuum of power and the clan-based Yemen politics make it difficult to create an effective unity government. We can only hope that a new caretaker government has enough foresight to create an inclusive government so as to avoid the pitfalls of countries like Iraq. Additionally, it would nice if both the US and the Saudis promised to pump in some economic assistance to help stabilize the country. Otherwise, what we have here is a failed state in the making. And given the presence of al-Qaeda on Yemen soil, as well as American interests in the region, this is something I hope Yemen avoids.
Saturday, June 4, 2011
Egypt's Transition to Democracy: Foreign Policy
For those of you who have followed this blog closely, what I’m about to say about Egypt’s future foreign policy probably won’t seem too surprising. After all, Egypt’s foreign policy is a topic that has come up several times over the last few months. What makes this blog post different from those prior posts is that here I perform a more systematic and comprehensive survey and analysis of Egyptian foreign policy.
Ambition
To begin, let’s look at a very basic, general level of Egyptian foreign policy. In short, what does Egypt want? What are its goals? Egyptians of many different stripes—those from different religions and economic strata and with different political beliefs—widely agree that Egypt should attempt to reclaim its position of leadership within the region. They look back at the Mubarak era with disgust, in part because they believe he consistently prioritized the interests of Israel and the U.S. over the traditional interests of his own country. Really, in their view, Israel’s and Washington’s interests became Egypt’s interests. Put simply, according to this logic, Egypt was a follower and became a passive player in the region. It looked to the U.S. and Israel to set the tone on its own foreign policy. We can debate how much of this is actually grounded in truth or myth, but in the end it doesn’t matter. What matters most is what Egyptians believe to be true, for it is these beliefs that will shape Egyptian policymaking going forward. And in the future, we should expect Egypt to try to break free from its so-called era of passivity by acting more assertively and exercising more independence in its foreign policymaking. Significantly, this is something that the revolutionaries, various political candidates and parties, and religious groups have called for.
A more assertive foreign policy carries a host of implications. One important implication is that other states the region, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran and Israel, are going to have to make a place for Egypt at the policy table or risk confrontation. This is the same dilemma that will likely plague U.S.-China relations in the future. In both cases, either (1) the established leaders make concessions to the rising power, granting it more respect and a greater voice on the regional/world stage, and seek to integrate this country into the status quo; or (2) face the possibility that the rising power will become extremely dissatisfied with its position in the region/world, to the point that it might try to overturn the status quo. At this point, we’re a long way from Egypt embracing such aggressive tactics, but it is a potential pathway that it could head down if it does adopt very assertive policies over the long-term.
Israel
Next, let’s turn to Egypt’s relations with various important countries, starting with Israel. There’s already been quite a bit of speculation that Egypt’s transition to democracy will be bad for Israel’s interests. Truthfully, there is some evidence for this concern. Already, much to Israel’s dismay, Egyptian officials helped to seal a reconciliation deal between Hamas and Fatah, bringing Hamas in from the cold once again, and they are now working with both sides to implement it.
Moreover, Egyptian citizens have been very vocal in expressing their pro-Palestinian (and in some cases, anti-Israeli) views. Even during the revolution, the crowd in Tahrir was not shy about voicing their thoughts on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There have been several protests at the Israeli embassy in Cairo, including one that triggered a violent crackdown by the Egyptian military. Last month, in a show of support for the Palestinians, who were commemorating Nakba Day, hundreds of Egyptians attempted to close in on the Rafah border crossing, but were stopped by the military. And to make matters worse, recent polling data from the Pew Research Center suggests that a majority of Egyptian citizens (54%) prefer to abrogate the peace deal with Israel.
Additionally, news about lower than market gas deals under Mubarak to Israel has surfaced, which has only infuriated Egyptians. Egyptian officials have promised to review these deals and possibly request Israel to pay a higher price.
And Egypt’s overtures to Iran, leading possibly to reestablishing ties with Iran, have unnerved Israel. Let’s face it: Under Mubarak, Egypt was one of the region’s stalwart countries that could be counted on to balance against any threatening politico-military moves emanating from Tehran. Without Egypt in an anti-Iran regional coalition, Iran’s freedom of movement, including its ability to cause havoc and mayhem directly or indirectly via its proxies, is greatly enhanced.
Lastly, as of last Saturday, to break Israel’s chokehold on Gaza, Egypt has opened the Rafah border. Reasonably, Egyptian officials argue that the move was made to alleviate humanitarian problems, but Israel sees the opening as a vehicle that allows unsavory people and things to get into Gaza.
As expected, Israeli officials are already finding all of these changes both frustrating and annoying at a minimum, and some, especially the foreign policy hawks, see these changes as worrisome and alarming.
But let’s take a deep breath for the moment. Most major players in Egyptian politics, even the Muslim Brotherhood, claim that they will respect the peace treaty. Most have been fairly careful about describing relations with Israel, emphasizing that Israel is not Egypt’s enemy. Indeed, most public statements simply highlight the need to break free from Israel’s shadow, to demonstrate some policy independence. Even the issue of the Rafah border crossing might not be quite so inflammatory to Israel or harmful to Egypt-Israel relations. For example, despite officially opening the border crossing, Gazans
I still believe the Egyptian Revolution could be a good thing for Israel. At Washington’s bidding, Hosni Mubarak supported the regional status quo, leading Egypt to avoid pushing Israel too hard to work with the Palestinians. In effect, this allowed the Israel-Palestinian conflict to get swept under the rug, and played into Israel’s hands. As we have already seen, a more open and free Egypt will no longer take this approach. Egypt will not avoid or ignore the longstanding conflict. Instead, it will make a greater effort to make progress on a deal, and this, in turn, might lead others in region to behave similarly, adding a sense of urgency and momentum to the stalled talks.
Saudi Arabia and Iran
What about the two other major countries in the region? As just mentioned, Egypt has broached the idea of normalizing relations with Iran. Egyptian officials have stated that they would like to treat Iran as just another country in the world, not necessarily as a friend or a foe. As a gesture of goodwill, in February, Egypt let Iranian warships pass through the Suez Canal, the first time that has happened since the Shah was overthrown. And Egyptian and Iranian officials have already held meetings in both Cairo and Tehran. Where all of this will lead is uncertain. But what is clear is that both sides value better inter-state ties.
Meantime, Egypt’s relations with Saudi Arabia are trending in the opposite direction. And there lots of moving parts involved here. First, to Saudi Arabia’s rulers, Hosni Mubarak not only presided over a friendly government, but he was their friend. Remember, Mubarak served for so long that was able to cultivate good political and personal ties to the King and his associates. The new democratic government in Egypt, whenever it takes office, with a whole new set of characters and intentions and goals, will be viewed by the King somewhat warily. The new democratic government just won’t have the longevity or the history with Saudi Arabia to make these inter-state relations as smooth and seamless as they have been in the past. And if the revolutionaries—the very group that toppled the Mubarak government—take power sometime soon, there could be some latent hostility between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
It is also becoming evident that Saudi Arabia doesn’t like the new direction in Egypt’s foreign policy. Resetting relations with Iran, downgrading its ties with Israel, becoming more pro-active in the region—these aren’t things the Saudis want to see. Yes, even the part about Israel. Why? On a big picture level, they are nascent signs that Egypt might begin to formulate and implement foreign policies without consideration of Saudi interests and concerns. But on a micro level, on an issue by issue basis, they generate specific concerns: Will Saudi Arabia be left alone to counter-balance Iran’s bid for regional hegemony? Will Egypt try to challenge Saudi Arabia as the vanguard of Sunni dominance in the region?
And here’s one more challenge in Saudi-Egyptian relations: Egypt’s revolutionaries and political activists, as well as various Shia and Coptics, believe that Saudi Arabia is funding extremist political groups (specifically, the Salafis) so as to undermine the revolution. That is to say, in their eyes, Saudi Arabia is meddling in their country and in bed with, if not actually leading, the counter-revolutionaries. Not surprisingly, there have been protests at the Saudi embassy in Cairo. Arguably, the more troubling part of this is that the accusations give the Saudis another reason to dislike the revolutionaries, which only complicates further the ties between both countries.
The U.S.
The U.S. probably will lose some influence in Egypt as the country opens up its political processes. If the new government in Egypt reflects the political preferences of its citizens, as they do in free and fair democratic regimes, then it will undoubtedly take foreign policy positions that are increasingly independent of Washington’s demands and interests. But given the deep economic and military connections between Cairo and Washington, it’s awfully difficult to envision a sharp break in the relationship. And as another good sign, while Egyptian officials have stated their desire to pursue a foreign policy program independent of Washington, they have also been effusive in their praise of the U.S., proclaiming America to be a good friend of Egypt.
Alas, not everything is well in Egypt-U.S. relations. Certainly, there is some backlash because the U.S. is viewed as the longstanding puppeteer of Egyptian foreign policy, effectively making Cairo a servant of Washington for decades. And some Egyptians, especially the April 6 Movement, are upset with the U.S. because they believe Barack Obama’s support for the revolution was excessively slow. To them, the U.S. was too indecisive, wielding the full weight of its power far too late, which contributed the death and violence during the revolution. And it seemed that the U.S. preferred the autocratic, repressive Mubarak over their freedom. This argument fits with a narrative that’s been long popular in the region: the U.S. is hypocritical when it comes to its much-cherished values of freedom and liberty. Washington supports democracy in some countries, but declines to encourage or back it in other countries. Yes, the U.S. does have its reasons for maintaining inconsistencies in its foreign policies, but that’s beside the point. The main point here is that the perception of U.S. actions is the motor behind some negative attitudes and opinions on the Obama administration and American foreign policy.
The reaction of a number of revolutionaries and political activists to Obama’s recent speech on the Middle East uprisings fully displayed their distaste for the Obama administration, American government, and U.S. foreign policy. Many were uninterested in what Obama had to say, thought his words and efforts to help Egypt have come too late, and preferred he kept out of Egyptian politics. In short, they tuned Obama out. It is possible these thoughts and feelings are triggered mostly out of frustration and don’t mean much for future Egypt-U.S. relations. But still, the revolutionaries are Egypt’s next generation of political and economic leaders, and so what they think should be taken into account.
Going Forward
It is very interesting to see Egypt so willing and eager to flex its muscles in the region. Most countries engulfed in political transition tend to retreat from the world/regional stage and focus on internal affairs. I wonder if this assertiveness will hold for a prolonged period of time. Will Egypt’s efforts and energy on foreign policy match its foreign policy desires and plans over the next 5-7 years? Or will Egypt eventually turn inward?
Another key is to see where power is vested in Egyptian politics. It’s these power bases that will drive Egypt’s foreign policy. Surely, the military will be one major player, but who are the others? Ultimately, it depends on whether substantial political power is vested in parliament or the president. If it’s parliament, then foreign policy will be led by the military and various political parties, mostly likely the Muslim Brotherhood for now. On the other hand, if Egypt opts for a presidential system, then foreign policy will be driven by the military and the president, such as Mohamed El-Baradei or Amr Moussa, and his/her associates.
Ambition
To begin, let’s look at a very basic, general level of Egyptian foreign policy. In short, what does Egypt want? What are its goals? Egyptians of many different stripes—those from different religions and economic strata and with different political beliefs—widely agree that Egypt should attempt to reclaim its position of leadership within the region. They look back at the Mubarak era with disgust, in part because they believe he consistently prioritized the interests of Israel and the U.S. over the traditional interests of his own country. Really, in their view, Israel’s and Washington’s interests became Egypt’s interests. Put simply, according to this logic, Egypt was a follower and became a passive player in the region. It looked to the U.S. and Israel to set the tone on its own foreign policy. We can debate how much of this is actually grounded in truth or myth, but in the end it doesn’t matter. What matters most is what Egyptians believe to be true, for it is these beliefs that will shape Egyptian policymaking going forward. And in the future, we should expect Egypt to try to break free from its so-called era of passivity by acting more assertively and exercising more independence in its foreign policymaking. Significantly, this is something that the revolutionaries, various political candidates and parties, and religious groups have called for.
A more assertive foreign policy carries a host of implications. One important implication is that other states the region, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran and Israel, are going to have to make a place for Egypt at the policy table or risk confrontation. This is the same dilemma that will likely plague U.S.-China relations in the future. In both cases, either (1) the established leaders make concessions to the rising power, granting it more respect and a greater voice on the regional/world stage, and seek to integrate this country into the status quo; or (2) face the possibility that the rising power will become extremely dissatisfied with its position in the region/world, to the point that it might try to overturn the status quo. At this point, we’re a long way from Egypt embracing such aggressive tactics, but it is a potential pathway that it could head down if it does adopt very assertive policies over the long-term.
Israel
Next, let’s turn to Egypt’s relations with various important countries, starting with Israel. There’s already been quite a bit of speculation that Egypt’s transition to democracy will be bad for Israel’s interests. Truthfully, there is some evidence for this concern. Already, much to Israel’s dismay, Egyptian officials helped to seal a reconciliation deal between Hamas and Fatah, bringing Hamas in from the cold once again, and they are now working with both sides to implement it.
Moreover, Egyptian citizens have been very vocal in expressing their pro-Palestinian (and in some cases, anti-Israeli) views. Even during the revolution, the crowd in Tahrir was not shy about voicing their thoughts on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There have been several protests at the Israeli embassy in Cairo, including one that triggered a violent crackdown by the Egyptian military. Last month, in a show of support for the Palestinians, who were commemorating Nakba Day, hundreds of Egyptians attempted to close in on the Rafah border crossing, but were stopped by the military. And to make matters worse, recent polling data from the Pew Research Center suggests that a majority of Egyptian citizens (54%) prefer to abrogate the peace deal with Israel.
Additionally, news about lower than market gas deals under Mubarak to Israel has surfaced, which has only infuriated Egyptians. Egyptian officials have promised to review these deals and possibly request Israel to pay a higher price.
And Egypt’s overtures to Iran, leading possibly to reestablishing ties with Iran, have unnerved Israel. Let’s face it: Under Mubarak, Egypt was one of the region’s stalwart countries that could be counted on to balance against any threatening politico-military moves emanating from Tehran. Without Egypt in an anti-Iran regional coalition, Iran’s freedom of movement, including its ability to cause havoc and mayhem directly or indirectly via its proxies, is greatly enhanced.
Lastly, as of last Saturday, to break Israel’s chokehold on Gaza, Egypt has opened the Rafah border. Reasonably, Egyptian officials argue that the move was made to alleviate humanitarian problems, but Israel sees the opening as a vehicle that allows unsavory people and things to get into Gaza.
As expected, Israeli officials are already finding all of these changes both frustrating and annoying at a minimum, and some, especially the foreign policy hawks, see these changes as worrisome and alarming.
But let’s take a deep breath for the moment. Most major players in Egyptian politics, even the Muslim Brotherhood, claim that they will respect the peace treaty. Most have been fairly careful about describing relations with Israel, emphasizing that Israel is not Egypt’s enemy. Indeed, most public statements simply highlight the need to break free from Israel’s shadow, to demonstrate some policy independence. Even the issue of the Rafah border crossing might not be quite so inflammatory to Israel or harmful to Egypt-Israel relations. For example, despite officially opening the border crossing, Gazans
I still believe the Egyptian Revolution could be a good thing for Israel. At Washington’s bidding, Hosni Mubarak supported the regional status quo, leading Egypt to avoid pushing Israel too hard to work with the Palestinians. In effect, this allowed the Israel-Palestinian conflict to get swept under the rug, and played into Israel’s hands. As we have already seen, a more open and free Egypt will no longer take this approach. Egypt will not avoid or ignore the longstanding conflict. Instead, it will make a greater effort to make progress on a deal, and this, in turn, might lead others in region to behave similarly, adding a sense of urgency and momentum to the stalled talks.
Saudi Arabia and Iran
What about the two other major countries in the region? As just mentioned, Egypt has broached the idea of normalizing relations with Iran. Egyptian officials have stated that they would like to treat Iran as just another country in the world, not necessarily as a friend or a foe. As a gesture of goodwill, in February, Egypt let Iranian warships pass through the Suez Canal, the first time that has happened since the Shah was overthrown. And Egyptian and Iranian officials have already held meetings in both Cairo and Tehran. Where all of this will lead is uncertain. But what is clear is that both sides value better inter-state ties.
Meantime, Egypt’s relations with Saudi Arabia are trending in the opposite direction. And there lots of moving parts involved here. First, to Saudi Arabia’s rulers, Hosni Mubarak not only presided over a friendly government, but he was their friend. Remember, Mubarak served for so long that was able to cultivate good political and personal ties to the King and his associates. The new democratic government in Egypt, whenever it takes office, with a whole new set of characters and intentions and goals, will be viewed by the King somewhat warily. The new democratic government just won’t have the longevity or the history with Saudi Arabia to make these inter-state relations as smooth and seamless as they have been in the past. And if the revolutionaries—the very group that toppled the Mubarak government—take power sometime soon, there could be some latent hostility between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
It is also becoming evident that Saudi Arabia doesn’t like the new direction in Egypt’s foreign policy. Resetting relations with Iran, downgrading its ties with Israel, becoming more pro-active in the region—these aren’t things the Saudis want to see. Yes, even the part about Israel. Why? On a big picture level, they are nascent signs that Egypt might begin to formulate and implement foreign policies without consideration of Saudi interests and concerns. But on a micro level, on an issue by issue basis, they generate specific concerns: Will Saudi Arabia be left alone to counter-balance Iran’s bid for regional hegemony? Will Egypt try to challenge Saudi Arabia as the vanguard of Sunni dominance in the region?
And here’s one more challenge in Saudi-Egyptian relations: Egypt’s revolutionaries and political activists, as well as various Shia and Coptics, believe that Saudi Arabia is funding extremist political groups (specifically, the Salafis) so as to undermine the revolution. That is to say, in their eyes, Saudi Arabia is meddling in their country and in bed with, if not actually leading, the counter-revolutionaries. Not surprisingly, there have been protests at the Saudi embassy in Cairo. Arguably, the more troubling part of this is that the accusations give the Saudis another reason to dislike the revolutionaries, which only complicates further the ties between both countries.
The U.S.
The U.S. probably will lose some influence in Egypt as the country opens up its political processes. If the new government in Egypt reflects the political preferences of its citizens, as they do in free and fair democratic regimes, then it will undoubtedly take foreign policy positions that are increasingly independent of Washington’s demands and interests. But given the deep economic and military connections between Cairo and Washington, it’s awfully difficult to envision a sharp break in the relationship. And as another good sign, while Egyptian officials have stated their desire to pursue a foreign policy program independent of Washington, they have also been effusive in their praise of the U.S., proclaiming America to be a good friend of Egypt.
Alas, not everything is well in Egypt-U.S. relations. Certainly, there is some backlash because the U.S. is viewed as the longstanding puppeteer of Egyptian foreign policy, effectively making Cairo a servant of Washington for decades. And some Egyptians, especially the April 6 Movement, are upset with the U.S. because they believe Barack Obama’s support for the revolution was excessively slow. To them, the U.S. was too indecisive, wielding the full weight of its power far too late, which contributed the death and violence during the revolution. And it seemed that the U.S. preferred the autocratic, repressive Mubarak over their freedom. This argument fits with a narrative that’s been long popular in the region: the U.S. is hypocritical when it comes to its much-cherished values of freedom and liberty. Washington supports democracy in some countries, but declines to encourage or back it in other countries. Yes, the U.S. does have its reasons for maintaining inconsistencies in its foreign policies, but that’s beside the point. The main point here is that the perception of U.S. actions is the motor behind some negative attitudes and opinions on the Obama administration and American foreign policy.
The reaction of a number of revolutionaries and political activists to Obama’s recent speech on the Middle East uprisings fully displayed their distaste for the Obama administration, American government, and U.S. foreign policy. Many were uninterested in what Obama had to say, thought his words and efforts to help Egypt have come too late, and preferred he kept out of Egyptian politics. In short, they tuned Obama out. It is possible these thoughts and feelings are triggered mostly out of frustration and don’t mean much for future Egypt-U.S. relations. But still, the revolutionaries are Egypt’s next generation of political and economic leaders, and so what they think should be taken into account.
Going Forward
It is very interesting to see Egypt so willing and eager to flex its muscles in the region. Most countries engulfed in political transition tend to retreat from the world/regional stage and focus on internal affairs. I wonder if this assertiveness will hold for a prolonged period of time. Will Egypt’s efforts and energy on foreign policy match its foreign policy desires and plans over the next 5-7 years? Or will Egypt eventually turn inward?
Another key is to see where power is vested in Egyptian politics. It’s these power bases that will drive Egypt’s foreign policy. Surely, the military will be one major player, but who are the others? Ultimately, it depends on whether substantial political power is vested in parliament or the president. If it’s parliament, then foreign policy will be led by the military and various political parties, mostly likely the Muslim Brotherhood for now. On the other hand, if Egypt opts for a presidential system, then foreign policy will be driven by the military and the president, such as Mohamed El-Baradei or Amr Moussa, and his/her associates.
Friday, June 3, 2011
The Persistence of Dictators: a Thinkpiece
Why don't leaders in places like Libya, Syria, Yemen, and so on step down from office in the face of widespread revolts and protests? Why do they hold on to power, even if this means shooting and killing their own citizens?
There is no silver bullet answer to those questions, but there are several factors in play here, ranging from psychological factors such as groupthink, messianic views, and misperceptions to the simple calculation that they can outlast their opponents.
First, let us talk about the psychological factor. Almost every dictator always has a messianic view of their role in their own societies and in the world more generally. Indeed, they seem to believe that they are the only persons capable of saving the state, ending existing political discord, and producing lasting peace and harmony. As a result, they believe that there's nobody after them who will keep the country running together and in good shape. This was evident in the gallery of dictators, from Adolf Hitler, Stalin, and Mao to Kim Il Sung and Qaddafi.
Messianic views, however, do not explain everything. Dictators have resigned and relinquished political power, even though they believed that they were essential to the welfare of their state. Sukarno and Suharto of Indonesia, Hosni Mubarak, and Pinochet are examples of dictators with messianic values that resigned in the end. Even one could argue that Hitler resigned by committing suicide.
What is important here is their perception of vulnerability, which, in turn, is heavily influenced by the "groupthink" around the leaders. Leaders don't operate alone. They invariably create a circle of trusted subordinates who will help these leaders maintain their grip on power. These subordinates in turn rely on the leaders as a source of legitimacy. This creates a dependency relationship between the leader and the system and fosters the need to maintain the survival of both the leader and the system.
Leaders usually fall when either the system collapses (e.g. Hitler) or the system (which includes a host of institutions and groups) has outgrown the leader and believes that the leader is no longer indispensable and can survive better without the leader itself (e.g. Sukarno, Suharto, Pinochet and Mubarak).
Let us look at three current dictators in the Middle East: Saleh (Yemen), Assad (Syria), and Qaddafi (Libya).
In Saleh's case, his leadership is indispensable to his clique (which include friends and family members). Yemeni politics in essence is comprised of a loose coalition of Arab tribes, and Saleh is able to stay on top based on his ability to play each tribe against the others. He blundered in the earlier days of protests, when he cracked down on protesters, creating unity among his political opponents. He then tried to divide the opposition by first declaring that he would resign and later by bringing the Saudis to mediate. Still, his inconsistent patterns of dealing with the protesters gave him credibility problems and in fact his opposition only became emboldened and tried to push for more. Yet, the fragmented nature of the opposition, combined by the indispensability of Saleh to his clique gives Saleh some hope that he might be able to survive the current political crisis, thus explaining his obstinacy.
In the case of Asaad, for him and his associates, it is a question of life and death: they came from the Allawites, the minority tribe that comprises only 10% of the Syrian population, making their survival at stake should they get toppled from power. As a result, Assad chose to crack down on his opponents, grant some carrots of amnesty in order to prevent international intervention, and attempt to divide the opposition.
In Qaddafi's case, the fragmented nature of the state--there is simply no organization at all--actually empowers Qaddafi, making it difficult to dislodge him from power. But at the same time, both the government and the opposition are fragmented, which had led to a stalemate. Qaddafi himself seems to be confident that without the NATO's meddling, he can rely on his mercenaries to get rid of the fragmented, unorganized and poorly trained and equipped opposition. And with both the U.S. and the Europeans unwilling to get dirty and bogged down in Libya, the longer he holds on to power, the higher his chance of survival as sooner or later war fatigue will set in.
Thus, all three dictators hold to power due to a simple logic, that their chance of survival is still high, considering the fragmented opposition and the unwillingness of international community to get their hands dirty.
There is no silver bullet answer to those questions, but there are several factors in play here, ranging from psychological factors such as groupthink, messianic views, and misperceptions to the simple calculation that they can outlast their opponents.
First, let us talk about the psychological factor. Almost every dictator always has a messianic view of their role in their own societies and in the world more generally. Indeed, they seem to believe that they are the only persons capable of saving the state, ending existing political discord, and producing lasting peace and harmony. As a result, they believe that there's nobody after them who will keep the country running together and in good shape. This was evident in the gallery of dictators, from Adolf Hitler, Stalin, and Mao to Kim Il Sung and Qaddafi.
Messianic views, however, do not explain everything. Dictators have resigned and relinquished political power, even though they believed that they were essential to the welfare of their state. Sukarno and Suharto of Indonesia, Hosni Mubarak, and Pinochet are examples of dictators with messianic values that resigned in the end. Even one could argue that Hitler resigned by committing suicide.
What is important here is their perception of vulnerability, which, in turn, is heavily influenced by the "groupthink" around the leaders. Leaders don't operate alone. They invariably create a circle of trusted subordinates who will help these leaders maintain their grip on power. These subordinates in turn rely on the leaders as a source of legitimacy. This creates a dependency relationship between the leader and the system and fosters the need to maintain the survival of both the leader and the system.
Leaders usually fall when either the system collapses (e.g. Hitler) or the system (which includes a host of institutions and groups) has outgrown the leader and believes that the leader is no longer indispensable and can survive better without the leader itself (e.g. Sukarno, Suharto, Pinochet and Mubarak).
Let us look at three current dictators in the Middle East: Saleh (Yemen), Assad (Syria), and Qaddafi (Libya).
In Saleh's case, his leadership is indispensable to his clique (which include friends and family members). Yemeni politics in essence is comprised of a loose coalition of Arab tribes, and Saleh is able to stay on top based on his ability to play each tribe against the others. He blundered in the earlier days of protests, when he cracked down on protesters, creating unity among his political opponents. He then tried to divide the opposition by first declaring that he would resign and later by bringing the Saudis to mediate. Still, his inconsistent patterns of dealing with the protesters gave him credibility problems and in fact his opposition only became emboldened and tried to push for more. Yet, the fragmented nature of the opposition, combined by the indispensability of Saleh to his clique gives Saleh some hope that he might be able to survive the current political crisis, thus explaining his obstinacy.
In the case of Asaad, for him and his associates, it is a question of life and death: they came from the Allawites, the minority tribe that comprises only 10% of the Syrian population, making their survival at stake should they get toppled from power. As a result, Assad chose to crack down on his opponents, grant some carrots of amnesty in order to prevent international intervention, and attempt to divide the opposition.
In Qaddafi's case, the fragmented nature of the state--there is simply no organization at all--actually empowers Qaddafi, making it difficult to dislodge him from power. But at the same time, both the government and the opposition are fragmented, which had led to a stalemate. Qaddafi himself seems to be confident that without the NATO's meddling, he can rely on his mercenaries to get rid of the fragmented, unorganized and poorly trained and equipped opposition. And with both the U.S. and the Europeans unwilling to get dirty and bogged down in Libya, the longer he holds on to power, the higher his chance of survival as sooner or later war fatigue will set in.
Thus, all three dictators hold to power due to a simple logic, that their chance of survival is still high, considering the fragmented opposition and the unwillingness of international community to get their hands dirty.
Why Obama Sqandered His "Osama Mojo"
In the aftermath of America's successful assassination of Osama Bin Laden, many media pundits clamored that Obama now had a foreign policy-proof vest, where the Republicans can no longer beat him using security issues. Heck, the Bush Administrations spent years without avail trying to capture or kill Osama, while Obama was successful, showing his ability to take risk when needed. He was on the top of the world and the king of the hill.
While Obama's approval rating enjoys a 6% bump in May thanks to Osama's death, within a few days, however, his accomplishment was unraveling. First, the administration tried to soak so much credit from the success that they rushed the facts of the operation. The problem is that due to the "fog of war," it was very difficult to get a nice neat story, and thus the administrations made so many contradictory statements, so many retractions, that Jim Treacher of the Daily Caller called it "victory lap in clown car."
Still, that couldn't match Obama's next blunder, which was his technically correct but politically disastrous speech on Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In essence, he gave the ammunition to the Republicans to start beating him again on foreign policy. While most Jewish donors seem to remain in Obama's camp, the administration seems to be rattled enough that even Rahm Emmanuel had to give assurance that the Obama Administration was acting on Israel's interests.
At the same time, the U.S. Congress took issue on his handling of Libya, where he ignored the War Power Act of 1973. John Boehner's resolution on barring the use of U.S. ground forces in Libya that was passed 268-145 and supported by both the Republicans and the Democrats was actually a compromise in order to prevent a more damaging Kucinich Resolution that would pull the US out from Libya in 15 days.
By the end of the day, Obama could not capitalize on Osama's death to create a long lasting shield to stop the Republicans from bashing his foreign policy. Obama's problem lies in the fact that he simply has no coherent foreign policy plan. His dealing with the Arab Spring, the Israel-Palestinian problem, and various other foreign policy problems is based on impulse. Obama is not an expert on foreign policy - he prefers to focus on domestic politics, content to leave foreign affairs to Hillary Clinton and her personnel at the Foggy Bottom.
This arrangement works in normal times. But Obama has no experience in dealing with foreign policy crises. Instead, he must rely on his policy advisers with various intellectual backgrounds and philosophies, which leads to paralysis in the foreign policy process. Worse, his political instincts frequently clash with the State Department's policies. This is most evident in the administration's early responses to the Arab Spring. Given this situation, it's not a surprise to see such incoherent and weak statements foreign policies formed in response to crises in Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, and so on.
To put it simply, Obama has no foreign policy because he is ignorant in foreign policy. As a result, when he finally got Osama and got his foreign policy triumph, he didn't know how to turn that accomplishment into a strong basis for American foreign policy.
While Obama's approval rating enjoys a 6% bump in May thanks to Osama's death, within a few days, however, his accomplishment was unraveling. First, the administration tried to soak so much credit from the success that they rushed the facts of the operation. The problem is that due to the "fog of war," it was very difficult to get a nice neat story, and thus the administrations made so many contradictory statements, so many retractions, that Jim Treacher of the Daily Caller called it "victory lap in clown car."
Still, that couldn't match Obama's next blunder, which was his technically correct but politically disastrous speech on Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In essence, he gave the ammunition to the Republicans to start beating him again on foreign policy. While most Jewish donors seem to remain in Obama's camp, the administration seems to be rattled enough that even Rahm Emmanuel had to give assurance that the Obama Administration was acting on Israel's interests.
At the same time, the U.S. Congress took issue on his handling of Libya, where he ignored the War Power Act of 1973. John Boehner's resolution on barring the use of U.S. ground forces in Libya that was passed 268-145 and supported by both the Republicans and the Democrats was actually a compromise in order to prevent a more damaging Kucinich Resolution that would pull the US out from Libya in 15 days.
By the end of the day, Obama could not capitalize on Osama's death to create a long lasting shield to stop the Republicans from bashing his foreign policy. Obama's problem lies in the fact that he simply has no coherent foreign policy plan. His dealing with the Arab Spring, the Israel-Palestinian problem, and various other foreign policy problems is based on impulse. Obama is not an expert on foreign policy - he prefers to focus on domestic politics, content to leave foreign affairs to Hillary Clinton and her personnel at the Foggy Bottom.
This arrangement works in normal times. But Obama has no experience in dealing with foreign policy crises. Instead, he must rely on his policy advisers with various intellectual backgrounds and philosophies, which leads to paralysis in the foreign policy process. Worse, his political instincts frequently clash with the State Department's policies. This is most evident in the administration's early responses to the Arab Spring. Given this situation, it's not a surprise to see such incoherent and weak statements foreign policies formed in response to crises in Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, and so on.
To put it simply, Obama has no foreign policy because he is ignorant in foreign policy. As a result, when he finally got Osama and got his foreign policy triumph, he didn't know how to turn that accomplishment into a strong basis for American foreign policy.
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