The US-North Korea Summit: Off or On?

If you have spent any time reading, writing, or even thinking about the US-North Korean standoff lately, I’m sure you’ve noticed something: it’s a very unpredictable situation. Mostly, that’s because the leaders of both countries are themselves very temperamental and capricious. Not, irrational, mind you, but unpredictable, prone to unexpected outbursts, statements, and policy shifts.

Just consider the wild and tumultuous course of North Korean-US relations over the last year or so. They’ve careened from name calling and threats of nuclear war and regime change to the prospect of rapprochement and détente, with Trump quickly and without consultation—apparently, neither from his staff nor from the South Koreans, who’ve acted as a mediator between Washington and Pyongyang—agreeing to meet personally with Kim Jong Un.

With all this in mind, it’s probably not a surprise that the proposed Kim-Trump summit was called off this week by Trump. This news has triggered a wave of speculation about the motives underpinning Trump’s decision to cancel. The overriding narrative, it seems, is that Trump feared that the North Koreans would either cancel the summit or back out at the last minute. Apparently, in the week or two prior to Trump's cancellation, dialogue between North Korea and the US had slowed. In fact, there had been zero of the usual requisite planning and coordination between the advance or security teams of North Korea and US ahead of the Kim-Trump summit. Which led US officials, including Trump, to believe that the North was getting cold feet and ready to pull out of the summit. As a result, not wanting to suffer the massive embarrassment of being stood up by Kim, Trump ostensibly pre-emptively scuppered his meeting with Kim. My former grad school colleague and current professor at UCSB Bridget Coggins called Trump’s move an example of the “insecurity dilemma.”

But was the meeting really canceled? Sort of. It’s true that Trump wrote a formal letter to Kim announcing his decision to scrap the meeting, but he also clearly hedged his position, taking time to praise Kim (“beautiful gesture,” “wonderful dialogue”) and encourage him to “not hesitate to call or write” Trump. Really, the letter was less about canceling the meeting than sending certain signals to Kim. It was a bargaining move, designed to show Kim that Trump isn’t overeager to meet Kim and that Kim and his regime has to do more to prove to the US that they really want the meeting.

What happened next? Well, again, no surprise, Trump now claims that talks with North Korea have picked up again and that his meeting with Kim could be back on. Makes perfect sense for several reasons.

First, as just mentioned, Trump really soft pedaled the cancellation, offering enough clues and hope to Kim that the meeting could still go as planned, or with only a minor delay.

Second, North Korea offered, all things considered, a relatively restrained response to Trump. And Trump, in turn, welcomed the statement, calling it “warm” and “productive.” He even tweeted: Very good news to receive the warm and productive statement from North Korea. We will soon see where it will lead, hopefully to long and enduring prosperity and peace. Only time (and talent) will tell!”

Third, a personal, direct Kim-Trump meeting something both Kim and Trump really want to see happen, whether in June or later down the line. We can see this in how they’ve engaged with one another indirectly over the last year; they’ve done so rather delicately, avoiding big missteps that could sabotage talks. For instance, recent outbursts by North Korea have targeted Veep Mike Pence and NSA John Bolton, not Trump himself. Also, keep in mind that Trump has never explicitly denied that he’s been in direct personal contact with Kim. That doesn’t mean he has talked with Kim, but it can’t be ruled out. And that, in itself, would be a major development.

But it’s more than those things. Both Kim and Trump have broader political and personal incentives to reach some kind of an agreement with the other side—whether a narrow one on nukes or a broader one that leads to détente and normalization of ties. Indeed, there has been lots of speculation about what Kim wants and needs from the US. This discussion can be boiled down to three things: (1) regime security, (2) economic factors, and (3) prestige.

Specifically, Kim wants credible promises that the US won’t attempt to topple or undermine his regime. It’s also likely that he sees the US as part of his program to boost North Korea’s economy: for example, aid packages, removing sanctions, and perhaps starting some trade discussions could be a boon to Pyongyang. Additionally, a thaw between North Korea and the US could offer a host of other benefits to Pyongyang. Put simply, it would signal to the rest of the world that it’s finally okay to engage and seal deals with North Korea, which could offer a broader way for North Korea to stimulate economic investment and development.

Lastly, North Korea and Kim specifically would also receive some measure of prestige. A meeting with Trump, with very few preconditions bargained for by the US, is a Bugs Bunny-sized carrot for Kim. It would allow North Korea to come out of the cold, no longer a pariah state, but a normal member of the international community—and in part due to Kim’s decisions. It would also allow Kim to stand on the world stage alongside Trump, figuratively and likely visually, which presents Kim, and by extension North Korea, as a peer of Trump and the US. Should all of this happen, Kim would get to bask in the praise that’s likely to be heaped on him domestically and internationally.

Now, as for Trump, certainly an agreement of some sort with North Korea appeals to his well-known narcissism. He’s already broached the idea of winning the Nobel Peace Prize for his diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis North Korea. Plus, Trump would get to revel in solving the intractable, insoluble puzzle that his predecessors, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, could not. He would get to credibly proclaim himself as a global statesman, a man of plans and action, a problem solver.

But there’s more than personal factors at play here. Trump also has political incentives to reach a deal with North Korea. In short, he needs a political win, and North Korea is a potential political goldmine for Trump. Sure, North Korea does offer a host of pitfalls, but probably not to Trump. At this point in his presidency, when he’s facing the prospect of being a one-term leader, if not outright impeached before his term ends, Trump has nothing to lose politically. It can’t get much worse for him. In the parlance of prospect theory, Trump is operating from a “domain of losses,” and in that domain individuals in general, and Trump in particular, are more likely to make risky decisions. Think of this in terms of gambling. Empirical evidence tells us that gamblers who are on a losing streak don’t stop betting, they instead often continue on, hoping to reverse their fortunes by doing the improbable, winning big. That is one way to look at Trump’s approach to North Korea. He’s hoping to win big so as to turn around his political fortunes, to help save his presidency.

So what should we expect going forward? Given the situation, the stakes, and the leaders involved, any predictions should be issued with great caution. Barring a severe uptick in tensions and hostilities, I still expect the Kim-Trump summit to happen at some point. As stated above, both Kim and Trump have plenty of incentives to go ahead with it.

But in the meantime, there is still opportunity for rocky times, especially as each side jockeys for more bargaining leverage. For instance, might Pyongyang be tempted to resume missile tests to regain the initiative versus Trump? If Trump gets frustrated with the  

The other thing to watch is the wider regional environment and its impact on North Korea diplomacy. Specifically, can the US maintain its North Korea coalition? Already, there are signs that South Korea and China are getting fed up with Trump’s campaign of “maximum pressure,” and greatly prefer the US-North Korean relationship to play out at the negotiating table. Hence, if the US doesn't play its cards right, there is the risk of multiple things happening: the coalition could fracture, the pressure campaign could unwind, and the US could find itself alone and sidelined. This would be the worst of all worlds for Team Trump.