In his
2014 Foreign Affairs article "The Return of
Geopolitics", Walter Russell Mead asserted that whereas the US has been
concerned with ideas of "global governance" since the end of the Cold
War, powers such as China, Iran and Russia remain focused on traditional
questions of territory and power.
The term
"geopolitics" is frequently used in conjunction with Russia's foreign
policy. It is, however, often limited to the context of Russian activities in
the post-Soviet space. Indeed, much of Russia's current foreign policy is
driven by a desire to re-assert influence in countries and regions that were
formerly under Soviet control.
Despite
not having been a part of the former Soviet empire, the Korean Peninsula offers
a unique chance to glean the dichotomy between the US's supposed concentration
of "global governance" and the Russian preoccupation with the issue
of territory. Much of the international focus on the DPRK has been based on
stemming North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The
primary framework through which the international community has worked to
achieve this is through international bodies such as the United Nations,
buttressed by international agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).
Nevertheless,
Russia's geopolitical interests have a long history in Korea. Those interests,
it seems, are making a comeback. Russia, however, is forced to contend with a
divided Korea that makes the pursuit of its geopolitical designs more
difficult.
The establishment of a Korean state that is friendly
toward Russia, but which is not particularly aligned with one state, has constituted
a basic Russian policy toward Korea since the end of the 19th century. The historic roots of Russia's ambitions on the Korean Peninsula date from
approximately 1860, during the reign of Aleksandr II. Russian designs for Korea
entered a period of abeyance during the Japanese occupation of Korea. After the
end of the Second World War, however, the USSR revived its Korea policy based
on three fronts: advancing the Soviet Union's national security, increasing the
scope of the communist camp, and keeping Russia in the realm of great power
politics.
Following the
"hot" phase of the Cold War, which included a rupture in
Sino-Soviet relations, the balance between China, the United States and the
USSR became more-or-less balanced. Nevertheless, the rapprochement between
Japan and South Korea following the 1965 normalization agreement between Seoul
and Tokyo led to another major shift in the USSR's geopolitical position in
Northeast Asia. While the US's alliance system in Asia was based on a series of
bilateral agreements between Washington and other individual states, rather
than a collective security system such as NATO, Japan-South Korea normalization
led to the formation of a Japan-South Korea-US network. In Asia, Russia was
unable to form a network of alliances or collective security similar to the
Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe. As a result, in order to securitize its Far
Eastern regions, in 1980 Russia embarked on a program of tripling its direct
investment in the Russian Far East's military position, compared with defense
spending in the Far East in 1978. Nevertheless, the USSR was unable to
undertake such a program, as at this time the first cracks in the Soviet socio-economic
system began to appear [1].
Upon assuming leadership of the USSR in 1985, Mikhail
Gorbachev hoped to use North Korea as a sort of lightning rod to expand the
Soviet Union's influence in East Asia more broadly. In addition to the narrower
imperatives of East Asia, Gorbachev's policy of outreach to North Korea was
also in part based on his attempts at shoring up cooperation
with the broader global communist bloc, including those countries that had kept
their distance from the USSR. During the final days of the Soviet era, however,
a reform-minded Gorbachev viewed South Korea, having recently experienced a
massive economic transformation in the so-called "Miracle on the
Han", as a valuable partner for the USSR. In particular, Gorbachev viewed
South Korea as a potential source of investment. Yet in the chaotic aftermath
of the USSR's collapse, Russian leaders (especially conservative politicians)
became increasingly disappointed with the fact that ROK-Russia ties didn't
provide the material benefits as had previously been hoped. Boris Yeltsin,
therefore, began to move Russia back to a more equidistant position between
North and South Korea.
Moscow's policy of maintaining balanced relations with
both Koreas has continued under the Putin government. Russia's attempts at
maintaining balanced relations with North and South Korea, however, could end up backfiring,
as happened with the USSR's attempts at maintaining balanced relations with
both Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1970's. With this in mind, Russia ultimately
hopes for a reunified peninsula. Moscow, however, approaches unification with a
mindset of cautious optimism.
According to a report
published by the Russian committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in
the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), two of Russia's main interests insofar as Korean
crisis management is concerned, is for Korean unification to happen gradually,
rather than suddenly, and for Korea not necessary to fall under the
geopolitical auspices of Russia, but rather for Korea not to come under the
geopolitical fold of one single country.
Ideally, unification would occur peaceably. Russia,
however, remains wary of the possibility of a large-scaled armed
confrontation. By extension, Russia also fears that the
aftermath of armed conflict would produce a unified Korean Peninsula with US
troops directly on its borders. This makes Russia's geopolitical situation in
East Asia not unlike Russia's circumstances in Europe, where the positioning of
large-scale military powers increases the possibility of confrontation. In
contrast, perhaps
the most critical difference between Russia's geopolitical interests toward the
Korean Peninsula and other regions on the Russian periphery is that whereas in
other areas Russia attempts to create a network of pro-Moscow states on its
borders, but as far as Korea is concerned, the most pressing issue for Russia is
not creating a buffer state, but rather creating investment opportunities for
its Far Eastern regions.
As Russia continues its so-called "turn to the
East," the Korean Peninsula will likely hold an increasingly important
position in Russia's geopolitical designs. At present, Russia is limited in its
ability to exercise geopolitical influence over Korea. The peninsula remains
divided, with the northern and Southern halves generally aligned with China and
the US, respectively. Should the overall situation in Korea change in any
notable way, however, Russia, based on its long-standing interests, will be
desirous to take advantage of any major shifts in North and/or South Korea's political
circumstances. By striving for closer ties with both North and South Korea,
Russia seeks to be primed to, at the very least, not be left out in the cold in
any ensuing geopolitical scramble for influence in a reunified Korea.
[1]
А. Б
Волынчук "Россия в Северо-Восточной Азии: вектор геополитических интересов"
