AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka
Should the US send arms to Ukraine? A recent report by the Atlantic Council, the
Brookings Institution, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs argues that the
US ought to do so. These three think tanks call for $3 billion in weapons to Ukraine
over the next three years (2015-2017). A bedrock assumption they make is that a
militarily beefed up Ukraine will force Putin to back down, once he clearly
understands the high costs entailed with fighting an empowered Ukraine and that the US
is serious about aiding and supporting Ukraine.
News reports indicate that the White House is considering this
idea. Apparently, Obama is having doubts about his initial reluctance to arm
Ukraine, and new Defense Secretary Ashton Carter has voiced sentiments supporting
US efforts to arm Ukraine.
This is bad news, for several reasons.
1. Although Obama won’t and arguably can’t say it, Ukraine
isn't an American interest. Ukraine is poor and weak. It does little to impact
the balance of power in Europe between Russia and America’s friends in the
EU/NATO. Additionally, Ukraine offers little in the way of trade and resources
to the US. With this in mind, then, why should the US devote so much effort and
resources to an area that’s really only tangentially related to American
interests?
2. On the other hand, Ukraine is Russia’s interest. In fact,
it's a core Russian interest. Just think about it. Ukraine is historically
linked to Russia, it sits next door to Russia, and Russian agencies have
durable links to various Ukrainian institutions. Arming Ukraine,
thereby signaling a strong attempt by the US (and the West more generally) to pull Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of influence,
is almost guaranteed to spark an escalation in the ongoing conflict. In short, Putin
will fight long and hard for Ukraine if provoked by the US or Europe. And just
as problematic, the US doesn't have the stomach nor the capabilities, given all
the other military imbroglios the US is currently involved in, to win outright a
military confrontation with Russia over Ukraine.
3. Will weapons the US transfers to Ukraine stay in friendly
hands? Recent events says maybe not. Indeed, if nothing else, the recent
lessons of Iraq and Syria should give American policymakers great
pause about arming foreign forces/militias.
4. Professor Kimberly Martin, of Columbia University, makes
a very salient point: arming Ukraine gives Putin a tailor-made rationale to
escalate the conflict, one that he can likely adeptly wield domestically. She
writes, “rather than prompting him to negotiate, sending U.S. and NATO weapons
to Ukraine would give him an excuse to declare that Russian forces must go into
Ukraine to defend Russia from American attack. It is not in America’s interests
to risk direct confrontation with nuclear-armed Russia, in non-NATO territory
that Russia claims as its sphere of interest.”
5. It’s highly likely that more weapons entering the fray,
in the end, will only contribute to prolonging the conflict and causing more
people to get hurt and killed. And along the way, it will also cause tremendous
pain and damage on Ukraine. And keep in mind, there are deep asymmetries in
military capabilities between Ukraine and Russia; sending arms won’t tip the
balance to Ukraine’s side. A more heavily armed Ukraine would be able to fight
longer, but not win the war.
6. But maybe tipping the balance isn’t the point? Maybe the
US ought to arm Ukraine in order to bleed Russia dry. It’s a cynical
calculation, to be sure. Here, the idea isn’t really help Ukraine win the conflict;
instead, it’s to suck the Russians in more, force them to up their military
investment in Ukraine at a time when Russia’s economy is in the dumps and the
country is running low on money. This was the same logic the US, under Jimmy
Carter and later Ronald Reagan, used in its involvement in the decade-long
Afghan war in the 1980s. Their efforts did work, in that the protracted war
helped to contribute to the crash of the old Soviet empire. Of course, as we
now know, a major downside is that the long war there created a hornet’s nest
of extremists, radicals and terrorists and a sanctuary for them to hide and scheme—something that exists in Afghanistan to
this day. Does the US want Ukraine to turn into something that resembles
Afghanistan in the heart of Europe? That’s a very risky bet to make.
Well, if arming Ukraine isn't a good idea, what should be done? While a complete answer is beyond the
scope of this post, let’s hit some major parts of a hypothetical response to
Putin/the conflict in Ukraine.
1. Let Putin shoot himself in the foot. Don’t overreact to
him and his moves. That's not all that should be done, but that's a major part
of it. It’s not sexy, and it’s passive, but it’s the right thing to do. After
all, Putin is not the military and security mastermind that’s portrayed by the
American right. In fact, a growing number of Russian experts have the
impression that Putin is simply making it up as he goes along. Just consider
these realities nowadays. Russia is economically weaker at this point because
of the sharp drop in oil prices and the sanctions imposed by the West. But
those economic problems will likely only get worse over time, as Russia now has
to pay for and protect Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine. It’s adding to its
empire at time when it can least afford to do so.
2. Tough diplomacy is essential, as a negotiated
settlement is necessary in the end. To start, US officials have to know what
Putin wants. Among other things, Putin will likely want Ukraine as a buffer
state, having limits to its links to the West. NATO is a no-go, as is full
membership within the EU. Putin will also probably want Eastern Ukraine to have
substantial autonomy. The key here is to see how much wiggle room there is to
negotiate on these issues. For instance, can US concessions cause Putin to bend
on some of his grand designs on Ukraine?
3. I'd be in favor of beefing up defenses in NATO countries
and working on the installation of missile defenses in Poland, among other
things. These countries are important to the US and should be protected in case
Putin, however unlikely, casts a wandering eye beyond Ukraine.
4. Build up the capacity of the Ukrainian state. The US
should focus on helping Ukraine to root out corruption, pay down its debt, find
ways to create more jobs, and stabilize its political system. This probably won’t
alienate Russia, and, if done well, it might even woo some of the Russian
nationalists to accept the authority and legitimacy of the government in Kiev.
What will world politics look like in the future? That’s
been a topic of much discussion among scholars, analysts and talking heads who currently
see a world in flux and wonder what this change and fluidity will lead to. Below
is my stab at it. Given that it’s impossible to give due justice to a topic so
big and important in a blog post, or even two or three of them, I’m focusing on
just a very small slice of what a more complete answer would entail. In particular,
this post centers on what world power and leadership will, in my view, look and
operate like in the future.
So let’s start with power. I define power in a Waltzian
sense, in that power is defined by state (mostly material) capabilities. With
this in mind, the short-term picture, buoyed by a very good 2014, looks decent
for the US. The US is the number one military power in the world and possesses
a relative abundance of soft power, especially relative to its main great power
rivals, Russia and China. And those things don’t look to change anytime soon.
But it’s the US economy that’s noteworthy nowadays. Yes,
inequality is still an issue, and political polarization threatens to hamper
America’s ability to keep its fiscal house in order; however, don’t let those
things distract from other, including larger, good factors. Oil prices are
down, US production of oil is up, unemployment is down and jobs are on the rise,
wages are up, more Americans are reducing their household debt, overall economic
growth, measured in GDP, is gaining strength, and consumer confidence is
rebounding.
But the picture isn’t entirely rosy for the US. As we know,
China, the number two world power, is catching up fast. China’s annual economic
growth, while slowing a bit, far outpaces that of America. It’s the number one
trade partner of a growing number countries, often supplanting the US. Although
not the best indicator of economic size, still, in terms of PPP China has
surpassed the US in 2014, and in terms of GDP, it is projected to trump the US
in the next 10-15 years. China also has second-largest defense budget in the
world, and has embarked on a large-scale program to modernize and expand its
military and power projection capabilities, especially its naval ones, and
refine its military doctrines.
And China isn’t the only one on the rise; several regional
and aspiring regional powers are also on the upswing. India, Brazil and
Indonesia, as examples, are doing well currently and are projected to continue
to rise going forward. In particular, these three countries are trying to tap
into and unlock their potential, namely, by cutting bureaucratic red tape, politically
and economically empowering their citizens, and allocating and using resources
more efficiently. This is why investors are looking to these three as
possessing economies to bet on in the future.
Adding another layer complexity to the above power dynamics
is the presence of a host of other formidable powers, such as Germany, France,
Britain, Japan, and Russia. At the moment, these five countries are second tier
great powers, and most of them will continue to possess considerable strength
in the future, though it’s possible that one or two of the fast risers
mentioned above will surpass them in the global rankings this century. After
all, all five second tier great powers have experienced sluggish economic
growth over the past decade, with few prospects of a big rebound, and Russia,
in particular, is a big mess, as the combination of sanctions and low oil
prices have hit its economy awfully hard.
All of this points to a future world characterized by
diffuse power. Yes, for the foreseeable future, the US will still be strong. It’s
economy, in all likelihood, will rank as the second strongest, while it will
maintain the biggest and baddest military, one that’s able to project power
faster, farther, and more effectively than any other country. Yet, at the same
time, there will be multiple spheres of power rising throughout the world. The
only question is whether there will be a few or several spheres in existence.
We’re likely moving toward an eventual multipolar world, the kind described by
Samuel Huntington years ago—a uni-multipolar system, in which the US is the
clear lead power over two or three other great powers of the first rank.
Next, let’s look at leadership. In the context of world
politics, leadership refers to the willingness and capacity of a country or a
group of countries to tackle various global problems and issues. The trajectory
of world politics points to a gloomy outlook regarding international leadership.
The US is still capable of but increasingly less willing to
assert itself in the world. Oh sure, there are Americans, on both the right and
left, who embrace the idea of the US as an activist nation—whether via hard,
soft or smart power means—but those views are primarily held by Washington
elites. Unsurprisingly, after more than a decade of bloody and costly warfare
and a traumatic economic collapse, American citizens have turned against US
activism, and there’s now a growing sense of bipartisan isolationism
percolating within the US. One could argue that America’s reticence to lead
internationally is something confined to the Obama era, a product of Obama’s
risk averse personality. Perhaps, though I suspect it’s something we’ll much
more of in US foreign policy in the future, as a cost and casualty conscious
citizenry force American presidents to be picky in when and where the US
executes in power.
Meantime, while China is on the rise, it hasn’t demonstrated
much in the way of global leadership. Sure, just in the past year, China
watchers will note, it has gotten involved in the fight against Ebola, the mission
to locate the missing Malaysian airliner, and even UN peacekeeping. That said, there
are host of extremely important issues and problems in which China has either
refused to involve itself or actually made worse, like international terrorism,
the civil war in Syria, Putin’s escapades in Ukraine, tensions in the South and
East China Seas, North Korea’s belligerence, and so on.
At bottom, China is a self-interested and inward-looking
power; it’s not much interested in being a being a global problem solver if
there’s no direct impact on Chinese national interests. Robert Zoellick’s 2005 critique
of China—that, if Beijing wants great power status and respect, it must be a
responsible stakeholder in global issues and problems—still applies today and
will likely persist for decades, if for no other reason that it will take
decades for China to internally micromanage, on a host of fronts, its global
rise.
What about the rest of the world? Well, as a whole, Europe is
increasingly stagnant politically and economically, is beset by homegrown
terrorism, and lacks unity on foreign policy issues. The prognosis for Europe’s
institutions isn’t much better. NATO will still be relevant because it’s backed
by US power, though likely less meaningful as time goes on if Washington does
indeed turn inward. The EU is a home to a large economic base, and so that
makes the EU an important economic player. The downsides, of course, are that
the EU is steadily losing ground—to countries like China and India—and that the
EU is riven by internal divisions, many of which are the result of
overexpansion. And although Europe’s two major powers, France and Germany, try
to be helpful on global issues, especially climate change, they have too much
on their plate—the EU, terrorism, Putin, internal political pressures—to be
counted on consistently. So overall, don’t expect much global leadership from
Europe.
The same bad news goes for the Middle East and Africa: both
regions are home to unstable states, poor economies, widespread extremism and violence;
plus, the Middle East remains bedeviled by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
which shows little sign of abating anytime soon. The big picture, in short, is of two regions in which most countries are bogged down with political, economic, and security troubles either in their own backyard or their own neighborhood. These aren't favorable conditions for any country in either region to exercise much leadership on a global level.
On top of all this, a number of regional players are more
confident than ever, more willing to act on their interests and more willing to
buck what the superpowers say. This is certainly applicable to countries like India
and Indonesia—two countries that want good ties with China and the US, but are
unwilling to cave into their demands, because of cultural and political
pressures. Additionally, tiny Qatar, Russia, Turkey, among others, have their
own regional dreams and ambitions and are determined to go their own way, even
if it means they butt heads with the US and cause regional and international
trouble.
In this international environment, it’s hard to get big
things done, to solve global problems. Essentially, this is the G-Zero dilemma
that Ian Bremmer and others have pointed out and expressed concern about. But
whereas Bremmer sees a G-Zero as a temporary phase, lasting 5-10 years, I see
it as something more permanent, likely enduring until some shock occurs in the
international system, which could take decades to manifest itself.
