Evan Vucci/AP.
Back in early 2016, Tufts University political science professor and
Washington Post columnist Daniel
Drezner posed two interesting questions: Is Donald trump a realist?
And if so, why don’t more contemporary realists embrace him as one of their
own?
At the time, Drezner found that realists, especially those present
in the academy, weren’t coming to trump’s defense. Why was that? Drezner
believed that “if they’re being intellectually honest,” they would openly claim
Trump as one of their own, as this could’ve been realism’s “moment in the sun.”
Given that realists often complain that their views aren’t widely shared within
the US foreign policy establishment, which advocates more interventionist,
activist policy positions, why not back the candidate that seemed to give the
US a chance at correcting America’s litany of foreign policy mistakes?
Makes sense, I suppose. Based on his message or platform, as
Drezner saw it then, Trump appeared, at least in speech, to be the epitome of
what realists would want in a US president. After all, Trump voiced support for
upgrading US military power, distancing the US from various international institutions
and agreements, focusing on getting Americans back to work and enhancing economic
productivity, confronting economic and security free riders in Europe and Asia,
taking on a rising China, and getting the US out of Syria. All together, these
policy positions signified a shift in US foreign policy to a new era of more restrained
US foreign policy interests, great power competition, and boosting American
power—all of which are consistent with the application of realist logic and
principles to US foreign policy.
Now that we’re almost two full years into Trump’s
presidency, it’s a good time to reflect on this debate. In 2015/16, Donald
Trump, candidate for the US presidency, seemed like a realist-oriented aspiring
politician. Is that still true today? Is Trump, as US commander in chief and
president, a foreign policy realist? Interestingly, Trump himself has claimed
the realist mantle, arguing that he’s a principled realist. Is he right? At this
point, we have more than enough data to make a reasonable critical assessment. To
do so, let’s evaluate trump and his presidency on two dimensions: foreign policy
and leadership.
On foreign policy, Trump does share some theoretical and logical
similarities with realism. He has carried his skepticism of institutions and
multilateral pacts with him into his presidency. In short, if the US isn’t able
to wield such institutions to its advantage, so goes the logic, then it’s not
worth it to work with or through them. Why? Because most institutions, by
design, attempt to constrain the ability of the great powers to act and wield
power globally. Given this logic, and given his statements on the campaign
trail, it should not be a surprise that, under Trump, the US has pulled out of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris Climate
Agreement, the INF Treaty, and various UN bodies. Trump has also repeatedly
criticized NAFTA, NATO, the WTO, and the EU.
But that’s not all. He has challenged China on trade. He has requested, and seems to have gotten, NATO members to begin devoting more spending to their defense budgets, thereby reducing a tad Washington’s concerns about Europe’s free riding. He has renegotiated NAFTA with Canada and Mexico, making slight alterations to the original agreement, to America’s favor. Trump has also scrapped human rights and democracy promotion abroad, the very things which, according to realists, have driven the US into a host of costly wars and quagmires in the post-cold war period. All of these things are connected to seminal realist concepts and arguments, like relative gains, inter-state competition, power, the perils of alliance dynamics, and so on.
But that’s not all. He has challenged China on trade. He has requested, and seems to have gotten, NATO members to begin devoting more spending to their defense budgets, thereby reducing a tad Washington’s concerns about Europe’s free riding. He has renegotiated NAFTA with Canada and Mexico, making slight alterations to the original agreement, to America’s favor. Trump has also scrapped human rights and democracy promotion abroad, the very things which, according to realists, have driven the US into a host of costly wars and quagmires in the post-cold war period. All of these things are connected to seminal realist concepts and arguments, like relative gains, inter-state competition, power, the perils of alliance dynamics, and so on.
Yet, there’s more to the story of Trump’s presidency. Put
simply, despite all of the above, Trump has pursued several policies that are
inconsistent with realism. For instance, Trump placed roughly 2000 troops
inside Syria to fight ISIS, and then expanded the mission, committing to keep
US forces there indefinitely to eliminate ISIS safe havens and guard against
Iran (and its proxy Hezbollah) gaining a permanent foothold in Syria. So while
Trump campaigned on getting out of the Middle East’s protracted conflicts and
reducing America’s footprint there, he’s actually done the opposite, upping US
commitments to the Middle East.
Furthermore, Trump’s foreign policy lacks strategic focus,
or better known among academics and intellectuals as a grand strategy. Essentially,
realists have written the literature on grand strategy. In their view, it’s
crucial that state leaders have an organizing principles, goals, and interests
to motivate and properly direct the course of their foreign policies, so as to
avoid letting their policies turn adrift, aimless, and costly. Trump, by
contrast, doesn’t operate in a big-picture, comprehensive way. His foreign
policy is purely transactional and driven mostly by Trump’s rapport with fellow
state leaders. If foreign leaders are willing to flatter Trump, stay at his
hotels, say nice things about him, and make minor concessions to US foreign
policy, then America’s POTUS is willing stand with them. Of course, there are
perils to this approach.
Look at US policy toward the Middle East. Team Trump has decisively
cast his lot with Mohammad bin Salman (MBS). MBS buys America’s weapons, gets
along well with Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner, fashioned himself as a
reformer, and is happily pushing back against Iran, and so the White House has invested
considerably in MBS, betting that he, and he alone, holds the keys to solving
the Middle East’s array of problems. While not optimal, it’s fine, but only as
long as MBS remains in power and free from trouble and misdeeds. We now know
that’s not the case, given his role in the Khashoggi affair. MBS is now on
shaky ground, suffering significant global blowback, including a severely
tarnished image, and we have to wonder if his position domestically is in
jeopardy. If he falls anytime soon, the entirety of America’s Middle East
foreign policy goes down the drain, with possibly dramatic and costly consequences.
Another policy issue that realists, especially more
internationalist realists, criticize is Trump’s apparent willingness to vacate
US global leadership. Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass
terms this “American abdication.” Trump’s propensity to withdraw from existing
international agreements and institutions, in combination with his team’s widespread
divestment from global diplomacy on a host of issues, has fostered the rise of power
vacuums in Europe and Asia. Under Trump, America is increasingly alone, and so
are its allies, who have to live without the customary assurances that
Washington has their backs. This has, in turn, created an increasingly destabilized
world, with Russia and China pressing outward, fomenting disturbances in their
neighborhood and beyond. This world is exactly the kind of world that realists—who
prize stability and balances of power—abhor.
Let’s turn to the second angle I’d like to explore: Trump’s
leadership. This is something that has gone largely ignored in the Trump-realism
debate, which has tended to emphasize discrete foreign policies pursued and
adopted by the Team Trump. In a sense, that’s not surprising. Academic and
intellectual realism is usually framed as a systemic, or 3rd image,
theoretical framework that “black boxes” things inside the state, like domestic
politics and leadership issues. For many realists, what’s most important are
anarchy, systemic power dynamics, and inter-state interactions. One problem,
however, is that the historical literature, and even some of the old school
theoretical tracts, that informs realism often takes leadership as quite
consequential. And it’s a particular type of leadership that’s most prized by
many realists, especially those who research foreign policy, decision-making,
and narrative case studies: leaders who are rational, wise, strategic, and
tough.
Think about realism’s embrace of Machiavelli, who is widely
lauded as a master chronicler of pragmatism and power politics. In The Prince, Machiavelli argues that
effective leaders are those who are ruthless about exercising power, value the
health and security of the state over their own pride and glory and morals,
manage well the staffers around him/her, and appreciate how humans and events
really are rather than how they hope them to be.
Classic examples of this kind of leadership, according to
realists, include Bismarck, Churchill, Reagan, and (George H. W.) Bush 41, among many others.
Today, we can consider Vladimir Putin a contemporary example. He’s ruthlessly wielded
power internally in Russia, stabilized the state, elevated Russia’s status
globally, and has disrupted and undermined the interests of more powerful competitors.
In short, Putin has played a bad hand—think about Russian chaos, instability,
and weakness in the 1990s—into something much greater, allowing Russia to punch
well above its weight internationally. If we’re being honest, Trump comes up
well short in comparison to these leaders.
Trump’s time in office is notorious for continual chaos—in
his administration, in US politics, and in US society more generally. Trump’s
perpetual lies—numbering in the thousands by now—have eroded his credibility
among large sectors of American voters. His approval rating has hovered around
35-40%—an amazingly low level of support given the strong US economy—and he’s just
lost the House of Representatives to the Democrats. Trump’s erratic
personality—manifested most clearly in his campaign rallies and Twitter
account—results in a constant cycle of outrageous statements and then fierce
blowback by the media. Polling data indicate that Trump’s numbers move in a
more favorable direction during times when he’s relatively quiet and
restrained; his numbers tank during his more irritable, erratic periods. This
trend should be easy to learn, yet Trump’s wild personality and propensity for
self-inflicted errors resurfaces time and again. Trump’s much-hyped management
skills have translated into near-constant turnover in the White House, damaging
leaks by his administration, and in-fighting and bickering among those staffers
who have stuck it out. His close staff is filled with incompetents,
kleptocrats, and suspected criminals. Plus, Trump is still under investigation
for a host of possible criminal activities by Special Counsel Robert Mueller
and the Southern District of New York.
So where does that leave us? How does trump fare as a
realist? It’s a mixed bag, and that’s being charitable. As prominent realist
scholar Stephen Walt recently stated, Donald Trump is the kind of guy to give
realism a bad name. That’s, in short, how most realists view him. The two
notable exceptions are Ohio State professor Randall
Schweller and Bard College professor Walter
Russell Mead, both of whom have lauded Trump for his realist credentials. But overall, realists today argue that Trump has instincts
that seem to be consistent with realism, but he lacks a strategic vision,
crudely executes foreign policy, and demonstrates little of the leadership
qualities that realists traditionally value. I agree. At best, we have left a
president whose views and policies do overlap a bit with realism, but who isn’t
nearly the realist that he was labeled as years ago.