Center for World Conflict and Peace

Center for World Conflict and Peace

Tuesday, June 12, 2018

The Trump-Kim Summit

Image result for trump kim signed agreement
AP Photo/Evan Vucci


Here are a few quick thoughts on the Kim Jong Un-Donald Trump summit. I'll start on a positive note. It's good that Trump and Kim met and talked, and that the meeting seems to have gone well. They've established, it appears, good rapport. Indeed, Kim was rather smiley throughout the public portion of their gathering. This could pave the way for a better relationship between the US and North Korea now--especially given Trump's insistence on personalizing US foreign policy--and going forward, beyond Trump's tenure as president. And the happy vibes from the meeting might portend some actual progress down the line on eliminating/dismantling North Korea's nukes. 

Okay, now for the problems. Let's begin with the agreement signed by Trump and Kim. I encourage you to read it, if you haven't. As North Korean expert Victor Cha asked today on MSNBC, "Did we really need a summit for the agreement?" The short answer is no. At bottom, Trump mostly received promises from Kim that the US has gotten previously from North Korea over the last two decades--and of course, the Kims subsequently broke those pledges. The main end goal of the document, "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula," is not the same as the Trump administration's stated objective of CVID (complete verifiable, irreversible denuclearization). 

Just as troublesome, the signed document is awfully vague and is short on specifics. It doesn't mention anything about timetables for implementing the deal; doesn't address how North Korea and the US are going to define "denuclearization" in practice; nothing about monitoring and verifiying that Kim's keeping his end of the deal. Trump is staking his personal and political reputation as a deal maker, as well as the security of the US and East Asia, mind you, on his new-found trust for Kim. If history is any guide, that seems like a terrible way to make discrete decisions, let alone policy. 

Moreover, the US has given up quite a bit already. Trump now has met Kim, bestowing prestige and legitimacy upon Kim, his government, and his nuclear program. Trump lavished Kim with much praise, calling him "talented," "smart," "a tough negotiator," among other things. Trump has also ended America's "war games" with South Korea. And now that Trump has warmed up to Kim, countries in the region, including China, are already reducing the pressure on Kim, interpreting the flurry of US-Korean diplomacy as evidence that Kim's normalizing his behavior. 

Frankly, I do wish both Trump and Kim great success in their diplomatic efforts. And I'm fine with Trump making concessions, even considerable concessions, if, as a result, the US is safer, the threat of war in Asia is reduced, and North Korea moves in a more modern, freer direction. But this agreement does none of those things. This is hardly the "art of the deal." If anything, Kim has suckered Trump. 

Look what he's accomplished on Trump's watch. Kim has built up his nuclear program, met personally with the president of the US (along with the leaders of South Korea and China), garnered glowing praise from Trump, and basked in the global media spotlight surrounding the summit--all of which are valuable on their own terms, but will likely have beneficial domestic political implications for Kim as well. After all, at a minimum, those things can be used by Pyongyang for propaganda purposes. And in return, what did Kim give up? Not much beyond a freeze on nuclear and missile tests. Actually, it's pretty remarkable that such a young and inexperienced leader has been able to the play the US to the extent he has.